or organs of sense to frame more such, quite different from those we already have, and by means of them to impart to us other perceptions, and determine us to assent on the evidence of the impressions conveyed to our minds by these other senses? If it is possible, as I see not how rationally it can be questioned, here is at least a fourth sort of objective light determining our minds to assent, admitted as possible.

Secondly, Here I would inquire, whether may not he, who, by these bodily organs we already have, impresses ideas upon our minds, and determines our assent to their agreement or disagreement, immediately, without the intervention of such organs, make impressions on our minds, whereby our assent or judgment may rationally be swayed? To deny this, will look very odd and irrational to sober men, that have due thoughts of God. If it is admitted, we have here at least the possibility of another ground of assent or objective light, acknowledged, different from those condescended on by Mr Locke.

3. We that have the benefit of sight, have in our minds a sort of objective evidence or light different from all those which men born blind have. And why should it be then thought impossible that others may have in their minds an evidence that we have no experience of, and that it may be equally real, convincing, or more so than any that we have.

4. Mr Locke grants that there are extraordinary ways whereby the knowledge of truth may be imparted to men; that God sometimes illuminates, by his Spirit, the minds of men with the knowledge of truths; that there is no bounds to be set to such divine impressions. Now if all this is so, why may there not be evidence of a different sort resulting from such extraordinary impressions, illuminations, &c. allowed to be also possible?

5. Either God can reveal his mind so to man, as to give him the highest evidence or objective light that he speaks to him who gets that revelation, or he cannot. If he can, then there is possible an objective evidence, and that of the highest sort, different from these three mentioned by Mr Locke; for that it must be different is evident, because Mr Locke, in this case, will allow no place for self-evidence, or that evidence we have in our intuitive knowledge, which he determines to be the highest degree of these three sorts he has admitted and owned. Speaking of immediate revelation, he says, "No evidence of our faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, as we heard above." Since, then, this evidence of the highest degree is dif

ferent from that which we have in our intuitive knowledge, if it is at all, it must be a different sort from any of those three: for by concession it is not self-evidence; and rational or sensible it is not, because these sorts of evidence are of a degree inferior to intuitive evidence. If, then, it is evidence of the highest degree, since Mr Locke will not admit it to be selfevidence, it must be none of the three: and so we have a fourth sort admitted possible. But if God cannot reveal his mind, so as to give the greatest objective evidence, that he speaks, or is the revealer, then I say it is plain, and follows unavoidably, that God's testimony can never have from man the highest degree of assent, which Mr Locke above expressly acknowledged to be its due. It is in vain to say, that God's testimony is infallible: for our assent to any truth upon God's testimony, as Mr Locke truly says, can never rise higher than the assurance we have of this, that really we have God's testimony, and take its meaning. If, then, God cannot give us the highest evidence or objective light as to this, no truth he offers can have from us the highest degree of assent. To me this looks like blasphemy, to imagine that God has made a rational creature, to whom he cannot so impart his mind as to give it such evidence as is absolutely necessary to lay a ground for entertaining his testimony with that respect, which is its unquestionable due. That his testimony is in itself infallible, will never make our assent of the highest degree, unless the evidence of his giving testimony is of the highest degree.

III." We assert that, de facto, there really is a sort of objective evidence or light, different from those condescended on by Mr Locke."

1. The prophets, to whom immediate revelations were made, had objective evidence or light sufficient to ground the highest assurance that the truths impressed on their minds were from God. It is impious to deny it. But this Mr Locke will not allow to be such evidence as we have in our intuitive knowledge, and all must confess that it did not result from their outward senses; and that it was not grounded on reasonings from evidences, marks or signs, extrinsical to the revelations, seems undeniable; or even from reasoning, and making inferences from what was intrinsical to the revelation. For, 1. We find not, that this persuasion came to them by such argumentation or reasoning. We can see no ground from any accounts we have in Scripture to think, that they took this way to assure their own minds. Yea, 2. The Scripture accounts of the way of their being convinced seem all to import, that as God im

pressed the truths on their minds, so that immediately, by that very impression, he fixed an indelible and firm conviction of his being the revealer. Again, 3. We see that the evidence was so convincing as to bear down in them the force of the strongest reasonings and the clearest arguments that stood against it, as we see evidently in the case of Abraham; he is commanded to offer his son Isaac. If this command had not been impressed on his mind with an evidence that God was the revealer, beyond what any reasoning upon signs and marks, and I know not what, could pretend to, the strong plain arguments that lay against it, strengthened by a combination of the strongest natural affections, must have carried it. 4. If Abraham was convinced by such reasonings that God revealed this, that this command was from God, is it not stranget hat he makes no mention of them, when it was so obvious that it was liable to be questioned whether God could give such a command? But the truth of it is, it is obvious to any one that thinks, that nothing could prevail, in this case, but the incontrolable and irresistible evidence resulting from the very impression, whereby the command was revealed. But to waive any further consideration of this, which now we have no experience of

2. Mr Locke will admit that the primitive Christians who embraced the gospel did it upon sufficient objective evidence. He is not a Christian who denies it. But he will not admit intuitive evidence in this case. And I shall, I hope, afterwards make it appear, that it was not on the evidence of such reasonings as Mr Locke talks of, that they embraced it.

