342] October Term, 1920. "This was an indictment for grand larceny as shown by a copy of the indictment set forth herein. The goods alleged to have been stolen by the defendants were set forth in the indictment to be the goods and chattels of R. W. McCreary Company, a partnership, doing business in the city and county of Aiken, and that the said indictment did not name the individual members of the said partnership. "Before the jury were impaneled, the defendants' attorney moved to quash the indictment on the ground that the said indictment did not allege the names of the individual members composing the partnership of R. W. McCreary Company, and in failing to do so the said indictment was fatally defective. "The Court held that the indictment was sufficient and the trial proceeded and terminated in a conviction of the defendants, who were duly sentenced. * * * a "Query: In an indictment charging larceny of the goods and chattels belonging to R. W. McCreary Company, partnership, doing business in the city and county of Aiken, is it necessary to further set out the names of the individual partners composing the said partnership before a conviction thereon can be had?" The appellants' attorney relies upon the case of State v. Ryan, 4 McCord 16, 17 Am. Dec. 702; State v. Dwyer, 2 Hill 287; State v. London, 3 S. C. 230, and State v. Hamilton, 77 S. C. 383, 57 S. E. 1098. They are not applicable, however, to the present case, as they involve questions arising out of variances between the allegations of the indictment and the testimony; whereas, the only question in the present case is whether there was error on the part of his Honor, the presiding Judge, in refusing the motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it was defective. Syllabus Section 56 of the Criminal Code of 1902 provides: [115 S. C. "Every indictment shall be deemed and judged sufficient and good in law which, in addition to allegations as to time and place, as now required by law, charges the crime substantially in the language of the common law or of the statute prohibiting the same, or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood. ***” As the indictment charged that the stolen goods belonged to R. W. McCreary Company, a partnership doing business in the city of Aiken, and as the proof corresponded with the charge in the indictment, it cannot be successfully contended that the offense was not so plainly alleged that its nature inight be easily understood. Appeal dismissed. MR. JUSTICE GAGE did not participate. 10557 MANNING v. SHORE. BOUNDARIES-FORECLOSURE SALE HELD TO PASS TITLE TO LAND WITHIN GENERAL DESCRIPTION, THOUGH NOT WITHIN DESIGNATED BOUNDARY. -Where mortgage and master's deed to foreclosure sale purchaser described land not only by described boundaries, but also as that owned, used, and occupied by mortgagor's cotton mill, purchaser had good title to all the land so used, though a part thereof was on other side of a road described as one of the boundaries. Before BOWMAN, J., Sumter, October, 1920. Affirmed. Action by Richard I. Manning against George D. Shore for specific performance of contract to purchase real estate. From decree for plaintiff, the defendant appeals. The decree of the Circuit Judge was as follows: A case agreed between the parties above named without action, dated the 29th day of April, 1920, and duly verified, has been submitted to this Court and the arguments of counsel thereon have been duly heard. The first and second questions submitted to the Court are as to the vesting of a marketable title in Richard I. Manning to "all that piece, parcel, or tract of land situate, lying and being in the city of Sumter, in the county and State aforesaid, containing one acre, more or less, and bounded on the north by land of Smith, on the east by Council street, on the south by land now or formerly of Alex. Davis, and on the west by land now or formerly of Thomas James," under and by virtue of a certain deed from H. C. Haynsworth, master, to Richard I. Manning, dated June 29, 1911, and recorded in the office of the clerk of Court for said county in Deed Book H-4, page 459, with this description, to wit: "All that lot of land lying and being in and near the corporate limits of the city of Sumter, in the county and State aforesaid, containing fifteen acres, more or less, and which is bounded, to wit: On the northwest by railroad track and right of way of the Wilmington, Columbia & Augusta Railroad; on the northeast by a street of the said city sometimes called Dargan street; on the southeast by a railroad track and right of way of the Manchester & Augusta Railroad Company; and on the southwest by the public road leading from the city of Sumter towards Cain's Savannah-the same being the tract of land whereon is built and located the cotton factory building and other structures thereto appertaining and including all the land and messuages owned, used. or occupied by the said Sumter Cotton Mills at the time of the commencement of this action, and near the corporate limits of the city of Sumter, in said county and State, Circuit Decree [115 S. C. whether particularly or accurately above described or not.” "And also all and singular every manner of the property, real, personal, and mixed, constituting the entire plant of the said defendant, Sumter Cotton Mills, owned, operated, or possessed by the said defendant at the time of the commencement of this action, excluding, however, from such sale of the mortgaged premises so much of the same as now belongs to the Southern Railway Company extending through said mortgaged premises as were taken under proper condemnation proceedings for such right of way for said railway company, of record in said Court said condemnation proceedings having been duly taken under the statutes of said State since the executing and recording of the mortgage described in the proceedings in this action." Which deed was executed by the said master pursuant to a foreclosure of the mortgage referred to in the description of the above deed by the Sumter Cotton Mills to R. M. Wallace, Marcus G. Ryttenberg, and Richard D. Lee, as trustees, dated June 29, 1897, and recorded in the office of the clerk for said county in Mortgage Book 28, at page 426, with the following tract of land described therein: "All and singular the plant and property, real and personal, rights and franchises of the said Sumter Cotton Mills of every kind and description whatsoever, and wheresoever situate, that is to say: "All that lot of land situate, lying and being in and near the corporate limits of the city of Sumter, in the county and State aforesaid, containing fifteen acres, more or less, and which is described as follows, to wit: On the northwest by the railroad track and right of way of the Manchester & Augusta Railroad Company; on the southwest by a public road leading from the city of Sumter towards Cain's Savan nah—the same being the tract of land whereon is built and located the cotton factory building and other structures whereunto appertaining, the intention being to include herein all the lands and messuages now owned, used, and occupied by the said Sumter Cotton Mills in and near the corporate limits of said city of Sumter, in, said county and State." As the one-acre tract of land first above described by the Sumter Cotton Mills at the time said mortgage was executed and as all property covered by the said mortgage was duly sold by foreclosure proceedings of the same, the said oneacre tract was conveyed by the said master to the plaintiff herein regardless of the fact that it was on the opposite side of the public road leading from the city of Sumter towards Cain's Savannah, which was a boundary of the lot of land particularly described in the said mortgage as being 15 acres, more or less. The same lot of land was bounded on the same side (southwest) in the master's deed to the plaintiff. In addition to the above particular description in the mortgage of the Sumter Cotton Mills to R. M. Wallace, and others, trustees, above referred to, we find a general description following the particular description limiting the 15-acre lot to a public road leading from the city of Sumter to Cain's Savannah, in which the intention of the mortgagor is expressed as conveying all lands then owned by the said cotton mill for purposes of the mortgage in these words: “*** The intention being to include herein all the land and messuages now owned, used, and occupied by the said Sumter Cotton Mills in and near the corporate limits of the said city of Sumter in said county and State." The master's deed to the plaintiff, Richard I. Manning, also contains a general description, showing that all property (in addition to the 15-acre tract, particularly described herein) owned by the cotton mill when the foreclosure of |