grantor kept the policy in his own possession. No notice of the 503. This principle is further illustrated in the recent case of Bill v. Cureton1. A single woman, not immediately contemplating 12 My. & K. marriage, transferred a sum of stock to which she was absolutely entitled to trustees, upon trust to pay the dividends to her until she should marry, and after her marriage to pay the dividends to her for life to her separate use, and after her decease to pay the same to her husband for his life, or until his bankruptcy; and after his decease or bankruptcy, in trust for the children of the settlor; and if no such child, in trust for such person or persons as she should by deed or will appoint; and in default of appointment, upon trust for her next of kin. In this case the trust was actually created, the relationship of trustee and cestui que trust actually established; there was nothing more for the settlor to do, nothing executory; and, accordingly, on a bill filed by her to set it aside, the court held that it was irreVocable. Sir C. Pepys, M. R., in giving judgment, observes, that the proposition "that a voluntary settlement, where the trust is actually created, is binding upon the settlor, has been so long and is so fully established, that no attempt to raise the question would probably have been now made, were it not that the modern cases of Walwyn v. Watts and Garrard v. Lauderdale have been supposed to be inconsistent with that doctrine. But, in fact, those decisions were not intended to interfere with the general doctrine, and the grounds upon which they were founded are perfectly consistent with all the preceding cases. These two cases, indeed, so far from deciding that a cestui que trust becoming entitled under a voluntary settlement had not a good title against the settlor, proceeded upon this, that the character of trustee and cestui que trust never existed between the creditors and the trustees of the trust deeds, but that the settlor himself was the only cestui que trust; and, therefore, that he was entitled to direct application of his own trust fund. Whether such views of the relative situation of the creditor and the trustees were correct or not is im material for the present purpose. The grounds upon which the judges who decided these cases professed to proceed, are sufficient to prevent their decisions from being considered as authorities against the former well-established doctrine. I do not wish to have it supposed that I entertain any doubt of the propriety of those decisions. That the distinction between them and the prior cases is somewhat refined, is true; but it is obvious that the distinction has good sense for its foundation, and that the rule as established by them is adapted to promote the views and intentions of the parties. A man who, without any communication with his creditors, puts his property into the hands of trustees for the purpose of paying his debts, proposes only a benefit to himself by the payment of his debts, his object is not to benefit his creditors. It would therefore be a result most remote from the contemplation of the debtor, if it should be held that any creditor discovering the transaction should be able to fasten upon the property, and invest himself with the character of a cestui que trust; I therefore feel no disposition to question or depart from the rule established by those two cases." In a case which came before Sir Ed. Sugden, L. C. I. 1, he decided, on grounds which might have been satisfactory before the Statute of Uses, but which have never been acted on since, that equity will enforce an executory trust, although supported only by a meritorious consideration. In that case a father, after the marriage of his daughter, agreed to settle upon her an annuity chargeable out of a specified estate. His Lordship decreed in favour of the cestui que trust. The decree was, indeed, affirmed by Lord Plunkett, but upon other grounds; and Sir L. Shadwell, in Holloway v. Headington 2, adverting to this case, observes, that under such circumstances it is no authority. In Edwards v. Jones 3, the obligee of a bond signed a memorandum, indorsed upon the bond, purporting to be a voluntary assignment of the bond to a person to whom, at the same time, the bond was delivered, but not being under seal was ineffectual for this purpose: the Lord Chancellor, affirming the decision of the Vice-Chancellor, held, that the gift was incomplete1. In 12 Kee. 81. Coleyear v. The Countess of Mulgrave, a father, who had four natural daughters, and a legitimate son, entered into a covenant with him to transfer a sum of money to a trustee for the benefit of his four daughters, but died before the covenant was performed, and the son covenanted to pay the debts of the father. The son paid some of the father's debts, and died before the covenant on the part of the father was performed, having by will given the whole of the property to his father. It was held, that this covenant could not be enforced: "The whole," observed Lord Langdale, "is executory, and nothing concluded." On the other hand, in Collinson v. Patrick 2, a bond was assigned in trust 2 Kee. 123. for such intents and purposes, and for such persons, as A., a feme covert, should appoint, and, in default of appointment, for her separate use. She afterwards appointed her interest in the bond to certain persons, in order to indemnify them in case they should not be able to recover the whole of a sum of money appropriated by her husband, who was their solicitor, and for no other consideration appearing on the deed. This was held to be an executed trust, to which, though voluntary, the court would give effect 3. See also God sal v. Webb, 2 Kee. 99. SECT. 4.-RECEIPT CLAUSE.-VENDOR'S LIEN. 1. Efect of the Receipt Clause at Law | 6. Vendor's Lien does not arise in fa- 2. Receipt of nominal Consideration, 7. Effect of the Clause enabling Trus 56. 3. To whom the Purchase-money ought| 8. Against whom the Vendor's Lien preto be paid, 56. vails, 60. 4. Vendor's Lien for unpaid Purchase- 9. Creditors and Legatees entitled to the money, 57. Benefit of the Lien, 60. 