with the decision that the liability of the person giving the acknowledgment must be made or shown by it (ƒ). sect. 40. In Carroll v. Darcy, Brady, C., admitted that, in Of judgment cases of simple contract, a letter written, shifting the debts under liability to another, or excusing the writer from payment, would not be a sufficient acknowledgment. But that where the acknowledgment only is required and the debt exists, the object being only to extend the time for payment, an acknowledgment without more is sufficient, and he held that letters, recognizing the existence of a judgment debt, though qualified by an offer of payment from a fund stated to be the only available one, was a sufficient acknowledgment under this statute. Where an acknowledgment was given by the agent of a trustee to sell lands and to pay debts, the court said, the personal liability of the party is out of the question. The 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, applies to sums of money payable out of any land. The trustee, who is the party by whom the money is payable, may acknowledge the debt by a writing signed either by himself or his agent; but such an acknowledgment will not impose on him any personal liability to pay the debt. All that the act requires is that some acknowledgment of the right to the sum claimed shall have been given in writing, signed by the person who represents the estate out of which it is payable, or by his agent. The act, therefore, allows of considerable latitude as to the form of the acknowledgment, and consequently it is not necessary that the acknowledgment should state the amount of the sum alleged to be due. If it refer to the thing in question, it is sufficient, and it was held that a mere acknowledgment of the claim was sufficient (g). The cases Lord St. John v. Boughton and Carroll (f) Holland v. Clark, supra. (9) Lord St. John v. Bough ton, 9 Sim. 219. See also Car- Given by a trustee imposes no personal liability. Admission of arrears to agent. Deed executed after dated. By payment. v. Darcy were upon the section 40 of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, and the terms of that section, as observed in those cases, are "some acknowledgment" in writing. The terms of section 42 of the same statute are "an acknowledgment," and in section 5 of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, are "any acknowledgment" (h). An admission by the person liable to the agent of the person entitled to arrears of rent that rent is due is an acknowledgment of the title of the principal to such arrears (i). If an acknowledgment be made by deed, which is not executed until several years after the date of it, the deed, as an acknowledgment, if read as speaking from its date, may not be, but if read as speaking from its execution, may be, a sufficient acknowledgment (k). The consent or agreement which may deprive a tithe payer of the benefit of the 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100, may be by an answer to a bill in Chancery for establishing a modus claimed under an agreement therein stated; but to take the payment of a modus for the statutable period out of the operation of the section 1 by virtue of the concluding part of it, the payment must be made by consent or agreement in writing for the payment of the very modus, during all or some part of that time, and that by a person who could otherwise have objected to the payment (7). A part payment of principal, to preserve the right must appear to have been made, first, on account of a debt, secondly, on account of the debt for which the action or suit is brought, and, thirdly, as part payment of a greater debt, because the principle upon which a part payment takes a case out of the statute is that it admits a greater debt to be due at the time of the part (h) Moodie v. Bannister, supra. (i) Fursdon v. Clogg, 10 M. & W. 572. (k) Jayne v. Hughes, 10 Ex. 430. (1) Toymbee v. Brown, 3 Ex. 117. payment. Unless it amounts to an admission that more is due, it cannot operate as an admission of any still existing debt (m); and the creditor is allowed to show that the payment was made on account of a larger sum remaining due; for there must be something to show that the payment had reference to a larger debt. Words accompanying the act of payment would be necessarily admissible to show the connection between the payment and such larger debt (n). A payment made by an agent on foot of the whole Payment by claim and allowed by his principal in account between agent. them is a sufficient acknowledgment to take the claim out of the Statutes of Limitation (0). Part payment made by an agent authorized to offer a part of the claim in discharge of the whole, but who, on the claimant refusing the offer, pays in part, is not a part payment within the statute (p). Payments of an annuity charged on personalty, that Payments of is, a legacy, are payments of so many parts of the annuity; principal money constituting the annuity within the section 40 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27 (q). In the case of payment of interest there must be —of interest; reasonable evidence of the identity of the debt on which the interest was paid with that sued for (r), and also evidence of the payment being quà interest (s), and at some specific time within the period of limitation (†). The interest to be paid within the meaning of the 1 Vict. c. 28, and the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, means, not merely that which is reserved by the original mortgage, (m) Tippets v. Heane, 1 C., M. & R. 252; Waugh v. Cope, 6 M. W. 825; Wainman v. Kynman, 1 Ex. 118; Mills v. Fowkes, 7 Scott, 444; Whitley v. Lowe, 2 De G. & J. 712; Davies v. Edwards, 7 Ex. 22. (n) Cottam v. Partridge, 4 Man. & G. 271, 292. (0) Forster v. Thompson, 2 Con. & L. 568. (p) See Linsell v. Bonsor, 2 Bing. N. C. 241. (q) Ashwell's Will, John. 312. (r) Waters v. Tompkins, 2 C., M. & R. 723. (s) Sims v. Brutton, 5 Ex. 802. (t) Gregson v. Hindley, 10 Jur. 383; Homan v. Andrews, 1 Ir. Eq. R., N. S. 106. -by retainer. payable as such at the end of six months, and which alone could be recovered as interest, eo nomine, in an action of debt, but, all interest recoverable in debt or in covenant as damages, (which is, in common parlance, interest,) and the payment of this description of interest gives a fresh period of twenty years under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, cc. 27 and 42, and the 1 Vict. c. 28. It is impossible to suppose that these statutes mean to give the additional period of twenty years in consequence of the payment of only the interest properly so called, and usually payable at the end of six months (u). A retainer of the interest by a tenant for life of the money secured by a judgment is, both at law (z) and in equity (y), a payment within the Statute of Limitations. (u) See Forsyth v. Bristowe, 8 Ex. 716. (x) Dillon v. Kennedy, 1 Jebb & Sy. 579; Cummins v. Finn, cit. 12 Ir. Eq. R. 591. (y) Burrell v. Earl of Egremont, 8 Beav. 205; O'Fallon v. Dillon, 2 Sch. & L. 13; Kirkwood v. Lloyd, 11 Ir. Eq. R. 561; 12 Ib. 585. CHAPTER XI. THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION. PEACE and Concord are the end of all laws, and the law The object of was ordained for the sake of peace; and, therefore, those this chapter. laws which bring the greatest peace are the most estimable (a). As was said of the law touching fines, such are the laws the subject of this treatise, for they secure and quiet the inheritances of the people, and fix them upon a certain foundation; and, as incertainty is the mother of contention, so certainty is the mother of repose (b). In the interpretation of all laws the end or design is the primary object to be ascertained. They attain this object in different modes some directly, others indirectly and collaterally. The laws which are the subject of this Book have in view, immediately and directly, this object, and therefore, in general, their terms and application are the principal objects for consideration, so as that their immediate and direct object may be effectually accomplished. Sometimes, however, an object subordinate to the primary one may be involved in the law. It may be a remedial law, and the end or design cannot be fully ascertained from the law itself, without a preliminary investigation of the nature of the mischief intended to be remedied. The primary design, therefore, of the laws, the subject of this Book, being immediate, direct and obvious, this chapter is chiefly devoted to a consideration of, first, the (b) Ib. 368 a. (a) Plowd. 368. |