questions arising on statutes, or on the great principles of jurisprudence, which we have to interpret in common, I will take upon myself to say that we shall always be pleased to have assistance from the decisions of our learned brethren in Ireland, and that we shall treat with the same deference a judgment pronounced in any of the four courts in Dublin as if it had been pronounced in Westminster Hall." And in Brittlebank v. Goodwin (p), Giffard, V.-C., said, "Though this court is not bound by the decisions in Ireland, it would always treat them as and feel them to be of the greatest weight." of these sta The statutes, the interpretation of which is to be Interpretation considered in this section, may be divided into three of three classes classes: (1) those applied to the Crown and the Duke tutes. of Cornwall exclusively (q); (2) those applied to the Crown, the Duke of Cornwall, and the subject, both clergy and laity, in common (r); and (3) those applied to the subject only (s). class. The statutes of the first class (t) are in pari ma- The statutes teriâ (u), are of a remedial character, and are there- of the first fore to receive a benign and liberal interpretation (v). The subject matters to which they relate are expressed in general terms without any provision, similar to that in the statute relating to claims between subject and subject in general (w), declaring that those terms are to have a more extended meaning than their ordinary one. When, however, the difficulties and embarrassments admitted, as will be presently seen, to be inherent in provisions extending the meaning of terms beyond their ordinary one, are kept in mind, the (p) 16 W. R. 696. (g) 21 Jac. 1, cc. 2, 14; 9 Geo. 3, c. 16; 48 Geo. 3, c. 47; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 105, ss. 71, 73, 74; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 53; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 62. (r) 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71; 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100. (s) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, and in- (t) Vide ante, p. 679. See Tut- (v) Vide ante, p. 676. 21 Jac. 1, c. 14. omission of such clauses in these statutes is scarcely to be regretted. The legislature, indeed, in one instance, has indirectly declared, by a later statute, the meaning of certain terms employed in an earlier one. Thus the earlier statute (w), containing the law as to claims between the Duke of Cornwall and other persons, is applied in express terms to "mines, minerals, stone or substrata," and the later statute (x), declaring and defining the respective rights of her Majesty and of the Prince of Wales and Duke of Cornwall to the mines. and minerals in or under land lying below high water mark within and adjacent to the county of Cornwall and for other purposes, declares (y) that, unless there is something in the context repugnant to such construction, the expression "mines and minerals" shall comprehend all mines and minerals, and all quarries, veins or beds of stone, and all substrata of any other nature whatsoever, and the ground and soil in, upon and under which, such mines and minerals, quarries, veins or beds of stone and other substrata lie (z); and in the statute (a) extending the provisions of the 9 Geo. 3, c. 16, to the Duke of Cornwall, the statute containing such declaration as to mines and minerals is recited with that declaration. The 21 Jac. 1, c. 14, is a mere regulation of the proceedings at law, by information of intrusion or scire facias; it applies only, from the very terms of it, to those cases which can fitly and aptly be tried by information of intrusion . . . and touches upon no part of the jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer considered as a court of equity, or as a court of revenue, having the superintendence of the possessions of the Crown. The object of this statute was to put a party who was contesting with the Crown in the same situation as a 72. (n) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 105, ss. 71, (x) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 109. (y) Sect. 8. (z) See Baggett v. Meux, 1 Phill. 628. (a) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 53. party contesting with any other plaintiff; but in equity the Crown and the subject always were on the same footing, and they are on the same footing now; there was no evil therefore to be remedied. At law, however, there was, arising from technical reasoning, a great injury accruing to a defendant in litigation with the Crown. The Crown's title was taken to be proved, unless a contrary title was set out and pleaded. That was a privilege which the Crown maintained against a defendant at law; but no such privilege has ever been asserted in equity (b). The principle and policy of the other statutes of The principle this class are to make sixty years' possession of the this class. and policy of land conclusive proof of the subject's title, and