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meaning of the rules which I summarize throughout because it would take me hours to read every word is this. The neutral ships must not carry belligerent implements or materials of war specified in the list, but, considering the advance of science and the possibility of new discoveries, belligerents may add by public declaration and notification to that list other articles, provided that they are articles exclusively used in war. Accordingly our merchants will know very well what to avoid if they are going to deliver goods in belligerent countries.

I now come to conditional contraband—that is to say, contraband only in special circumstances. Goods susceptible for use in war, as well as for the purposes of peace, will always be regarded as being possibly and sometimes treated as contraband. There is a list, also, of conditional contraband provided in the Declaration. So far as I have heard in this debate, and so far as I know, although I do not pretend to be as diligent a student of the newspaper press as perhaps I ought to be, there is no complaint as to any article included in that list except foodstuffs-a most important article, of course, I quite agree, and one on which the whole of this controversy really turns. A great deal of complaint and clamor, and, I venture respectfully to think, not always very well-informed or well-instructed clamor, has arisen because we have agreed in this list that foodstuffs may in certain circumstances be regarded and treated as contraband of war. People speak as if it is the final abandonment by this country of all the principles that we have insisted upon. Great Britain has always treated foodstuffs as being conditional contraband-that is to say, as being matter which may or may not be contraband according to the circumstances of the case. No one who knows the subject will question that. So have all other countries. You can perfectly well imagine that in some circumstances the supply of food to an enemy may save his army from utter destruction, and may be of far more assistance to him and more prejudicial to the other belligerent than the supply of any number of pistols, rifles, and ammunition of war. The difference between us and other countries with regard to the treatment of foodstuffs has been very wide and marked, but it has not been with regard to the right to treat foodstuffs as conditional contraband, but as to the circumstances in which foodstuffs can be so treated. There is history connected with this branch of the subject. As I understand the documents, bluebooks, and historical accounts, France, Germany and Russia have at times asserted that foodstuffs were liable to be seized under all circumstances-not any special circumstances, but in all circunstances to whatever port they were destined if they were destined to a belligerent port. That would be most dangerous indeed to the interests of this country if it were allowed, because we are dependent more than any other nation in the

world upon imported food. The British rule was that foodstuffs could be captured only if their destination was in effect to help the fighting forces of the belligerent. I think myself, and I hope your lordships who have studied the documents will consider, that the Declaration does in very little depart from the British rule adapted to modern circumstances.

Let me summarize the effect of articles 33 and 34 to which Lord Selborne drew particular attention, and which, indeed, I admit are of great moment in connection with this subject. Henceforth foodstuffs are free unless they come within articles 33 and 34. They are contraband if they come within 33 and 34. They are contraband if the are destined for the use of the armed forces of the enemy or of a Government department of the enemy State. And according to the Declaration they are presumed, though the contrary may be proved, to be so destined if they are consigned to the enemy authorities or consigned to a trader established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. It has been pointed out that supplying articles of this kind to the enemy may mean to the individual enemy and not to the enemy Government. Sir Edward Grey has stated that when we ratify this Declaration we shall make it clear that all we agreed to is that it should mean "supplied to the enemy Government." Food supplies are also, under the Declaration, presumed to be contraband if they are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or to another place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. I will advert in one moment to the phrase that was commenced upon, "base for the armed forces of the enemy," but is not that, on the whole, very near the English rule as regards foodstuffs being treated as contraband of war, subject only to the point made about the words, "a base for the armed forces of the enemy"? In my opinion that does not, and can not, apply in the case of our being at war, to all the ports in England, as one noble lord suggested it would. It cannot so apply, and when he asks us to give an illustration, I say for instance the port of Bristol. But may I take this attitude, which I believe your lordships will accept and will assent to? I do not think it is possible to say "serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy" would enable an enemy to treat all the ports of England as a base for our armed forces, otherwise it would reduce the articles to an absurdity. And I do hope that no one of your lordships, or no responsible writer in this country, will give countenance to an idea of that kind in any speech he may make or any letter he may write.

LORD DESBOROUGH. The report distinctly states "base of supply.” That is a very important point. The original document is enlarged into "base of supply," not merely "armed place."

The LORD CHANCELLOR. I think your lordships would not desire or think it appropriate that I should enter upon a legal argument upon that subject before your lordships. I ask you to accept as my opinion, about which I entertain no real doubt, that you could not treat any port, except ports which are actually magazines for war or actually places of equipment for war, as being within the term "base for the armed forces of the enemy."

Let me pass on, on the subject of contraband, to the only other point that remains. Some nations, notably America, have asserted that if the ultimate destination of a cargo of food or other conditional contraband is to the enemy, you may seize it even if its primary destination is a neutral port. An illustration may be given. Supposing for example, we were, which Heaven forbid we ever should be, engaged in a war against Germany. According to the American doctrine, which was applied in their Civil War, you might stop conditional contraband destined for Germany which was to be delivered in the first instance at Rotterdam. The British rule has never been clearly defined, although we acquiesced in practice during the American Civil War in the American doctrine. The Declaration of London abolishes this doctrine, which is known as the doctrine of continuous voyage, for conditional contraband-that is to say, for food-and establishes it for absolute contraband. Were we right in agreeing to this? In the first place, it was difficult for us if we wished to oppose it, because we could not say absolutely that it was contrary to the British rule. But ought we to resist it? Is it to our disadvantage? We are more in need of foreign supplies of food than any nation in the world.

