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great qualifications as a jurist. His reputation as an advocate, must chiefly live in the traditions of the bar of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Even in this department, however, there remains the speech on Knapp's trial, which is, we suppose, a good specimen of his best manner. From his letters, we get more fully the same general facts of his struggles with poverty, of his ardent pursuit of learning under all difficulties, and of his ultimate and still early triumph, with which our readers are already familiar. We find also frequent reference to his earnest desire to make the profession, in his own person, a liberal and enlightened one, with a constant regard to high principles, and his disgust at anything like pettifogging.

Of his course as a student, take this sample from the autobiography:

"I was conscious of making a good stride onward, when I had obtained admission into Mr. Gore's office. It was a situation which offered to me the means of studying books, and men, and things. It was on the 20th of July, 1804, that I first made myself known to Mr. Gore; and although I remained in his office only till March following, and that with considerable intervening absences, I made, as I think, some respectable progress. In August the Supreme Court sat. I attended it constantly, and reported every one of its decisions. I did the same in the Circuit Court of the United States. I kept a little journal at that time which still survives. It contains little beside a list of books read.

"In addition to books on the common and municipal law, I find I read Vattel, for the third time in my life, as is stated in the journal; Ward's Law of Nations, Lord Bacon's Elements, Puffendorf's Latin History of England, Gifford's Juvenal, Boswell's Tour to the Hebrides, Moore's Travels, and many other miscellaneous things. But my main study was the common law, and especially the parts of it which relates to special pleading. Whatever was in Viner, Bacon, and other books then usually studied on that part of the science, I paid my respects to. Among other things, I went through Saunders's Reports, the old folio edition, and abstracted and put into English, out of Latin and Norman French, the pleadings in all his reports. It was an edifying work. From that day to this, the forms and language of special pleas have been quite familiar to me. I believe I have my little abstract yet.

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"I remember one day, as I was alone in the office, a man came in and asked for Mr. Gore. Mr. Gore was out, and he sat down to wait for him. He was dressed in plain gray clothes. I went on with my book, till he asked me what I was reading, and coming along up to the table, I held out my book, and he took it and looked at it. Roccus,' said he, de navibus et naulo; well, I read that book too when I was a boy; and proceeded to talk not only about ships and freights,' but insurance, prize, and other matters of maritime law, in a manner to put me up to all I knew,' and a good deal more. The gray-coated stranger turned out to be Mr. Rufus King."

The well known story of the clerkship which was offered to and refused by Mr. Webster, at this period, is very

pleasantly told by himself in this sketch, and also in a letter, contemporaneous with the event, and confirming the later account. It seems that it was not the dawning consciousness of future greatness, on Mr. Webster's own mind, as the ordinary version has it, but the earnest persuasion of Mr. Gore that induced him to decline the honor and emolument of the clerkship.

The following sketches of Chief Justice Parsons, and Mr. Dexter, as they appeared at that time, have never been published till now; they are taken from Mr. Webster's journal referred to above, and which contains little else of interest:

"SOME CHARACTERS AT THE BOSTON BAR, 1804.

Theophilus Parsons, Esq., is now about fifty-five years old, of rather large stature, and inclining a little to corpulency. His hair is brown, and his complexion not light. His face is not marked by any striking feature, if we except his eyes. His forehead is low, and his eyebrows prominent. He wears a blue coat and breeches, worsted hose, a brown wig, with a cocked hat. He has a penetrating eye of an indescribable color. When couched under a jetting eyebrow, it directs its beams into the face of a witness, he feels as if it looked into the inmost recesses of his soul. When Parsons intends to make a learned observation, his eyebrow sinks; when a smart one, for he is, and wishes to be thought, a wit, it rises. The characteristic endowments of his mind are strength and shrewdness. Strength, which enables him to support his cause; shrewdness, by which he is always ready to rebut the sallies of his adversary. His manner is steady, forcible, and perfectly perspicuous. He does not address the jury as a mechanical body, to be set in motion by mechanical means. He appeals to them as men, and as having minds capable of receiving the ideas in his own; of course, he never harangues. He is never stinted to say just so much on a point, and no more. He knows by the juror's countenance when he is convinced; and therefore never disgusts him by arguing that of which he is already sensible, and which he knows it impossible more fully to impress. A mind thus strong, direct, prompt, and vigorous is cultivated by habits of the most intense application. A great scholar in everything, in his profession he is peculiarly great. He is not content with shining on occasions, he will shine everywhere. As no cause is too great, none is too small for him. He knows the great benefit of understanding small circumstances. It is not enough for him that he has learned the leading points in a cause; he will know everything. His argument is, therefore, always consistent with itself, and its course so luminous that you are ready to wonder why any one should hesitate to follow him. Facts which are uncertain, he with so much art connects with others well proved, that you cannot get rid of the former, without disregarding the latter. He has no fondness for public life, and is satisfied with standing where he is, at the head of his profession.

