the company will, in equity, be estopped from relying on the mis-statement; and this may be specially replied to the defence. Wood v. Dwarris, 11 Exch. 493; 25 L. J., Ex. 129. But, where the policy is issued by a company, which circulates a prospectus purporting that their policies are indisputable, a reply, relying on this fact, must be supported by proof, that the prospectus had been seen, or acted upon by the insured; and, the mere proof of the public circulation of the prospectus, before the policy was effected, is not sufficient. Wheelton v. Hardisty, ante, p. 438. The omission to state that the deceased had any occupation, in answer to questions in the proposal, any mis-statement or concealment in which was to vitiate the policy, is not such an untrue statement as to vitiate the policy. Perrins v. Marine & General Insur. Society, 2 E. & E. 317, 324; 29 L. J., Q. B. 17, 242. But, the omission to state that proposals for insurance were made to, and declined by, other insurance offices was held to vitiate a contract for insurance. London Assur. v. Mansel, 11 Ch. D. 363. The person whose life is the subject of insurance by another has been held to be so far an agent for the assured that his false answers will vitiate the policy. Rawlins v. Desborough, 2 M. & Rob. 328, and note, Id. 334. But this case turned on the form of the particular policy; and, the false and fraudulent statements of the person whose life is insured, and of the medical referee, will not vitiate the policy, as against an innocent person, who effected the insurance, there being no condition, that the untruth of the statement, contained in the proposal, should avoid the policy. Wheelton v. Hardisty, Ex. Ch., ante, p. 438. As to effect of change in the health of the proposer, between the acceptance of proposal for insurance and payment of premium, see Canning v. Farquhar, 16 Q. B. D. 727, cited ante, p. 436.

Suicide.] Clauses avoiding a policy if the person, whose life is insured, "commits suicide," or "dies by his own hands," are construed to include all voluntary self-destruction, though not felonious; and consequently the unsoundness of the person's mind is not material. Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; Dormay v. Borradaile, 5 C. B. 380. Where the policy was conditioned to be valid, notwithstanding suicide, to the extent of any bonâ fide interest acquired by any person, by virtue of an equitable lien or security on it, on proof of such interest, to the satisfaction of the directors of the company: proof of the policy being held by the trustees of the wife of the assured, by way of marriage settlement, was held to support the alleged lien. Moore v. Woolsey, 4 E. & B. 243; 24 L. J., Q. B. 40. Proof of the above facts was reasonable evidence for the directors, by which they were bound to be satisfied. S. C.; see also Braunstein v. Accidental Death Insur. Co., infra. The clause is, in the absence of fraud, for the benefit of the assured. Solicitors' & General Life Assur. Soc. v. Lamb, 1 H. & M. 716; 33 L. J., Ch. 426; Accord. City Bank v. Sovereign Life Assur. Co., 50 L. T. 565, Ch. D., H. S. So, where the policy is mortgaged to the society, they are in the same position as if it had been mortgaged to a third party. White v. British Empire, &c. Assur. Co., L. R., 7 Eq. 394. But the assignees of the assured under a foreign bankruptcy, are not within the condition in a policy that it should be valid, notwithstanding suicide, if any third party had acquired a bona fide interest therein by assignment, or by legal or equitable lien for a valuable consideration, or as a security for money. Jackson v. Forster, 1 E. & E. 463; 28 L. J., Q. B. 166; 1 E. & E. 470; 29 L. J., Q. B. 8, Ex. Ch.

Insurance against Personal Accidents.

In a policy of insurance effected against injury caused by accident or violence, provided the same should be caused by some outward and visible

