ing as a jury, awarded him 2507. Inchbald v. W. Neilgherry Coffee, &c. Co., 17 C. B., N. S. 733; 34 L. J., C. P. 15. See further Moffat v. Laurie, 15 C. B. 583; 24 L. J., C. P. 56. A Where a broker is employed to find a buyer, he is entitled to his commission if he introduced the parties, though the principals eventually settled the terms; and, semble, if several brokers are employed separately, the one who first introduces the parties is entitled. Cunard v. Van Oppen, 1 F. & F. 716. The above was a case of shipbrokers, and was perhaps governed by the proof of custom at the trial; but in the absence of express stipulation, or of fraud, the rule seems reasonable in other like cases. broker or other agent finds a buyer, if he introduce a buyer to the seller, or to the premises for sale, or call the premises to the notice of a buyer; introduction to the agent of the buyer is sufficient. Wilkinson v. Alston, 48 L. J., Q. B. 733, C. A. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant to sell an estate for him, upon the terms of being paid commission if the estate were sold, and a fixed sum if not sold. The estate was sold by the defendant himself to a person, who had first heard of the estate being in the market from the plaintiff's advertisement. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to the commission, the relation of buyer and seller having been brought about by what the plaintiff had done. Green v. Bartlett, 14 C. B., N. S. 681; 32 L. J., C. P. 261. See also Bayley v. Chadwick, 39 L. T., N. S. 429, D. P., and Mansell v. Clements, L. R., 9 C. P. 139. It seems that the purchaser may be asked "whether, but for the plaintiff's intervention, he would have bought the property?" S. C. See further Tribe v. Taylor, 1 C. P. D. 505. Where A. employed B. to procure a loan on mortgage of A.'s property, for a certain commission, and B. has procured a person, C., willing to make the advance, B. is entitled to the whole of the commission, although the advance was not made, because A. was either unable to give a good security; Green v. Lucas, 33 L. T., N. S. 584, Mich. S. 1875, C. A.; or refused to give it; Fisher v. Drewitt, 48 L. J., Ex. 32, C. A.; for agents "who bargain to receive commission on introduction, have a right to their commission as soon as they have completed their portion of the bargain, irrespective of what may take place subsequently between the parties introduced. Id. 33, 34, per Bramwell, L. J.; Lockwood v. Levick, 8 C. B., N. S. 603; 29 L. J., C. P. 340. Performance.] The plaintiff must prove a performance of the work and labour according to the terms of the contract; or if there be a deviation from those terms, an assent of the defendant to the deviation. Vide ante, p. 558. Thus in an action to recover the value of a riding habit, for which the defendant's wife had been measured, but which was returned to the plaintiff on the day on which it was delivered, it was ruled to be incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the habit was made agreeably to the order. Hayden v. Hayward, 1 Camp. 180. So, a herald who sues for making out a pedigree, is bound to give some general evidence of the truth of the pedigree. Townsend v. Neale, 2 Camp. 191. Where an agent, A., has, without the knowledge of his principal, B., agreed to receive from C. 3,000l. as profit to himself, out of a purchase by A. on behalf of B. from C.; B. on knowing of the agreement, before A. has received the 3,000l., may adopt A.'s agreement and sue C. for the 3,000l. Whaley Bridge, &c. Co. v. Green, 5 Q. B. D. 109. See also cases cited post, pp. 576, 577. Value.] In what manner the value of the work done is to be calculated where there is a special contract and deviations from it, has been already mentioned, pp. 545, 558. Where a tradesman finishes work differing from the specification agreed on, he is not entitled to recover the actual value of the work done; but (if anything) only the stipulated price, minus the sum necessary to complete the work according to the specification. Thornton v. Place, 1 M. & Rob. 218; Chapel v. Hickes, 2 Cr. & M. 214. In an action for work and labour as a surveyor or architect, in the absence of express agreement, it is a question for the jury whether the commission charged is, under the circumstances, a reasonable or unreasonable charge. Chapman v. De Tastet, 2 Stark. 