As to advowsons. all the others of the class (p), and after such entry the possession of the one so entering was the possession of all the others of the same class (q), and not adverse to them (r); and after such an entry, neither the taking of the whole profits by any one of these joint owners without accounting to the others for their shares (s), nor any mere claim of the whole (t), nor such taking and such claim together (u), affected the possession of the others. But the mere receipt of the whole of the profits by one of these joint owners, for a period of forty years without any claim by the others, was deemed a sufficient acquiescence of the others in the receipt, as, under an adverse holding, to warrant the presumption by a jury of an actual ouster of and a bar to the others (x). An entry, however, by one of these joint owners claiming the whole and taking the profits of the whole divests, in law, the freehold of the other (y). For claiming the whole and denying possession to the other is beyond the mere act of receiving the whole rent, which is equivocal (z). The seisin or possession of an advowson consists in presenting a clerk to fill the church, and until a presentation by the person claiming the advowson, his possession is but a quasi possession or a possession in law (a), and he cannot be deprived of it otherwise than by admission and institution upon an usurpation by a presentation to the church, and not by collation of the bishop (b). (p) Litt. s. 398; Co. Litt. 243 b, 373 b; Hob. 120; Doe d. Reed v. Taylor, 5 Ad. & E. 575. (q) Ford v. Grey, 1 Salk. 285; 6 Mod. 44; Davenport v. Tyrell, 1 Bl. 675; Doe d. Thorn v. Phillips, 3 B. & Ad. 753; Doe d. Fishar et al. v. Prosser, Cowp. 217; Peaceable v. Read, 1 East, 568. (r) Culley v. Doe d. Taylerson, 11 Ad. & E. 1008. (8) Litt. s. 398; Co. Litt. 243 b, 373 b, 374 a; Fairclaim v. Shackleton, 5 Burr. 2604; 2 Salk. 423; 2 Atk. 632; Doe v. Hulse, 5 B. & C. 757. (t) Smales v. Dale, Hob. 120. (u) Co. Litt. 243 b, 273 b. (x) Doe d. Fishar et al. v. Prosser, Cowp. 217; 1 East, 575. (y) Co. Litt. 373 b; Doe d. Fishar et al. v. Prosser, Cowp. 217. () Per Cur. Doe d. Hellings v. Bird, 11 East, 51. (a) Co. Litt. 29 a. (b) Ib. 344 b. In the case of an advowson vested in joint tenants (c), and tenants in common (d), all of them respectively should join in the presentation. But vested in coparceners, if they cannot agree to present, they (e) and their assignees (f) present according to seniority of age of the coparceners. one only. The presentation, however, by one of two joint Effect of presentation by tenants (g), or tenants in common (h), or parceners (i), and the admission of the clerk so presented, does not affect the possession of the other joint owner. But if, as they may (k), they make partition to present by turns every one is to be taken and adjudged to be seised of his or her separate part of the advowson to present in his or her turn (7). If a next presentation be derived from one of several coparceners, and before it arrives, the one from whom it is derived and some of the others usurp the turns of some of the other coparceners, those usurpations will not affect the right to such presentation in the order in which, but for such usurpations, it would have been reckoned, but in determining it such usurpations will be counted as turns. Thus, where an advowson vested in four coparceners, and on the seventh turn, which belonged to the third daughter, arriving, she being dead, leaving two coheirs, a dispute as to the right to present arose between them. The younger of the two, pending a quare impedit between them, presented, and on the death of the clerk so presented the elder of these two presented, and on the next vacancy the persons claiming under the youngest of the four coparceners presented. (c) Wilson v. Kirkshaw, 1 Ves. 413; 7 B. & C. 296. (d) 2 Roll. Ab. 372. (e) Co. Litt. 166 b; Plowd. 333. (f) 2 Inst. 365; Buller v. Bishop of Exeter, 1 Ves. 340; Willes' Rep. 663. (g) 1 Inst. 186 b; 2 Ib. 365. (h) 2 Roll. Ab. 372. (i) 13 Edw. 1, c. 5; 1 Inst. 243 a; 2 Ib. 365; 2 Roll. Ab. 346; see also Barker v. Lomax, Willes' Rep. 659, 1 H. Bl. 412; 10 B. & C. 607. (k) Bishop of Sarum v. Philips, 1 Ld. Raym. 535. (1) 7 Anne, c. 18, s. 2. The position of such owners inter se since c. 27, as to -land and rent, -advowsons. Guardian and ward. The last presentation was held to be the tenth (m), and the next was held to be the eleventh and to belong to the younger of the two coheirs of the third coparcener (n). Since the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, however, this relation in connection with our present subject and as regards land and rent within the meaning of the section 1, has been deprived of those advantages and privileges, and the persons placed in this relation are now in the same position inter se as strangers (o). But where one of these joint owners holds under a lease the undivided shares of the other owners, but by paying no rent reserved by the lease takes all the profits for twenty years, he acquires