not evidence against the defendant in another action. Allen v. Hartley, 4 Doug. 20.

Suffering a judgment by default is an admission on the record of the cause of action. Thus in an action against the acceptor of a bill, the defendant, by suffering judgment by default, admits a cause of action to the amount of the bill, unless part payment be indorsed. Green v. Hearne, 3 T. R. 301. So in an action on a contract the defendant cannot, after judgment by default, insist upon the fraud of the plaintiff. E. India Co. v. Glover, 1 Stra. 612.

Whole admission to be taken together.] The whole of an admission must be taken together; therefore, where an account rendered by the defendant is produced to establish the plaintiff's demand, it is evidence to prove both the debtor and creditor side of the account. Randle v. Blackburn, 5 Taunt. 245; Thomson v. Austen, 2 D. & Ry. 361. But the jury are not bound to believe both sides of the account; therefore, where the plaintiff put in evidence an account rendered by the defendant in which he had stated a counter-claim, the plaintiff was permitted to disprove the counter-claim, and to recover the amount admitted. Rose v. Savory, 2 N. C. 145. And see Baildon v. Walton, 1 Exch. 617, cited post, Actions on contract; Defences; Statutes of Limitation. Where the plaintiff put in the defendant's answer in Chancery to prove an admission, defendant had a right to have the bill read, but the judge cautioned the jury not to take the allegations as true. Pennell v. Meyer, 2 M. & Rob. 98. See Proof of Chancery proceedings, post, pp. 112 et seq. The assertion of a party, in a conversation given in evidence against him, of facts in his favour, is evidence for him of those facts. Smith v. Blandy, Ry. & M. 257. But a party cannot examine a witness, who is called to prove the conversation against him, as to unconnected statements made by him (the party) on the same occasion containing distinct assertions of his own rights. In other words, there are limits to the general proposition that the whole of a conversation is evidence, where part is admissible. Semb. Prince v. Samo, 7 Ad. & E. 627, cited under Re-examination of witnesses, post, p. 183.

OBJECT OF EVIDENCE.

The object of evidence is to prove the point in issue between the parties; and in doing this, there are three general rules to be kept in view: 1. That the evidence be confined to the issue; 2. That the substance of the issue only need be proved; 3. That the burden of proof lies on the party asserting an affirmative fact, if it be unsupported by any presump

tion of law.

EVIDENCE CONFINED TO THE ISSUE.

As the object of pleading is to reduce the matters in difference between the parties to distinct and simple issues, so the rules of evidence require that no proof, oral or documentary, shall be received that is not referable to those issues. All evidence of matters which the courts judicially notice, or of matters immaterial, superfluous, or irrelevant, is therefore excluded.

Thus, where the inquiry is, whether A. made a qualified, or an unqualified, sale of goods to B.; and A. denies the qualification, it cannot be shown in disproof of the denial that he had sold to others the like articles subject to such qualification; and it is doubtful whether he can be asked the question, though merely to test his veracity of memory. Hollingham v. Head, 4 C. B., N. S. 338; 27 L. J., C. P. 241. For another instance of this rule, see Hyde v. Palmer, 3 B. & S. 657; 32 L. J., Q. B. 126; and see on the Cross-examination of witnesses, post, p. 177.

Facts of which the court will take judicial notice.] There are many facts which the courts will notice judicially, and of which it is therefore unnecessary to give any evidence. The following are examples:-They will judicially notice the order and course of proceedings in Parliament, Lake v. King, 1 Wms. Saund. 131b; the established privileges of the House of Commons, Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1; Bradlaugh v. Gossett, 12 Q. B. D. 271; the existence of war with a foreign state, R. v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67; the existence of a foreign state recognised by the British Government; but not otherwise, Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Simons, 213; Berne, City of, v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347; the several seals of the Queen; as the great seal, Ld. Melville's case, 29 How. St. Tr. 707; privy seal, privy signet, and seal of the Exchequer attached to leases of land in its management; Lane's case, 2 Rep. 17 b. The court took judicial notice of the seal of the city of London; Doe d. Woodmass v. Mason, 1 Esp. 53; so of a seal of a superior court of Westminster. Tooker v. Beaufort, Dk. of, Say, 297. It is said also that the seals of the Great Sessions of Wales, and of the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty courts, prove themselves; but the cases usually cited to show this are not satisfactory. See Kempton v. Cross, Cas. temp. Hardw. 108 (Ecclesiastical Courts); Green v. Waller, 2 Ld. Raym. 893 (Admiralty Court); Olive v. Guin, 2 Sid. 145; Hardres, 118 (the Great Sessions of Wales), Com. Dig. Testm. (A. 1), (A. 2); which have ruled, that the seal of those courts authenticates their proceedings; but not that it proves itself; nor does it follow, that where a statute authorises the use of a seal, the court is to take notice of the seal without proof of it.