means, of which satisfactory proof should be furnished to the insurers, is meant such proof as the insurers may reasonably require, and not such as they may capriciously demand. Braunstein v. Accidental Death Insur. Co., 1 B. & Š. 782; 31 L. J., Q. B. 17. See Moore v. Woolsey, supra, and Trew v. Ry. Passengers' Assur. Co., 6 H. & N. 839; 30 L. J., Ex. 317, Ex. Ch. Where there was an exception in the policy, of death from certain specified diseases, or any other disease or cause within the system of the assured before or at the time or following such accidental injury; it was held that one of the specified diseases, brought on solely by the accident, was not within the exception. Fitton v. Accidental Death Insur. Co., 17 C. B., N. S. 122; 34 L. J., C. P. 28. Where, however, the exception extends to secondary causes, the insurers are not liable. Smith v. Accident Insur. Co., L. R., 5 Ex. 302. Where the policy excepted injury caused by natural disease or weakness, or exhaustion consequent on disease, and the assured while fording a stream was seized with an epileptic fit, and fell into the stream and was drowned, this was held not to be within the exception. Winspear v. Accident Insur. Co., 6 Q. B. D. 42, C. A.; see also Lawrence v. Accidental Insur. Co., 7 Q. B. D. 216. A policy against "death from the effects of injury caused by accident," includes death from a disease which was the natural consequence of an injury caused by accident. Isitt v. Railway Passengers' Assur. Co., 22 Q. B. D. 504. Death by sunstroke is not a death from the effects of an injury by accident. Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers' Assur. Co., 3 E. & E. 478; 30 L. J., Q. B. 77. Where death occurs from a risk which was either obvious to the assured, or would have been obvious to him if he had been paying reasonable attention to what he was doing, it falls within an exception in the policy, of accident caused by "exposure of the deceased to obvious risk." Cornish v. Accident Insur. Co., 23 Q. B. D. 453, C. A.

A policy for 12 months, from November 24th, 1888, covers an accident on November 24th, 1889. South Staffordshire Tramways Co. v. Sickness, &c., Assur. Co., W. N. 1890, 176, M. Sit., Q. B. D. As to whether injury caused to several persons by the same negligence, is one accident or more, vide S. C., where the Court was equally divided. Whether a term of the policy requiring notice of death within 7 days is a condition precedent depends on the construction of the whole policy. Stoneham v. Ocean, &c. Accident Insur. Co., 19 Q. B. D. 237. As to stamp duties, vide ante, p. 261.

Fire Insurance.

The fundamental principle of fire insurance is that like an open marine policy, it is a contract of indemnity. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D. 380, C. A. A policy which has lapsed becomes renewed by the payment of the premium. Kirkpatrick v. S. Australian Insur. Co., 11 Ap. Ca. 177, P. C.

Policies of fire insurance are within the stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, cited ante, pp. 436, 437. As to their form, vide ante, p. 436. A fire policy was not generally assignable, at law, except with the consent of the insurer; 3 Kent, Com. 375; Park, Ins. 8th ed. 978; but, this is now altered by the J. Act, 1873, s. 25 (6), ante, p. 300. Where the policy requires the assured to deliver a certificate of the minister and churchwardens, as to the character of the assured, and the bona fides of the loss; Worsley v. Wood, 6 T. R. 710; or particulars of loss within a certain time of the fire; Mason v. Harvey, 8 Exch. 819; 22 L. J., Ex. 336; it is a condition precedent. See Fearnley v. L. Guarantee Co., 5 Ap. Ca. 911, D. P. As to whom the notice of loss may be given under a similar clause, see Marsden v. City &

County Assur. Co., L. R., 1 C. P. 232. Fire policies are sometimes so framed as to be covenants to pay only an adjusted loss; in such case before adjustment no action can be maintained on the policy. Elliott v. R. Exchange Assur. Co., L. R., 2 Ex. 237; Viney v. Bignold, 20 Q. B. D. 172. Policies sometimes contain a clause entitling the insurers to determine the policy on notice, refunding a proportionate part of the premium. Sun Fire Office v. Hart, 14 Ap. Cas. 98, P. C. A policy from August 14th to November 14th was held to include the latter day, on which a fire took place. Isaacs v. R. Insur. Co., L. R., 5 Ex. 296. See South Staffordshire Tramways Co. v. Sickness Assur. Co., ante, p. 440.

An interim receipt for premiums or slip initialed by the insurer constitutes an agreement to insure. Parsons v. Queen Insur. Co., 7 Ap. Ca. 96, P. C.; Thompson v. Adams, 23 Q. B. D. 361. Where issued at Lloyd's, it is not subject to an implied condition that the policy should be put forward within a reasonable time. S. C.

As to stamp duties, vide ante, p. 261.

