deemed to have first accrued on the determination of such lease, as against any person whose possession or enjoyment of such manors, &c., or whose receipt of the rents, &c. thereof, has commenced during such lease, or who claims under any person whose possession or enjoyment of such manors, &c., or whose receipt of the rents, &c., have so commenced (q). In certain cases arising within the sixty years, the Cases within right of the Duke and of the Crown is, by the express right not the period when terms of the statutes, unaffected: as, firstly, where affected. either of them has been answered, by virtue of that right, the rents, revenues, issues and profits; secondly, where the right or title first accrues to the Duke or to the Crown (r); and, thirdly, where in the case of fee farm or other rents out of any of the property of which the estates, rights or interests being defective are established by the first act, such rents have been actually answered and paid to either of them (s). although all in The Duke and the Crown are not to be deemed to Profits of part have been answered the rents, &c. of any hereditaments not answered, which have been held or enjoyed, or of which the rents, charge. &c. have been taken, by any other person for sixty years next before any proceeding for recovering the same, or in respect thereof, by reason of the same having been part of any honour or manor or other hereditament, of which the rents, &c. have been answered to the Duke, or any person under whom he claims, or to the Crown, or which honour or manor or other hereditament has been duly in charge, or stood insuper of record (t). In the first instance, the mere circumstance of the property claimed, or of the rents, &c. thereof having been in charge, or stood insuper of record within the sixty years, was to preserve the right of the Duke or Statutes affect and the Duke are in pari materia. the Crown (u), but now is not to enable either of them to sue after that period has elapsed (x). As in the statutes in relation to the Crown alone, the subject referred to as being in charge is the rents, revenues, issues and profits, so are they, in these statutes in relation to the duchy of Cornwall, the same subject, but sometimes the property itself (y). These statutes in relation to the Duke of Cornwall, ing the Crown including the Crown, and the statutes in relation to the Crown alone just noticed, being in pari materiâ, and, in their main provisions and substance, in the same terms, and having the same objects, the interpretation generally of each class of these statutes will be the same as the other. Between subject and subject. Twenty years for land and rent. SECTION II. The Periods of Limitation between Subject and Subject. The several periods of time fixed for the different subjects to which the Statutes of Limitation are applied, vary with those subjects. When land or rent, within the meaning of those terms as used in the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, is claimed either at law (z) or in equity (a), by any natural person, or by any corporation aggregate, either lay, or spiritual or eleemosynary, the right thereto is to be asserted within twenty years next after the time when such right first accrued, subject to extension, however, in certain cases, as will be afterwards shown. When such land or rent is in mortgage, and is claimed to be redeemed by such persons or corporations, the right must be asserted within twenty years next after the time at which the mortgagee obtained the possession or receipt of the profits of the land, or the receipt of the rent comprised in the mortgage, or next after the time at which any acknowledgment, or if more than one, the last of the acknowledgments, of the title of the mortgagor or of his right of redemption, has been given in the mode specified (b). the minimum But when such land or rent is claimed, in either Sixty years jurisdiction, by any spiritual or eleemosynary corpo- for certain corration sole, the right thereto is to be asserted within the porations. period during which two persons in succession have held the office or benefice in respect whereof such land or rent is claimed, and six years after a third person has been appointed thereto, if such period and term together amount to sixty years; and if together they do not amount to this term, then during such further number of years, in addition to such six years, as, with such holding and such six years, will make sixty years, and not at any time afterwards (c). cessor not predecessor. Formerly, although the right might have accrued to Formerly sucany of these corporations sole, a new right accrued to affected by every successor on his appointment (d), and therefore time against no lapse of time against a predecessor affected a successor. By this provision the period of limitation is reckoned from the time next after that when the right of any such corporation, or of his predecessor, first accrued. After the expiration of the statutory period, an invalid exchange of glebe land made before the statute will be valid (e). Where the rent is continuously received by the owner Effect of reof it from the owner of only a part of the lands charged ceipt of rent with it, the right of the claimant of the rent or of his only part of (b) Sect. 28. (c) Sect. 29. (d) Plowd. 