The following seals are required by statute to be judicially noticed: the Chancery Common Law Seal, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 109, s. 11; the Seal of the Enrolment Office in Chancery, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 109, s. 17; of the Probate Court, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, s. 22; of the Divorce Court, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 13; of the Admiralty Court, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 10, s. 14; of the Bankruptcy Court, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 137 (formerly 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 109); the Wafer Great Seal, and Wafer Privy Seal, 40 & 41 Vict. c. 41, ss. 4, 5 (3a); the Patent Office Seal, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 84; the Seal of the Railway and Canal Commission, 51 & 52 Vict. c. 25, s. 2.

By Rules, 1883, O. lxi. r. 7, "all copies, certificates, and other documents appearing to be sealed with a seal of the Central Office shall be presumed to be office copies or certificates or other documents issued from the Central Office, and if duly stamped may be received in evidence, and no signature or other formality, except the sealing with a seal of the Central Office, shall be required for the authentication of any such copy, certificate, or other document.”

By the J. Act, 1873, s. 61, writs and documents, and all exemplifications and copies thereof, purporting to be sealed with the seal of a district registry of the High Court of Justice, shall be received in evidence without further proof.

The seal of a notary public has been judicially noticed; Bayley on Bills, 490; Anon., 12 Mod. 345; Cole v. Sherard, 11 Exch. 482; and see stat.

52 & 53 Vict. c. 10, s. 6, infra; see, further, Effect of notarial and consular certificates, post, p. 213.

By the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 10, "Every document which by any law now in force, or hereafter to be in force, is or shall be admissible in evidence of any particular in any court of justice in Ireland, without proof of the seal, or stamp, or signature authenticating the same, or of the judicial or official character of the person appearing to have signed the same, shall be admitted in evidence to the same extent, and for the same purposes in any court of justice in England or Wales, or before any person having in England or Wales by law, or by consent of parties, authority to hear, receive and examine evidence, without proof of the seal, or stamp, or signature authenticating the same, or of the judicial or official character of the person appearing to have signed the same."

By the Commissioners for Oaths Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 10), s. 3 (1), Any oath or affidavit required for the purpose of any court or matter in England, or for the purpose of the registration of any instrument in any part of the United Kingdom, may be taken or made in any place out of England before any person having authority to administer an oath in that place. (2) In the case of a person having such authority otherwise than by the law of a foreign country, judicial and official notice shall be taken of his seal or signature affixed, impressed, or subscribed to or on any such oath or affidavit."

By sect. 6 (1), "Every British ambassador, envoy, minister, chargé d'affaires, and secretary of embassy or legation exercising his functions in any foreign country, and every British consul-general, consul, viceconsul, acting-consul, pro-consul, and consular agent exercising his functions in any foreign place may, in that country or place, administer any oath and take any affidavit, and also do any notarial act which any notary public can do within the United Kingdom; and every oath, affidavit, and notarial act administered, sworn, or done by or before any such person shall be as effectual as if duly administered, sworn, or done by or before any lawful authority in any part of the United Kingdom. (2) Any document purporting to have affixed, impressed, or subscribed thereon or thereto the seal and signature of any person authorized by this section to administer an oath in testimony of any oath, affidavit, or act being administered, taken, or done by or before him, shall be admitted in evidence without proof of the seal or signature being the seal or signature of that person, or of the official character of that person."

