view. For instance, Mr. Gibson Bowles,1 one of the few people in this country who have mastered the 2,000 pages of the French Blue Book relating to this matter, takes the view that the establishment of the prize court is the king pin of the situation, and that if the prize court is not set up the Declaration falls to the ground. I hope that His Majesty's Government will make this point quite clear.

There is another question I should like to ask before briefly discussing a few points of the Declaration, and it is one on which there has been a good deal of controversy among international lawyers in the public press. It is this: Is the report of Mr. Renault, which is a running commentary on each article of the Declaration, to be taken as authoritative? From some points of view it seems to make the Declaration better; from other points of view it seems to make it worse; while yet, again, from others it seems difficult to reconcile it with the Declaration at all. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has stated that

The international prize court, if set up, will be bound to construe the text in conformity with the terms of the report.

Sir Thomes Barclay, at the summer conference of the International Law Association, said:

I have never heard of any such suggestion being made by a practical lawyer. And Prof. Holland has stated that

Such a report as that which accompanies the Declaration of London has no claim to the sort of interpretative authority which has been attributed to it, nor is it desirable that the requisite steps should be taken to give it that authority. It would be calamitous should a practice be introduced of attempting to cure the imperfect expression of a treaty by tacking on to it an equally authoritative reasoned commentary.

And he goes on to say

The fact is that the vitally important questions of theory and practice raised by the convention and Declaration need calmer and better instructed discussion than they have yet received. Ought they not to be referred to a royal commission, on which should be placed representatives of the navy and merchant service, of the corn trade, and of the colonies, together with international lawyers, in touch with the views of their continental colleagues?

Be that as it may, it is absolutely impossible to gauge the effects of this new Declaration unless one knows whether the report in the shape of a running commentary by M. Renault is authoritative or not; and, if it is authoritative, perhaps the suggestion of Prof. Westlake, Mr. Cohen, and others, that it should be ratified by all the

1 One of the most vigorous opponents of the naval prize bill was Thomas Gibson Bowles, the late member from King's Lynn-Conservative, 1892-1906: Liberal, 1910-and author of Maritime warfare, The Declaration of Paris, 1856, and Sea law and sea power as they would be affected by recent proposals; with reasons against those proposals. He contributed generously to The Times and current periodicals, and addressed many meetings held to protest against the passage of the bill and the ratification of the Declaration of London.

powers concerned, should be carried out. A categorical answer from the Government on this point appears to be absolutely necessary.

As regards the Declaration itself, I propose to confine my remarks to three main points raised by the various chambers of commerce in their protests to the Foreign Office. These protests have been answered at some length by the Foreign Office, which has taken up the view that the Chambers did not understand international law or the law of nations as now very generally interpreted, and also that they had misconceived the alterations introduced into that generally accepted law by this new code. That, of course, may be so, and I only hope that this discussion may do something to clear away these misconceptions. In these islands we can not afford to have misconceptions on sea laws which affect our national existence. The merchants, traders, shipowners, corn dealers, and underwriters, nay even the people at large, must understand. These matters affect the business man; they are not religious mysteries, or murmured incantations of priests behind a veil. The Declaration, when ratified, is to hold good for 12 years; none of the signatory powers can denounce it within that time. I am no enemy of international agreements, of arbitration courts, or of proposals for limiting armaments, and I am as alive to the horrors of war as any member of this Chamber; but international agreements should be fair and not one-sided, otherwise they may provoke the very war which all the friends of peace wish to avoid. This Declaration and the international prize court have nothing to do with peace; they only take effect when war has actually broken out.

My lords, the Declaration of London is divided into 9 chapters, and concludes with some final provisions; there are 71 articles altogether. The chapters dealing with blockade in time of war, with unneutral service, with the transfer of the neutral flag, enemy character, convoy, resistance to search, and compensation, I propose to leave to others who are more capable of pointing out where they are injurious, if they are injurious, to the interests of this country. I shall confine my criticisms to three main points-first, the effect of the Declaration in exposing to capture or deliberate destruction of food supplies borne to this country in time of war in neutral vessels; secondly, the admission of the principle of destruction of neutral prizes; and, thirdly, the absence of any provision in the Declaration for preventing the conversion of merchant vessels into commerce destroyers on the high seas.

As regards the first point, the question of food supplies, it should be observed that there are three divisions of articles made by the Declaration. The first is absolute contraband, the second conditional contraband, and the third the free list. Articles exclu

sively used for war are absolute contraband. The free list contains articles which may not be declared contraband of war, and which, with the notable exception of cotton and hemp, never have been declared contraband of war. But what concerns us most is the list of articles susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace, which may, without notice, be treated as contraband of war under the name of "conditional contraband." The list of conditional contraband is given in article 24 of the Declaration, and is as follows: (1) Foodstuffs; (2) forage and grain suitable for feeding animals; (3) clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes suitable for use in war; (4) gold and silver in coin or bullion and paper money; (5) vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts; (6) vessels, craft and boats of all kinds, floating docks, parts of docks and their component parts; (7) railway material both fixed and rolling stock, and material for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones; (8) balloons and flying machines, and their distinctive component parts, together with accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines; (9) fuel, lubricants; (10) powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war; (11) barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same; (12) horseshoes and shoeing materials; (13) harness and saddlery; (14) field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments. This list can, under article 25, be added to by a declaration.

