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challenges an assent of the highest degree;" that it is “ evidence beyond exception.” These are goodly words. He has well spoken in all that he has said. I wish that his meaning and heart may be found as good as his words. “ All is not gold that glitters.” Let us, then, look a little more narrowly into his meaning

To find it out, we shall suppose that God, as no doubt he did, does reveal immediately to Paul this proposition, “ Jesus is the Son of God.” Here is a revelation. By Paul it is assented to. Well, here is faith. Now in his believing this proposition, he may be said to assent to three things, " That what God says is true, that Jesus is the Son of God, and, that God says this to Paul.” Now I ask Mr Locke, or any of our rationalists that are of his mind, to which of these three is it, that Paul assents, with an assent of the highest degree, and of which he has evidence beyond exception?"

1. Could Mr Locke only mean, that we have the highest assurance of this general verity, that God's testimony is infallibly true? No, sure; for, first, the assent to this truth is not an act of faith, but of intuitive knowledge. The truth itself is not a truth here divinely revealed, but of natural evidence. This is not so much in this instance expressly assented to, as supposed to be known.

2. Doth Mr Locke mean, that we assent to this proposition, that Jesus is the Son of God? Had Paul assurance beyond doubt, and evidence beyond exception, of this? But sure Mr Locke knew that Paul, in this supposition, does not assent at all to this proposition, Jesus is the Son of God absolutely, but as it is revealed? Well, then, all the evidence that Paul has to ground his assent upon, is the evidence of this, that God says so to him. If, then, the evidence of God's saying so to him is not such as challenges an assent of the highest degree, Paul cannot have the highest degree of assurance of that proposition, the faith whereof leans entirely upon his assurance of this, that God has revealed it. For, as Mr Locke says very truly in this same paragraph, “our assurance of any particular truth, that is, the matter revealed, can never rise higher in degree than our assurance of this, that it is revealed.” If, then, Paul has not evidence, beyond exception, that God reveals the proposition we speak of to him, he can never have such assurance of the truth of the proposition materially considered. Wherefore,

3. Did Mr Locke think, in this case, that Paul would have evidence beyond exception, challenging the highest degree of assent, and thereon assurance beyond doubt, or of the highest degree of this, that God did in very deed say to Paul, that Jesus is the Son of God; or of this truth, that Jesus is the Son of God as revealed? It is the assent to this proposition that, in proper speaking, is faith. The assent to the general proposition above mentioned, is not an act of faith at all: nor is the assent to the proposition revealed, materially considered, an act of faith. Faith, in this case, is only the assent to that proposition as revealed, or to the revelation of it. If, then, Paul has not the highest evidence for, and thereon the highest assurance of this, that God says this to him, his faith can never be said to be the highest degree of assurance or assent. This, then, Mr Locke must mean, or he means nothing. But yet I suppose he scarcely thought so: for, 1. He tells us afterwards, that we can have no evidence for receiving any truth revealed that can exceed, if equal, the evidence we have for our intuitive knowledge. If we have not then evidence, equal at least to that which we have for our intuitive knowledge, for our belief of God's being the revealer, or that he speaks to us, we cannot have the highest degree of assurance. 2. He afterwards tells us, that we have no evidence for this, that this or that truth is revealed to us by God; but that which results from reasons or arguments, drawn from marks, whereby we prove that God is the speaker: but Mr Locke owns, that the evidence of all our reasonings is still short of that which we have for our intuitive knowledge. Now, methinks, this quite overthrows Mr Locke's goodly concession. With what consistency with truth or himself, Mr Locke wrote at this rate, is left to others to judge.

II. Whatever there is in this concession yielded in favour of faith, Mr Locke afterwards takes care that we, who now live, shall not be the better for it: for afterwards he tells us plainly, " that whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our ideas, will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed by traditional revelation.” We have no revelation at this day, but that which Mr Locke calls traditional. And here it is plain, that Mr Locke thinks that our certainty of any truth we have from this, is inferior in degree to any sort of natural knowledge, whether intuitive, rational, or sensible.

Ill. It is manifest, that the foundation of all is what Mr Locke teaches in the fourth position above mentioned, wherein he tells us, that to talk of any other light in the mind, beside that of self-evidence, reason, and sense, is to put ourselves in

the dark. I have added this last—the light of sense— because Mr Locke, though he mentions it not here, yet elsewhere he admits it. That we may understand Mr Locke's assertion exactly, it must be observed, that writers, when they treat of this subject, usually take notice of a twofold light. There is subjective light, by which is meant either our ability to perceive, discern, know and judge of objects, or our actual knowledge, assent, &c. Again, there is objective light, by which they mean that evidence whence our knowledge results, whereon it is founded, and which determines the mind to assent or dissent. Now, it is of this last that Mr Locke is treating in his chapter of Enthusiasm, from whence this proposition is taken. And his opinion is this:- He owns that there is a threefold objective light, which is real, and a just ground for the mind to assent on. There is, first, self-evidence, which is the ground of our intuitive knowledge, resulting from the obvious agreement or disagreement of our ideas, appearing upon first view or intuition, when they are compared. Secondly, there is rational light, or the evidence resulting from arguments, wherein the agreement or disagreement of our ideas is cleared by assuming intermediate ideas, by the help of which our mind is cleared as to what judgment it is to pass. Thirdly, there is the light of sense, or the evidence resulting from impressions made on our minds by the intervention and means of our organs of

But besides these, he admits of no other objective light or evidence that may be a just ground of assent; and adds, “ that to talk of any other, is to put ourselves in the dark; yea, in the power of the prince of darkness, and turn enthusiasts."