By sect. 11, "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 'oath' includes affirmation and declaration: 'affidavit' includes affirmation, statutory or other declaration, acknowledgment, examination, and attestation or protestation of honour: swear' includes affirm, declare, and protest." Sect. 12 repeals 18 & 19 Vict. c. 42, s. 3; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 22; and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 95, s. 31.

Sects. 3, 6, and 11, supra, replace and extend the provisions of these repealed sections, and avoid the difficulties that arose under those sections. Rules, 1883, O. xxxviii. r. 6, which relate to the swearing of affidavits, and their proof, seems also to be replaced by 52 & 53 Vict. c. 10, ss. 3, 6,

supra.

There are numerous provisions which make copies of documents, authenticated by the seal of a court or public body, good evidence without further proof. See post, pp. 98 et seq.

By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, s. 2, "All courts, judges, justices, masters in chancery, masters of courts, commissioners judicially acting, and other judicial officers shall henceforth take judicial notice of the signature of any of the equity or common law judges of the superior courts at West

VOL. I.

G

minster, provided such signature be attached or appended to any decree, order, certificate, or other judicial or official document." This section applies when the signature is affixed by a stamp in the usual manner. See Blades v. Lawrence, L. R., 9 Q. B. 374.

By the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 137, judicial notice shall in all legal proceedings be taken of the seal and of the signature of the judge or registrar of any court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy. By sect. 127, general rules and orders made under the Act are to be judicially noticed. See also sect. 140, as to orders and certificates issued by the Board of Trade. See further post, Part III., Actions by and against trustees of bankrupts.

By the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 25), s. 20, general rules made by the railway and canal commission under that Act, for carrying it into effect are to be judicially noticed.

By 52 & 53 Vict. c. 30, s. 6 (2), the seal of the Board of Agriculture shall be "judicially noticed, and such seal shall be authenticated by the signature of the president," &c.

By the Land Transfer Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 87), s. 111, rules made thereunder are to be judicially noticed.

By the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57), s. 96, certain certificates purporting to be under the hand of the comptroller of patents are prima facie evidence.

There is no doubt that the existence of all the superior courts will be judicially noticed; Tregany v. Fletcher, 1 Ld. Raym. 154; and so of course will that of all courts established by Act of Parliament. In Dobson v. Bell, 2 Lev. 176, and Pugh v. Robinson, 1 T. R. 118, it was stated, generally, that the practice of the superior courts would be judicially noticed; but in Caldwell v. Hunter, 10 Q. B. 86, Ex. Ch., Maule, J., seemed inclined to doubt whether, the jury having found the practice to be one way, the court could hold it to be another, when the practice was not prescribed by statute, or by the common law, by which latter expression he seems to mean immemorial usage, as distinguished from modern usage. The doubt is altogether not very clearly expressed, and Parke, B., appears not to have assented to it.

The courts formerly took notice of the law of England as administered in the Court of Chancery. Sims v. Marryatt, 17 Q. B. 281; 20 L. J., Q. B. 454. But the practice of that court was proved by oral evidence, as in Dicas v. Brougham, Ld., 1 M. & Rob. 309, where Ld. Eldon was called as a witness to prove that practice, and in Tucker v. Inman, 4 M. & Gr. 1049, where equity counsel were called for a similar purpose. In Place v. Potts, 8 Exch. 705; 22 L. J., Ex. 269, the court informed itself by private inquiry as to the jurisdiction of, and proceedings in the Court of Admiralty; which is the same thing as taking judicial notice of it. The court took a similar course with reference to the practice in the Enrolment Office of the Court of Chancery in Doe d. Williams v. Lloyd, 1 M. & Gr. 671. Now under the J. Act, 1873, s. 24, all the courts constituted under that Act are to give effect to every equitable estate, right, and ground of relief. It would seem therefore that every judge of the High Court is bound at Nisi Prius to take judicial notice of the practice of the several divisions of the court. In Pilkington v. Cooke, 16 M. & W. 615, the court refused to take judicial notice of when an order of the judges, allowing a scale of fees to be taken by sheriffs, was made.

