-sect. 10.

as such surviving partner he was entitled to the benefit of such enactment; in other words, that the enactment was retroactive (t).

In Jackson v. Woolley (u), Williams, J., referring to the decision of Kindersley, V.-C., in Thompson v. Waithman (x), said he could not coincide with him in his interpretation of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 14, as being retrospective. In coming to such a conclusion he does not seem to have regarded Lord Coke's well-known canon-" Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis." That is the ordinary rule as to the interpretation of all legislative enactments, and is to be observed unless there is something in the terms of a particular enactment to prevent its operation. "I see nothing in the language of the section under discussion to prevent its application. It would require words of no ordinary strength in the statute to induce us to say that it takes away a vested right. I see nothing in the section to give it that effect. I am of opinion that sect. 14 is wholly prospective." The rest of the court con

curred.

Again, a cause of action accrued in 1844 to a person who was then in prison, and there remained for more than twelve years afterwards. In 1856 the last-mentioned act was passed, and also enacted (y) that no person entitled to any action, &c., with respect to which the period of limitation within which the same shall be brought is fixed by the statutes referred to, "shall be entitled to any time within which to commence and sue such action, &c., in the cases in which, by virtue of any of the aforesaid enactments, imprisonment is now a disability by reason of such person being imprisoned at the time of such cause of action, &c. accrued." The action was commenced after this statute was passed, and

established by

the decisions.

the defendant was held entitled to the benefit of it; in other words, that this enactment also was retroactive (z). The distinctions established by the decisions generally Distinctions were stated by Wilde, B. (a), to be, that when a new enactment deals with rights of action, unless it is so expressed in the act, an existing right of action is not taken away. But where the enactment deals with procedure only, unless the contrary is expressed, the enactment applies to all actions, whether commenced before or after the passing of the act. And Lord Wensleydale (b) said it is clear that there is a material difference when an act of parliament is dealing with a right of action already vested, not intended to be taken away, and when it is dealing with mere procedure to recover those rights, which it may be quite reasonable to regulate and alter; and that this had been most clearly and satisfactorily explained in the case of Wright v. Hale, especially in the judgment of Wilde, B., in that case.

To prevent in, at least, some measure an ex post facto How ex post operation of statutes, they are frequently made to come facto operation prevented. into operation at a period subsequent to that of their passing (c). In Amner v. Cattel (d), Best, C. J., said it was with a view to present an ex post facto operation with respect to suits already commenced that the period of the act's coming into operation was postponed, and Park, J., in the same case, said that the legislature, postponing the operation of the act, indicated an intention to enable parties relying on parol promises to sue on them effectually. In Towler v. Chatterton (e), the court observed that in order to obviate what might by many be deemed a hardship, the operation of the act

(z) Cornill v. Hudson, 8 Ell. & B. 429; Pardo v. Bingham, 17 W. R. 419, 20 L. T. R., N. S. 464, S. C.

(a) Wright v. Hale, 6 Exch., N. S. 227.

(b) 10 H. of L. Cas. 763.

(c) See 9 Geo. 4, c. 14; 2 & 3 Will. 4. cc. 71, 100; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27.

35.

(d) 5 Bing. 208.

(e) 6 Bing. 258. See 2 Exch.

Enactments sometimes expressly retroactive.

was postponed, so as to give all persons in possession of parol promises seven months and more in which to bring their actions, founded on such promises, if so minded.

Again, in Paddon v. Bartlett (f), Tindal, C. J., said, with reference to postponing the operation of a statute until a day subsequent to that of the passing, the natural import of that is, that they shall have no operation till the day named, and therefore shall not take effect by being pleaded in an action commenced before that day; such at least would be the construction unless there were other words to the contrary: and in Goodall v. Skerratt (g), Kindersley, V.-C., after observing that the sections 21 and 22 of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, were clearly restrospective, said "this might seem to impose hardship upon persons who would be affected by an ex post facto law; but it must be recollected that, whilst the act of parliament abolishes all real actions, it reserves a short period within which such actions may be brought." If, when the operation of a statute is so postponed, persons neglect to avail themselves of the law in force between the time of the passing of the statute and the time when it comes into operation, they cannot complain. Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt.