The Declaration in this particular facilitates the supply of food through a neutral port. Suppose we were at war with Germany. Food could come from America under the Declaration of Paris quite free and safe to a French port and be run across the Channel, even if we had lost command of the sea-or, at least, it would have a chance of running across the Channel. I admit, on the other hand, that food could be safely supplied to Germany through Rotterdam under this Declaration. Which stands to gain most by the Declaration facilitating this kind of trade? I say Great Britain stands to gain most, because we are more dependent upon foreign food, and because we can not, and Germany can, get food supplies by land transit across her frontiers. The Declaration of Paris in this respect can be no more than convenient to Germany. It may be absolutely vital for our advantage. Let me take another illustration, because a great deal of attack has been levelled against this part of the Declaration. Let me again suppose that we are at war with Germany. A ship laden with food starts from America for one of the belligerent countries, Great

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Britain. Suppose her bound for Bristol. If you reject the Declaration, Germany might claim to seize her on her way. If you accept the Declaration, Germany could not seize her. But suppose she is bound for Havre, a neutral port. If you reject the Declaration, Germany might seize her under the doctrine of continuous voyage. If you accept the Declaration, Germany could not seize her, because she was destined for Havre, which is a neutral port. I think this is distinctly in our favour if we are belligerents; and it is admittedly in our favor if we are neutrals, because it enlarges our opportunity of trade and commerce.

I pass now to the destruction of neutral prizes, which has been the subject of attack by many people. All nations assert the right to destroy neutral prizes, if they find they can not take them into a port, except Great Britain, Japan, Spain, and Holland. That is the law which they would apply in their prize court if you reject this Declaration. Even the record of Great Britain is not quite clear upon this subject of the destruction of neutral ships. The Declaration allows it, but allows it subject to distinct conditions. The ship may be destroyed if the observance of article 48-that means taking her into a port for adjudication-would involve danger to the safety of the warship or to the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time. Supposing we reject this Declaration. Our enemy would destroy neutral prizes at discretion, without any limitation at all, acting upon her own law. But suppose that we are neutral and our merchant ships are destroyed? This actually happened, as we know, in the Russo-Japanese War. We were then put to the choice I have referred to, either of allowing the incident to pass uncompensated, or of having recourse to war with Russia. Of course, the late Government, like sensible men, never thought of making that a subject of a declaration of war. If that happened again after this Declaration had been ratified Russia would have to submit to the international court and to pay compensation if she was found to be wrong. These are the only points in this Declaration which have been made, I think, the subject of attack in this House, and they are the chief points, almost the only material points, which are attacked in the campaign outside this House.

The noble lord, Lord Desborough, complained that no provision appears in the Declaration to deal with the difficult point of the conversion of merchant ships into war vessels on the high seas. Nations differ upon this subject, and it was found impossible to arrive at an agreement. We should have liked to have arrived at an agreement very much, but we could not because other people would not agree to it. Is it not a strange subject of complaint that having done our best to agree with other nations, we found that other nations were not willing to agree with us? The only real point is this, whether, being

unable to get agreement upon this point, and therefore being obliged to leave the point in the chaos of uncertainty and obscurity in which it now rests, we were to refuse to agree to all the other terms which the other powers were willing to give us? That is the point.

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Now what does it all come to? So far as this Declaration touches the law we gain certainty for our shipowners and our merchants by laying down rules which, if they are observed, can make their commerce safe. Then, do we pay too high a price for it? Every one will agree that certainty of that kind is a very desirable thing if we do not pay too high a price. I have endeavored to show your lordships, by examining point by point the different changes that have been made, that as a whole we have not lost but actually gained. It has not been for us to consider what price we would pay. There has been no price paid. It is a profit, and not a payment of price. We submit decisions of our own courts to an international tribunal. That is true. My lords, that only affects cases in which we have captured or arrested neutral vessels. Even if the international tribunal were biassed-an assumption which, I hope, will not be made in regard to all the great nations of the world-the subjects that the international prize court can deal with are not of such magnitude that they can vitally affect us. My noble friend Lord Desart said, in his admirable speech, much upon that point which was well worthy of reflection. On the other hand, whenever our vessels, being neutral, are captured or arrested, we have an appeal from the belligerent prize court to the international court, which we did not have before, and in either case, seeing that the great source of difficulty and embarrassment has been the friction arising between a belligerent and a neutral, it must be remembered that we have the means under this Declaration of avoiding friction with nations with which we are at peace, by referring disputes between us to this international tribunal. We also obtain by the Declaration the law which all prize courts are to administer. In regard to blockades we get substantially, I think, our own law. In regard to contraband we get better security for our food supplies than we might or probably should have had if foreign nations had been left to apply their own law. And in regard to the destruction of neutral ships we make a doubtful concession, having regard to our own previous practice, but we limit the rights now asserted by nearly all the powers of the world.

I would ask your lordships to bear in mind that we are not the only nation in the world. We are not the only maritime or commercial nation in the world. If we wish, as some writers apparently desire that we should, to stand by our own law even to the last jot and tittle, if we are to refuse such concessions in return for the advantages which I have endeavored to place before your lordships,

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