equitable, as is required to bar a legal entail, a court of equity has no more power over the one than it has over the other, and consequently it is as little able to enforce specific performance in the one case as in the other. ' Per Sir W. Grant, in Gowland v. De Fa ria, 17 Ves. 25. 2 Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 423. 1. Effect of Inadequacy of Price merely.]—Where all the parties are competent to contract, and meet each other on equal terms, mere inadequacy of price constitutes no ground for resisting the performance of the contract*, it being the business of the parties themselves to exercise due care and precaution in the negotiation of their own bargains, and no part of the business of a court, either of law or equity, to rectify the consequences of individual negligence; a contract, therefore, is not to be set aside for mere inadequacy of consideration1, such a circumstance being of no more weight in equity than at law 2. 2. Improvidence.]-It is to be observed, however, that though a court of equity does not affect to weigh the actual value, nor to in "Unless the inadequacy of price prietor of an estate not alleged to have been under any incapacity, or deficiency of judgment, or to have been led by accident or design into a misapprehension of the value. On one side we see a vendor setting his own price, obtaining it, living a year and a half after the completion of the bargain, and never expressing any dissatisfaction, but accusing the purchaser of delay: on the other, here is the testimony of one farmer, who in April, 1814, looks over the estate, and says, that, in his judgment, that estate must, in 1809, have been worth nearly double the price. The court would treat men's contracts with great levity, if on such a state of circumstances it should refuse to carry them into execution." sist upon the equivalent in contracts when each party has equal competence, yet when undue advantage is taken it will not enforce that; but it cannot listen to one party saying, that another man would have given him more money or better terms than he agreed to take. It may be an improvident contract; but improvidence or inadequacy do not determine a court of equity against decreeing specific performance1. 1 Sullivan v. Jacob, 1 Moll. 477, per Hart, C. Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 12. Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves. sen. 19. 3. Intoxication.]-In general the court will not assist a person who has obtained, or wishes to get rid of, an agreement or deed, merely on the ground of the party being intoxicated at the time2; unless there was, as expressed by Lord Hardwicke in one case, any unfair advantage made of his situation 3, or by Sir Joseph Jekyll, in another, any contrivance or management to draw him into drink. Subject to this qualification the court leaves the parties to their remedy at law; but where a lease was obtained by the contrived and habitual intoxication of the lessor, immediately on his coming of age, at a very inadequate (a). rent, it was set aside with costs, notwithstanding acts of confirmation, it not appearing that at the time he "was apprised of the true value of his estate5." 4. Distress.]-But though a man, who meets a purchaser on equal terms, negligently selling his estate at an undervalue, has no title to relief in equity, yet the court will inquire whether the parties did actually meet on equal terms, and if it be found that the vendor was in distressed circumstances, and that advantage was taken of that distress, it will avoid the contract. Accordingly in a recent case, where the vendors, tenant for life and remainder in tail, both in distress, joined in selling the estate for an undervalue, although the court refused to interfere on the ground of its being the sale of a reversion (which it clearly was not, the union of the tenant for life and remainder-man rendering it, in fact, the sale of an estate in possession), yet the purchase being made at an inadequate price, without the intervention of any other professional assistance than the purchaser's attorney, and it being in evidence, that, in this purchase, advantage was taken of the distress of the vendors, the conveyances were ordered to be set aside, upon the usual terms of redemption. 4 Johnson v. 5 Say v. Barwick, 1 Ves. & Bea. 195. • Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 417. The same doctrine was a good deal considered, under a not dissimilar state of circumstances, in the recent case of Molony v. L'Estrange7, which is mentioned here, merely because it gives 1 Beat. 406. additional force to the proposition, that, though inadequacy of 7 consideration is not alone a ground for setting aside a contract, yet it is a circumstance which may, in conjunction with others, be entitled to great weight. There Sir Anthony Hart said, "It is not necessary to go into the abstract question of inadequacy of value on which Judges have differed. I think it clear, that the price was inadequate, at least to some extent; and I cannot disconnect the consideration of value from the fact, that the purchaser was the confidential attorney of the vendor." 1. Expectant Heirs and Reversioners.]