2 1 Hennand v. Moore, 1 Eden, 327; Ex parte Price, 1 Buck, 221.' 9 Honeycomb v. Waldron, 2 Stra. 1064; and see Williams v. Sorrell, 4 Ves. 389. Bailey v. Fermor, 9 Price, 268. the equitable estate, and such as are only available in a court of equity, must also be registered, or the party claiming the benefit of them will lose his priority1. 6. Memorial of Leases, and the Assignment of Leases.]— Leases exceeding twenty-one years, and such as are not at rack rent, and assignments of them, are within the meaning of the Registry Acts and must be registered. It has been determined that the registry of an assignment of a lease, wherein the original lease is recited, will not be a sufficient registry of the lease itself 2. Leases originally made at rack rent, are considered as continuing so, and, though they afterwards become valuable leases, are excepted. Leases not exceeding twenty-one years, where the possession and occupation go along with such leases, are also excepted. An assignment of such a lease, out and out, to a purchaser who takes possession is also excepted; but on an assignment by way of mortgage, as the possession does not usually accompany the lease, the registration of the mortgage is generally recommended3. 7. Construction of the Registry Acts.]-On the construction of these acts it has been decided, that a first mortgagor, duly registered, getting in a third mortgage, shall have priority as to both securities, over an intermediate registered incumbrance. This was de42 Eq. Ab. 615. cided in Bedford v. Backhouse4; there was a first mortgage by A. 52 Atk. 275. Cator v. Coo ley, 1 Cox, 182; Morecock v. duly registered; a second mortgage by B. also duly registered; and then A. lent a further sum upon the same security; and Lord King held that A. was entitled to be repaid the whole of his money in priority to B., on the ground "that the registration of the second mortgage was not constructive notice to A. before his advancement of the latter sum; for though the statute avoids deeds not registered as against purchasers, yet it gives no greater efficacy to deeds that are registered than they had before." On the other hand, it is laid down by Lord Hardwicke, in Hine v. Dodd5, "that the registry act, 7 Anne, c. 20, is notice to the parties, and a notice to every body; and the meaning of this statute was to prevent parol proofs of-notice, or not notice." This view of the operation of the registry act has not been acquiesced in, and a long line of cases 6 have established the conclusion that a subsequent incumbrancer is not bound unless he have express notice; it is true," as observed by Lord Redesdale, " the registry is considered as notice to a certain extent; no person thinks of purchasing an estate without searching the registry, and if he searches he has notice; 66 but I think it cannot be considered as notice to all intents, on account of the mischiefs that would arise from such a decision. For, if it is to be taken as constructive notice, it must be taken as notice of every thing contained in the memorial: if the memorial contain a recital of another instrument, it is notice of that instrument;-if a fact, it is notice of that fact. It strikes me to be a better and safer way of considering it, to let the words of the act operate by their own force, and that the registry shall not be taken as notice1." The observation, that, if a party" search, he 'Bushell v. has notice," must be taken with the qualification, that where a search generally is admitted or proved, it will be presumed that the party was acquainted with all the contents of the register; but where it appears that the search was from a certain date only, it will not be presumed that he had notice of any of the contents prior to that date2. au Bushell, 1 Sch. Underwood v. 64. Hodgson v. Dean, 2 S. & S. 221. On the other hand, it has been decided in a long series of thorities, that a purchase or mortgage, though duly registered, shall not prevail against a former incumbrance, of which the purchaser or mortgagee had express notice, on the ground that getting his own conveyance first registered is a fraud,--the design of the registry acts being only to give parties notice, who might other wise, without such registry, be in danger of being imposed on by a former purchase or mortgage,-which they are in no danger of when they have notice thereof in any manner, though not by the registry3; and for this purpose notice to a solicitor Le Neve v. is actual notice to his client4. SECT. 14.-EFFECT OF ALTERATION, CANCELLATION, &c. 1. Alteration, 129. 2. Tearing of the Seal, 130. 3. Cancellation, 130. 1. Alteration.]-Where any alteration or erasure is made in a deed before it is executed, such alteration or erasure ought to be noticed in the attestation, and then the deed is read as if it had been so originally engrossed. As to the effect of an alteration, Le Neve, 1 ♦ Tunstall v. 301. after it has been executed, it was resolved in Pigot's case5, "that, 11 Rep. 27 a. when any deed is altered in a point material, by the obligor himself, or by any stranger, be it by interlineation, addition, rasing, or by the drawing of a pen through a line or through the middle of any material word, the deed thereby becomes void. So, if the obligee himself alters the deed by any of the said ways, al though it is in words not material, yet the deed is void; but if a stranger without his privity alters the deed by any of the said ways in any point not material, it shall not avoid the deed 1." A deed may be altered whilst in fieri;-such alteration will neither affect its validity nor render a new stamp necessary. Thus, in a recent case, at a meeting of the parties to a marriage settlement, the father of the intended husband, who was the only conveying party, having executed and delivered the deed,-immediately after, and before any other person had executed, the father of the intended wife objected to a clause giving a power of revocation; upon which the father of the intended husband immediately agreed that it should be struck out; which was accordingly done, the conveying party re-executing, and then the others executed: it was held that the deed was valid, and that no fresh stamp was necessary,- -the deed being only in fieri when the alteration was made 2. So in a case where by deed a mortgagee conveyed to the mortga gor the legal estate upon being paid the mortgage-money, and the latter re-conveyed it to trustees for the purpose of securing an annuity. At the time of the execution by the mortgagee there were several blanks in the deed, but not in that part which affected him. The blanks left were for the sums to be received by the mortgagor from the grantees of the annuity, and were all filled up at the time of the execution of the deed by the mortgagor; but several interlineations were made in that part of the deed after the execution by the mortgagee. It was held that the deed was not therefore void, but operated as a good conveyance of the estate from the mortgagor to the trustees for the payment of the annuity 3, the whole deed being " considered as one entire transaction, operating as to the different parties to it from the time of the execution by each, but not perfect till the execution by all the conveying parties; and that any alteration made in the progress of the transaction still left the deed valid as to the parties previously executing it, provided such alteration had not affected the situation in which they stood 4." 