The courts take notice of the diocese in which the superior courts at Westminster are situate, Adams v. Savage, 6 Mod. 134; the privileges of their officers, including those of solicitors, Stokes v. Mason, 9 East, 426; Ogle v. Norcliffe, 2 Ld. Raym. 869; the beginning and end of terms,

Estwick v. Cooke, Id. 1557; the Queen's proclamation, at least if the Gazette or other authorized copy be produced, Van Omeron v. Dowick, 2 Camp. 44; Dupays v. Shepherd, 12 Mod. 216; and see post, pp. 105, 106; they will take notice of the different counties, palatinates, and counties corporate, in England, 2 Inst. 557; Deybel's case, 4 B. & A. 248; R. v. S. Maurice, 16 Q. B. 908; 20 L. J., M. C. 221; the existence of the two English universities, and of the purposes of their institution, viz., religion and learning, Re Oxford rate, 8 E. & B. 184; the days of festivals appointed by the calendar of the Church of England, Brough v. Perkins, 6 Mod. 81; the number of days in a particular month, 1 Rol. Ab. 524; that a particular day of the month in a year falls on Sunday, Hanson v. Shackelton, 4 Dowl. 48; that a place lies east or west of Greenwich, and that its true time therefore differs from that of Greenwich, Curtis v. March, 28 L. J., Ex. 36, per Pollock, C. B.; that a colony, or place in it, is not in England, Cooke v. Wilson, 1 C. B., N. S. 153; 26 L. J., C. P. 15; that the value of money has diminished since the time of Richard I., Bryant v. Foot, L. R., 3 Q. B. 497, Ex. Ch. per Kelly, C. B. In construing a marine policy, the court will take judicial notice of what appears on the admiralty chart of the portion of the sea to which the insurance relates. Birrell v. Dryer, 9 Ap. Ca. 345-347, 353, D. P.

A company incorporated by public statute will be noticed, and its identity with the one named in the pleadings will be assumed. MacGregor v. Dover Ry. Co., 18 Q. B. 618, 627; Church v. Imperial Gas Co., 6 Ad. & E. 856. When any facts are notified by a public Act of Parliament, it seems that they must be judicially noticed; thus the courts will notice that the Isle of Ely is a franchise in the nature of a riding, liable to the repair of its bridges since 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 53. R. v. Ely, 15 Q. B. 827. In R. v. Anderson, 9 Q. B. 663, the court took judicial notice that the assessor and collector of the land-tax and assessed taxes were "public annual" officers within the meaning of the 3 W. & M. c. 11, s. 6.

The courts will not notice judicially the nature and jurisdiction of a local inferior court, Moravia v. Sloper, Willes, 37; nor Scotch, colonial, or foreign law, vide Proof of foreign law, post, p. 119; nor particular customs, as those of London, Argyle v. Hunt, Stra. 187; unless duly certified by the recorder, Blacquiere v. Hawkins, 1 Doug. 378; Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624; as to which see 1 Taylor, Evid. § 5; nor that a particular town is within a certain diocese, R. v. Sympson, 2 Ld. Raym. 1379. It is indeed said, in the report of Adams v. Savage, Id. 854, that the courts notice the "limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction;" but the report in 6 Mod. 134, shows only that the courts at Westminster will take notice in what diocese they are, and that there is an ecclesiastical division of England into provinces and dioceses. They will not notice the local situation of a town or a street in a county, Deybel's case, 4 B. & A. 243; Humphreys v. Budd, 9 Dowl. 1000; nor that part of the Tower of London is within the city of London, Brune v. Thompson, 2 Q. B. 789; nor that a particular town (as Dublin) is in Ireland, Kearney v. King, 2 B. & A. 303; sed quære? for this appears in several Acts of Parliament. Though the courts took judicial notice of the articles of war which were printed by the King's printer, Bradley v. Arthur, 4 B. & C. 304; R. v. Withers, cited 5 T. R. 446, and are now bound to do so by the Mutiny Act, yet the book called "Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Army" will not be noticed. Bradley v. Arthur, supra.

The courts would not formerly notice the seal or proceedings of a foreign court; Henry v. Adey, 3 East, 221; Ganer v. Lanesborough, Lady, Peake, 17; but this is altered by the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 7, cited post, p. 100.