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be deprived of their votes by fraud or force. Our own history has its own unerasable illustration of this law of politics. When the North gave the ignorant negroes the ballot after 1865, it also forced the carpet bag state and local governments upon the South, and thereby the subversion of law and social order. The educated and dominant classes of the South restored order and law through the unlawful anarchy of the Ku Klux Klan and by illegally depriving the negroes of their votes. This was one of the few revolutions in history, from the top down, to restore law and order, and therefore it was legitimatized and made permanent by decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

How complete are the electoral changes which are taking place in all democracies can be well illustrated in the case of England. About 1788 Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist that the English House of Commons. had 556 members, of whom one-ninth were elected by 354 persons, and one-half by 5,723. This was the climax of the rotten borough system in England.

One hundred years ago, the proportion of persons who could vote in England was..

1 in 40

In 1832, by the addition of the middle class, this was increased to...

1 in 24

After 1867 the working classes in towns were made voters and the polls were open to...

1 in 12

......

By the act of 1884, agricultural laborers were en-
franchised and the ballot given to.....
The law of 1918 added 8,000,000 new voters or
2,000,000 men and 6,000,000 women, of whom
5,000,000 were married-a registry of.....

1 in 7

1 in 3

This gives England a new democracy and a government of the people, which will assuredly soon lead to full government by the people and thereafter for the people, unless Marxism intervenes and makes it government of and by and for the proletariat. A like change in the

nature of our own electorate has been in progress since 1789, and we must wisely meet the altered conditions which will follow. This also removes any excuse for a social revolution such as Marx advocated seventy years ago.

It is a grave question whether European parliamentary government will be a safe form of government where universal suffrage prevails and there are not the checks and counterchecks of a revered and cast-iron constitution. The English Parliament gained its power under a monarchy where less than one person in one hundred could vote and where the legislators were drawn from the finest lot of freemen in the world. In those slow days, such a parliament was not likely to be swept from its feet by any sudden popular clamor. Modern conditions and the modern electorate are entirely different from those under which the English parliamentary system was developed. Nowadays there is nothing stable in regard to a European cabinet. A single powerful newspaper may overturn it in a day; a breath of unwarranted popular disfavor may blow it away. The multiplicity of parliamentary parties often makes it impossible to get a majority except by bargaining and wire-pulling. This militates against a strong, trusted and stable government which is a prerequisite for purposive government. With universal suffrage it is perfectly evident that no European parliamentary democracy can get as satisfactory results as we have out of our government of checks and counterchecks, and of fixed duration under a written constitution to which the people bow until they see fit to change its provisions,

XXII

CHANGES IN THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EX-
ECUTIVE WROUGHT BY THE GROWTH
OF PURPOSIVE GOVERNMENT

A

T the date of the Declaration of Independence the proportion of the old-fashioned English and colonial operative government to purposive government was about 1,000 to 1. To-day it does not exceed 1 to 4 or I to 5. In other words, the relative amount of ruling government to purposive government has changed from 1,000 to 1 to less than I to 4. Such a change in the operations and outlook and demands upon our political institutions must necessarily have involved a corresponding change in the instrumentalities by which those governments were carried on as well as new methods of using the old instrumentalities. This change is like that which has taken place in ocean transportation during the same period. We still carry freight and passengers by ships, but the size of the largest vessels has increased from 200 ton wooden sailing ships to 50,000 ton steel

steamers.

The changes of our old-fashioned governments to rule the people into those engaged in the business of helping the people have entirely changed the functions, powers and duties of the executive and legislature; have produced a new form of judicial functions which, in a sense, is more important than that of the ordinary law courts; and have made the political party a mere shell of what it was, and already clearly indicates what its functions are to be in

the near future, in connection with purposive government. These changes in these four agencies of government are fundamental and radical and will be considered in order.

Our colonial forefathers regarded the governor of the colony either as a miniature of the English king, or as his direct representative, or, in some colonies, as the representative of the proprietor to whom the King had conveyed his rights over the colony. On the contrary, the legislature was elected by the people and therefore was presumed to represent their wishes. The governors had the power of veto which was often unscrupulously or unwisely used by dishonest or hot-headed men. The only check upon these governors arose from the fact that the amount and payment of their salaries were usually dependent upon the vote of the legislature, which thus held the purse-strings. Nevertheless as we read our colonial history we cannot help feeling that the life of a colonial governor sent out from England was not always a happy one; and often without any fault of his. Too often the governors were expressly directed to enforce unpopular royal behests or to veto too radical legislation, and thus became the scapegoats in the colonial governmental troubles.

This feeling against the governor was carried through from colonial times to statehood times. All governors, royal or state, looked alike to our fathers, who thought that none of them could be trusted very far; that real safety lay in the legislature which was elected annually, and which, therefore, represented the people better than the executive or the judiciary could possibly do. The first state constitutions greatly restricted the powers of the governor and amplified those of the legislature. The New York Constitution of 1777 (twelve years before the United States Constitution became effective) fixed the

governor's term at three years and made him the general and commander-in-chief of the militia and admiral of the navy of the State. Otherwise, he was practically a figurehead, with no power of appointment, even of the militia officers under him. The power to sign or veto bills was vested in the Council of Revision, composed of the governor, chancellor and Supreme Court justices. Except the few named in the constitution, all ordinary local and state officials were not to be elected, but were to be named by a Council of Appointment, consisting of four senators, with the governor as president, but with only a casting vote. The Assembly was annually to appoint, openly, these four senators, who were eligible for only two successive years. A majority of the Council was a quorum. All military and other officials, whose terms were not fixed by the constitution, were to be appointed at the pleasure of the Council. Sheriffs and coroners were to be annually appointed, but not for more than four consecutive years. Officers of the higher courts and attorneys were to be named by those courts. In 1821 the Council appointed 8,285 military officers and 6,663 civil officers and justices of the peace-14,948 in all.

Thus a majority of the dominant party in the Assembly, through its selection of the Council of Appointment, absolutely controlled the political and military patronage of the State, without regard to the rights of the other parties, or the majority of the Senate, or the executive or the people, from whom even the power to elect their ordinary local officials was taken and vested in a political clique of the legislature. This neat little plan, in force for thirty-four years, would be very acceptable to any state boss to-day. Yet these constitutional provisions were proposed and adopted in absolute good

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