2. Tearing off the Seal.]-It was formerly held5, that, if the seal of a deed "were broken off or defaced," such deed became void; it has, however, been long settled, conformably with the reason of the thing, that if the seal has been torn off by accident, or destroyed by time, the deed will, notwithstanding, be deemed valid 6. 3. Cancellation.]—If a deed be delivered up to the party who is bound by it to be cancelled, and is accordingly cancelled by tearing off the seal or otherwise defacing it; or, if the person who has possession of the deed cancel it by agreement with the other party, such deed becomes void; but where an estate has actually passed by a deed, the cancellation of the deed will not divest the estate out of the person in whom it was vested by the deed 1. Thus, the cancellation of a lease does not operate as a surrender of it 2, unless the lessee accept a new lease; for the acceptance of a new lease, whatever be its duration, and though the old lease be by deed, and the new lease by parol, is a surrender by operation of law, "because the lessee has, by acceptance thereof, affirmed the lessor to have ability to make the new lease, which he had not, if the first lease shall stand3." SECT. 15.-REFORMATION OF A DEED. 1. Under what Circumstances a Deed | 2. Principles on which Equity reforms Hudson's ca., Bolton v. Carlisle, 2 H. Pr. Ch. 235; Black. 259. ley v. Arch- 6 East, 86. 3 Ive's ca., Searle, Cro. Jac. 4 176. 203. Henkle v. Roy Exch. Ass. Co., 1 Ves. sen. so 318. 1. Under what Circumstances a Deed will be reformed.]—Lord Hardwicke, on one occasion, says, that "mistakes and mis- Langley v. apprehensions in the drawer of a deed, contrary to the design Brown, 2 Atk. of the parties, are as much a head of relief as fraud and imposition;" and, on another5, "no doubt but this court has jurisdiction to relieve in respect of a plain mistake in contracts in writing, as well as against frauds in contracts; that if reduced into writing contrary to the intent of the parties, on proper proof that would be rectified;" but he added, "that there ought to be the strongest possible proof:" which words, as Lord Eldon observes, leave "a weighty caution to future judges 6." In the language of Lord Thurlow, "it must be strong irrefragable evidence7." In another case his Lordship observes: "If admitted to be a mistake, the court would not overturn the rule of equity by varying the deed; but it would be an equity Inchiquin, dehors the deed: then it should be proved as much to the satisfaction of the court as if it were admitted. The difficulty of this is so great, that there is no instance of its prevailing against a party insisting that there was no mistakes." Lord Eldon, observing upon these declarations, said, that Lord Child, 1 Bro. Thurlow "seemed to say, that the proof must satisfy the court 6 Townsend v. 6 Ves 333. 1 Bro. C.C. 338. s Irnham v. C. C. 93. 2 Beaumont v. Bramley, T. & R. 51. 1 LI. & Goo. 150. And see Pearce v. Verbeke, 4 Jur. 117, R. Rogers v. A Beaumont v. T. & R. 51. what was the concurrent intention of all the parties; and it must never be forgot to what extent the defendant, one of the parties, admits or denies the agreement." And, on a subsequent occasion, his Lordship says: "In cases of this nature great weight must be given to what is reasonably and properly sworn on the part of a defendant; because it must be a very strong case that would, even in a recent transaction, operate to overturn or vary a solemn instrument1." "The court," observes Sir Ed. Sugden, in Alexander v. Crosbie 2, "is always tender in varying a settlement where the effect will be to defeat vested rights, or where it is sought to do so on mere parol evidence. In all the cases, perhaps, in which the court has reformed a settlement, there has been something beyond the parol evidence, such, for instance, as the instructions for preparing the conveyance, or a note by the attorney, and the mistake properly accounted for; but the court would, I think, act where the mistake is clearly established by parol evidence, even though there is nothing in writing to which the parol evidence may attach 3." Generally speaking, the court will not be satisfied with any evidence short of the articles which upon the deed was grounded, or the instructions given to the drawer of the impeached instrument; and on such evidence it is of course to reform the deed according to the intention so manifested*. In the absence of evidence of this kind, the court is very reluctant to interfere; and, accordingly, in a recent case, the bill being filed to rectify a conveyance by striking out a sweeping clause,' alleged to have been introduced by mistake, inasmuch as it was not found in an agreement entered into previous to the conveyance; but the parties being dead, the agent of the grantor having acknowledged the extended agreement, and the agent of the grantee, who could have given a personal account of the transaction, not having been examined by the plaintiff, Lord Eldon dismissed the bill. In another recent case 6, articles previous to marriage were reformed, by directing that the estates should be limited Chandos, 2 My to the sons of the marriage in tail male, and not in tail general, as stipulated in the articles,-this being manifested to be the intention of the parties by letters written shortly previous to the marriage, with reference to the form of the settlement 7. 6 Bedford v. Abercorn, 1 My. & C. 312. 7 Marquis of Breadalbane v. & C. 711; and see Exeter v. Exeter, 3 My. & C. 321. D'Olliffe, v. South Sea Co. 5 Ves. 601, cited. Beaumont v. Bramley, T. & R. 51. Where the court cannot satisfy itself of the fact of mistake, an issue may be directed to try it8; "but it is only after great consideration that such a case should be sent to a jury 9." 2. Deeds of Family Arrangement.]—In the application, how |