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Rush v. Peacock, 2 M. & Rob. 162. In a suit by assignees of bankrupt, admissions by them before their appointment were received in evidence against them by Tindal, C. J., in Smith v. Morgan, Id. 257; but they were rejected, by Abbott, C. J., in a previous case of Fenwick v. Thornton, M. & M. 51. In Legge v. Edmonds, 25 L. J., Ch. 125, letters written by a defendant, sued as administratrix, containing admissions made by her before letters of administration had been taken out, were rejected as evidence, against her. Perhaps the admissibility of statements made by executors, assignees, and others filling an official character, but before they were invested with that character, will be found to depend on the nature of the facts stated by them. So an admission, before probate, by an executor may perhaps be entitled to more consideration than the admission of a mere stranger who has afterwards obtained letters of administration, for the executor takes his title from the will. When an official manager of a company, appointed under the Winding-up Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 45, was substituted as defendant by order in Chancery, instead of a shareholder D., who had been sued by a creditor of the company "as nominal defendant," it was held that the declarations of D., while defendant, were not evidence against the official manager. Armstrong v. Normandy, 5 Exch. 409. The decision here turned on the misnaming of D. on the record as "nominal defendant only."

Admissions by guardian and prochein amy.] The admissions of a guardian are not evidence against an infant who sues by his guardian. Cowling v. Ely, 2 Stark. 366; Eggleston v. Speke, 3 Mod. 258. Nor the admission of prochein amy. Webb v. Smith, Ry. & M. 106.

Admissions by agents and servants.] Where a party to the suit directly or impliedly constitutes a third person his agent for the purpose of an admission, the admission so made is evidence. Thus, if a person agree to admit a claim, provided J. S. will make an affidavit in support of it, such affidavit is proof against him. Lloyd v. Willan, 1 Esp. 178; Stevens v. Thacker, Peake, 187. And it is conclusive in an action founded on the special agreement. Amy v. Andrews, Freem. 133. But see Garnet v. Ball, 3 Stark. 160. So if the vendee of goods deny having received them, but add, "If the carrier's servant says he delivered the goods, I will pay you," the answer of the servant when applied to on the subject may be given in evidence. Daniel v. Pitt, 1 Camp. 366, n.; Williams v. Innes, Id. 364. In an action for the loss of a horse through the defendant's negligence in not fencing a shaft, defendant consented to pay compensation if a miners' jury should say the shaft was his; held, that the finding of such jury was evidence against him of negligence, though not conclusive. Sybray v. White, 1 M. & W. 435.

With regard to the admissions of agents in general, the rule is this: When it is proved that A. is agent of B. whatever A. does, or says, or writes, in the making of a contract as agent of B., is admissible in evidence against B., because it is part of the contract which he makes for B., and which therefore binds B.; but it is not admissible merely as the agent's account of what has passed. Per Gibbs, J., Langhorn v. Allnutt, 4 Taunt. 519. Thus the declaration of a servant employed to sell a horse is evidence to charge the master with a warranty, if made at the time of sale; but statements made at any other time are not admissible against him. Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Esp. 72. So where the servant of a horsedealer, who was employed to take a horse to the stables of the purchaser, had signed a receipt containing a warranty, this receipt without proof of the servant's authority to give a warranty was rejected in an action against his master. Woodin v. Burford, 2 Cr. & M. 391. An admission

by a servant, in a transaction not relating to the business in which he is employed, is not evidence against his master. Thus where a pawnbroker's shopman was heard to state that his master had lent 2007. at 5 per cent. on the security of certain plate, this was held inadmissible as against the master. Garth v. Howard, 8 Bing. 451. But if the statement had been made by him in the course of a transaction in the ordinary course of a pawnbroker's business, it would have been different. Id. 543; Schumack v. Lock, 10 B. Moo. 39. The letters of an agent to his principal, containing a narrative of past transactions in which he had been employed, are not admissible in evidence against the principal. Kahl v. Jansen, 4 Taunt. 565; Fairlie v. Hastings, 10 Ves. 128; Betham v. Benson, Gow, 45. An admission by a person who has generally managed A.'s landed property, and received his rents, is not evidence against A. as to his employer's title, there being no other proof of his agency ad hoc. Ley v. Peter, 3 H. & N. 101; 27 L. J., Ex. 239. So in an action against a surety, the admissions or declarations of the principal, to whom goods have been sent by the plaintiff at the defendant's request, are not evidence against the defendant either as to the receipt of the goods, or as to other facts respecting them. Evans v. Beattie, 5 Esp. 26; Bacon v. Chesney, 1 Stark. 192.

