and first accrued seventeen years prior to the filing of the bill, and therefore the claimants were within the period of limitation fixed by the statute; and the court, after alluding to this provision as not affecting the jurisdiction in cases of acquiescence, determined, as against a purchaser for value with notice, that the claimants had not acquiesced so far as to protect the purchaser. In Archbold v. Scully (x), also, the right was to land claimed by a landlord against his tenant, and therefore the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, was held not to affect the case, Lord Chelmsford, however, seems to have thought that the lapse of time which had occurred, being less than twenty years, amounted to simple laches or delay in asserting the right; but that, even if there had been acquiescence properly so called, although the period of limitation had not expired, relief might have been refused by this provision. If, in a suit to recover land, including charges thereon, or rent, in equity, the period of limitation can, under this provision, be shortened, it would seem to follow that an action of ejectment might be restrained by injunction, on the ground of acquiescence or otherwise, under its original jurisdiction, and thus, in effect, shorten the period of limitation at law, whilst there it can neither be extended (y) nor diminished by an equitable construction of the statute (z); and if titles, unquestionable at law, could be disturbed in equity, the Statute of Limitations would be useless, and no man could be sure of the possession of his estate (a). The legislature having prescribed a specific period of limitation in cases of express trust and concealed fraud involving land, including charges thereon and rent, and chiefly for the protection of purchasers for value, in the former case, whether with or without notice of (x) 9 H. L. C. 360. (y) Plowd. 371. (z) Ib. a breach of trust, but in the latter case, when neither assisting in, nor having notice, either actual or constructive, of the fraud, would seem to have intended merely to declare, ex abundanti cautelâ, that the act should not be construed to affect the rules or the jurisdiction of equity in cases not involving land, or charges thereon, or rent, and thus to exclude all question in such cases, and can scarcely be supposed to have intended to give to courts of equity, indirectly by a mere saving clause, jurisdiction to shorten, in such cases, the prescribed period of limitation. Courts of equity have always considered it of the Courts of greatest possible importance that parties should not equity, as to long-neglected sleep on their rights (b), and require persons to come rights, are passive. there in reasonable time. The peace of mankind, and the security of property, require it. If the demand is made under circumstances of inconvenience to individuals, that would break in upon those principles which are established for the peace of all the families constituting the great family of the public. Courts of equity have said you must go to those courts that were not made for a righteous man, if there be such courts; you cannot have relief in a court of equity (c). A suit to enforce an express contract to convey an estate, if nothing be done under it for a long time, although less, much less (d), than twenty years, and although the contract be under seal, and à fortiori a suit to enforce a right arising not by, but depending upon and collateral to, an express contract, as a right to contribution, after the lapse of a much less period than twenty years, will not be entertained (e). (b) 14 Beav. 113. (c) 9 Ir. Eq. R., N. S. 478. (d) Crofton v. Ormsby, 2 Sch. & L. 583; Heapy v. Hill, 2 Sim. & & S. 29; Watson v. Reid, 1 R. & M. 236; Walker v. Jefferys, 1 L. Hare, 341; Southcomb v. The (e) See Stone v. Yed, Jac. 426, L L The ground of those courts being so. In case of laches, as So, where a transaction is impeachable on only an equity arising out of the transaction itself, and less than twenty years have elapsed since the transaction took place, courts of equity constantly refuse relief to the person seeking their aid to impeach the transaction(ƒ). Even with respect to claims by a cestui que trust against an express trustee, the general rule of equity, that encouragement is not to be given to stale demands, is applicable; and in taking an account for the purpose of charging the trustee with personal liability, where the claim sought to be enforced is one which arose many years ago, and one of the nature and particulars of which the beneficiary was, at the time when it arose, perfectly cognizant, every fair allowance ought to be made in favour of the trustee (g). In these and analogous cases, courts of equity, however, in refusing relief upon stale demands, do not act either upon a presumption of actual payment or satisfaction (h), or on the ground of individual hardship or loss, or upon a bar by analogy to the Statute of Limitation (i), but upon public policy, upon the acknowledged principles of a court of equity, which, as Lord Camden said, in Smith v. Clay (k), " by its own