The terms of this provision, as of the sect. 28, are clear that the twenty years are to be computed either from the time when a present right to the charge has accrued to a person capable of giving a discharge for or release of the charge, or from the making of an acknowledgment of it, or, if more than one, of the last of them; and the natural meaning of the words "in the mean time" in this provision, as of the same words in the sect. 28, would seem to be, some time during a period of twenty years computed from the time when such right accrued (d), and not at any time intermediate between the time of such accruer, and the commencement of the proceedings for the recovery of the charge. But it has been held that these words represent a period intermediate between the time when the present right accrued and the commencement of the action, and not a period intermediate between the former and the expiration of the twenty years mentioned in this provision, and that an acknowledgment of the charge made at any time within twenty years next before the bringing the action or suit will be sufficient to preserve the charge, whilst in the case of the land itself, and of a rent, as already shown, the acknowledgment of the title thereto must be made within that period next after the right first accrues (e). pires. In the case, also, of charges on land, as in the case Before time of of land itself, not only is the remedy for the recovery of limitation exthe charge barred, but the right to the charge itself is extinguished (ƒ), for a charge on land is an interest in land, and an interest in land, even of a chattel nature, is land within the meaning of the act (g). In Watson v. Birch (h), Shadwell, V.-C., said, the (d) See Homan v. Andrews, 1 Ir. C. R. 106, 115. (e) Harty v. Davis, 13 Ir. L. R. 23; Toft v. Stephenson, 7 Hare, 1; 1 De G., M. & G. 28; 5 Ib. 735; Latouche v. O'Brien, 10 Ir. Eq. R. 113; Clinton v. (f) Sect. 34, supra. (h) 15 Sim. 523, 524, 529. Of title to advowsons will not preserve the right. Of right to charges on them, or rent, &c., may be made at any time. intention of the legislature is, that no proceeding whatever shall be taken on a charge after the lapse of the period of limitation, unless an acknowledgment of the charge be made within that period. The statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, makes no provision for the preservation of a right or title to advowsons by an acknowledgment in writing as in the cases of land and rent, and of charges thereon. The only mode of interrupting the period of limitation applied by this statute to advowsons is by the exercise of the right of presentation thereto by the rightful claimant, and the institution and induction of the clerk presented by him. An acknowledgment of the right to a charge on a rent or an advowson, or to a legacy not charged on land (i), or of a right to the personal estate, or any share of the personal estate of an intestate (j), not being chattels real, or to arrears of rent or of interest for money charged on, or payable out of land or rent, or for any legacy, or for any damages in respect of such arrears (k), or to claims by specialty (1), may be made at any time, and as well after as before the expiration of the period of limitation (m), for the right to these matters respectively is not, as in the case of land and charges thereon, and of rent, extinguished after the determination of the periods of limitation applicable, but the remedy is only barred (n). In the case of an obligation by simple contract, an acknowledgment made either before (o) or after (p) action brought, plea of the Statute of Limitations pleaded, and issue joined, will not prevent the operation of that SECTION VI. Determining the Time when an Acknowledgment is made. Inasmuch as after the expiration of the several periods Date. of limitation applicable to land, rent and advowsons, all title and right thereto are extinguished (7), and as an acknowledgment of such title and right to land and to rent, is to be given, as already shown, before the expiration of the period of limitation, the determination of the exact time of making the acknowledgment may be important. When an instrument has a date, the date is primâ facie, but not conclusive, evidence of the instrument having been made at that date (r). In some instances in bankruptcy an exception arises (s). In Potez v. Glossop, Parke, B., said, it is a difficult matter to support the cases of Sinclair v. Baggaley and Anderson v. Weston; and yet, at the same time, it is an equally difficult matter not to be bound by them, and that he felt great difficulty in seeing the reason of that exception. None of the Statutes of Limitation requires any Evidence of acknowledgment to be dated (t). But in those cases when not time of giving where the acknowledgment must be made within the dated. period of limitation, the absence of a date to an acknowledgment may render the proof of the time when it was (4) Chap. VI. (r) Anderson V. Weston, 6 Bing. N. C. 296, 300; Sinclair v. Baggaley, 4 M. & W. 312, 318; Potez v. Glossop, 2 Ex. 191; Malpas v. Clements, 19 L. J., Q. B. 435; Morgan v. Whitmore, 6 Ex. 716. But see the judgment of Parke, B., in Potez v. Glossop, (8) Anderson v. Weston, supra. Delivery. When by deed. actually given essentially necessary (u), and such proof may be furnished by extrinsic evidence (x). An acknowledgment, however, may be dated on one day and not be given or delivered to the person to whom it is made until long after. In such case the acknowledgment will operate as such, not from the date of it but from such delivery (y). If an acknowledgment be by deed the date of the deed may be long before the delivery of it by the person making the acknowledgment; and as it may be dated on one day and delivered on another, or dated on an impossible day (z), and as it may be pleaded as delivered after (a), but not before (b), the effect of the deed as an acknowledgment will be from the delivery (c), and the day of the delivery will be the day of the date (d), and the time of such delivery may be shown by extrinsic evidence (e). In general. May be a new SECTION VII. The Effect of an Acknowledgment. The effect, in general, of an acknowledgment is, or may be, sometimes to preserve the right, sometimes to revive or restore the remedy and enable a claimant to enforce his right, and sometimes ineffectual to revive or restore the right. Another effect of an acknowledgment in the manner limitation. prescribed, is to establish a new terminus from which terminus of the period of limitation applicable is to be computed, and, so toties quoties, as an acknowledgment may be made (ƒ). As respects the time of making, the effect of an ac- Effect when knowledgment made before, and of one made after, the and when after, made before, expiration of the period of limitation, varies with the the time of subject to which the Statutes of Limitation are applied. expired. An acknowledgment made before the period of limitation has expired, interrupts the period, but, as respects claims by simple contract and by specialty made after the expiration, destroys or removes the limitation (g); whilst as respects land and charges thereon and rent, an acknowledgment cannot destroy or remove the limitation, because the right and title thereto are extinguished after the period of limitation has expired (h). The Statute of Fines (i), after the expiration of the time after levying a fine for asserting a claim, extinguished the right of the claimant, and therefore the mere recognition or admission of it made after such expiration had not the effect of reviving or restoring the right. Thus where an entry to avoid a fine before the five years elapsed was made by a stranger in the name of, but without any precedent authority by, the person having the right, but who after the five years ratified such entry, the ratification was held to be inoperative (k). So an acknowledgment of the title to land or to a charge thereon, or to a rent, made in the same way before, but not ratified until after the expiration of the period of limitation, would be equally inoperative. (f) See Scott v. Nixon, 2 Con. & L. 185, 191, 3 Dru. & War. 388, 404, S. C.; Burroughs v. M'Creight, 1 Jones & Lat. 290,304. (g) See Poth., by Evans, 462, 463, 465. (h) Vide ante, Sect. V. of this Chap. L. (i) 4 Hen. 7, c. 24. (k) Lord Audley's case, Cro. Eliz. 561; Moore, 457; Poph., cit. and approved by Lord Coke in Margaret Podger's case, 9 Rep. 104 a. See 4 Ex. 799; Bird v. Brown, 4 Ex. 786, S. P. TT limitation is |