Where a tenant covenanted to leave the premises in repair, "together with all wainscots, windows, &c., and other things which at the time of the demise or at any time thereafter should be thereunto affixed or belonging," and upon entering removed the ordinary shop window, and substituted a plate glass front, which was kept in its place by means of wedges, but without screws, nails, or glue, and could be removed entire :

Held, that this was a window within the meaning of the covenant, and that the tenant was not entitled to remove it at the end of the term, although he restored the original shop sash window.

Rolls' Court. February 20, 21, and March 17, 1856.

Settlement '—“ Unmarried” — Illegitimate children.

By an ante-nuptial settlement a fund was limited to the wife for life, and then to the husband for life, and after the death of the survivor, upon trust for the children of the marriage, to be vested at twenty-one or marriage; but if the issue should die without having acquired vested interests, and in case the wife should die in the lifetime of her husband, then upon trust for the next of kin of the wife," as if she had died unmarried and intestate."

The wife died in the lifetime of her husband, leaving one child, who died without having acquired a vested interest:

Held, that "unmarried" meant not being under coverture at the time of her death, (that is, to exclude marital rights only,) and that the representatives of the child took the fund.

A testator who had gone through the form of marriage with his deceased wife's sister, (such marriage being illegal in England,) and lived with her as his wife till his death, by his will devised to "my wife" for life, and after her decease "for all and every my children hereafter to be born." He had no children at the date of the will, but two days after a child was born to him by his reputed wife :

Held, that the reputed wife was sufficiently designated, and would take a life interest; but that the child could not take, because not identified as the individual intended, and a gift to illegiti mate children to be born is invalid.

Queen's Bench. April 30, 1856.

SIEVEKING v. SMITH.

Ships and shipping-Duty of master - Freight.

Where a ship at a foreign port is by charter-party to land there, and proceed with the cargo to such one of a certain class of ports as shall be ordered by the shipper, the master is not bound to wait more than a reasonable time for orders, and if none arrive within that time, he is not bound to communicate with the shipper before sailing, but may proceed to such port, within the enumerated class, as he may reasonably consider the best for the ship.

Policy on goods for a voyage "at and from Liverpool to Cardiff, whilst there, and thence to all or any part or parts, place or places, islands and settlements on the west coast of America, in the Pacific, and seas adjacent, particularly Acupulco and Panama, on the outward voyage, and the Chincha Islands, on the homeward, backward and forward, or forward and backward, in any order or succession, during the vessel's stay, trading, discharging and loading there, and thence back to a port or ports of discharge in the United Kingdom." The vessel sailed on her voyage and arrived at Callao, proceeded to the Chincha Islands, and took a full cargo of guano, with which she returned to Callao. Thence she cleared out for the homeward voyage; but after she had been at sea a day or two she sprung a leak, and was compelled to return to Callao. It then became necessary to unload the cargo, which was of very little value there, and was sold for less than it cost to take it out of the vessel.

The cargo having been sold, and the vessel repaired, the master returned to the Chincha Islands and took another cargo of guano, with which he proceeded homeward. A loss subsequently happened:

Held, a clear case of deviation, because the vessel had once begun her homeward voyage.

May 1, 1856. HALLHEAD v. YOUNG.

Marine insurance - Profit on goods — When policy attaches.

A policy of insurance on profit on cargo, at and from New York to Quebec, during her stay there, and thence to some port in the United Kingdom, "beginning the adventure upon the goods from

the loading thereof," is, in effect, a policy upon goods, and does not attach until they are loaded on board.

Nor can the construction of the policy be varied by showing that the underwriters knew, before effecting the policy, that the vessel was to be loaded at Quebec. M'Swinney v. The Royal Exchange Insurance Company, 14 Q. B., 634, followed.

Common Bench. April 28, and May 7.

CLEMENTSON v. HUDSON.

