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ingly abused his authority, or used the process of the court as a cover for doing acts which he knew to be illegal or oppressive. Each case must stand or fall upon its own merits; applying to the facts proved a sound discretion, there can be no danger that this summary process will be used in improper cases. That it should be resorted to, and the power to punish exercised promptly, in all cases where it can be established that an officer has permitted himself to be used by unscrupulous parties, to obtain undue advantages by an oppressive and abusive exercise of his authority in the service of process, we think no one will be disposed to doubt.

The remaining question, whether the facts proved here make out a case for the interposition of the court, presents no considerable difficulty. Applying to the facts proved the rules which should govern cases of this kind and which we have already indicated, it would seem quite plain that no contempt has been in this case sufficiently established by the evidence. It is undoubtedly true, that an officer has no right to hold and use the shop or buildings of one whose personal property he attaches for the purpose of keeping and storing the property so taken: he is bound to remove it, if required, within a reasonable time; but it is equally true, that after such attachment, he has a right to keep it on the defendant's premises, where he finds it, such time as would be reasonably and fairly sufficient for him to properly remove it to a safe place. This length of time is to be determined by all the surrounding facts in each case; the kind and character of the property attached, its situation, the means at hand to remove it, the greater or less time required to find a proper place of storage, and all elements to be appreciated in settling the question of the reasonable time in each case. In looking at the facts proved here, we cannot say affirmatively that six days, considering the kind of property attached, would be an unreasonable time to keep it on the debtor's premises before removal; nothing has been put in evidence but mere lapse of that time, and we can only say that such evidence alone is not sufficient, we must have other facts, before we can affirmatively declare there has been such a wilful wrong, as would amount to contempt; the time proved may or may not have been unreasonable, depending upon a variety of other facts not before us. We by no means intend to say that an officer has the right to keep attached property on the debtor's premises for six days in all cases; all we intend

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to decide is, that under the circumstances proved here, we are not satisfied that the respondent has been guilty of contempt. He may have rendered himself liable in damages for a tort, upon which we do not intend, nor indeed is it necessary, to give an opinion. But there is another fact proved and admitted, which certainly has a considerable bearing upon the question of reasonable time. A portion of the property attached, although mortgaged, was subject to be taken by the officer, and a portion belonged absolutely to Keith, but both portions were so intermingled that some time was required to separate them. The petitioner permitted, then, his property to be mingled with Keith's, so that the officer had the right to attach both portions, and would not be in the wrong till he had time to make a separation. Nor was he obliged, we think, to remove any portion of the property, under the circumstances, till he had a reasonable time to separate what he had a right to hold, from that belonging to Keith. He had no means of making the division, that is, of knowing under which of the titles the different articles were held; and before Gilbert can complain of the officer, it was his duty, having the knowledge, to point out, at least, what property was his and what was not. He chooses, however, not to do it, and having so neglected, we think he cannot with justice, claim that the officer, by merely keeping a person in his warehouse, for six days, doing no unnecessary injury to his possession or business, has been guilty of such a wil ful abuse of the process of this court, as would amount to a contempt. The petition must be dismissed.

Notes of Recent English Decisions.

Court of Chancery (Ireland). Friday, February 8, 1856. CLELAND V. LEECH.

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Where a solicitor made a bona fide representation to one whose professional adviser he was, as to the adequacy of a particular estate, on the security of which money was about to be loaned, and the estate proved to be insufficient:

Held, that the solicitor was liable to indemnify the person to whom the untrue representation was made, for the loss he sustained thereby.

Rolls' Court. April 17, 18, and 19, 1856.

Re RADCLIFFE.

Mortgagee's costs.

If a mortgagee assign his security without the knowledge of the mortgagor, he cannot charge the costs of the transfer upon the mortgaged premises.

V. C. Wood's Court. December 22 and 23, 1855.

RADWORTH V. Parker.

Rule in equity as to provisoes limiting the time for execution in composition deeds.

It is a rule in equity that, although composition deeds may contain certain provisoes that they are to be executed by the creditors within a limited time, they are nevertheless to be construed with latitude; and it is not necessary in equity for a creditor to seal and deliver the deed, provided he indicates, within due time, his assent to the terms of it, and his intention to act under it.

