In equity, when. As to chattels real derived by the Crown action the Statute of Limitations be pleaded, upon which issue is joined-proof being given that the action did clearly accrue beyond the time fixed by the statute -the defendant, notwithstanding any agreement to inquire, is entitled to the verdict (u). In other words, the direct operation of the statute at law cannot be there prevented by the private agreement of the parties. In equity, however, such a contract, founded on a valuable consideration, might be enforced, and an injunction would be granted to restrain the pleading of the statute at law (x). If the Statutes of Limitation in relation to the property of the Crown (y) do not extend to chattels real, from a subject. and as the Crown is not within any of the other statutes of that nature, the time which has commenced against a subject in respect of such chattels, but not continued to the limit before they come to the Crown, will be suspended, and the prerogative will be available (z). Not on disabilities. As to advowsons. It has been said that the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, suspends the operation of its enactments during the disability of lunacy (a). But, as will be shown in the next chapter, the effect of the provisions as to disabilities would seem to be to extend the period of limita tion. When the possession of an advowson has once commenced adversely, and continues of that character during the whole of the prescribed period of limitation, no intermediate acknowledgment of the title of the rightful patron, as in the case of land and rent under the section 14, will suspend the period of limitation. (u) Per Lord Campbell, 5 Moore, I. A. C. 70. (x) Supra, p. 540. (y) Vide ante, p. 324. (z) See Lambert v. Taylor, 4 B. & C. 153. (a) Per Wood, V.-C., Manby v. Bewicke, 3 K. & J. 342. CHAPTER VI. THE EXTENSION OF THE SEVERAL PERIODS OF SECTION I. The Extension as respects the Crown and the Duke of Cornwall. THE period of limitation fixed by the statutes in rela- Extension for tion to the property of the Crown is not extended. the Crown, But the Crown, where it acquires property derivatively from a subject to whom, before such acquisition, the right to such property has accrued under, but is not barred by the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, although not within this statute (a), yet taken derivatively is, to the extent of the period which has already expired as against such subject, also bound (b); but, not being within the statute, will be entitled to such further period as, with that so expired, will complete the period of limitation prescribed by those statutes relating to the property of the Crown (c); and a grantee of the Crown will also be entitled to such further period as well as the Crown itself (d). Cornwall. The observations just made, as respects the periods and Duke of of limitations assigned to the Crown, apply equally to the Duke of Cornwall under the statutes affecting him (e). (a) Vide p. 248 et seq. C. 153. (e) Vide ante, p. 251 et seq. For other persons. For a mortgagee, and how. SECTION II. The Extension as respects other Persons. In various cases the several periods of limitation prescribed by the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, are under certain circumstances extended, and the rights are thus preserved for a longer period. In the case of a mortgage of land in the possession of the mortgagor, the period of limitation may be extended for the mortgagee, by the payment, or a series of payments, of any part of the principal or interest, although more than twenty years have elapsed since the right to enter first accrued (f) The twenty years prescribed by the sect. 2 may be extended by an acknowledgment in writing (g); and, from time to time before that period has elapsed, by a series of such acknowledgments, and the right to land and to rent may be thus preserved for an indefinite period (h). In this respect the statute is so framed as that, if a man enter into possession by permission of the true owner, and without payment of rent, and give an acknowledgment in writing of the title, from that moment the possession becomes adverse, and time begins to run; and instead of the real owner having an admission of title, upon which he may rest, the effect is the very reverse; the adverse possession, in fact, commences, and the statute begins to run. In such cases, therefore, where the operation of the statute is so powerful, parties must be careful to get such new acknowledgments, from time to time, as will admit their title, and thus preserve the right (i). (f) 1 Vict. c. 28; Wrixon v. Vize, 2 Con. & L. 138. (g) Sect. 14. (h) Incorporated Society v. Richards, 1 Con. & L. 58. (i) Scott v. Nixon, 3 Dru. & War. 388; 2 Con. & L. 185, S. C.; Burroughs v. M' Creight, 1 Jo. & Lat. 290. The extension by the sect. 15 was of a very partial and limited character, and is constantly becoming of less practical importance. That extension was only in those cases, in the terms of the section, where the possession, at the time of the passing of the act, was not adverse to the right of the claimant, as in cases of persons having rights under a common title, and of mortgagor and mortgagee (k). possessed of a term in right of his wife left her in possession of the land in order, as was assumed, to manage it for him, and she permitted her son to build upon the land a house and to live in it, on condition of supporting her, and he and his devisee held for more than twenty years, the possession was not adverse to her, and therefore not to her husband (7). So also where a husband gagor, and In cases of mortgage of land, in the possession of the For a mortmortgagee, the time for redemption may be extended, w in effect, by an acknowledgment in writing signed by the mortgagee, or by a series of such acknowledgments from time to time before the time for redemption has elapsed (m). So, in case of charges upon land or rent, and of lega- For claimants cies, the time within which such charges and legacies land and rent, of charges on are to be claimed may be extended by an acknowledg- and of legacies; ment, either in writing or by part payment, or by a series of such acknowledgments, before such time has expired (n). If, therefore, on the last day of the twenty years prescribed by the sects. 2, 28 and 40, an acknowledgment be given in accordance with the sect. 14, and the sects. (k) See Doe d. Burgess v. Thompson, 5 Ad. & E. 532; Doe d. Jones v. Williams, Ib. 291; Nepean v. Doe d. Knight, 2 M. & W. 894; Incorporated Society v. Richards, 1 Dru. & War. 258; Wricon v. Vize, 2 Con. & L. L. (1) Doe d. Wilkins v. Wilkins, 5 Nev. & M. 434; 1 Har. & W. 575, S. C. (m) Sect. 28, 1 Vict. c. 28; Wrixon v. Vize, 2 Con. & L. 138. (n) Sect. 40. N N -and of ar &c. 28 and 40, and so on for any number of times, the period of limitation may be extended indefinitely. In the cases of arrears of rent, or of interest of money rears of rent, charged upon or payable out of any land or rent, or in respect of any legacy, or any damages in respect of such arrears, an extended period of limitation may be given by an acknowledgment in writing (0). For persons under disabilities. Time of disability, how reckoned. Difference between 3 & 4 Will. 4, cc. 42 and 27. All the Statutes of Limitation, both ancient and modern, give to persons who are under certain disabilities a great degree of indulgence; but the indulgence is withdrawn from the time the disability ceases to exist (p). The degree of indulgence is regulated by the nature of the right, and is greater in certain cases, when the right is to be asserted in a personal action, than in certain other cases, when the right is to be asserted in an action real, or relating to realty. In the former cases the time, during which the disability, when existing at the accruer of the right, had existed, is not reckoned at all (q), but the period of limitation is reckoned from the time when the disability ceases (r); whilst in the latter cases the time during which, after the right has accrued, the disability existed, is reckoned as part of the period of limitation, but as in the case of acknowledgment (s) that period is suspended (t), or rather extended, for an additional period, commencing from the time when the disability ceases (u). In this respect the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, differs from the c. 27 of the same session. By the former chapter the period of limitation does not commence during the (0) Sect. 42. (p) 13 C. B. 819. (q) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, ss. 3, 7; 3 (s) See ss. 14, 28, 40; Scott v. Nixon, 3 Dru. & War. 388; 2 Con. & L. 185, S. C. (t) Manby v. Bewicke, 3 K. & J. 342. (u) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, ss. 1, 2; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 2, 16, 17, 18; Thomas v. Thomas, 2 K. & J. 79. |