Samuel Dexter, Esq., is about forty years old; a man of large and noble appearance. His complexion is dark, and his eyes dark, large, and prominent. In point of character, Dexter undoubtedly stands next to Parsons, at the Boston bar; and in the neighboring counties and States, I suppose he stands above him. He has a strong, generalizing, and capacious mind. He sees his subject in one view, and in that view single and alone

he presents it to the contemplation of his hearer. Unable to follow Parsons in minute technical distinctions, Parsons is unable to follow him in the occasional vaultings and boundings of his mind. Unlike Parsons too, he cannot be great on little occasions. Unlike him, Parsons cannot reject every little consideration on great occasions. Parsons begins with common maxims, and his course to the particular subject, and the particular conclusion brightens and shines more and more clearly to its end. Dexter begins with the particular position which he intends to support. Darkness surrounds him. No one knows the path by which he arrived at his conclusion. Around him, however, is a circle of light when he opens his mouth. Like a conflagration seen at a distance, the evening mists may intervene between it and the eye of the observer, though the blaze ascend to the sky and cannot but be seen. Mr. Dexter is not a great student. Early attention has stored his mind with an immense fund of general principles, and he trusts his own powers in the application. He is generally opposed in causes to Parsons, and their contest is that of exalted minds. No fretting, no bickering, no personal asperity ever exists between them. Dexter is not rich. He lives upon his profession, which, as I was told by a pupil of his, affords him an income of near five thousand dollars. He once received fourteen hundred dollars for arguing a cause for the Spanish consul."

As time goes on, the letters allude less and less to law, and more and more to politics, and after the Dartmouth College cause, which evidently engaged his interest to a high degree, and is finally disposed of about 1820, there is not much of professional interest to be found. This is but natural, for communications on legal subjects, between lawyers, are more frequently by word of mouth, than by correspondence. But into the region of politics, of course we cannot follow the clue.

District Court of the United States.- District of Massachusetts. October, 1856.

THE R. B. FORBES.

Where a steam tow-boat was attached to a ship, whose sails were furled, the whole motive power being furnished by the tow-boat, it was held, that the whole moving body was to be considered as a steamer. And in such a case, a collision having occurred with a schooner, which showed a light and kept her course, as she had a right to do, and it appearing that the lights on the ship and steamer were unskilfully placed, held, that the steamer was liable for the damage.

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It was not thought necessary to consider whether the ship would also be liable.

THE facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the

court.

SPRAGUE, J.-This is a libel in rem against the steamer

R. B. Forbes, for damages caused by collision between the schooner Eliza, owned by the libellants, and the Romance of the Seas, a ship of about 1600 tons, towed by the steamer and lashed to the steamer's side. The steamer is a tow-boat of about 350 horse power. The schooner was lumber-laden, and was beating up Boston harbor on the evening of June 4, and the collision took place about ten o'clock, somewhere between Long Island Light and the "Castle."

I. The first question that arises is: Whether the steamer is, in any event, liable?

It is contended, in the defence, that the steamer was the mere motive power; that she was the servant of the ship; that the whole control of both ship and steamer was in the owner of the ship; and therefore, that the ship, or her owners, are alone liable.

It is to be observed, in the first place, that the ship had no motive power of her own. Her sails were furled, and whatever motion she had was imparted to her by the steamer. The only separate motion the ship could have would be such lateral motion as might result from a change of her rudder. The ship and the steamer were so lashed together as to constitute one combined moving mass, whose momentum was the result of the steamer's motive power acting upon the aggregate bulk and weight of both ship and steamer. And such being the fact, I must conclude that the steamer had the control of the ship; and if there was negligence in the present collision, the steamer must be held liable.

The fact that the steamer was hired for the service of towage, can make no difference. This is a proceeding in rem, and not in personam. Generally speaking, in a proceeding in rem, no regard is had to the owners, as such. One chief benefit of such a proceeding is, that the law puts its hand on the offending thing, and without any regard to the matter of ownership, gives a remedy in favor of the injured party, against the vessel itself which has caused the damage.

It is not necessary, in this case, to decide whether the ship is also liable. That is another matter, and is not now before me for consideration.

It has been contended that the steamer was under the control of the officers, or the pilot, of the ship. But if such were the fact, it would not exonerate the steamer, nor affect her liability as to third persons. But the fact of

such control is not proved. The testimony of both the captain and mate of the steamer show that the orders, at and about the time of the collision, were given, chiefly, by the officers of the steamer. It did not appear that the master of the ship took any part in the direction at that

time.

II. It is contended on the evidence, (1), That the fault was on the part of the schooner; or, (2), That the accident was inevitable.

As to the latter it must be a very extraordinary state of circumstances that could make the accident inevitable. The more intelligent witnesses, on both sides, testify that the night was slightly overcast, with stars appearing here and there, and that the schooner could be seen at a considerable distance, far enough to have been avoided with due precaution. Several of the witnesses for the defence, it is true, say that the night was very dark. But if it was so dark that the schooner could not be seen, then it was not a night for such a large ship and so powerful a steamer to have left the wharf at all to go down the harbor, where vessels are very numerous, both outward and inward bound. In either view it is clearly not a case of inevitable accident.

Where, then, was the fault? So far as a look-out is concerned, I am satisfied that the ship and steamer had a good look-out both in numbers and character. And it is also testified that the schooner had a good look-out. The witnesses for the libellants also say that, when the ship and steamer were half a mile off, a light was taken from the schooner's binnacle and shown, in full view, until the collision was inevitable.

Now there is no imperative rule that a sailing vessel must show a light. Yet if a schooner in the night time, going where steamers may be expected to be met, fails to show a light, she ought not to recover for damages done by collision with a steamer, if the steamer keeps a good look-out and uses reasonable exertions to prevent a collision. It becomes therefore important to inquire whether a light was shown by the schooner. There were four persons on the deck of the schooner, and they all say that a light was shown in a conspicuous place above the deck load, and state all the attending circumstances. One or two persons also on board the ship say they saw a light just before the collision. But a large number of those on the look-out on board the ship and steamer say they did

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