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Parliament compels a land-owner to give, are restricted by the terms of the legislative contract, and are qualified by the circumstance that the estate was compulsorily given to effect a specified purpose of public benefit.

An act of Parliament empowered a canal company to take lands, for a reservoir, which lands were to be vested in the company, "to and for the use of the navigation, but to or for no other use or purpose whatever.” And lands were sold to them accordingly, reserving rights of fishing, &c., to the vendors. By a subsequent act, the canal lands and property became vested in a railway company, as purchasers, with the same powers and obligations.

Held, that the railway company were not entitled to let out boats for hire, or to hold a regatta on the reservoir, or to use the land for any other purpose than that signified in the acts. A perpetual injunction was granted on the suit

of a vendor.

Court of Appeals (before the Lords Justices). February 28 and March 11, 1856.

HOLMES V. GODSON.

Devise-Repugnant Condition.

A devise over, in case a prior devisee in fee shall die without having made a will, held to be void, as depending upon a condition repugnant to the nature of the preceding estate. Doe v. Glover, 1 C. B. 448, commented upon. V. C. Kindersley's Court. Thursday, February 21, 1856. GARRATT V. LANCEFIELD.

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Where leaseholds have been specificially bequeathed by the lessee, and they are insufficient to indemnify the executors against the rents and covenants contained in the leases; if the specific legatees cannot or will not give a sufficient indemnity, the executors are entitled to be indemnified out of the general estate.

The rule is the same where the leaseholds have been sold by direction of the court.

Court of Queen's Bench. February 23, 1856.

CHAMBERLAYNE . CHAMBERLAYNE.

Testator devised real estate to his son A., "to hold to him and the heir male of his body, lawfully begotten, and the heirs and assigns of such heirs male forever," subject to certain charges, "but in case my son A. shall happen to die without leaving any son of his body lawfully begotten, then I give, devise and bequeath the said real estate to B., his heirs and assigns forever," subject to the same and certain additional charges.

Held, that this was a devise to A. for life, with a contingent remainder to the parties, if any, who should answer the description of heirs male of his body at his death.

Rolls' Court. November 16, 17, and December 5, 1855. HOPE V. LIDDEL. LIDDEL V. NORTON..

Will-Power of Sale

Bond fide Sale by person not a Trustee-Rights of cestui que trust - Adoption of Sale - Lapse of Time.

Lands were devised upon trust for C. for life, remainder to her husband B. for life, remainder in tail, remainder in fee. The will contained a power to the trustee, his heirs and assigns, at the request of C. and her husband, to sell the property and give a valid discharge to the purchaser; the purchase money to be re-invested upon the same trusts. The trustee died in 1806, intestate as to the trust estates, the management of which was erroneously assumed by his residuary devisee, G., who the same year, by the direction of B., executed a conveyance to a purchaser, and the purchase money was subsequently, with the assent of G., paid to B., and never re-invested according to the trusts of the will. None of the tenants in tail became aware until 1848, that G. had no authority to sell the property, but they dealt in the interval with their shares of the purchase moneys under a full knowledge of the character and circumstances of the sale.

In 1851, B. and C. being both dead, the cestuis que trust filed their bill against the purchaser, disputing the validity of the sale, and seeking to restrain him from setting up an outstanding term in any action of ejectment against him. The purchaser filed a cross-bill for an injunction to restrain the cestuis que trust from taking any proceedings

at law.

Held, that the sale having been made bona fide, under mistake, by a party not authorized, and for an adequate consideration, the court would sustain it, if this could be done consistently with justice to those claiming under the will; and that the cestuis que trust having a remedy against the estate of G. (the supposed trustee), which is solvent, and against the estate of B., this court would not, after such a lapse of time, and the dealings of the cestuis que trust with their shares of the purchase money, interfere to set aside the sale, but would grant a perpetual injunction against any action at law, to recover the estate.

Held, also, that the cestuis que trust having dealt with their shares of the purchase money with knowledge that the sale was bona fide, and for full value, and that the purchase money had been paid to B., thereby adopted it, although ignorant at the time that G. was not the trustee.

Rolls' Court. November 12, 13 and 14, and January 29. WALKER V. ARMSTRONG.

Power of Appointment - Will-Appointment to New Uses. By an appointment made by husband and wife in pursuance of a marriage settlement, certain estates were limited to such uses as they should by deed jointly appoint, and in default of such appointment, as to part of the land to such uses as the wife should by deed or will appoint, and in default of any such appointment, to different uses. The wife afterwards made her will in pursuance of her power, devising a part of the land.