But a letter from an agent abroad stating the receipt of money, coupled with the answer of the principal directing the disposition of the money, will be evidence of the receipt by the principal. Coates v. Bainbridge, 5 Bing. 58. And a letter from the master of a ship to her owners has been held admissible against them, with regard to the facts, but not to the opinions therein stated. The Solway, 10 P. D. 137. The admissions of an under-sheriff are evidence against a sheriff, for he is the general agent of the sheriff; Drake v. Sykes, 7 T. R. 117; but not unless they accompany an act done, or they tend to charge himself; he being the real party in the cause. Snowball v. Goodricke, 4 B. & Ad. 541. The admissions of a bailiff are evidence against the sheriff, like the statements of any other agent, only when they form part of the transaction. North v. Miles, 1 Camp. 389.

The admissions of a surveyor of a corporation respecting a house belonging to the corporation, are evidence against the latter in an action for an injury to the plaintiff's house by works done on the defendants' premises. Peyton v. S. Thomas's Hospital, 3 M. & Ry. 625, n. ; and see London, Mayor of, v. Long, 1 Camp. 25, cited ante, p. 68; and R. v. Adderbury, East, 5 Q. B. 187. Evidence may be given against companies, of admissions made by their directors or agents relating to matters within the scope of their authority. In Meux's Executors' Case, 2 D. M. & G. 522, a letter written by the secretary of a company by order of the acting directors, stating the number of shares held by M., was admitted on behalf of his executors, in proceedings against them. See also National Exchange Co. of Glasgow v. Drew, 2 Macq. 103. The secretary of a projected company has not, by virtue only of his office, any power to bind the members of the provisional committee by admissions. Burnside v. Dayrell, 3 Exch. 225. In Bruff v. Gt. N. Ry. Co., 1 F. & F. 345, Willes, J., rejected an admission of the secretary of a company as to the receipt of a letter. And an admission by the board meeting of a company registered under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, consisting of a less number of directors than was required by the deed of settlement, was rejected in Ridley v. Plymouth Baking Co., 2 Exch. 711. In an action against an incorporated company by one of its members on a bond, entries in a book kept by the clerk of the company, to which all members by the act of incorporation had access, cannot be used against the plaintiff as an admission. * Hill v. Manchester, &c. Waterworks Co., 5 B. & Ad. 866. Admissions by servants

of a company as to the ferocious habits of a dog, were not allowed to bind the company, in the absence of evidence that these servants had the care of the animal. Stiles v. Cardiff S. Navigation Co., 33 L. J., Q. B. 310. As to admissibility of statements by servants of a railway company with reference to delay in delivery or loss of goods, see Gt. W. Ry. Co. v. Willis, 18 C. B., N. S. 748; 34 L. J., C. P. 195; and Kirkstall Brewery Co. v. Furness Ry. Co., L. R., 9 Q. B. 468, cited post, p. 619.

Before the admissions of an agent can be received, the fact of his agency must be proved. This can be done by proving that the agent has acquired credit by acting in that capacity, and that he has been recognised by the principal in other instances of a similar character to that in question. In Watkins v. Vince, 2 Stark. 368, a guarantee signed by a son for his father was admitted upon proof of the son having signed for his father upon three or four previous occasions. But in Courteen v. Touse, 1 Camp. 43, n., where, in an action upon a policy, a witness proved that he had often seen B. sign policies for the defendant, but was not acquainted with any instance in which the defendant had paid a loss upon a policy so subscribed, it was held that the agency was not sufficiently proved.

A receipt for debt and costs, indorsed by the plaintiff's solicitor's town agent on a writ of summons, is evidence of payment against the plaintiff, without further proof of agency. Weary v. Alderson, 2 M. & Rob. 127. Where the statements of a party's agent are admissible, the statements of the agent's interpreter, made while acting as such in the agent's presence, may be given in evidence, without calling the interpreter. Reid v. Hoskins, 5 E. & B. 729.

