general principles applicable in the interpretation of all these laws, and then to a consideration of the interpretation which has been given to each of the statutes which are the immediate subject of this Book. The intention, and how ascertained. SECTION I. The Interpretation in general. In applying the maxims of interpretation to any law the object is throughout, first to ascertain by legitimate means, and next to carry into effect, the intention of the legislature (c). Conjecture, however, as to the intention, is inadmissible. We cannot say of the legis lature that it is inops consilii; but we may say that it is "magnas inter opes inops" (d). That must be the truest exposition of a law which best harmonises with its design, its objects, and its general structure (e), and everything which is within the intent of the makers of the law, although not within the letter, is as strongly within the law as that which is within the letter and the intent also (ƒ). For the letter without the sense does not make the law, but the letter and the sense together, and every one that would be acquainted with the law positive ought to understand them both. And the way to apprehend the sense is to consider the common law, which is the ancient of every positive law, and has a place in the exposition of the law positive (g). The true construction of a statute is to give effect to the intent and object of the legislature, as far as it is possible, and, if there be provisions seemingly (c) Dwar. on Stats. 569. (d) Hor. Od. III. 16, 28. Per Lord Tenterden, C. J., 9 B. & C. (e) Dwar. on Stats. 556. inconsistent or contradictory, to reconcile them so as to further that intent (h). a law. The key to the opening of every law is the reason The reason and spirit of the law-it is the animus imponentis, the and spirit of intention of the law maker, expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole. Hence, to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute, that particular phrase is not to be viewed detached from its context in the statute; it is to be viewed in connexion with its whole context-meaning by this, as well the title and preamble (i), as the purview or enacting part of the Preamble. statute. It is to the preamble more especially that we are to look for the reason or spirit of every statute (j); rehearsing this, as it ordinarily does, the evils sought to be remedied, or the doubts purported to be removed, by the statute, and so evidencing, in the best and most satisfactory manner, the object or intention of the legislature in making and passing the statute itself (k). Pollock, C. B., referring to this case, said the title is certainly no part of the law, and in strictness ought not to be taken into consideration at all, and referred to the opinions of Lord Coke (1), Lord Holt (m), Lord Mansfield (n), and Lord Hardwicke (o). But the object and view of the legislature is not the only thing, said Lord Brougham (p), which is to be taken into account by courts of justice in construing what the legislature has actually done, could we know exactly what it meant, or gather from the preamble the very object it had in view; if on considering the terms used, we found that instead of merely accomplishing Effect of, in ascertaining the object of a law. Danger of interpretation founded on the remedy being more extensive than the evil. that particular object, a much larger one was accomplished, it would not do to limit the construction of the expressions and the operation of the enactment by the words of the preamble. The preamble may be perfectly clear, may leave no doubt whatever of the intention; but if it is equally clear that more has been done than was meant to be done, shall we say that because it is not included in the preamble, that was not done which has been accomplished? According to all rules of construction, if any ambiguity hangs over the enacting part, resort is had to the preamble, and finding from the preamble what the intention of that measure was, you then construe the enacting part, which, but for that, would be ambiguous, giving to it that meaning which the preamble sanctions. But when there is no doubt whatever in the enactments, the preamble is not to be left to control the words and to confine their operation, if they plainly and without any implication, by direct meaning and intendment, give to the section a larger scope. Lord Wensleydale also said (q), "There can be no doubt that we must consider the preamble as a key to the construction of the statute, though it would not, of course, control every provision, for we very often find that the subsequent provisions of a statute extend beyond the limits of the preamble." There is no line of reasoning, said Lord Denman (r), so dangerous as that which would deprive the statute law of its fair meaning, or, in other words, repeal an act of parliament by a judicial construction founded on the mere fact that the remedy provided is more extensive than the evil to be cured. It is enough to say, in general terms, on this doctrine, that the evil is but the motive for legislation, and the remedy may both consistently and wisely be extended beyond the mere cure of that evil to every provision which the most comprehen (7) 7 Moore, Ind. A. R. 99. (r) 4 Q. B. 349. sive view of the law, the state of manners, and of society at large, may appear to render expedient(s). In expounding acts of parliament, where words are The language. express, plain and clear, the words ought to be understood according to their genuine and natural signification and import, unless by such exposition a contradiction or inconsistency would arise in the act by reason of some subsequent clause, from whence it might be inferred the intent of the parliament was otherwise (and this holds with respect to penal as well as other acts (t)). And "the generality of the words," said Burton, J.(u), "may properly be restrained within the limits of the declared or implied policy of the statute; the more especially if a construction, to the full extent of its phrase, would lead to any repugnancy or inconsistency in its provisions. That policy is, however, I conceive, only to be looked for in the statute itself, and not to be either enlarged or contracted upon merely speculative grounds-a mode of construction that always incurs the hazard, and has, perhaps, in some instances, produced the effect, of legislating in the form of exposition." The modern rule is, that statutes must be construed according to their plain meaning, neither adding to nor subtracting from them (x). struction. It is also a rule in the construction of statutes, that, The gramin the first instance, the grammatical and ordinary matical consense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (y). The grammatical con (8) Per Lord Denman, 4 Q. B. 349. (t) Moore v. Hussey, Hob. 93, 97. Per Parker, C. B., Parker's Rep. 233. (u) 1 Huds. & B. 636. See also, 6 H. of L. Cas. 106. (a) Per Bramwell, B., 4 Exch., N. S. 629. (y) 1 Huds. & B. 648; 6 H. of L. Cas. 106. Remedial laws, and how interpreted. struction, said Pollock, C. B. (u), has frequently been adverted to in this court. He said, however, "I doubt, if it were laid down as a general rule, that the grammatical construction of a clause shall prevail over its legal meaning, whether a more certain rule would be arrived at, than if it were laid down that its legal meaning shall prevail over its grammatical construction. In my opinion, grammatical and philological disputes, and indeed all that belongs to the history of language, is as obscure and leads to as many doubts and contentions as any question of law, and I do not, therefore, feel sure that the rule, much as it has been commended, is on all occasions a sure and certain guide. It must, however, be conceded, that where the grammatical construction is quite clear and manifest, and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail, unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. But the rule adverted to is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence may be, if it be perfectly clear from the contents of the same document (and the same rule applies in the construction not only of an act of parliament, but of deeds, wills and of any subject of a like nature), that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which upon the whole is the true meaning shall prevail in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it." All the laws, the subject of this Book, are more or less of a remedial nature, some amending and extending the existing laws on the same subject; others applying them to matters which have not been previously embraced by them; and therefore, so far as they are of that nature, are to receive a benign and liberal construction (v), and to be interpreted so as to suppress the (u) 8 Exch. 356. (r) 11 Co. 67; 1 Jo. & Lat. 60. |