unless one has authority to accept or refuse acceptance for all, in which case presentment may be made to him only; 2. Where the drawee is dead, presentment may be made to his personal representative (d); 3. Where the drawee has been adjudged a bankrupt or an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, presentment may be made to him or to his trustee or assignee. (a) Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, 635. (b) Byles on Bills, 182. The holder may require the production by the agent of clear and explicit authority from his principal to accept in his name, and without its production may treat the bill as dishonored. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, section 487. (c) But if one of the drawees accepts he will be bound by his acceptance. Smith v. Melton, 133 Mass. 369. (d) Presentment in such case is not necessary. See section 245. Indeed, an executor or administrator has no authority to bind the estate of the decedent by an acceptance. Schmittler v. Simon, 101 N. Y. 554. But as it will in most cases be convenient to have the bill duly protested, it is well to have some one designated to whom presentment can be made. § 243. On what days [resentment may be made.-A bill may be presented for acceptance on any day on which negotiable instruments may be presented for payment under the provisions of sections one hundred and thirty-two* and one hundred and forty-fivet of this act. When Saturday is not otherwise a 'holiday, presentment for acceptance may be made before twelve o'clock noon on that day (a). (a) In the Colorado Act the following is substituted for the last sentence: "When any day is in part a holiday, presentment for acceptance may be made during reasonable hours of the part of such day which is not a holiday." In the Wisconsin Act the last sentence is omitted. * Number one hundred and thirty-two" substituted for seventy-two by Laws 1898, c. 336. + Number one hundred and forty-five" substituted for eighty-five. (Id.) $244. Presentment where time is insufficient.-Where the holder of a bill drawn payable elsewhere than at the place of business or the residence of the drawee has not time with the exercise of reasonable diligence to present the bill for acceptance before presenting it for payment on the day that it falls due, the delay caused by presenting the bill for acceptance before presenting it for payment is excused and does not discharge the drawers and indorsers. § 245. Where presentment is excused.-Presentment for acceptance is excused and a bill may be treated as dishonored by non-acceptance in either of the following cases: 1. Where the drawee is dead (a), or has absconded, or is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to contract by bill; 2. Where after the exercise of reasonable diligence, presentment cannot be made (b); 3. Where, although presentment has been irregular, acceptance has been refused on some other ground. (a) Prior to the statute there was some doubt as to the proper course in this case. See Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, section 1178. But as the personal representative cannot bind the estate by an acceptance (Schmittler v. Simon, 101 N. Y. 554), presentment would be but an idle form. (b) As to what will constitute due diligence, see Sulsbacker v. Bank of Charleston, 86 Tenn. 201. § 246. When dishonored by non-acceptance. A bill is dishonored by non-acceptance: I. When it is duly presented for acceptance, and such an acceptance as is prescribed by this act is refused or cannot be obtained; or 2. When presentment for acceptance is excused and the bill is not accepted. 247. Duty of holder where bill not accepted.Where a bill is duly presented for acceptance and is not ac cepted within the prescribed time, the person presenting it must treat the bill as dishonored by non-acceptance or he loses the right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers. § 248. Rights of holder where bill not accepted. When a bill is dishonored by non-acceptance, an immediate right of recourse against the drawers and indorsers accrues to the holder, and no presentment for payment is necessary (a). (a) Sterry v. Robinson, 1 Day (Conn.), 11. ARTICLE XIII.* PROTEST OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE. Section 260. In what cases protest necessary. 261. Protest; how made. 262. Protest; by whom made. 264. Protest; where made. 265. Protest both for non-acceptance and non-pay ment. 266. Protest before maturity where acceptor in solvent. 267. When protest dispensed with. 268. Protest; where bill is lost, et cetera. 