In some cases, said Rolfe, B. (h), the legislature has thought it just to make enactments retrospective, even at some sacrifice of general principle. But then it does so in express terms; and generally, I believe invariably, couples the retrospective enactment with the best indemnity in favour of vested rights which the nature of the case admits and as an illustration of his meaning he referred to the section 16 of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, on which the case of Moon v. Durden turned, and to the 54 Geo. 3, c. 54, ss. 6 and 7, and the 2 Vict. c. 12, S. 5.

Limitation, as to their

operation,

statutes.

Statutes of Limitation, however, as regards their Statutes of retroactive operation, are to be viewed in a light different from that in which other statutes as to such operation retroactive are viewed. The primary object (i) of Statutes of viewed differLimitation can only be secured by defeating and extin- ently to other guishing those rights which the owners, by their indifference and negligence, have permitted for a long period to remain dormant. These statutes, as regards the rights to which they are directed, are generally so framed as to have a retroactive operation upon them and the circumstances under which they were originally created and from time to time surrounded, until the law to be applied to them comes into operation. But as regards any proceedings which may have been adopted for the asserting and establishing of such rights before such law was made, or, if the operation of it be postponed, after the making and before the coming into operation of such law, the operation of the law, in order to obviate, as far as may be reasonable and practicable, any supposed hardship to the persons having those rights, is generally postponed, according to the nature of the case, to some period subsequent to the time when the law was made (k). In some cases the law is made to take effect from a period antecedent to the time when it was made (7). But although so made, all the provisions of it may not operate from such antecedent period. For if any of its provisions be in terms, or the intention of the legislature appears to be that those provisions shall be prospective only, the operation of those provisions will be from, not that period, but the time when it was made (m).

And in Hunter v. Nockolds (n), the court thought the statute reconcilable with the chapter 27, by con

(i) Vide ante, Book I. Chap. I. Sect. III.

(k) See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27. (1) See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42; post, p. 696; Paddon v. Bartlett,

3 Ad. & E. 884.

(m) Burn v. Carvalho, 4 Mee. & W. 893; Pardo v. Bingham, supra, p. 693.

(n) 1 Mac. & G. 652.

sidering this latter chapter as applicable to the land only, and not to the relief of debtors, and the chapter 42 as applicable to the person only.

It may be added, in conclusion, that some of the enactments of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, have been held to have a retroactive operation. Thus, under sect. 31, executors were held liable to costs in actions commenced before the act took effect (o). This statute passed on the 14th of August, 1833, but came into operation on the 1st of June preceding.

The authority of the deci

sions in Ireland.

SECTION II.

The Interpretation of the Statutes considered in the preceding Chapters of this Book.

As some of the laws considered in this section extend to Ireland, the judicial decisions thereon in that part of the United Kingdom will receive equal attention with those in England. In Doe d. Newman v. Rusham(p), Lord Campbell, C. J., said, "Having heard of a misconception which arose on a former occasion when I objected to the citation of a decision of an Irish court on a mere point of practice, I beg now to state that, in my opinion, the defendant's counsel were fully justified in citing this decision of an Irish court on the construction of an act of parliament which is common to both parts of the United Kingdom. Our procedure and theirs are regulated by different statutes, different rules and different usages; and on mere questions of procedure no assistance can be derived in one island from the decisions of the courts in the other. But in considering

(0) Freeman v. Moyes, 1 Ad. & E. 338, 896; Pickup v. Wharton, 2 Crom. & M. 406; Grant v. Kemp, 2 Crom. & M. 636; Freeman v. Moyes was questioned by

Parke, B., in Pinhorn v. Souster, 8 Exch. 138.

(p) 17 Q. B. 723, 736; S. C., 21 L. J., Q. B. 139, 145.