Charter-party- Evidence to explain "regular turn" of loading. By charter-party it was agreed that the vessel should load “with all possible dispatch in the south dock at Sunderland, in the customary manner, a full and complete cargo of coke, to be loaded in regular turn," &c.:

Held, that the defendant, in an action against him for not using proper dispatch, could give in evidence a custom of the port, tending to explain the meaning of the words " regular turn."

Court of Queen's Bench. May 2, 1956.

The plaintiff agreed to build a ship for the defendant, the work to be approved by G., and his certificate obtained. The work was to be paid for in instalments, the last instalment on the ship being delivered complete. The ship on being finished was delivered and accepted, but the certificate of G. was not obtained :

Held, the obtaining G.'s certificate was not a condition precedent to the payment of the last instalment.

A churchwarden has no lien on the parish books for moneys expended by him for the use of the parish.

JEWELL V. STEAD.

Measurement of distance.

A turnpike act enacted that no toll should be taken within three miles of B.:

Held, that the distance was to be measured in a straight line on the horizontal plane from point to point, and not by the road in existence when the act was passed.

Court of Queen's Bench. April 26, 1856.

M'GREGOR v. RHODES.

Bill of exchange - Evidence.

A declaration by indorsee of bill of exchange against indorser averred an indorsement from the drawer, who was also payee, to the defendant, and from the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant traversed the indorsement from the drawer to himself, but not his own indorsement:

Held, a bad plea. (CROMPTON, J., dissentiente, because defendant may traverse the mode in which plaintiff's title is stated.)

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, April 3, 1856.

CASTRIQUE v. Buttigieg.

Bill of exchange - Principal and agent — Liability of agent indorsing to principal.

A., a merchant in London, sent funds to B., a merchant in Malta, and requested him to purchase a bill of exchange for his (A.'s) account. The bill was drawn on a firm in Glasgow, payable to B.'s order, and by him indorsed to A.; it was accepted by the drawee, but dishonored at maturity, and duly protested, with notice to B. A. sued B. on his indorsement.

Sir W. H. MAULE delivered the opinion of the court, and said that the general law merchant must govern this case, and that by that law an agent did not render himself liable to his principal by indorsing to the latter a bill brought for him, in the absence of circumstances to show that such liability was intended. He distinguished the case from Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 159. In that case (said the learned judge) there were circumstances which tended to show that the defendant meant to make himself personally liable, and a special jury of merchants having found for the plaintiff, the court would not disturb the verdict.

The liability of an indorser to his immediate indorsee arises out of a contract between them, and this contract is shown not exclusively by the indorsement, although that is necessary to the existence of the contract, but also by the intention with which the delivery was made, as evidenced by words written or spoken at the time, and by the circumstances under which it is made, and the mode of dealing between the parties.

Queen's Bench. May 5, 1856.

PERIN v. CAMPRELL.

Contract Conditional signature and delivery.

Upon the trial of an action on a written agreement, evidence is admissible under non-assumpsit, to show that the defendant signed and delivered the document upon the understanding between the parties that it was not to operate as an agreement until a certain condition had been performed. The jury should be cautioned to regard with scrupulous suspicion the evidence adduced to prove such an arrangement.

A covenant in a lease not to convert the premises into a shop or public house, or suffer any public trade or business to be carried on therein, but to use the same as a private dwelling-house only, is broken by using them as a day school for young ladies, with dancing and singing classes.

Exchequer. April 30.

WOOD v. BLETCHER.

Pleading - Debt.

Where one makes a purchase, and the article is paid for on the spot, there is no debt incurred, and no occasion for a plea of pay

In October, 1854, a verbal contract was made between A. & B. that A. should serve B. until September 1, 1855, and for a year thereafter, unless the employment was determined by three months' notice to be given by either party : —

Held, that this was within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, as an agreement not to be performed within a year.

An act of parliament prohibits gaming in any street, road, highway, or other open or public place. Under this act a person was convicted of gaming in a railway carriage on the Brighton railway,