entire, or only part of, writ ing. Where the contents of a writing containing an ac- Signature apknowledgment with other matters are divisible, and the plicable to signature of the person making the acknowledgment is placed under or opposite one portion only, the question whether the signature applies to the entire writing, or to only that one portion, is purely one of intention and must be for the jury (c). So where a written document or more than one Writing conare connected with other evidence (d), or where there nected with other evidence, is more than one such document, as in the case of a or more than series of letters (e), the effect of such document or docu- one writing. ments is to be submitted with the other evidence to the jury, and the effect of the series is to be determined by them under the direction of the judge (ƒ). The precise time when an acknowledgment is either Time when made by the person to make it, or given to the proper ment is given. acknowledgperson, would be a question for the jury, and may be shown by oral testimony (g). The time of making an acknowledgment by payment may, in most cases, be easily ascertained, but an acknowledgment in writing may have been lost, and then its contents may be proved by such testimony (h), or it may be without a date, and the time of making or giving may be then so proved (i), or, in the case of a deed relied on as an acknowledgment, although dated is not delivered by the person who by it makes the acknowledgment until long after the date, the delivery by such person may also be so proved (k). Whether a document relied on as an acknowledg- Whether be that given, or (c) 3 Ell. & B. 71. (d) Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C. 883; Power v. Barham, 4 Ad. & E. 473; Routledge v. Ramsay, 8 Ad. & E. 222; Bolckow v. Seymour, 17 C. B., N. S. 107. (e) Dodson v. Mackay, 4 Nev. & M. 327; Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 405; The Incorporated Society v. Richards, 1 Con. & L. 58. L. (f) See also Neilson v. Harford, 8 M. & W. 806. (g) Hartley v. Wharton, 11 Ad. & E. 934; Jayne v. Hughes, 10 Ex. 430. (h) Haydon v. Williams, 7 Bing. 163. (i) Hartley v. Wharton, su pra. (k) Jayne v. Hughes, supra. UU the right be that in question. ment be or be not the actual acknowledgment made (1), and whether the title or the right to which reference is made in an acknowledgment be or be not the title or the right in question (m), are questions to be determined by the jury. No specific form necessary. SECTION IX. What is a sufficient Acknowledgment within the Statutes of Limitation. No precise or specific form of acknowledgment in writing is in any case necessary. All that the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27 (n), and the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42 (0), require is that some acknowledgment of the right in the mode they prescribe shall be given, and therefore they allow considerable latitude in the form of the acknowledgment (p). The courts have put a liberal construction on the statutes which mean that the claim shall not be barred where the party has really acknowledged it (q). Consequently the acknowledgment, when in writing, may be by letter (r), a deed (s), an affidavit (t), the will of the party liable, either specifically (u), or by a devise of real estate for the payment of his debts, either primarily, or in aid of the personal estate, of such (1) See Rogers v. Hadley, 2 H. & C. 227; Bolckow v. Seymour, 17 C. B., N. S. 107. (m) Frost v. Bengough, 1 Bing. 266; Smith v. Thorne, 18 Q. B. 134. (n) Lord St. John v. Boughton, 9 Sim. 919. (0) Moodie v. Bannister, 4 Drew. 432. (p) Ib.; Carroll v. Darcy, 10 Ir. Eq. Rep. 321. (g) Blair v. Nugent, 9 Ir. Eq. Rep. 406. (r) Lord St. John v. Boughton, supra; Incorporated Society v. Richards, 1 Con. & L. 58; Holland v. Clark, 1 You. & C. C. C. 151; Vincent V. Wellington, Long. & T. 456; Burrowes v. Gore, 6 H. L. C. 907; Jortin v. The South-Eastern Railway Co. 2 S. & G. 48; 6 De G., M. & G. 270; Toft v. Stephenson, 1 Ib. 41; Thompson v. Bowyer, 9 Jur., N. S. 863; Trulock v. Robey, 12 Sim. 402; Stansfield v. Hobson, 16 Beav. 236; 3 De G., M. & G. 620. (s) Jayne v. Hughes, 10 Ex. 430. (t) Blair v. Nugent, supra; Tristram v. Harte, Longf. & T. 186. (u) Millington v. Thompson, 3 Ir. C. R. 236. of them at least as at his death are not barred by the Statute of Limitations (x). A correspondence between two parties who are dealing with each other, the one claiming a right to property, and the other an incumbrance upon it, would not amount to an acknowledgment of title to the property, because there might be an infirmity in the title acknowledged, which would give a third person a title against one or both of them. But if the correspondence be between the incumbrancer and such claimant, in the character of owner, for the redemption of the estate by payment of the incumbrance, the former cannot set up a title adverse to the latter, and the correspondence would be an acknowledgment of the title of the latter (y). The acknowledgment in the case of land, or of rent, Must be of the or of a charge thereon, must be of the title of the claimant thereto (z), that is, of some particular person, Will. 4, c. 27, and not doubtful whether of the title of one person or of another (a); and must contain something more than a mere statement of fact, or of a past transaction (b), and if given under, or as in contemplation of, a bargain which is not concluded, the bargain must be final (c) The acknowledgment of a title to land or rent, or to any charge thereon, must also be of a present existing title, and not of a title which has been extinguished by the lapse of the period of limitation (d); and should contain, either expressly (e), or by necessary inference, a reference to the claim to which it relates (ƒ). (x) Fergus v. Gore, 1 Sch. & L. 107; Burke v. Jones, 2 Ves. & B. 275; Jones v. Scott, 1 Russ. & M. 255. (y) Incorporated Society v. Richards, 1 Con. & L. 58. 