-To the general doctrine as to the effect of mere inadequacy of price, the case of expectant heirs is an exception. The policy of the doctrines of equity, in respect to the bargains of expectant heirs, has been frequently and most justly condemned by equity Judges, as it is obvious that these doctrines have no effect in preventing such bargains, although they tend materially to augment the hardness of them: it being necessary for the purchaser of reversionary interests to take additional precautions, and to make the vendor pay for the contingency of the bargain being set aside. Notwithstanding this, instead of throwing in the whole weight of authority against a doctrine so pregnant with evil consequences, the courts have gone on, multiplying refinements and branching out new distinctions in every direction. "I am aware," said Lord Eldon, "that during my whole time, considerable doubt has been entertained, whether that policy with regard to expectant heirs ought to have been adopted; and although Lord Thurlow repeatedly laid it down, that this court does shield heirs expectant, to the extent of declaring a bargain oppressive in their case, which would not be so in other cases, and imposes an obligation on the parties dealing with them to shew that the bargain was fair; yet he seldom applied the doctrine, without complaining that he was deserting the principle itself, because the parties dealing with the heir expectant insured themselves against that practice, and therefore the heir made a worse bargain; but he certainly, like his predecessors, adhered to the doctrine, though not very ancient. It is not the duty of a Judge in equity to vary rules, or to say that rules are not to be as fully settled here as in a court of law." And, in Shelly v. Nash2, Sir J. Leach says, "the principle and policy of the rule may be both equally questionable. Sellers of reversions are not necessarily in the power of those with whom they contract, and are not necessarily exposed to impositions and hard terms; and persons who sell their expectations and reversions from the pressure of distress, are thrown by the rule into the hands of those who are likely to take advantage of their situation, for no person can securely deal with them." It seems that in a court of equity all persons dealing with their reversionary interests, by way of sale or mortgage, are to be considered as expectant heirs 3, and that years do not make so much difference in the protection afforded them. In the case of expectant heirs dealing for their expectancies, it was at one time held that the purchaser must shew that he had given full value *; and if he failed in doing so, the vendor was entitled to have the contract set aside on terms of redemption. The doctrine on this subject has undergone considerable changes. In the earlier cases, it was held necessary to shew that undue advantage had been taken of the situation of such persons; but in more modern times, it has been considered not only that those who were dealing for their expectations, but those who were dealing for vested reversions also, were so exposed to imposition and hard terms, and so much in the power of those with whom they contracted, that it was a fit rule of policy to impose upon all who dealt with expectant heirs and reversioners, the onus of proving that they had paid a fair price,— that is to say, in regard to mere reversions5, the market, not the calculated value,—and otherwise to undo their bargains and compel a reconveyance of the property purchased. 2. Effect of a Sale by Public Auction.]-On this principle, as followed out and explained by the recent authorities, it may be considered, that, whenever the mode of sale is such as to * Gowland v. De Faria, 17 Ves. 20. land paying De Faria the costs, and a This decision was appealed from, but sum beyond what was decreed him at the suit was compromised by Gow- the Rolls, Davis v The Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst. 163. 2 3 Madd. 236. 17 Ves. 23, Swanst. 140, n. 25; but see 2 3 Swanst. 143. Ryle v. Swindells, 1 M'Clel. 519; Headen v. Rosher, 1 M'Clel. & You. 89. afford reasonable probability that a fair price would be obtained, the purchaser will not be put to shew that he has given an adequate consideration. A sale by public auction, fairly conducted, affords a very strong presumption that the full market value would be given; and in such a case, therefore, the general rule, that the purchaser must shew that full value was given, does 1 Shelly v. not apply1. Sales by public auction of reversionary interests, Nash, 3 Madd. being supported, on the presumption that, by such sale, conducted in the ordinary manner, and with the usual precautions, the fair market price will be ascertained, it follows, that if there be any thing in the circumstances or management of the sale which rebuts this presumption, the purchaser will then be thrown back on the general rule, requiring him to shew that he gave full value. If, for example, the sale by auction be resorted to merely as a expedient to cover a private bargain," it will operate nothing?" 232. Per Sir T. Plumer,in Shelly v. Nash, 3 Madd. 236. Equally unavailing will it be as a protection to the purchaser, if the vendor does not employ the precautions which are usually resorted to for securing a sale at the full value; and, therefore, if it was announced in the particulars that the estate would be sold without reserve, in such case it seems that the purchaser would be compelled to shew that he had given the full value. Thus, in 6 Madd. 111. Fox v. Wright3, which was a suit to be relieved from certain post obit bonds, Sir J. Leach, V. C., on a motion to dissolve the injunction to restrain proceedings at law, said, "The true effect of the case of Shelly v. Nash is, that every purchaser at a sale by auction of a reversion is not necessarily bound to establish that he purchased at a full price; but that he purchased under circumstances which make it as equitable that he should have the be nefit of his bargain, as if he had bought not a reversion but an estate in possession. The question is, whether the present defendant purchased this post obit bond under such circumstances! The particulars of sale disclose that the vendor was a young man about to raise 40,000l. upon post obit bonds payable at the death of his father, and that the sale was to take place without reserve; that is, without any bidding on his part. Those who attended this auction necessarily, therefore, knew that the vendor was a young man in distress; that he was so much pressed for money that he undertook with those who thought fit to be bidders; that he would not have recourse to those precautions by which every provident seller at an auction protects himself against an inadequate price. And I have to ask myself, in the language of Shelly |