294; Upsdell v. Stewart, Peake, 193. Defence. By Rules, 1883, O. xxi. r. 3, "a defence in denial must deny such matters of fact from which the liability of the defendant is alleged to arise, as are disputed." See also O. xix. r. 17, ante, p. 301. By r. 15, ante, p. 301, the defendant must plead specially all facts, not previously stated, on which he relies, and must raise all such grounds of defence as if not pleaded would be likely to take the plaintiff by surprise. And by r. 20, ante, p. 302, a bare denial denies the making of the contract in point of fact only, and not its sufficiency in point of law. It is a good defence that the work was done under a special contract not executed. Jones v. Nanney, 1 M. & W. 333. Or, that the defendants, being a corporation, did not contract under seal, or with the formalities required by the act of incorporation. Cope v. Thames Haven Ry. Co., 3 Exch. 841. So that the defendants, guardians of a union, are charged for work done by a surveyor, which it was no part of their duty to order. Paine v. Strand Union, 8 Q. B. 326. If the defendant have received no benefit from the work, it having been improperly executed by the plaintiff, the latter cannot recover anything. Farnsworth v. Garrard, 1 Camp. 38; Montriou v. Jefferys, Ry. & M. 317. Thus an auctioneer, through whose gross negligence the sale becomes nugatory, can recover nothing for his services. Denew v. Daverell, 3 Camp. 451; see ante, pp. 488, 489, 494. Where the plaintiff had contracted to repair completely some chandeliers for 107., and returned them incompletely repaired, in an action for work and labour it was held that the plaintiff could not recover anything, at least in this form of action, though the jury found that the repairs were worth 51. Sinclair v. Bowles, 9 B. & C. 92, and vide ante, pp. 558, 559. So, where A. contracts to do work and supply materials upon the land of B. for a specific sum, to be paid on the completion of the whole, A. is not entitled to recover anything until the whole work is completed, unless it is shown that the performance of the contract was prevented by the default of B. Appleby v. Myers, L. R., 2 C. P. 651, Ex. Ch. In this case, the completion of the work on the defendant's premises was prevented by a fire there, and the court held that by the contract the work to be done was entire, and that the defendant did not warrant that his premises should continue in such a state as to enable the plaintiff to do the work. But, where the contract is not thus entire, the defendant must pay pro tanto for the work done by the plaintiff. As where a shipwright undertook to put a ship into thorough repair, and, before the work was finished, required payment for the portion done, without which he refused to proceed, and the ship thereby lost her voyage, it was held that he was nevertheless entitled to recover for the work done. Roberts v. Havelock, 3 B. & Ad. 404. So, where the ship was burnt in the plaintiff's dockyard before the repairs were completed, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover for the work done. Menetone v. Athawes, 3 Burr. 1592. And the same principle applies where the work has been badly done. Farnsworth v. Garrard, ante, p. 565. Where A. engaged with defendant's landlord to build a house on defendant's land, and A. made a sub-contract with the plaintiff to do part of the work, and defendant separately agreed to pay over to the plaintiff directly all money due for such part of the work upon a discharge from A., it was held that the defendant's agreement did not make him liable to the plaintiff for work and labour, but only on the special agreement. Sweeting v. Asplin, 7 M. & W. 165. Where the plaintiff agrees to do work for a certain sum on a false representation by defendant of the quantity of work to be done, he may repudiate the contract; but if he perform it, he can only recover the stipulated sum in this action. Selway v. Fogg, 5 M. & W. 83. As to defence to action by a builder, that the work was done under a contract, which entitled him to payment by his employer, out of a special fund only, see Williams v. Hathaway, 6 Ch. D. 544. An agent entrusted to sell land for his principal on commission is not entitled to any remuneration if he became himself the purchaser. Salomons v. Pender, 3 H. & C. 639; 34 L. J., Ex. 95, citing Story on Agency, § 210. See also Morison v. Thompson, L. R., 9 Q. B. 480, cited post, p. 576. An agent cannot recover a bribe promised to induce him to enter into a contract on behalf of his principal, even though the promise did not affect his mind, and his principal was not prejudiced. Harrington v. Victoria Graving Dock Co., 3 Q. B. D. 549. As to the defence arising under the Stamp Acts to a claim for brokerage, vide ante, pp. 245, 262. Election expenses.] By stat. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 84, s. 5, a person having a claim against a Parliamentary returning officer for work and labour, &c., in respect of an election (except publication of the accounts), must, within 14 days after the return, send to him the particulars of the claim in writing, and he is liable only in respect of claims included in such particulars; such claims are liable to a taxation by the Mayor's Court, London, or by the County Court, which is final for all purposes. By stat. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, s. 29 (2, 3), every claim against a candidate at a Parliamentary election in respect of any expenses incurred on account or in respect of the conduct or management of such election, which is not sent in to the election agent within 14 days after the return, shall be barred. By sect. 30, in the case of an action in a disputed claim for such expenses, where the defendant admits his liability, but disputes the amount, the amount is to be referred for taxation, unless the court on the application of the plaintiff otherwise directs. ACTION FOR MONEY PAID. The plaintiff, in an action for money paid, must prove, if denied by the defendant, 1. The payment of money by the plaintiff; 2. That it was paid at the request of the defendant, and to his use. The payment of money.] The payment must be proved as a fact; the admission of the payee is not admissible against the defendant, vide ante, p. 70. To prove, as against C., payment by A. to B. for work done by B. for A., for which C. is ultimately liable, it is sufficient to show that A. received from B. an invoice of the work done, that on Feb. 25th he sent B. a cheque for the amount, and on the next day received back the invoice from B. with a receipt, and that B. received the cheque on the 26th, at 9 a.m., and sent the receipt: the receipt is then admissible as a link in the evidence. This was held to be evidence of payment at 9 a.m. on the 26th, without producing the cheque or showing that it was honoured. Carmarthen & Cardigan Ry. Co. v. Manchester & Milford Ry. Co., L. R., 8 C. P. 685. The plaintiff must prove that money was paid; giving a security, as a bond or warrant of attorney, is not sufficient; Taylor v. Higgins, 3 East, 169; Maxwell v. Jameson, 2 B. & A. 51; unless, perhaps, where a bill or note is taken from the plaintiff by a creditor as payment of the defendant's debt. Barclay v. Gooch, 2 Esp. 571. So, stock cannot be considered as money; Nightingal v. Devisme, 5 Burr. 2589; unless it be so treated by the parties, as where it was transferred to the defendant with the view to a sale for defendant's use. Howard v. Danbury, 2 C. B. 803. The plaintiff must prove that the money paid was his money. Thus, an under-tenant, whose goods had been distrained and sold to strangers by the original landlord for rent due from his immediate tenant, cannot maintain an action for money paid to the use of the latter; for immediately on the sale under the distress, the money paid by the purchaser vested in the landlord in satisfaction of the rent, and never was the money of the under-tenant; Moore v. Pyrke, 11 East, 52; but it is otherwise where the under-tenant, or a stranger, redeems his goods with his own money. Exall v. Partridge, 8 T. R. 308. See post, p. 571, and other cases there cited. Defendant's request.] The plaintiff must prove a request by the defendant, express or implied. Alexander v. Vane, 1 M. & W. 511. Thus, where the lessee is to pay the lessor's expenses of granting a lease, and the lease has been granted, the lessor may recover his own solicitor's bill as money paid to the use of the lessee. Grissell v. Robinson, 3 N. C. 10. A subsequent assent to the payment will be evidence of a previous request; 1 Wms. Saund. 264 b, (2); and if there be a request to pay, the plaintiff may recover the money, though the debt so paid be one that could not be enforced; e.g., a time bargain, which, as a wager, is void by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, post, p. 589. Knight v. Cambers, 15 C. B. 562; 24 L. J., C. P. 121; Rosewarne v. Billing, 15 C. B., N. S. 316; 33 L. J., C. P. 55. See also Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D. 685, C. A., cited ante, p. 555. And where A., at B.'s request, has made bets for him, in A.'s name, and would incur disqualification, and sustain injury, if he did not pay the losses consequent on such bets, A. has, on the bet being made, an irrevocable authority from B. to pay such losses. Read v. Anderson, 10 Q. B. D. 100; 13 Id. 779, C. A., diss. Brett, M. R. So where a broker, C., bought for D. on his order bank shares on the Stock Exchange according to the custom there, under a contract void by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 29, s. 1, ante, p. 548, C. is entitled to recover the price