5. Vendor's Lien arises only in the case of a simple Sale for Money, 58. 10. Charity not entitled to the Benefit 4 1. Effect of the Receipt Clause at Law and in Equity.]-It is usual to express the receipt of the consideration in the body of the deed; and, at law, this is conclusive, on the principle Lampon v. that "a party who executes a deed is estopped in a court of Corke, 5 Barn. law from saying that the facts stated in that deed are not truly stated 5" in equity it is merely formal,the indorsement of a receipt on the deed being, in equity, the only effectual acknowledg & Ald. 606. Dewey v. Baker, 1 Barn. & Cr. 704. ' Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. W. 295. • Hill v. rist, 744. ment of payment, and the absence of such receipt being constructive notice that the money has not been paid. But even a receipt indorsed is of no avail in equity if it can be shewn that, in point of fact, the money has not been actually paid1. And in a recent case2, it was held, that the evidence of an attesting witness proving the signature of an indorsed receipt for the consideration, was not Gomme, 3 Ju- sufficient proof of payment, the witness having stated a fact, from which it appeared, that though there was an apparent intention of immediate payment, yet at the time of the signature it was not actually paid, and he not having witnessed the payment of it afterwards. So, the recital of a receipt of the purchase-money in the body of the deed is sufficient, where it expresses that the consideration had been previously paid, and all accounts settled,-as where a mortgage debt is discharged, and a re-conveyance taken at a subsequent period; or where the purchase-money is paid, and a conveyance made at a subsequent period. 2. Receipt of nominal Consideration.]-Nominal considerations are frequently expressed to be given to parties to whom no substantial consideration is given: these are merely formal, and not essential to the validity of the deed, except in the case of a bargain. and sale enrolled, where a valuable consideration is necessary to raise an use under the statute. 3. To whom the Purchase-money ought to be paid.]-No one but the party legally entitled to receive the money can give an effectual discharge for it; and, therefore, care must be taken that the purchase-money is paid to the proper persons, and that they are competent to give an effectual discharge, and that they join in the acknowledgment of the receipt. Where there are trustees for sale, and the parties entitled to the purchasemoney join in the conveyance, it is sometimes the practice to express that the money was paid to the cestuis que trust, and sometimes that it was paid to the trustees to be held by them upon the trusts in the instrument creating their authority: as regards the convenience and safety of the trustees, the former is the more eligible mode, since it settles the account as between them and the cestuis que trust; but as regards the safety and convenience of the purchaser, the latter mode is better. Where, however, there are ascertained incumbrancers, who do not join in the conveyance, payment should be expressly made to them individually, in order to exonerate the estate from the incumbrances, even if the trustees be authorized to give discharges for the purchasemoney. When a sale is made under an act of parliament, the act usually prescribes the mode of payment; and when sales are effected under the decree of a court of equity, the court usually orders the application of the purchase-money, as that it shall be paid into the Bank, or into the hands of a particular trustee, mortgagee, incumbrancer, &c. pur the Wheate, 1 Bl. 150. ? Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 337. 3 Gibbons v. 4. Vendor's Lien for unpaid Purchase-money.]-If the vendor convey the legal estate to the purchaser "prematurely1,"-to use 'Burgess v. Sir Thomas Clarke's expression,-that is to say, before the chase-money has been paid, the purchaser is a trustee of the estate for the vendor for the whole or the residue of the purchasemoney, according as the case may be. In other words, to the extent of unpaid purchase-money, the vendor has a charge, or lien, as it is commonly called, upon the estate. It has been laid down by Lord Eldon, that, unless there be special circumstances, "where the vendor conveys without more, though the consideration is upon the face of the instrument expressed to be paid, and by a receipt indorsed, if it is the simple case of a conveyance, the money or part of it not being paid, as between the vendor and vendee and persons claiming as volunteers, upon doctrine of this court, which, when it is settled, has the effect of contract, though perhaps no actual contract has taken place, a lien shall prevail, in the one case, for the whole consideration; in the other, for that part of it which had not been paid 2." The vendor's lien will not be affected by his taking the purchaser's note for the unpaid purchase-money 3, even if the note have been negotiated 4, or the purchaser gave an acceptance by himself and a third person, or by a third person alone 5; nor by taking a bond 6; nor necessarily by taking a mortgage upon the estate sold for part of the purchase-money, and a note taken for the rest, or by taking a mortgage upon another estate 7. The taking, however, of a collateral security is very strong evidence against the lien; and, in a case before Sir William Grant, where the vendor took a transfer of long annuities, with a covenant from the purchaser, that, if they should not rise within two years so that the stock so transferred might be sold, he would pay the purchase-money on having a re-transfer of the annuities, subject to a proviso empowering him to demand a re-transfer on payment of that sum. Sir William Grant held that the lien was gone 8, but his decision has not been entirely approved of 9. The Baddall, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 682, n. (b) to (D); Ex p. Peake, Madd. 346. 4 Ex Loaring, 2 Rose, 79. 1 2 p. Grant v. Mills, Ves. & Bea. winter v. 306. Lord Anson, 3 Russ. 488; Saunders v. Symmons, 8 Nairn v. 760. 9 Mackreth v. |