6 M. & W. 291. (d) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 2, 14, 34, 40; Kemmis v. Macklin, 11 Ir. L. R. 372; Morrogh v. Power, 5 Ib. 494; Maddock v. Bond, Ir. T. R. 332; Cloncurry v. Piers, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 407; Hobson v. Burns, 13 Ir. L. R. 286; Howcutt v. Bonsor, 3 Ex. 491. (z) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 14, 24. (a) Hobson v. Burns, 13 Ir. L. R. 286; Thompson v. Bowyer, Jur., N. S. 863; 11 W. R. 975; 9 L. T. R., N. S. 12, S. C.; post, p. 662. (b) Hobson v. Burns, supra. (c) Doe d. Curzon v. Edwards, (e) Lord St. John v. Boughton, 9 Sim. 219; Holland v. Clark, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 151. (f) Archer v. Leonard, 15 Ir. claimant's title; 3 & 4 s. 14; and as existing and refer to it. None if right denied. In cases of pe If a writing relied upon as an acknowledgment contain a positive and unqualified denial of any right by any person there will be no acknowledgment (g). In cases of pecuniary claim the amount of the claim cuniary claims. need not be stated in the acknowledgment (h), but may be shown by extrinsic parol evidence (i). But the acknowledgment, when it is by an account stated (j), must show that there is a certain amount due (k). Answer in Schedule of insolvent debtor. An answer to a bill in Chancery filed by the claimant against the party liable (7), signed and sworn, may be said to be indisputable evidence of consent by such person, and, considering that it is a deliberate act, is entitled to more weight than if the acknowledgment had been given without deliberation. Where the defendant by his answers acknowledged that he held under an agreement for a lease, and that the residue of the term had been assigned to the plaintiff and another person, that was an admission by the defendant that he held as tenant from year to year, and a distinct acknowledgment that the legal estate was in such assignees, and being in answer to questions put by the plaintiff is "given to the person entitled" within the section 14 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27 (m). Whether the schedule by an insolvent debtor can, under any circumstances, amount to an acknowledgment Ch. Rep. 267; Vincent v. Wel- (g) Thompson v. Bowyer, supra. 321. (i) Waller v. Lacy, supra; Williams v. Griffiths, 3 Ex. 335; Gardner v. M'Mahon, 3 Q. B. 561; Hartley v. Wharton, 11 Ad. & E. 934. (j) Vide ante, Sect. I. of this Chapter. (k) Per Parke, B., 5 M. & W. 667. (1) Blair v. Nugent, supra; Baildon v. Walton, 1 Ex. 617; 3 Ex. 129; Moodie v. Bannister, supra; Goode v. Job, 1 Ellis & E. 6. (m) Goode v. Job, 1 Ellis & E. 6; 28 L. J., Q. B. 1; 5 Jur., N. S. 145, S. C. of title under the section 14 of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, has been doubted (n). The acknowledgment relied upon in that case was such a schedule, but it was held insufficient on the grounds that it was not of the title of any particular person, or of any existing title. As the effect of an acknowledgment of the title to When acknowland or to rent under the section 14 of this last statute ledgment to be repeated. is to put an end to all presumption arising from length of possession (o), and as from the time when the acknowledgment is given a new adverse possession or receipt arises, fresh acknowledgments or other subsequent acts, as receipts, must be made or done to avoid such possession or receipt (p). But mere verbal admissions by persons in possession that they hold as tenants will not estop them from setting up the statute (q). The admission in writing under the section 42 of the Admission in 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, by the person liable for arrears of writing of arrent of land to the agent of the claimant of the land of rent being due, would be an acknowledgment of the title of the claimant to the land (r). rears of rent. An acknowledgment by payment of rent must be made By payment of by the person making it in respect of the land or rent rent. which is claimed,-Quicquid solvitur, solvitur secundùm animum solventis,-and not on another account (s). If no proof of an actual demise, or of the person paying having been let into possession by the person to whom the payment was made, can be given, the person paying may show the payment to have been made either by mistake or by misrepresentation (t). But (n) Hobson v. Burns, 13 Ir. L. R. 286. (0) 1 Con. & L. 84. (p) 2 Ib. 192. (q) Kirkwood v. Lloyd, 12 Ir. E. R. 599. (r) See Fursdon v. Clogg, 10 M. & W.572. (8) Att.-General v. Stephens, (t) See Fenner v. Duplock, 2 |