Subsequently, the husband and wife executed another appointment, for the purpose of supplying a clerical omission in the first deed, but otherwise limiting the estate to the same uses as declared by the former deed omitting, however, certain of said uses which had become superfluous.

The wife died without having republished her will (which was not affected by the will act of 1 Vic.)

Held, that the second appointment of the property, rendered the will of the wife inoperative as an appointment under the settlement. The execution of a power takes the part appointed entirely out of the settlement, so that no resisting trust arises in favor of the old uses. The part appointed was here the whole property, and in favor of the wife there was created a new power to appoint by will,

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and the old power to appoint by will and all instruments exercising it were destroyed.

Held also, that evidence of the circumstances under which, and object for which the deed was executed, was inadmissible.

Court of Appeal, in Chancery. Tuesday, March 4. (Before the Lords Justices.)

VORLEY V. RICHARDSON.

Will-Construction - Benefit of Survivorship.

A testator directed the income of his residuary personal estate to be paid to his wife, until his youngest child attained the age of twenty-one years, she maintaining his children during the i minorities, and as soon as that event should happen, the trust estate to be divided between the wife and the five children of the testator, "in equal shares and proportions, as tenants in common and not as joint tenants, with benefit of survivorship."

Held, that the share of one of the children who attained the age of twenty-one years, and died before the period of distribution, was distributable among those of the legatees who survived that period.

Semble, the clause as to survivorship, applied only to the original, and not to accrued shares.

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Friday, March 14. (Before the Lords Justices.)

Re WALTON'S TRUST.

Will-Construction — Gift to one or his Heirs or Assigns.

Land was devised to trustees in trust for A. for life, and after A.'s death, to be sold, and the produce to be paid to B. or her heirs or assigns. B. died in the lifetime of A.

Held, that the interest of B. was vested and absolute, and passed to her personal representatives, and not to her children as substitued legatees under the words, "or her heirs or assigns."

Miscellany.

NOTE ON THE WISCONSIN CASE.Just as we are going to press, we have received a learned and well-written letter from Urbana, Ohio, which we regret not to be able to give in full. The writer reviews the Wisconsin case, noticed in our last number, and maintains that the true point of the case was upon the finality of the certificate of the State canvassers, and that if that point had been presented by a plea in bar, which it was not, the decision must have been that the certificate was conclusive, the finding being judicial in its nature.

We agree with our correspondent that this was an important question in the cause, but it was not an entirely novel one, and we still think, as intimated in our article, that the court were right in their decision upon it, for they did decide it, though not, perhaps, bound to do so. We can see nothing but a ministerial duty imposed upon the canvassers by the statute of Wisconsin; there is no provision for anything resembling a trial, nor, it would seem, for any process but those of arithmetic. The acts of Wisconsin do not differ materially from those of other States, under which elections have been often contested in the courts, and in some of which this point has been raised and decided. For instance, (to cite cases relied on by the judges in the principal case,) Strong, Petitioner, 20 Pick. 484; People ex rel.; Cook v. Welsh, 14 Barb. 4. See also the recent case in Massachusetts, Ellis v. County Commissioners, 2 Gray, 370. Our correspondent admits that the jurisdiction of the canvassers extends only to certifying the result of such of the returns before them as have the requisite formalities of law, and that if a person should appear to be chosen, and doubts were raised as to his possessing the qualifications of residence, &c., required by the constitution, the courts might inquire into these points. If so, why not into all other questions, of substance. If the objection be to the form of proceeding, we can only say that we can see no objection to the one already adopted, although there is often a doubt between that writ and mandamus.

IMPORTANT TO OUR CONTRIBUTORS.- We take the following notice from the newspapers:

PREMIUM OF $1000 FOR THE BEST ESSAY ON TEMPERANCE LEGISLATION, AND OUTLINE OF A LAW. With a view to incite the spirit of duty in the statesman, and to advance the cause of temperance in a reasonable and practical way, the subscriber hereby offers a premium of one thousand dollars for the best essay on the subject of legislative enactments designed to regulate the manufacture, sale and use of intoxicating liquors, to be accompanied by an outline of a law for consideration. The great object to be accomplished, is a law for general adoption, that shall best subserve the cause of temperance, and it will be expected that competitors for the premium, will in their essays set forth the principles upon which such a law should be based.

No limits or requisitions are prescribed as to the number of pages, but all will understand the importance of a directness of aim, and a comprehensive brevity. All persons intending to write, are respectfully requested to send their productions enveloped and sealed, to the subscriber, enclosing their names and places of residence, on or before May 1st, 1857, to be placed in the hands of the judges.

The board of judges are invested with full power to approve, reject,

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