Interest.] Vide ante, p. 437. It is necessary to show an interest in the subject insured at the time of insuring and of the fire. Lynch v. Dalzell, 4 Bro. P. C., 2nd ed. 431; Saddlers' Co. v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 554. The unpaid vendor of a house may recover the full value thereof, if it be burnt before the conveyance is executed, though after the contract of sale. Collingridge v. R. Exchange Assur. Co., 3 Q. B. D. 173. This interest need not be the absolute property; thus, an insolvent might insure a house, &c., to which his assignees were entitled, he being in possession and responsible to the real owners. Marks v. Hamilton, 7 Exch. 323; 21 L. J., Ex. 109. Warehousemen and wharfingers may insure their customer's goods in their custody, and may recover the whole value under a policy on goods "held in trust or on commission." Waters v. Monarch Assur. Co., 5 E. & B. 870; 25 L. J., Q. B. 102. And, a carrier, who so insures, may recover the whole value of goods lost by fire, although the owner of the goods may be disabled from recovering from the carrier by reason of the value not being declared under the Carriers Act. L. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Glyn, 1 E. & E. 652; 28 L. J., Q. B. 188. See also Ebsworth v. Alliance Marine Insur. Co., cited ante, p. 408. But it is otherwise where the further words, "for which they (the assured)" are responsible," are added. N. British Insur. Co. v. Moffatt, L. R., 7 C. P. 25. As to the claim of the general owner to the insurance money, when received by the assured, see Martineau v. Kitching, L. R., 7 Q. B. 436, and Ebsworth v. Alliance Marine Insur. Co., supra. Goods delivered by A. to B., who is to return to A. an equivalent quantity of similar goods, but not necessarily the identical goods delivered to B., are to be insured as the goods of B., and not as the goods held by B. in trust; for the transaction amounts to a sale of the goods to B. S. Australian Insur. Co. v. Randell, L. R., 3 P. C. 101.

Premises of sufficient value were mortgaged to A., and then to B., and A. insured them in one office in a sufficient sum to cover his loan, and B. in another office to cover his loan, and they were burnt down; A. recovered enough on his policy to reinstate them, but did not do so, and the premises not reinstated were insufficient to cover B.'s security; it was held that B. was entitled to recover on his policy to the extent of his loss; Westminster Fire Office v. Glasgow Provident Investment Society, 13 Ap. Ca. 699, D. P.; but not for loss of rent of the premises. S. C.

Description of the articles insured; alteration in premises, &c.] The property intended to be insured must be described; but substantial accuracy is sufficient. See Forbes' claim, L. R., 19 Eq. 485. Thus, where the

policy required the house or other building, in which the goods are, to be mentioned, the goods of a lodger may be called "goods in his dwellinghouse." Friedlander v. London Assur. Co., 1 M. & Rob. 171. The locality of the subject of insurance is material. Pearson v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 1 Ap. Ca. 498, D. P., ante, p. 410. Where the premises are described as being where "no fires are kept, or hazardous goods deposited," this means where no fires are habitually kept; and the casual use of fire to repair the premises does not come within the condition. Dobson v. Sotheby, M. & M. 90. So, where the condition was against any alteration of the trade without notice, a single instance of drying bark in a kiln, used and insured as a corn kiln, will not avoid the policy. Shaw v. Robberds, 6 Ad. & E. 75. When no steam engine, stove, or other description of fire heat was to be introduced, without notice to the insurers, the introduction of a stove, and use of it on one occasion as an experiment, without notice, prevents the insured recovering. Glen v. Lewis, 8 Exch. 607; 22 L. J., Ex. 228. But, where there is no condition relating to alterations in the premises after the policy, a subsequent change, as by setting up a more hazardous trade in them, if without fraud, will not avoid the policy. Pim v. Reid, 6 M. & G. 1. Policies usually provide for notice of any such change; and where the alteration is one which makes the subject-matter insured no longer substantially correspond with the property as particularly described in the policy, and varies the risk, it will avoid the assurance; for the description in such cases is equivalent to a warranty. Sillem v. Thornton, 3 E. & B. 868; 23 L. J., Q. B. 362. In this last case, the house was enlarged so as no longer to agree with a description of it, annexed to the policy, and referred to in it so as to form a part of it. But, such a constructive warranty or condition is restrained by an express condition, requiring notice of any alteration increasing the risk and payment of a higher premium. Stokes v. Cox, 1 H. & N. 533 ; 26 L. J., Ex. 113, Ex. Ch.