no title to such shares, whether the right be legal or equitable (p). This relation, however, when subsisting in respect of advowsons still remains in all its force. For the section 12 applies to land and to rent only. Advowsons are the subject of special enactments, without any one corresponding with that section. But this is to be understood as applicable in those cases only where no partition has been made between any of these joint owners to present in turns. Where any such partition has been made they are severally seised (7), and the presentation by one only on the turn of another would be an usurpation, and adverse to the possession of the other. The next special relation we notice is that of guardian and ward. Whilst this relation continues, the guardian or any person claiming under him (r) cannot acquire (m) See Pyke v. Bishop of (n) Richards v. The Earl of (0) Sect. 12; Culley v. Doe d. 1 Ir. Eq. Rep. 634; Lessee O'Sul livan v. M'Swiney, Longf. & T. 111; Doe v. Horrocks, 1 Car. & K. 566; Doe d. Jacobs v. Phillips, 11 Jur. 692; Murphy v. Murphy, 15 Ir. L. R. 205; 9 H. L. C. 360. (p) Archbold v. Scully, 9 H. L. C. 360. (g) 7 Anne, c. 18, s. 2. (r) Quinton v. Frith, Ir. L. R. 2 Eq. 396. adversely to his ward any title to the lands of the latter. And the unbroken continuance of the management of the property by the guardian after the ward has attained majority is in effect a continuance of the guardianship as to the property (s). This is so not only in the case of guardians proper, Quasi guardian but also in the case of quasi guardians, although not perhaps quite to the same extent. Any person, whether a relative or a stranger, but not being in the position of a legal guardian (t), entering upon and receiving without authority the rents and profits of the estate of an infant is, during the minority of the infant, quasi guardian (u); and if the entry and receipt be continued after the infant has attained majority is thenceforth quasi bailiff of the infant (x), or a trustee for him, and be treated by the infant having the legal estate as a trespasser, and is liable, in an action of trespass for mesne profits, for all the profits accrued during the minority of the infant (y). And the person so entering cannot set up any other title to the lands(z) than quasi guardian or quasi bailiff. In equity such person may be treated, at the election of the owner, after attaining majority, either as bailiff or as guardian or as trustee (a). But such owner electing to take his equitable remedy must take it upon equitable terms. If, therefore, the entry was with other persons jointly he must pursue his may (8) 1 Sim. & S. 145. (t) See Co. Litt. 88 b et seq. and notes; Treat. Eq. book ii. pt. ii. c. ii. s. 2, n. (h). (u) Litt. s. 124; Co. Litt. 89 b; Com. Dig. tit. Accompt (A. 2) 2; Fitzh. N. B. 117 b, 118; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 489; Dormer v. Fortescue, 3 Ib. 129; Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Kay & J. 79; Pelley v. Bascombe, 4 Giff. 390. (x) Litt. s. 124; Co. Litt. 90 a; Com. Dig. tit. Accompt (A. 3) 2; 2 Inst. 380; Fitz. N. B. 118; 4 Giff. 395; Dormer v. Fortescue, supra; 2 P. W. 645; Griffin v. (y) 3 De Gex, M. & G. 801; 6 (z) Litt. s. 124; Thomas v. When quasi relation arises. Difference in equity between entry of a remedy against all the persons jointly liable by reason of such entry (b). The equitable remedy enables the owner to obtain, more easily than at law, the discovery upon oath of books and papers (c). This quasi relation arises not only where the possession is assumed without title, but also where it has been under an adverse judgment recovered at law, and where it has been taken by mistake on a supposed title (d). In equity, however, it seems that the entry by a relation is totally different from that of a mere stranger (e). relation and of This difference would seem to be not in the nature of a stranger. the character attributed to them, but only in the extent of the liability, in point of time and amount, to the award; e. g., the account of profits, in equity at least, may be directed more readily and for a longer period against a relation than against a mere stranger (ƒ). How far receipt of profits of infant's estate a trust and within 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, This receipt of the profits of the estate of an infant is not such a trust in the view of a court of equity as that after the lapse of six years from the termination of the minority, or the waiver of an account within that period (g), an action or suit by the infant for an account will not be barred by the Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16 (h); and, if a suit in equity for an account be within the statute, is so only by analogy to the action of account at law, and in that proceeding the case of infancy is saved. That statute therefore would be no bar to such a suit for the account for the whole period of the infancy during which the right accrued, although for more than six years before the commencement of |