under consideration, if they were like the last, whereupon he was assured by the defendant that they were not like the last.

Held, that the representations of the defendant amounted to a warranty of the soundness of the oysters.

LIDDLE v. Mulligan.

Slander Privileged communications.

The defendant was secretary of the Fulton Fire Insurance Com. pany. The plaintiff had an insurance in that company. He had presented preliminary proofs, and claimed from the company full payment on the policy. An interview took place at the office of the said company, between the plaintiff, the defendant, and one Bowers, the Secretary of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, against which the plaintiff held a claim on a policy issued on the same property which had been insured by the Fulton Company. At this interview the defendant said to the plaintiff that facts had come to their knowledge, which, if true, would go to show that he knew more about the origin of the fire than he admitted in the affidavit. The plaintiff rested his case on proof of the alleged slander, without offering further evidence in proof of malice.

Held, that what was said by the defendant was a privileged communication, and not slanderous.

WILKINNING BY HIS GUARDIAN v. SCHMale.

Judgment - Guardian.

The defendant pleaded a previous adjudication as a bar to the present suit, and proved a former judgment in his favor in a suit for the same cause of action.

The plaintiff insisted that the former proceedings and judgment were void, for the reason that the appearance of the plaintiff was by a next friend, and not by a guardian as required by the statute.

Held, that the error in question, if it was one, could not affect the validity of the judgment, or render it void. It might be a ground for reversing the judgment for error in fact, and as the judgment was against the plaintiff, his remedy if he appeared erroneously by a next friend instead of a guardian, was by taking an appeal and getting the judgment reversed. As long as the judgment stood unreversed it was a bar to any other action for the same cause. Maynard v. Downer, 13 Wendell, 575; Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill, 130.

Notes of Cases in Massachusetts.

Supreme Judicial Court.- Counties of Plymouth, Bristol, Barnstable, and Dukes County. October Term, 1856. Present: SHAW, C. J., DEWEY, METCALF, BIGELOW, and THOMAS, JJ. COMMONWEALTH V. BRADY.

Police Court - Evidence.

By the Rev. St. c. 87, § 29, the towns of Salem, Lowell, Newburyport, and New Bedford, are each constituted a Judicial District, under the jurisdiction of a Police Court. Held, that the provision of § 33 of that chapter, that "all warrants issued by the said courts, or by any Justice of the Peace, in said Judicial District, in any criminal suit or prosecution, shall be returnable before the Police Court of the district," does not extend to warrants issued by Justices of the Peace in a town in which a Police Court is subsequently established by a statute which expressly defines its jurisdiction.

On the trial of an indictment for perjury, alleged to have been committed at the hearing of a complaint for setting a ship on fire, the District Attorney introduced evidence that a reward was offered for the detection of the incendiary, and contended that this offer of reward was the motive which induced the commission of the alleged perjury. Held, that evidence was then admissible for the defendant to show that he came on from New York to give his evidence at that trial reluctantly, and at the earnest solicitation of the insurers of the vessel.

W. H. L. Smith, for defendant.

J. H. Clifford, (Attorney General,) for Commonwealth.

COMMONWEALTH v. WILLIAMS.

Husband and wife - Evidence.

On the trial of an indictment averring the stealing of the property of a husband from the person of his wife, the property is presumed to be the property of the husband, in the absence of proof that it was the property of the wife, notwithstanding the St. of 1855, c. 304, §§ 1, 2, providing that the property of any woman thereafter married should remain her separate property, and that the earnings of any married woman from her trade or business should be her own.

B. Sanford, for defendant.

J. H. Clifford, (Attorney General,) for Commonwealth.

Nol. pros.

COMMONWEALTH v. KIMBALL.

Indictment on St. 1855 for keeping house of ill-fame, &c.

A nol. pros. may be entered after the empanelling of the jury, even against the objection of the defendant, if he do not demand a verdict.

By St. 1855, c. 405, all buildings used as houses of ill-fame, resorted to for prostitution, lewdness or illegal gaming, or used for the illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating liquors, are declared to be common nuisances. Held, that an indictment on this statute, which averred that the defendant at a time named "did keep and maintain a certain building, to wit: a dwelling-house, used as a house of ill-fame, resorted to for prostitution, lewdness, and for illegal gaming, and used for the illegal sale and keeping of intoxicating liquors, said building so used as aforesaid being then and there a common nuisance to the great injury and common nuisance of all the peaceable citizens of said Commonwealth there residing," &c., was not bad for duplicity; and was sufficient, without alleging that the building was used by the defendant for the purposes enumerated; and did not require evidence of its being used for more than one of such purposes; or of its being an annoyance to all the community.