My lords, this list is a comprehensive one, but I suppose the first article-foodstuffs-is to us living in islands which import food at the appalling rate of £484 a minute is the most important, and we must see what the Declaration has to say on the subject of the importation of conditional contraband. Under article 34 of the Declaration neutral ships are liable to capture, and under certain circumstances to destruction of the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country, who as a matter of common knowledge supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place "serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy." This article sets forth where neutral ships may not convey conditional contraband to. It is the most disputed article in the Declaration as regards its precisemeaning. "Enemy authorities," "contractor," "place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy," require the most careful definition. It has been frequently pointed out that "contractor" is a very limited translation of the authentic word, which is commercant, or trader, and I suppose there are a few great traders in this country who are absolutely free from the imputation of supply

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ing the authorities with articles of conditional contraband. "Enemy" is also ambiguous in this article. But the sentence which has caused the most alarm is "other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy." These islands are small, and there is no port suitable for the reception of grain ships which could not serve as a base for our armed forces, or which, as a matter of fact, does not do so. The commentary, or report, of M. Renault, whether authoritative or not, seems to make the matter worse. He says it may be a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or a place used as a base whether of operations "or of supply," for the armed forces of the enemy. This seems to adopt the German view, for articles 34, 35, and 49 are taken almost in their entirety from the German report laid before the London conference.

The chambers of commerce and others representing the trading and shipping interests of this country are much alarmed by these articles. It appears to them that foodstuffs and other articles of conditional contraband would, when shipped to any port in the United Kingdom, be liable to capture, and under article 49 the neutral vessels carrying them would be liable to be sunk. They would be grateful if the Government would name any ports in this country which they consider at the present time as above suspicion-any ports to which, if this country were at war, neutral vessels could convey foodstuffs and the other articles of conditional contraband. The Chamber of Commerce of Glasgow asked the Foreign Office whether Glasgow would be considered a free port, but the answer, put shortly, was that the question would have to be decided by the international prize court sitting at The Hague probably long after the war was over. The same uncertainty would also exist when this country was a neutral. I am not sure indeed, that under article 34 it would not be the duty of a hostile commander to capture any neutral vessels conveying conditional contraband to any port in this country. The best and safest manner to wage warfare on this country is to cut off her supplies, especially of food, and the sinking of neutral vessels carrying foodstuffs to this country would inevitably cause a serious rise in prices of food and freight and probably create a panic. And, indeed, he would run no great risks in comparison with the objects to be secured. The owner of the cargo and ship would have the onus put upon him of proving before the international prize court that the port for which he was destined could not serve as a basis of supply for the armed forces of the enemy, and a negative is very difficult to prove.

I am well aware that the supporters of the Declaration argue, with regard to foodstuffs, that this country would be no worse off under the Declaration than it is as matters stand now. They maintain that food can be declared contraband at the present time. But

that is not so. As the Right Hon. James Bryce stated in the House of Commons on August 11, 1904:

Food, by the general consent of nations, was not contraband of war unless it is clearly proved to be intended for military or naval purposes. In 1885 a demand was made by the French Government to treat rice as contraband of Lord Granville protested in a most energetic way, and stated that he would not recognize the decision of French prize courts which treated rice under that category, and in point of fact rice never was treated as contraband of war.

war.

It may also be noted that, as regards this particular instance, in the French Chamber it was stated that rice was made contraband not as the food of the people, but because it was used as tribute and as payment for the Chinese soldiers. Many more quotations could be given against the thesis that the food of the people can be declared contraband of war.

The worst of article 34 is that while good excuse is given for foodstuffs coming to this country in neutral vessels in time of war being seized and even destroyed, article 35 states that conditional contraband is not liable to capture when it is to be discharged in an intervening neutral port. That is to say, if we were to be at war with a continental power or powers neutral vessels carrying conditional contraband, which includes all the articles I have already enumerated, could be, as I understand it, addressed straight to their belligerent forces, but we could not interfere with it as long as it was to be discharged at a neutral intervening port. Our cruisers might meet them, but they could only wish them godspeed. These two articles taken together are grossly unfair to us as an island power. We have no neutral ports to draw these supplies from overland. All our ports would be suspect. It is said, indeed, that neutral vessels could take our food supplies to France if France were a neutral, which is perhaps improbable. But grain comes over now in big ships. There are no facilities for storing and transshipping large quantities of grain in the northern French ports, and Antwerp and Rotterdam, where there are facilities, might not be geographically very safe points for this operation, which in any case must largely increase the cost of the commodity. Articles 34 and 35 imperil our food supplies and other articles of conditional contraband, while they secure them for possible continental enemies when carried in neutral ships. It is impossible for the captain of a neutral vessel carrying foodstuffs to any port in England to satisfy the commander of a hostile cruiser as to the destination of his cargo. For one thing, he does not know. Under modern conditions cargoes of grain change hands on the high seas, and it is impossible to prove that their destination is what is termed innocent. The hostile commander will in that case either capture or perhaps sink the ship, and leave the talking to be done afterwards at the international prize court.