375, 537, 538; Greenlaw v. King, 3 Beav. 49. (e) See Thorpe v. Plowden, 14 M. & W. 520; 7 Cl. & F. 137. from owner of land. For advowsons minimum, predecessor, as against the other lands charged, will not accrue (d). When advowsons are claimed in either jurisdiction sixty years the by any such natural person, or by any such corporation, either aggregate or sole, the right is to be asserted within the period during which three clerks in succession have held the benefice, having obtained possession thereof adversely to the right of the claimant, or of some person through whom he claims, when such incumbencies together amount to sixty years, and when they do not amount to that time, then such further time as with those incumbencies will make up that term (e). -one hundred years the maximum time. When the right is claimed by virtue of any estate, interest or right, which the owner of an estate tail in the advowson might have barred, the claimant is to be deemed to claim through the person entitled to the estate tail, and the right is limited accordingly (ƒ ). The reason for this appears in Boswell's case (g). In no case, however, after the expiration of 100 years from the time when a clerk obtains possession of the benefice adversely to the right of the claimant, or of some person through whom he claims, or of some person entitled to some preceding estate or interest, or undivided share, or alternate right of presentation, or gift of the person so claiming, or of some person through whom he claims, or of some other person entitled in respect of an estate, share or right held or derived under the same title (h). Here the first period of limitation is neither an absolute term of sixty years, nor such a term irrespective of the number of incumbencies happening within it, but, at the least, three incumbencies, successive and adverse, and their minimum aggregate duration that number of years, and if not extending (d) Archbishop of Dublin v. Lord Trimleston, 12 Ir. Eq. Rep. 264; post, p. 447. (e) Sect. 30. (f) Sect. 32. (g) 6 Rep. 50 a, b. over that number, then so many more years as will complete it, whilst the maximum period of limitation in any case is 100 years after the possession has become adverse, irrespective of the number of incumbencies happening within that period. verse the whole time. The benefice must be held during the whole of the The holding prescribed period of limitation adversely to, that is, in- must be adconsistent with (i), the right of the claimant, and may be either presentative, or, since the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 54, collative, belonging to a bishop, either in right of his see, or in his own right. tation and The difference between presentation and collation is, Difference bethat the former is a giving and offering of the parson to tween presenthe church, and makes a plenarty, and the latter is a collation. giving of the church to the parson, and does not make a plenarty (j). when made, Collation is frequently made to benefices presentative, Collation, and is either without title, or upon a lapse which hap- and its effect. pens, first to the bishop, at the end of six months after the vacancy, then to the metropolitan at the end of another six months from the first six, and lastly to the Crown, at the end of another six months from the second (k), and whether before (1), or upon (m), a lapse is an equivocal act. When made before, may be either by right or only provisionally for celebration of divine service until the patron present, and does not affect his possession (n), and the possession of the clerk collated is not adverse to the patron (o). When made upon lapse is neither a trespass nor an exercise of adverse possession, but the bishop collates either as patron or as attorney of the patron, and the collation is in right of the latter, and an exercise of his possession (p). (i) See Hardman v. Ellames, 2 Myl. & K. 732. (j) 1 Leon. 226. (k) Plowd. 498; 1 Inst. 344 b; 2 Ib. 361; 6 Rep. 52; 1 Smythe's Ir. Rep. 517. (1) Co. Litt. 344 b. (m) 4 Cl. & F. 495. (n) 6 Rep. 50 a; Co. Litt. 344 b. (0) Ib.; Green's case, 6 Rep. 29; Boswell's case, Ib. 49. (p) Reg. v. Archbishop of York, 1 Leon. 226; Meath v. Winchester, 4 Cl. & F. 445; London v. Derry, 1 Smythe's Ir. Rep. |