Court of Exchequer.

Wednesday, April 16, 1856.

MUMFORD AND OTHERS v. THE OXFORD, WORCESTER, AND WOLVERHAMPTON RAILWAY COMPANY.

Nuisance - Action by reversioner.

In an action by a reversioner for damage to his property in erecting a nuisance, it is requisite to prove that the nuisance is of a permanent nature, and so to be continued as to injure the reversionary interest, and whether it is so or not, is a question for the

court.

Quare, whether a mortgagor who has let out the premises to a tenant has such a reversion as to entitle him to bring the action?

V. C. Wood's Court. February 15 and 20, 1856.

Statute of Limitations

RODDAM v. MORLEY.

Bond debt-Payment of interest by tenant for life.

By 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, all actions upon bonds, &c., are barred after twenty years, except where " any acknowledgment shall have

been made, either by writing signed by the party liable, or his agent, or by part payment, or part satisfaction on account of any principal or interest being due thereon." The party alone making the acknowledgment, and who is liable for the debt, is within this exception. Therefore, payment of interest on such a debt by one who is tenant for life under the will of the debtor, does not take the case out of the statute as against the remainder-man.

Although a bond-debt may be said to be payable out of real estate, in the sense that the real estate is assets for the payment of it, it is not a charge upon the land within the meaning of the 40th section of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, which provides that "no action or suit, or other proceeding, shall be brought to recover any sum of money secured by any mortgage, judgment, or lien, or otherwise charged upon or payable out of any land or rent, at law or in equity, or any legacy, but within twenty years, etc., unless, etc."

Rolls' Court. March 4, 5, and 18, 1856.

HODGSON v. SMITHSON.

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A testator bequeathed stock in trust for his wife for life, and after her decease one-half to M., or in case of her decease, to be equally divided" between her children living."

M. died in the testator's lifetime, leaving one child, B., who died before the testator's widow :

Held, that B. took a vested interest in the fund.

In the case of a gift to a class after a gift to a particular legatee, the class is to be ascertained at the death of the particular legatee, provided the legatee has survived the testator; if not, it will be ascertained at the death of the testator.

Ive v. King, 6 Beav. 46, affirmed.

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Living," in this clause, was held to mean living at the death of the parent M.

Court of Queen's Bench. Monday, April 21, 1856.

MARQUAND V. BANNER.

Charter-party- Ownership pro hac vice ·Shippers and ship-owner.

Where it was stipulated by charter-party that the vessel should receive and take on board from the charterers, (who were to have "the full reach of the vessel's hold, from bulkhead to bulkhead, including the half deck,") a full cargo, and that such goods only as the charterers should direct were to be received on board; the master, at the charterer's request, to sign bills of lading for the in the usual and customary manner, and at any rate of

same

freight that may be filled and made payable in any manner the charterers may choose, without prejudice to this charter;" and it was agreed that the charterers should have the option of naming the lumpers and stevedores, the ship to pay the former, the charterers the latter; and a lump sum was to be paid for freight; part of which was to be received by the captain abroad, and the residue at the port of loading, within three months from the day of sailing:

Held, that the charterers were the owners pro hac vice of the ship; that the master, in signing bills of lading, acted as their agent, and not as agent for the ship-owner; and that, consequently, although the charterers had stopped payment, the ship-owner was not entitled to claim from the ship-owners the amount of unpaid freight.

Court of Appeal in Chancery. January 28, 29, and March 18, 1856.

ROBINSON v. WHEELWRIGHT.

Married woman — Anticipation

Power of Court of Equity.

A testator left a legacy to his daughter on condition that she and her husband should give up and convey all his, her, and their interest in a small parcel of land, which had been settled upon her for life, without the power of anticipation:

Held, that the court could not assist her to comply with the condition.

April 19. Re ADAMSON'S PATENT.

Patent- Dedication to public.

Where an inventor had used his invention in public for four months, the court refused to order his patent to be sealed.

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An act of Parliament (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36) requires bills of sale to be registered, together with an affidavit of the time of such bill of sale being made or given, and a description of the residence and occupation of the person making or giving the same : —

Held, that to describe a clerk in the audit office as "a gentleman in such an affidavit, rendered the bill of sale void.

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