Admissions by partner.] After primâ facie evidence of partnership, the declaration of one partner is evidence against his co-partners as to partnership business; Nicholls v. Dowding, 1 Stark. 81; though the former is no party to the suit. Wood v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104; but see Rooth v. Quin, 7 Price, 198. And it is evidence, though made after the dissolution of partnership, if made as to a transaction which took place before the dissolution; Wood v. Braddick, supra; but not so as to bind his co-partner as to a transaction which occurred previously to the partnership, unless a joint responsibility be proved as a foundation for the evidence. Catt v. Howard, 3 Stark. 3. Admissions made by one of several partners after the dissolution of the partnership, are admissible to prove payment, after the dissolution, of a debt due to the partnership. Pritchard v. Draper, 1 Russ. & Myl. 191. A declaration by one of several partners, joint plaintiffs, that goods, the subject-matter of the suit, were his separate property, is evidence against all the plaintiffs; Lucas v. De la Cour, 1 M. & S. 249; but an admission by a partner as to a subject, not of co-partnership, but of joint ownership of a vessel, is not admissible against his co-partner. Jaggers v. Binnings, 1 Stark. 64. In an action against two partners on a deed purporting to be executed by one defendant "for self and partner," a subsequent acknowledgment of the deed by the other defendant was held not evidence to prove the actual execution by him, without producing the authority under seal. Steiglitz v. Eggington, Holt, N. P. 141. But see Ball v. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313, post, p. 135. And in Harvey v. Kay, 9 B. & C. 356, letters of a member of a joint stock company, admitting that he was a partner in it, were received as proof of that fact, without any evidence of his having executed the deed of settlement by which the company was formed. A statement by one who became partner after the cause of action arose, is not evidence against his co-partner who sues on it. Tunley v. Evans, 2 D. & L. 747, B. C., Wightman, J.

Admissions by wife.] In general, the admissions of a wife will not affect the husband. Thus, the wife's receipt for money, or admission of a trespass, is not evidence against the husband. Hall v. Hill, Stra. 1094; Denn v. White, 7 T. R. 112. But where the wife can be considered the agent of her husband, her admissions may be received as evidence against him. Emerson v. Blonden, 1 Esp. 142; Anderson v. Sanderson, 2 Stark. 204; S. C., Holt, N. P. 591. Thus, in an action for goods sold and delivered at the defendant's shop, an offer made by his wife to settle the demand is admissible in evidence, if she were accustomed to serve in the shop, and to transact the business in her husband's absence; Clifford v. Burton, 1 Bing. 199; and her admission, under such circumstances, will take a case out of the Statute of Limitations. Palethorp v. Furnish, 2 Esp. 511, n. But her admissions are not evidence of the terms of her husband's tenancy of the shop, in a suit for the rent, although she is carrying on business in it by her husband's authority in his absence. Meredith v. Footner, 11 M. & W. 202. A wife's declaration that she agreed to pay 48. a week for nursing a child will charge the husband, it being a matter usually transacted by women. Anon., Stra. 527. In an action against defendant, as administrator of his wife, for money lent to her before marriage, admissions of the debt made by her during coverture are evidence. Per Lord Tenterden, C. J., Humphreys v. Boyce, 1 M. & Rob. 140. But in an action by husband and wife for a loan by the wife dum sola, her admissions, after coverture, negativing the debt, were refused by Lord Kenyon, C. J. Kelly v. Small, 2 Esp. 716. So, where plaintiff sued, with his wife as executrix, her declarations were inadmissible. Alban v. Pritchett, 6 T. R. 680. A joint answer in Chancery by husband and wife was not evidence against her, being considered as the answer of the husband alone. Elston v. Wood, 2 My. & K. 678. In Shelberry v. Briggs, 2 Vern. 249, in a bill against husband and wife for payment of a legacy under a will, of which the wife was executrix, the answer was admitted against the wife after the death of her husband. See Wrottesley v. Bendish, 3 P. Wms. 238. In the case of a wife sued, with her husband, in respect of her separate estate, it would seem that her admissions, but not those of her husband, would be evidence against her. Where the conduct of the wife is in question, her declarations have, in some cases, been held admissible for her husband, in an action against him. Thus, in an action for necessaries supplied to the wife, the defence being that the husband had turned her out of doors for adultery, her declarations as to the adultery, made previously to her expulsion, were admitted by Abbott, C. J., Walton v. Green, 1 C. & P. 621; this decision, however, as reported, seems unsatisfactory. See 1 Taylor, Evid., § 695. In an action for seduction, declarations of defendant's wife, tending to show that she aided and colluded with the defendant in seducing the plaintiff's daughter, were admitted as evidence in aggravation. Per Gurney, B., Knowles v. Compiyne, Winton Sum. Ass. 1835.