the mode in which the possession of the subject has been acquired or commenced is not regarded. It may have been by tortious intrusion without colour of title, or it may have lawfully commenced by virtue of title from the Crown or the Duke, and have been unlawfully continued after the determination of that title. Defect of title and want of title, if there be any distinction between them, are equally contemplated, and both remedied. If we were to inquire what the phrase "defective title" means, we should probably find that the defect, whatever its nature or character, is resolved into a want or absence of title, either in the whole or some part of the estate (c) The right of the Crown and of the Duke to sue is taken away, the estate had or claimed by the subject and enjoyed for sixty years against the title of the Crown and of the Duke is confirmed absolutely and for ever, and that title is barred and extinguished and transferred to the subject (d). They do not provide for the protection of actual title in which there might be some defect or Their retroactive operation. The statutes of c. 71. infirmity, but validate the title and estate which the subject claims to have (e). These statutes, in their general aspect, are framed so as to have generally a retroactive operation; that is, as regards the circumstances under which the title against the Crown, the Duchy of Lancaster, and the Duke of Cornwall commenced. But as to the earlier of these statutes, lapse of time has rendered any question as to such operation very improbable, if not impossible, and therefore needless to be here particularly considered. One of the statutes of the second class is the Prescription Act (ƒ). There is no doubt much difficulty 2 & 3 Will. 4, in carrying this statute into effect, and it affords an instance of the difficulty which attends the alteration of the law, where that alteration is for the purpose of putting an end to questions of doubt; indeed, in many cases, greater doubts are raised by the proposed alteration than had existed before (g). But whatever absurdities of construction may have been rendered unavoidable in other cases by the peculiar wording of the statute, it does not follow that we should extend those absurdities beyond what is necessary (h). General interpretation, -and the policy, of the act. The construction of the act, which gives the words their ordinary meaning without introducing any inconsistency or absurdity in the working of the act, will be adopted, and the construction which unnecessarily attributes to the words a meaning other than their ordinary one, will be rejected (i), and the natural construction is to be abided by, unless made out that it would lead to some absurdity or manifest incongruity with the intention of the legislature to be collected from every part of the statute (j). The general policy of the act appears to found the rights it confers essentially on the uninterrupted and con (e) 1 Jones & Lat. 61, 62. (h) Per Crompton, J., 10 Jur., N. S. 849. (i) 12 C. B. 467. tinued enjoyment of them (k); to give that enjoyment the same effect as the evidence which would sustain a prescriptive claim before the act, except that the terminus of the statutory enjoyment must be a suit or action which discloses the nature of the claim, and gives an opportunity of litigating it (1); and to confer, after the periods of enjoyment therein mentioned, a right from their first commencement, and to legalize every act done in the exercise of the right during their continuance (m); and it is impossible to construe the act as intending that the periods of years therein mentioned should terminate at a different time from that fixed in express and positive terms (n). If the words of the statute were capable of being modified, so as to avoid an inconvenience plainly and manifestly arising from a strict construction of them, we ought to do so (0). To found a right under this statute, the claimant must show that it is a claim which might have been made at common law (p), and the whole purview of the act shows that it applies only to such rights as would, before the act, have been acquired by the presumption of a grant from long user (q). One object of the act was to shorten the time by which persons who had the access and use of light could acquire an absolute right to it (r); and the section relating to the access of light seems to simplify and almost new found the mode of acquiring the right to access of light. It founds it on actual enjoyment for the full period of twenty years without interruption, unless that enjoyment is shown to have been by consent or agreement expressly made by deed or writing-thus putting the right on a simple foundation and with the simplest exception (s). The rights to which it ap plies. This act was also intended to prevent old rights from Its effect on (k) 12 C. B. 476. (1) 12 C. B., N. S. 470. (0) 1 Mee. & W. 99. (p) 10 C. B. 286. (q) 5 Mee. & W. 233. (r) 8 Exch. 864. (s) 11 Exch. 863. old rights, |