If there be a condition in the policy that no more than 20 pounds of gunpowder be on the premises insured, the policy is avoided if the condition be broken, although the breach of the condition have not occasioned the loss. Beacon Life Assur. Co. v. Gibb, 1 Moo. P. C., N. S. 79.

Loss.] A fire policy is a contract of indemnity, and the assured can only recover the actual loss or damage sustained by him according to the real quantity and value of the goods at the time of the fire; Chapman v. Pole, 22 L. T., N. S. 306, Cockburn, C. J.; and, in respect of the interest in the goods covered by the insurance; Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D. 397 et seq., per Bowen, L. J. A valued policy is considered an open one if the loss be not total, and damage and expenses caused by removing articles insured are also covered by the policy. 3 Kent, Com. 375, and note. By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 90, s. 12, "any damage occasioned by the" metropolitan "fire brigade" constituted by that Act "in the due execution of their duties, shall be deemed to be damage by fire within the meaning of any policy of insurance against fire."

A damage sustained by atmospheric concussion, caused by an explosion of gunpowder at a distance, is not a damage insured against in a policy against loss occasioned by fire. Everitt v. London Assur. Co., 19 C. B., N. S. 126; 34 L. J., C. P. 299. See Marsden v. City and County Assur. Co., post, p. 433. Where a fire policy contained an exception of liability for loss or damage by explosion, except for such loss or damages as should arise from explosion by gas, and an inflammable vapour caught fire, exploded, and caused a further fire, it was held that gas meant only ordinary coal gas; and that the exception included not only the effects of the

explosion, but also the further fire caused thereby. Stanley v. Western Insur. Co., L. R., 3 Ex. 71.

The policy covers a loss by fire owing to the negligence of the assured himself, if there be no fraud. Shaw v. Robberds, 6 Ad. & E. 75. Wilful misrepresentations of the value of the property destroyed will, under the usual clause against fraudulent claims, defeat and vitiate the whole claim. Britton v. R. Insur. Co., 4 F. & F. 905; see also Chapman v. Pole, ante, P. 442.

A condition "that if, at the time of any loss happening to any property hereby insured, there be any other subsisting insurances, whether effected by the assured or any other person, covering the same property," the insurer shall not be liable to pay more than his rateable proportion of such loss, applies only where the same property is the subject-matter of insurance, and the interests are the same. N. British & Mercantile Insur. Co. v. L. Liverpool & Globe Insur. Co., 5 Ch. D. 569, C. A. See further as to double insurance, Australian Agricultural Co. v. Saunders, L. R., 10 C. P. 668, Ex. Ch.

Where A. is insured by B., and A. can also recover the loss from C., B. may, when he has made good A.'s loss, recover in A.'s name the amount over from C. Mason v. Sainsbury, 3 Doug. 61; N. British & Mercantile Insur. Co. v. L. Liverpool & Globe Insur. Co., supra. And, so if, after B. has paid A. the amount of his loss, C., under a legal obligation, also makes it good, B. can recover the amount from A., whether A.'s right of action against C. is founded on tort (Darrell v. Tibbitts, 5 Q. B. D. 560, C. A.), or arises out of contract. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D. 380, C. A. See also cases cited ante, pp. 429, 430.

Insurance against Accidents to Chattels.

By a policy of insurance, plate glass in the plaintiff's shop front was insured against "loss or damage originating from any cause whatsoever, except fire," &c.; a fire broke out on premises adjoining the plaintiff's, but did not approach his shop front; a mob attracted by the fire tore down the plaintiff's shop shutters, and broke the plate glass for the purpose of plunder; it was held that the proximate cause of the damage was the lawless act of the mob, and that it did not fall within the exception of the policy. Marsden v. City and County Assur. Co., L. R., 1 C. P. 232. As to stamp duties, vide ante, p. 261.

ACTION ON CONTRACT OF AFFREIGHTMENT.

This action lies by or against a shipowner, whether the ship be general or chartered. The contract need not be under seal. In the case of a general ship, the bill of lading, or in the case of a chartered ship, the charter-party, is the proof of the contract. As the pleadings and proofs are substantially the same, whether the contract be or be not under seal, the following cases are to be taken as applicable to actions on contracts between shipper and shipowner, whatever the technical form of action may be, unless otherwise specified.

As to the admissibility of oral evidence to explain charter-parties, bills of lading, or other like contracts, see ante, pp. 21 et seq.