Admissions by counsel or solicitor.] In Colledge v. Horn, 3 Bing. 122, Burrough, J., expressed an opinion that if one of the parties to a cause were in court and had heard an admission made by his counsel in his opening statement, this was evidence against him. In Haller v. Worman, 2 F. & F. 165, where, in an action of detinue, it was proved that the defendant's counsel had stated, while attending a summons at chambers, that his client had the papers in his possession; this was admitted at the trial to negative the plea of "not possessed." When the counsel in a cause so conducts it as to lead to an inference that a certain fact is admitted by him, the jury may take it as proved; Stracy v. Blake, 1 M. & W. 168;

and the judge is also warranted in acting upon such tacit admission. at Nisi Prius for the purpose of supporting one issue, it must be taken as admitted for the purpose of disproving another issue. Semble, Bolton v. Sherman, 2 M. & W. 403. And if counsel for the plaintiff open a fact from which his client's possession of a document may be presumed (as payment of a cheque), though he offers no proof of it, yet defendant may give secondary evidence of it after notice to produce, without further proof of the plaintiff's possession. Duncombe v. Daniell, 8 C. & P. 222. Where, after a verdict subject to a special case, a new trial has been directed, the special case, signed by counsel on both sides, is evidence of the facts there stated. Van Wart v. Wolley, Ry. & M. 4. In a case where the statement of counsel as to the limitations of a deed on a former trial was offered as secondary evidence of its contents, the admissibility of it was considered questionable, even if the parties had been the same; but it was rejected on the ground that the defendant, against whom it was offered, was different. Doe d. Gilbert v. Ross, 7 M. & W. 102.

An admission made by the solicitor of one of the parties to prevent the necessity of proving a fact on the trial is sufficient evidence of that fact; Young v. Wright, 1 Camp. 141; as where he admits the handwriting of an attesting witness. Milward v. Temple, Id. 375; and see Truslove v. Burton, 9 B. Moore, 64. See also Rules, O. xxxii. r. 1, cited ante, p. 62.

Admissions made by the defendant's solicitor, when making proposals on behalf of his client respecting the plaintiff's demand (the solicitor refusing to be examined), are evidence against the defendant; and proof that they were made by the solicitor on the record will be sufficient to establish his agency. Gainsford v. Grammar, 2 Camp. 9. But an admission made in a letter written by a solicitor (who was afterwards the solicitor in the cause) before the commencement of the action, is not evidence against the defendant, without some proof of his having authorized the communication. Wagstaff v. Wilson, 4 B. & Ad. 339; Ley v. Peter, 3 H. & N. 101, 111; 27 L. J., Ex. 239, 242, per Watson, B. See also Blackstone v. Wilson, 27 L. J., Ex. 229. And an admission made in the course of conversation between the two solicitors respecting the cause, but not with a view to dispense with proof, cannot be given in evidence. Petch v. Lyon, 9 Q. B. 147. See Parkins v. Hawkshaw, 2 Stark. 239. An undertaking to appear for "Messrs. T. and M., joint owners of the sloop A.," given by the solicitor on the record, is evidence of the joint ownership. Marshall v. Cliff, 4 Camp. 133. An agreement by the solicitor" to admit on the trial of this cause," &c., may be used on a new trial; Elton v. Larkins, 1 M. & Rob. 196; even though the solicitor retracts it before the new trial. Doe d. Wetherell v. Bird, 7 C. & P. 6.

Admission under a notice to admit.] By Rules, 1883, O. xxxii. r. 2, "Either party may call upon the other party to admit any document, saving all just exceptions: and in case of refusal or neglect to admit after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the cause or matter may be, unless at the trial or hearing the court or a judge certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable, and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice be given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the taxing officer, a saving of expense." By rule 4, "Any party may, by notice in writing,

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