from D., provided D. knew of the custom; Seymour v. Bridge, 14 Q. B. D. 460; but not otherwise; Perry v. Barnett, Id. 467; 15 Q. B. D. 388, C. A. If there be no request, plaintiff cannot recover, though he has paid a legal debt of the defendant. Stokes v. Lewis, 1 T. R. 20. Costs and expenses, incurred by the mortgagee, in relation to the mortgaged property, cannot be recovered from the mortgagor, as money paid. Ex pte. Fewings, 25 Ch. D. 338, C. A. Where, in the absence of usage, a broker purchases stock to fulfil a contract entered into by him for his principal, but which his principal refuses to make good, he cannot sue his principal in this action. Child v. Morley, 8 T. R. 614. So where the party to whom the stock was contracted to be sold, on the defendant's refusal to transfer, bought the stock himself, and sued for money paid, to recover the difference in the price of the stock, it was held that this action could not be sustained. Lightfoot v. Creed, 8 Taunt. 268. But where there is a usage of the Stock Exchange that brokers should be responsible to each other on their contracts (vide ante, p. 549), and the seller's broker is obliged to pay money in consequence of his principal's default, he may reimburse himself in this form of action. Sutton v. Tatham, 10 Ad. & Ě. 27; Bayliffe v. Butterworth, 1 Exch. 425; Pollock v. Stables, 12 Q. B. 765; Smith v. Lindo, 4 C. B., N. S. 395; 27 L. J., C. P. 196; 5 C. B., N. S. 587; 27 L. J., C. P. 335, Ex. Ch. See Westropp v. Solomon, 8 C. B. 345. In such cases it is immaterial whether or not the principal knew of the usage. S. CC.; Grissell v. Bristowe, L. R., 4 C. P. 36, 49. It makes no difference to the broker's right to recover, that the company, in which the shares had been bought, is being wound up, and therefore the shares cannot be transferred to his principal. Taylor v. Stray, 2 C. B., N. S. 175, 197; 26 L. J., C. P. 185, 287; Chapman v. Shepherd, and Whitehead v. Izod, L. R., 2 C. P. 228. Where the broker, who had been authorized to buy shares at a certain price, was called upon by the seller, according to the rules of the Stock Exchange, to repay him a call due after the sale, and paid by the seller in order to enable him to transfer the shares, the principal was held liable over to the broker in this action. Bayley v. Wilkins, 7 C. B. 886. Where the principal, P., has instructed his broker, B., to carry over (vide ante, p. 552) stock to the next settlement, B. may, by the usage of the Stock Exchange, close P.'s account, if the balance of differences, due from P. to B., have not been paid on the pay-day of the current settlement, provided B. gave P. notice of the amount due to him before the pay-day, and P. have not paid or secured the amount, and B. may sue P. for any balance due. Davis v. Howard, 24 Q. B. D. 691. And in the event of the death, bankruptcy, or insolvency of the principal, whereby he will be unable to take up the stock, which the broker has bought for him on his own credit, the broker is justified in immediately selling the stock, and claiming the difference against the bankrupt's estate, subject to a set-off for any loss arising to the estate from such sale being made before the settling day, the customary time for selling out stock, on default of the principal to take it up (vide ante, p. 553). Scrimgeour's Claim, L. R., 8 Ĉh. 921; see also Crowley's Claim, L. R., 18 Eq. 182. Where the broker is, otherwise than through the fault of his principal, unable to meet his engagements, and thereby becomes a defaulter under the Stock Exchange rules (r. 177 of 1890, ante, p. 554), and his contracts are closed in accordance with those rules, his principal is not bound to indemnify him against the loss thereby occasioned to him. Duncan v. Hill, L. R., 8 Ex. 242, Ex. Ch. Secus, where the principal has assented to the closing of the contract made for him, and has declined to exercise his right of taking it up himself, or of having it transferred to another broker. Hartas v. Ribbons, 22 Q. B. D. 254, C. A. There is an implied agreement between the original lessee and each successive assignee of a term, that the latter shall indemnify the former from liability on breaches of the covenants of the lease during the possession of the assignee; such agreement is implied, although each assignee expressly covenants to indemnify his immediate assignor against all subsequent breaches; the lessee is in the position of a surety to the lessor for the assignee. Moule v. Garrett, L. R., 5 Ex. 132; L. R., 7 Ex. 101, Ex. Ch.; and see Roberts v. Crowe, L. R., 7 C. P. 636, per Willes, J.; and Crouch v. Tregonning, L. R., 7 Ex. 88. The damages recoverable are the |