On the trial of an indictment on St. 1855, c. 405, the character of the women resorting to the house, and the character of the conversation of the women in the house, are admissible in evidence to show the character of the house.

E. L. Barney, for defendant.

J. H. Clifford, (Attorney General,) for Commonwealth.

JOHNSON V. THAXTER.

Insolvent debtors.

An assignee of an insolvent debtor cannot, in the absence of fraud, impeach collaterally a judgment against the debtor; but may sue out a writ of error to reverse the judgment.

J. A. Andrew, for demandant.

E. Wilkinson and N. C. Berry, for tenant.

HEWS v. HEWS.

Divorce.

The commitment of a husband to the House of Correction, on several successive sentences, at short intervals, will not prevent a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, if the desertion commenced before the first commitment, and was not interrupted during the intervals.

NYE U. INHABITANTS OF MARION.

School district.

A vote of a town to set off N. (without adding "and his estate,") from School District No. 5 to School District No. 4, is invalid; and no action will lie by one of his children on St. 1845, c. 214, for his exclusion by the School Committee from the school in District No. 4.

S. Miller, Jr., for plaintiff.
B. Sanford, for defendants.

ROSCOE v. HALE.

Statute of limitations.

The insertion of a debt in the schedule filed and sworn to by the debtor, under proceedings in insolvency, is not such an acknowledgment as will take the debt out of the statute of limitations. Nor is the payment by the assignee, of a dividend on said debt, such a partial payment as will defeat the statute.

J. Daggett, for defendant.
No appearance for plaintiff.

BARROWS v. Rose.

Trustee process.

It is no ground of abatement on motion of the defendant, of a trustee process brought in the county in which the defendant resides, and duly served on him, that the trustee resides out of the Commonwealth.

E. H. Bennett, for plaintiff.
G. W. Dean, for defendant.

HOLMES v. GREEN.

Domicil.

A citizen of Massachusetts, removing with his family in Rhode Island, and retaining no dwelling-place in Massachusetts, though intending at some future indefinite period of time to return, is not entitled to vote in Massachusetts.

C. J. Reed, for plaintiff.

J. S. Brayton, for defendant.

MORRISON v. New BedfoRD INSTITUTE FOR SAVINGS.

Trustee process.

A judgment rendered in a trustee process, charging one summoned as trustee, will protect him against a suit by the principal defendant to recover money paid by the trustee on the execution

issued on such judgment, although such principal defendant was not served with notice, and did not appear in the trustee process. T. D. Robinson, for plaintiff. T. M. Stetson, for defendant.

DUNNING MANUFACTURING Co. v. INHABITANTS OF PAWTUCKET. Tar.

A corporation which is taxed, in the same bill, lawfully for its machinery, and unlawfully for its personal property, and pays both may maintain an action to recover back the amount of tax on the latter, the machinery being made by Rev. Sts. c. 7, § 10, clause 2, a distinct subject of taxation.

C. B. Farnsworth, for plaintiff.

C. J. Reed, for defendant.

CODDING v. INHABITANTS OF MANSFIELD.
Offer of reward.

On an offer of reward made by selectmen under St. 1840, c. 75, "to any person who will give information to the subscribers that will lead to the detection and conviction of the person who set fire to" a certain dwelling-house, a declaration which alleges that the plaintiff arrested such a person, and gave information to said selectmen, whereupon such proceedings were had that the prisoner was convicted, is insufficient.

C. J. Reed, for plaintiff.

E. H. Bennett, for defendants.

COMMONWEALTH v. WELSH.

SAME V. MITCHELL.

Prize-fighting.

per

The St. of 1849, c. 49, entitled "an act to prevent prize-fighting," provides in § 1 for the punishment of "every person who shall, by previous appointment or arrangement, meet another son and engage in a fight;" and in § 2, of "every person who shall be present at such fight, as an aid, second or surgeon, or who shall advise, encourage, or promote such fight."

An indictment on § 1 of this statute is sufficient, which alleges that the defendant, at a place and time named, by and in pursuance of a previous appointment and arrangement made to meet and engage in a fight with another person, to wit, with one J. S., did meet and engage in a fight with the said J. S."

An indictment on § 2, is sufficient, which alleges that the defendant, at a time and place named, "was present as aid and second, and did advise, encourage, and promote a fight, in which one A. B. did then and there, by previous appointment and arrangement so to meet and engage, meet and engage with one J. S."