3228 Mattes v. Pause... .22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 41. 3228 Weston v. Stoddard. ...... .22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 51. 3228 Kemp v. Union Gas & Oil Stove Co...22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 190. 3229 Weston v. Stoddard... ...22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 51. 3229 Kemp . Union Gas & Oil Stove Co...22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 190. 3234 Burns v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co...... 3234 Browning v. N. Y., Lake Erie & West ern R. R. Co.. .22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 43. .22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 193. 3234 Burns v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co........63 Hun, 19. 3234 Browning v. N. Y., Lake Erie & West ern R. R. Co..... 3240 People v. Pratt. 3240 Hollock v. Bacon 3247 O'Connor v. Mechanics' Bank... 3251 Gowing v. Levy . 3253 Bradley v. Walker... .64 Hun, 513. .22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 294. .64 Hun, 90. 3253 Dr. Jaeger's Sanitary Woolen System Co. v. Le Boutillier. ...... 3253 Dr. Jaeger's Sanitary Woolen System Co. v. Le Boutillier..... .22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 393. 22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 10. .22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 1. .22 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 6. .63 Hun, 297. 3253 People v. Fitchburg Railway Co...... .133 N. Y. 239. 3256 Seasongood v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. 3280 People ex rel. Sutliff v. Supervisors....64 Hun, 375. 3366 In re St. Lawrence & Ad. Railway Co.133 N. Y. 270. 3379 In re St. Lawrence & Ad. Railway Co.133 N. Y. 270. CIVIL PROCEDURE REPORTS. BRADLEY, RESPONDENT, v. WALKER, APPELLANT. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, GENERAL TERM; JANUARY, 1892. § 3253. Additional allowance when not granted because no basis upon which to compute-Deed-effect of defective acknowledgment--notice from record of restrictive covenants. A determination made upon an appeal from an order vacating an injunction is decisive as to all questions so determined upon an appeal to the same court from a judgment rendered in the same action.[1] A purchaser of real estate with notice of an equity attached to it buys subject to that equity and must conform to the mode of occupation and use of the estate, however restrictive, that was enjoined upon or attached to his grantor.[2] Bradley v. Walker (14 N. Y. Supp. 315) followed.[2] Notice to a purchaser of real property of a covenant restricting its use or occupation may be impliable from circumstances [3]; and where the adjoining houses on the same block in a city are set back eight feet from the street line and have remained so for many years, and this large open space in front of the houses is not usual in the city, these facts in themselves are circumstances which might well put a purchaser upon inquiry as to whether they existed because of a restrictive covenant.[4] VOL. XXII.—1. Bradley v. Walker. Tallmadge v. East River Bank (2 Duer, 614, aff'd 26 N. Y. 105) followed. [3, 4] Where, in an action to restrain the proposed violation by a purchaser of real property of a covenant contained in a recorded agreement executed by one under whom he claims that buildings erected on said lands should stand eight feet back from the line of the street, it appeared that the attorney who represented the defendant on the trial of the action had examined the title to the premises and he was not called to testify that in such examination he had failed to discover the existence of such covenant,-Held, that, under the circumstances, there was a conclusive presumption that the defendant had actual notice of the covenant;[5] that notice to the attorney in an investigation of a title is notice to his client, [6] and a purchaser of real property must be presumed to examine every deed or instrument forming a part of his chain of title, [8] and must be deemed to know every fact disclosed by the instruments of record affecting said property;[7] that the fact that the defendant did not have actual notice would not relieve him from the obligation imposed by said instruments.[7] Kendall v. Niebuhr (45 Super. Ct. 542, aff'd 46 Id. 544) followed. [5] Where, in such a case, the agreement was not properly recorded as to the defendant's grantor because her acknowledgment was defective, but was properly recorded as to other parties to it,Held, that the defendant could not in law see a part without the whole, and he would thereby have actual notice through his attorney who searched the title.[9] Where the subject-matter involved in an action is not capable of a money value or the money value is not shown, an additional allowance is not authorized.[11] Where, in an action to enjoin the violation of an agreement restricting the use of real property, there is no evidence of the value of the subject-matter involved and no sum recovered beyond the costs, the court cannot properly grant an additional allowance of $250.[10] (Decided January 29, 1892.) Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the special term enjoining the defendant from erecting and maintaining structures in front of his premises in violation of a covenant agreement, and also from an order granting an extra allowance. Bradley v. Walker. Sufficient facts appear in the opinion. Henry Holt, for defendant, appellant. George W. Cotterill, for plaintiff, respondent. GILDERSLEEVE, J.-By a judgment of the court below. the defendant was enjoined from erecting and maintaining structures in front of his premises in violation of a covenant agreement entered into by prior owners of this and adjacent property, reserving a space of eight feet in front of the street line. The questions of law involved in this case, and requiring consideration for its proper determination, were all substantially decided by a former general term of this court on an appeal from the order vacating the injunction granted at the inception of the action. See Bradley v. Walker, opinion by MCADAM, J., 14 N. Y. Supp. 315. In the above-mentioned [1] opinion, the question of the defendant's notice of the agreement is not fully discussed; and the claim of his learned counsel that, on the former appeal, it was assumed that the defendant purchased the premises with notice is not without foundation. We now propose to discuss this question, and also give attention to the alleged error in granting plaintiff an allowance of $250. We hold the former general term opinion to be decisive of all other material matters herein. Whoever purchases real estate with notice of any equity attaching to it buys subject to that equity. He must conform to the mode of occupation and use of the estate, [2] however restricted, that was enjoined upon or attached to his grantor. Bradley v. Walker, supra, and authorities there cited. The notice may be implied from circumstances. In Tallmadge v. East River Bank, (2 Duer, 614, affirmed 26 N. Y. 105), the court held "that the uniformity of the position of all the houses on St. Mark's place was probably suffi [8] |