But not under c. 27. Extension for disabilities as to claims under disability in him, and also for the like disability of a person making an acknowledgment (1). And now the disability of absence beyond seas of one of several joint debtors is not to give to the creditor any time within which he is to commence his action against the other or others who, when it accrues, may not be so absent, and he may sue the absent debtor on his return, notwithstanding he has already recovered against the other or others (m). In Roddam v. Morley (n), Lord Cranworth, C., after observing that Fannin v. Anderson and Towns v. Mead proceeded on the 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 7, and the 4 Ann. c. 16, s. 19, said he did not see why a similar principle should not warrant the holding (if such a case should arise) that an acknowledgment made abroad by one of several persons liable on a bond, who was resident abroad when the cause of action arose, would keep alive the bond in its integrity against all parties liable. But in cases within the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, when the right has once accrued, neither such disability, nor any other, of the person against whom the claim arises, will extend the period of limitation prescribed by this latter statute (o). As regards the periods of limitation prescribed by the 2 & 3 Will. 4, cc. 71 and 100 (p), those periods are 2 & 3 Will. 4, not, in form, but are in effect, extended by reason of cc. 71, 100. the disabilities of infancy, idiotcy, non compos mentis, and coverture. The period of those disabilities is simply excluded from those periods of limitation, except only in those cases where the right or claim is thereby declared to be absolute and indefeasible. It G. & S. 675; Towns v. Mead, supra; Fladong v. Winter, 19 Ves. 196. (p) Vide ante, pp. 426-429, pp. 432-435. may also be remarked, that in each of these two statutes the term non compos mentis is used, and not either lunacy or unsoundness of mind, as in 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27 (q). Amongst the disabilities mentioned in the two sta- None for absence beyond tutes just cited, absence beyond seas is not included, seas, or conand therefore is not available (r); and in neither of tinued. them is any restriction as to the continuance of the disabilities mentioned, as in the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27. (4) Vide supra, p. 547 et seq. (r) See Plowd. 371; Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves: 87. In general affect the remedy only, and not the right. CHAPTER VII. THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE STATUTES OF OF LIMITATION. STATUTES of Limitation or prescription, considered in their true light, are ordinarily simple regulations of suits and not of rights. They regulate the times in which rights may be asserted in courts of justice, and do not purport to act upon those rights. They affect the remedy and not the merits, they go ad litis ordinationem, and not ad litis decisionem, in a just juridical sense, and their object is to fix certain periods within which suits shall be brought (a). They do not extinguish, but deprive the claimant of his remedy to enforce, the claim, and thus render it inefficacious, and induce a presumption that it is extinguished and discharged(b); and most of these statutes, whether applied to rights in or to personal property, or to those in or to real property, have been so framed (c). In the language commonly used in courts of law, the demand is not extinguished, but only the remedy barred. But this expression must not be supposed to carry too much with it. The statute furnishes an absolute legal answer to the demand of the claimant, and in the sense of a legal obligation enforceable by law, it does there (a) Story's Conflict of Laws, ss. 576, 582, 582 a, 582b; The British Linen Co. v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 903; Huber v. Steiner, 2 Bing. N. C. 202; Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 413; Ruckmaboye v. Mottichund, 8 Moore, P. C. C. 4; Williamson v. Naylor, 3 You. & C., Ex. 208. (b) 1 Poth. by Evans, 450, 464. (c) 21 Jac. 1, c. 21; 9 Geo. 4, c. 14; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 113; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97; Bell v. Bell, Lloyd & G. temp. Plunket, 44. But it is fore extinguish the debt at his volition. Ireland affect the right. Some of these statutes, however, applied to real pro- Certain staperty have been directed to the rights themselves, as in tutes as to real property in the case of those statutes of this nature, which have England and been applied to the Crown exclusively (e), for it was not bound by the ordinary Statutes of Limitation (ƒ), and to the Duke of Cornwall (g); and have not merely regulated the times within which the Crown and the Duke are to assert their rights, but have, at the same time, excluded those rights by confirming the title of the persons having held the property during those times. So also in the case of the Statute of Non-claim after a fine (h), and the old statute, "The Act of Limitation with a proviso" (¿), and that for the limitation of actions and suits relating to real property (j). In Scotland the laws of this nature are of two kinds; So in those of limitation, which bar the remedy only, and Scotland, those of prescription, which bar the right; and the latter are, either negative, precluding the demand of a debt after certain periods, but not operating an extinction of property, although they sometimes fortify a title, or positive, establishing a right of property in land, and rendering a title unexceptionable after a long uninterrupted possession by a person as owner on a title apparently good (k). (d) Coombs v. Coombs, 15 L. T. R., N. S. 329. (e) 21 Jac. 1, c. 2; 9 Geo. 3, c. 16; 48 Geo. 3, c. 47; 3 Inst. 188. (f) Vide supra, p. 242 et seq. (g) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 105. (h) 4 Hen. 7, c. 24; Bell v. Bell, Lloyd & G. temp. Plun ket, 44. (i) 32 Hen. 8, c. 2, s. 6. See Brooke's Reading, 180. (j) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27. (k) Bell's Principles of the Laws of Scotland, ss. 586, 605, 606, 2002, 2016, 2017; ante, pp. 25, 26. -and some colonies. In statutes applied to incorporeal rights. So the Statutes of Limitation or possessory laws of some of the British colonies, not merely bar the legal remedies, if the parties do not proceed within a certain time, but convert a possession for that time into a positive absolute title against all the world; and after such possession the possessor may give the statute in evidence or plead it in bar, not, as our statute says, “of certain legal remedies," but in bar in any suit or suits, claim or demand to be brought or made against him by the Crown or any other person whatsoever (1). Again, with respect to certain incorporeal rights claimed in, upon, or over lands, those rights, after the enjoyment under certain circumstances, for certain definite periods, without interruption, are vested in the person or persons who have exercised them, and rendered absolute and indefeasible (m). Affirm the estate of the subject. SECTION I. The Statutes in Relation to the Crown and the Duke of Cornwall. These statutes not only bar the remedy of the Crown and the Duke of Cornwall after the expiration of the period of limitation, or negative and exclude the right and title of the Crown and the Duke, but affirm and establish the estate of the subject (n). Lord Ellenborough, indeed, said (o), that the statute of the 9 Geo. 3 does not give a title. It only takes away the right of the Crown, or those claiming from the (1) Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. (m) 2 & 3 Will. 4, cc. 71, 100. c. 16; 48 Geo. 3, c. 47; 3 Inst. 188; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 105; Tuthill v. Rogers, 1 Jo. & Lat. 38. (0) Goodtitle d. Parker v. Baldwin, 11 East, 488. |