proper authority always maintained a limitation, which prevented its being called into activity, unless at the requisition of conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence" (1). Mere laches, negligence (m) or delay, and acquiescence, however, are distinguishable. Merely abstain (f) See Oliver v. Court, 8 Pri. 127; Champion v. Rigby, 1 Russ. & M. 539; Gregory v. Gregory, G. Coop. 201; Atkins v. Delu, 12 Ir. Eq. R. 1; Roberts v. Tunstall, 4 Hare, 257; Smyth v. Smyth, 2 Mad. 75. (g) 11 H. L. C. 579. (h) Peyton v. M'Dermott, 1 Dru. & Wal. 198. (i) Chalmers v. Bradley, 1 J. & W. 51. (k) 3 B. C. C. 639, n.; Ambl. 645. (1) See Pomfret v. Windsor, 2 Ves. sen. 472; Merry v. Ryves, 1 Eden, 1, 7; Jones v. Tuberville, 2 Ves. sen. 11, 13; 4 B. C. C. 115; Peyton v. M'Dermott, supra. (m) Termes de la Ley, voc. Laches; Co. Litt. 380 b. ing from asserting by legal proceedings a right, is not distinguished from acquiesacquiescence but mere passive assent, and cannot be re- ence;" garded as anything more than laches or delay (n). Where one person invades the right of another, that other does not, in general, deprive himself of the right of seeking redress merely because he remains passive, unless, indeed, he continues inactive so long as to bring the case within the purview of the Statute of Limitations (o). Simply neglecting to enforce a claim during the period the law permits delay without losing the right cannot be any equitable bar by acquiescence; and where there is a Statute of Limitations, the objection of simple laches does not apply until the expiration of the time allowed by the statute (p). In effect, the laches by a person out of possession, and the laches by a person in possession, under whatever title, differ (q). Laches by a person in possession under an equitable title, in not clothing that title with the legal title, is not that species of laches which will prevail against the equitable title (r). Delay by children claiming the execution of marriage articles for seventeen years, and aware of their rights, but whose father had possession of the articles, and until very recently before the commencement of the suit was abroad with his regiment, was held, as against a purchaser for value with notice, not acquiescence (s). Mere laches, however, for a long period, short of the period of limitation, although insufficient to exclude the claimant from relief, may yet be ground for depriving him of costs (t). (n) 9 H. L. C. 388; 3 De G., F. & J. 74; Thompson v. Simpson, 1 Dru. & War. 459. (0) Per Lord Cranworth, V.-C., The Rochdale Canal Co. v. King, 2 Sim., N. S. 89. (p) See Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & L.474; Archbold v. Scully, (q) 5 Bli, N. R. 665. (8) Thompson v. Simpson, 1 Dru. & War. 459. (t) Archbold v. Scully, 9 H. L. C. 318. --and of acquiescence as from laches. In the case of landlord and tenant, as respects all accruing payments of rent, the legal principle is, that the right is constantly renewed. Arrears may be lost; but there can be no neglect in not enforcing what is not due, and therefore in such cases the doctrine of laches is inapplicable (u). Acquiescence, properly so called, is a different thing distinguished to, and means more than laches. If a person having a right stands by and sees another dealing with the property in a manner inconsistent with that right, and makes no objection while the act is in progress, he cannot afterwards complain. That is properly acquiescence (x). The person so acquiescing for a long period, during which the position of the other person has been substantially altered, would be in a position in which for him to enforce his right would be unconscientious, and interference on his behalf would be refused (y). Acquiescence also imports knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of the material facts alleged to have been acquiesced in (z); for a person cannot be said to have acquiesced in what he did not know (a), and as to claims which he did not know he could dispute (b). Length of time, where it does not operate as a statutory or positive bar, operates simply as evidence of assent or acquiescence. The two propositions of a bar by length of time and by acquiescence are not distinct propositions, but constitute one proposition (c). (u) Archbold v. Scully, 9 H. L. C. 360. (x) Duke of Leeds v. Earl Amherst, 2 Phill. 117; Archbold v. Scully, 9 H. L. C. 348. See also Hardcastle v. Shafto, 1 Anstr. 185; East India Company v. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83; 2 Mer. 362; Hickes v. Cooke, 4 Dow, 17; Selsey v. Rhoades, 1 Bli. N. R. 1; 2 Sim., N. S. 89. (y) Archbold v. Scully, 9 H. L. C. 348. (z) Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves. 427, 428; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & L. 474; More v. Royal, 12 Ib. 335; 2 Ball & B. 137; March v. Russell, 2 Myl. & C. 31; Ryder v. Bickerton, 3 Swanst. 81; Bennett v. Colley, 2 Myl. & K. 225; Wall v. Cockerell, 10 H. L. C. 229. (a) 2 Mer. 362; 3 De Gex, F. & J. 74. (b) 9 Hare, 16; Marquis of Clanricarde v. Henning, 30 Beav. 175. (c) Per Turner, L. J., 3 De G., F. & J. 72. |