This grape must be pressed, that we may taste its juice, how it relishes." In the consideration of this doctrine delivered by Mr Locke, we shall not at present inquire whether it really does not preclude all place for faith, properly so called. This in issue will be further cleared. But whatever there is as to this, if Mr Locke's doctrine hold, certain it is, that either faith, if there is such a thing, must be founded on one of those three grounds of assent, or sorts of objective light, or it is altogether irrational.

For an assent not founded on, and to which we are not determined by real objective evidence, is brutish, irrational, and really " enthusiastic," as being no reason or ground: and besides these three sorts of grounds, Mr Locke admits of none. Faith, therefore, must be founded either on one or other of them, or it must want all reason for it.


Further, it is to be observed, that Mr Locke, taking selfevidence for that which is immediately perceptible without the intervention of any intermediate ideas, by the natural power of our intellectual faculties, not assisted, renewed, elevated, and influenced by any supernatural influence; and taking sensible evidence for that which is conveyed by the intervention of bodily organs, from corporeal substances, cannot be thought to make either of these the ground of faith to the testimony of God: and therefore it must have no reason save that rational evidence, which makes the middle sort of objective light. But I need not spend time in proving this, since it is no more than what he has taught us in the fifth proposition above mentioned.

This opinion thus far explained is indeed the sum, and contains the force of what is pleaded, or, for ought I know, can be pleaded, for the judgment of our rationalists. We shall therefore weigh the matter more seriously, and proceed by some plain steps in the ensuing propositions.

“ I. If good and solid reasons can be produced for proof of another sort of objective light or evidence, besides those three mentioned by Mr Locke, it must be admitted, though we should not be able to give a satisfying account of its nature and other concernments.

1. This I believe was never denied, in the general, as to other things, by any person of judgment, adverting to, and understanding what he said; and why it then should be refused in this case, I can see no ground.

2. If any has ever in general denied this in words, I am sure every man in fact admits it. Who is he that receives not many truths, that admits not the being of many things upon good proof, from their causes, effects, inseparable adjuncts, &c. of the nature of which he can give no satisfying account? We all own the mutual influence of our souls and bodies upon one another, upon the proofs we have from the effects: but who ever understood the manner how the soul operates on the body, or the body upon it? Instances of this sort are innumerable.

3. Sufficient proofs must always determine our assent; and if there are such in this case, it is unreasonable to refuse it

4. If we have sufficient reasons to convince us that there is a fourth sort of objective light distinct from those three admitted by Mr Locke, and only deny it because we understand not, or cannot give a clear account of its nature, I cannot tell; but on this same ground we shall reject, and be obliged to refuse these three sorts admitted by him, for the very same rea

son. Mr Locke, perhaps, has done as much as any man to explain them: but were he alive, I believe he would be as ready to own as any, that he has been far from satisfying himself, or offering what may fully clear others as to the nature of these things wherein evidence consists, what it is, what is selfevidence, or that evidence which is the ground of our sensible or rational knowledge, how they operate and influence the assent. All his accounts are only descriptions taken from causes, effects, or the like. But what objective light or evidence is, wherein it really consists (and the like may be said of the rest), is as much a mystery as it was before, when he tells us that self-evidence, for example, is that which isimmediately perceived without the intervention of intermediate ideas. Here I learn, that it is not rational evidence that requires such intermediate ideas: but this is all, unless it be that it is perceptible by the mind, that is, it is evidence. But what evidence is, I am yet to learn. I think this proposition is plain.

II. “A fourth sort of objective evidence different from those three assigned by Mr Locke, is not impossible.”

1. If any say it is, it lies upon him to prove it. That Mr Locke, or millions more, observed no such light in their minds, found themselves determined to assent by no other objective evidence or light, will not prove it impossible; yea, will not prove that actually there is no such light; nay, will not prove that there was no such light in their own minds. For Mr Locke, though he observed as accurately the manner of his mind, its actings, as most men, yet might not observe it so, but that he possibly overlooked somewhat that passed there. And if really Mr Locke did not assent upon other evidence to some things, though he observed it not, I doubt not by this time he is sensible it was his loss that it was so. It cannot be pretended that it is impossible for want of a sufficient cause, while that God is in being, who is the author of the three sorts of lights that are admitted, and who is the father of lights. Nor can it be pretended that the members of this division stand contradictorily opposed to one another, as it is in this, every being is dependent or independent.

2. If any will say yet, it is impossible there should be a fourth or a fifth sort of light or objective evidence, I shall desire him only to stay a while, and consider the light of sense. It is nothing else save « that evidence which results from impressions made on our minds by means of our organs of sense.' Well, hereon I shall ask two questions.

First, Is it not possible for him who made those conveyances

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