costs, now the most substantial bolt to aim at a delinquent. From the nature of their institution, moreover, the proceedings were directed against offenders as sinners, and not with a view to the adjustment of their individual rights and wrongs. From a variety of causes, therefore, the ecclesiastical courts are virtually without any powers to aid in the protection of women from the machinations of vice.

It is a remarkable fact that the separation of the ecclesiastical from the other courts of the country, and the transfer of offences against morality to the former, calculated to and probably producing for a time a more uniform and impartial administration of those laws, should be one principal cause why this country is now, as we shall presently see, so defective in its code with respect to offences against chastity.

III. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW IN THIS

COUNTRY.

HAVING given an historical sketch of the laws in this country, direct and indirect, for the protection of women, and ascertained the principles upon which the common law appears to have been expounded, and the statute law framed, the law bearing directly on the subject as it now exists will be stated. This will be done without reference to the policy of those laws, but simply as a guide to the lawyer, the legislator, and the thinking public.

The evils and injuries in question, like most other classes of wrongs, may be divided, for the purpose of being more clearly comprehended, into public and private.

Public wrongs are those that are deemed offences, not merely against the individual who is the immediate sufferer, but against society in general, and consequently allow of being prosecuted and punished in the criminal courts of justice.

Private wrongs or injuries, on the other hand, are such as affect the individual alone, and not the community at large, and the remedy or compensation for them is by action in the civil courts.

In treating of the law as to public wrongs, resulting from evil machinations and the allurements of vice, directed against women, we may conveniently divide them into, 1. those relating to the procuring and abduction of women for the purpose of defilement; 2. the laws respecting houses of ill fame.

I. THE PROCURING AND ABDUCTION OF WOMEN

FOR DEFILEMENT.

"Where any woman shall have any interest, whether legal or equitable, present or future, absolute, conditional, or contingent, in any real or personal estate, or shall be an heiress presumptive, or next of kin to any one having such interest, if any person shall from motives of lucre take away or detain such woman against her will, with intent to marry or defile her, or to cause her to be married or defiled by any other person, every such offender, and every person counselling, aiding, or abetting such offender, shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable to be transported beyond the seas for life, or for any term not less than seven years, or to be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, in the common gaol or house of correction, for any term not exceeding four years."*

To bring any person within this offence, the woman must have an interest in property. The words of the statute define it to be " any interest, whether legal or

*9 Geo. IV. c. 31. sec. 19.

" an

equitable, present or future, absolute, conditional, or contingent, in any real or personal estate," or heiress presumptive or next of kin to any one having such interest."

Secondly, the woman must be "taken or detained against her will." It seems, however, that, although the taking or detaining be with her will, if that will were obtained by fraud practised upon her, the case will be within the statute*; and although consent were given in the first instance, if she refuse to continue with the offender, it is within the act, which places the detainer on the same footing as the taking. Independently of that, however, it scems that a woman who consents and afterwards refuses to continue, may from that time as properly be said to be taken against her will, as if she had never given any consent at all.† It appears also that it is not material whether a woman so taken contrary to her will at last consent thereto or not, if she were under the force at the time, for the offence is complete at the time of taking.‡

Thirdly, the taking or detention must be from motives of lucre. In coming to a conclusion whether the prisoner was actuated by motives of lucre or not,

* Wakefield's Case. Deacon's Criminal Law, 4. † 1 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, ch. xli. s. 7.

Fulwood's Case. Croke's Rep. (Charles), 488.; Swendon's Case, 5 State Trials, 459.; 1 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, ch. xli. s. 8., antè, p. 69.

expressions used by him, respecting the property of the woman, such as his stating that he had seen the will of one of her relatives (naming him), and that she would have 2001. a year, are important for the consideration of the jury.*

Fourthly, the intent must be to marry or defile the woman, or to cause her to be married or defiled by. any other person.

The words "counselling, aiding, or abetting such offender" necessarily include accessories before and after the fact, who are therefore punishable as principals; † but in conformity to a recognised principle of law that every attempt to commit a felony is a misdemeanour, the above section creates another offence which may be thus described:

Every person who attempts to commit the felony mentioned in the above enactment is guilty of a misdemeanour, punishable by fine or imprisonment.‡

The attempt must be in all its circumstances, as

* Rex v. Barratt, 9 Carrington & Payne's Rep. p. 387. †The 31st section of the act, therefore, which provides for the punishment of accessories before the fact "to any felony punishable under this act for whom no punishment has been herein-before provided," and also providing for the punishment of accessories after the fact, does not appear to apply to the 19th section.

That an attempt to commit a felony or misdemeanour, whether statutable or at common law, is itself a misdemeanour, see authorities cited in Russell on Crimes by Greaves, vol. i. p. 47.; and Patteson, J., in Rex v. Butler, 6 C. & P. 368. ; and Parke, B., in Rex v. Roderick, 7 Id. 795.