3. The Scriptures demand our assent, and offer no evidence but this of God's authority. And arguments are not insisted on to prove that it is God that speaks; God calls us not to assent without objective evidence, and yet waives the use of such arguments as Mr Locke would have to be the foundation of our faith. There must certainly be, therefore, some objective light of a different sort supposed, that must be the ground of our assent. And that there really is so the Scriptures teach, as we shall see afterwards, when this proposition must be proved and explained more fully.

4 Abstracting from what has been said, we have as good ground as can be desired, and as the nature of the thing admits, for believing there is really a light distinct from those mentioned by Mr Locke. As to the persons who have it, this light evinces itself in the same way as the other sorts of intellectual light do. They are conscious of it, and find it has the same effect determining the mind to assent, assuring it, and

giving it rest in the full conviction of truth.

As to others

who want it, they have such evidence as a blind man has that there is such a thing as visible evidence. They have the concurring suffrage of persons, sober, judicious, and rational, who have given evidence of the greatest cautiousness in guarding against delusion, enthusiasm, and groundless imaginations. Besides, the effects peculiarly flowing from such a faith as leans on this foundation, give evidence to it. But I cannot stay to prove this farther at present.

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IV. Though perhaps an account every way satisfying cannot be given of the nature of this light, nor can we see so clearly what it is, and wherein it consists, as to make those who are unacquainted with it, understand it, or have as exact a notion of it as they have, whose experience satisfies them as to its reality; yet such an account may be given of it, as may secure it against the imputation of unreasonableness, and unintelligibility. To this purpose, I shall only observe the few things ensuing.

1. That light or objective evidence, whereon we are obliged to believe, and all that are subjectively enlightened to believe the Scriptures, and ground their assent, is such, that a more intelligible account by far may be given of it to those, who have no experience of it, than can be given of the objective evidence of visible objects to persons who have no experience of sight. To clear this

2. It is to be observed, that in the writings of men, especially of some who have any peculiarity of genius, and excel in any kind, we find such characters, marks, and peculiar evidences of them, not only in the matter, but in the manner of expression and way of delivering their thoughts. There is such a spirit, and somewhat so peculiar to themselves to be observed, that such as have any notion of their writings, cannot thereon avoid a conviction, that this or that book, though it bears not the author's name, or those other marks, whereon we depend as to our opinion of the authors of books of whom we have no particular acquaintance, is yet written by such an author, the vestiges of whose peculiar spirit and genius run through, and are discernible in the strain of the book, There are few men, who are acquainted with books, and read them with attention and judgment, who have not the experience of this. And hence, we are frequently referred to this, as what may satisfy us, that books that bear such authors' names are genuine and truly theirs. And it is found more convincing than the attestation of no incredible witnesses in many cases.

Yet it must be confessed, that persons of the best judgment, and most capable to express their thoughts, will find it difficult, if not impossible, to express intelligibly wherein this objective evidence consists; but that really it is there, and that there is such a thing, is impossible for them to question.*

3. If poor men, who differ infinitely less from one another than the most exalted created being can be supposed to do from God, do impart to the product of their own thoughts, and leave on their writings, such peculiar and discernible characters of their own genius and spirit, as, at first view, upon the least serious attention, convinces the reader that they are the authors, and enables him to distinguish their writings from others, is it not reasonable to suppose that a book written by God must carry on it a peculiar and distinguishing impress of its author, and that by so much the more certainly discernible, by any that has right notions of him, as the difference betwixt him and the most exalted human genius is infinitely greater, than that betwixt the most contemptible pamphlet-writer and the most elevated scholar? Nay, is it not impossible rationally to imagine the contrary? Can we think, that he, who in all his works, even in the meanest insects, has left such objective evidence, and such impressions of himself, whereby he is certainly known to be the author, has not left impressions, more remarkable and distinguishing, on his word, which he has magnified above all his name, that is, all the means whereby he designs to make himself known, and which he designed to be the principal means of imparting the knowledge of himself to men, and that to the highest purposes-their salvation and his own glory?

4. This impress, those characters, prints, and vestiges of the infinite perfections of the Deity, that unavoidably must be allowed to be stamped on, and shine, not merely, or only, or principally in the matter, but in that as spoken or written, and in the writings or words, in their style, the spirit running through them, the scope, tendency, &c.- This dog or God-becoming impress of Majesty, Sovereignty, Omniscience, Independence, Holiness, Justice, Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, is not only a sufficient and real, but in very deed the greatest objective light and evidence imaginable. And where one has an understanding given to know him that is true,

Though you had not named the author, &c. I could have known, and avouched him. There is a face of a style, by which we scholars know one another, no less than our persons by a visible countenance.-Bishop Hall, Pref. to Dr Twiss; his doubting Cons, resolved, page 2.