260. In what cases protest necessary. Where a foreign bill appearing on its face to be such is dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be duly protested for non-accept *The numbers of the sections of this article in other States than New York are as follows: Colorado, Connecticut. District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts. North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Washington, 152-160; Maryland, 171-179; Rhode Island, 160-168; Wisconsin, 1681-9-1681-17. ance, and where such a bill which has not previously been dishonored by non-acceptance is dishonored by non-payment, it must be duly protested for non-payment. If it is not so protested, the drawer and indorsers are discharged (a). Where a bill does not appear on its face to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dishonor is unnecessary (b). (a) Commercial Bank v. Varnum, 49 N. Y. 269, 275; Halliday v. McDougall, 20 Wend. 81; Dennistoun v. Stewart, 17 How. (U. S.) 606; Phoenix Bank v. Hussey, 12 Pick. 483. Protest is indispensable, and the proof cannot be supplied in any other way. Joseph v. Solomon, 19 Fla. 623. There are several reasons why protest is required in such cases: (1) for the sake of uniformity in international transactions; (2) because it affords satisfactory evidence of dishonor to the drawer, who, from his residence abroad, might experience a difficulty in making inquiries on the subject and be compelled to rely on the representations of the holder; (3) because, as foreign courts give credit to the acts of a public functionary, the protest affords the most satisfactory evidence to charge an antecedent party. Byles, 256. (b) See sections 189 and 213. § 261. Protest; how made.-The protest must be annexed to the bill, or must contain a copy thereof (a), and must be under the hand (b) and seal (c) of the notary making it, and must specify: 1. The time (d) and place (e) of presentment; 2. The fact that presentment was made and the manner thereof; 3. The cause or reason for protesting the bill; 4. The demand made and the answer given, if any, or the fact that the drawee or acceptor could not be found (f). (a) Fulton v. MacCracken, 18 Md. 528. (b) The signature of the notary may be printed. Bank of Cooperstown v. Woods, 28 N. Y. 561; Fulton v. MacCracken, 18 Md. 528. (c) Donegan v. Wood, 49 Ala. 251. In other cases it has been held that the official signature is all that is required. Huffuker v. National Bank, 12 Bush. 293. When the court can perceive that a seal is attached thereto the protest is sufficiently authenticated; neither the seal nor the signature of the notary need be proved. Barry v. Crowly, 4 Gill (Md.) 194. (d) In the case of a note, the statement in a notarial certificate that it was presented on a certain day is not conclusive upon the parties, but evidence is admissible to show that presentment was also made on another day. Reynolds v. Appleman, 41 Md. 615. (e) A certificate of a notary which states that he presented a note for payment at a certain town and demanded payment, which was refused, but did not state to whom or at what place in the town it was presented, does not show such a presentation to the maker as will bind the indorser. Duckert v. Von Lilienthal, 11 Wis. 56. (f) The notarial certificate of protest is competent, without further proof. This has often been so held in respect to foreign bills. Porter v. Judson, 1 Gray, 175; Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546; Browne v. Philadelphia Bank, 6 S. & R. 484; Coruth v. Walker, 8 Wis. 252. For this purpose the different States of the Union are deemed foreign to each other, so that the notorial certificate of protest under seal is good on mere production. Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 170; Halliday v. McDougall, 20 Wend. 81; Carter v. Burley, 9 N. H. 558, 566; Johnson v. Brown, 154 Mass. 105, 106. The statement in the certificate that notice of dishonor has been given is also received as evidence. Barry v. Crowly, 4 Gill (Md.) 194; Rosson v. Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90; Legg v. Vinal, 165 Mass. 555. But the notary's certificate is not evidence of other collateral or independent facts it may contain, especially when such facts are not necessarily within the personal knowledge of the notary, or are of such a character as could not be established by his testimony if he were produced as a witness. Weems v. Farmers' Bank, 15 Md. 231. Thus, the statement that the party on whom the demand was made was one of the administrators" of the acceptor does not establish the facts of the death of the acceptor, and of the granting of letters of administration on his estate to such party. (Id.) So the words "after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain his whereabouts" are not admissible as evidence of such "diligent search and inquiry” having been made; for this is a conclusion of law which the notary could not legally draw or establish by his own testimony. Reier v. Strauss, 54 Md. 278. See also Ricketts v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320; Duckert v. Von Lilienthal, 11 Wis. 56; Sumner v. Bowen, 2 Wis. 524; Adams v. Wright, 14 Wis. 408. A notarial certificate of protest is evidence of the facts therein set 66 |