with a view of ascertaining whether an instrument is now chargeable with duty or not, it must be borne in mind that the provisions of the present Act are considerably wider than those of the former one (vide ante, p. 236), and the cases decided on 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, cited below, where instruments were held to be entitled to exemption, must be applied subject to such modifications.

Where the instrument operates as an equitable assignment it seems not to be within the Act. Thus, an order by A., addressed to his debtor on a contract for works, authorizing him to pay B. the sum of 3657., "being the amount of my contract, B. having advanced me that sum," was held, under 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, not to be an order for payment out of a particular fund within the Act, for it operated as an equitable assignment of the whole fund. Diplock v. Hammond, 2 Sm. & G. 141; 5 D. M. & G. 320; 23 L. J., Ch. 550. So, under the Stamp Act, 1870, where it was in the form, "I hereby assign to R. the sum of 401., or any other sum now due or that may hereafter become due in respect of the steam launch I am building for you." Buck v. Robson, 3 Q. B. D. 686, following Brice v. Bannister, Id. 569, C. A., and dissenting from Ex parte Shellard, L. R., 17 Eq. 109. So, a document addressed to C., the trustee of a will, and given to F., "I hereby authorize and direct you to pay to F. or his order the sum of 1407. out of moneys now due, or hereafter to become due to me under the will of my late father, and before making any payment to me thereout." Fisher v. Calvert, 27 W. R. 301, M. R., H. S. 1879.

But unless the order specifies the fund or debt out of which the payment is to be made, it is not an equitable assignment. Percival v. Dunn, 29 Ch. D. 128. So an ordinary bill of exchange drawn on H. by C. for the exact amount of C.'s funds in H.'s hands does not operate as an equitable assignment of such funds. Shand v. Du Buisson, L. R., 18 Eq. 283. And the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), s. 53, expressly provides that "" a bill of itself does not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of the drawee available for payment thereof," but this section has no effect on the stamp duty payable on such an instrument, vide, sect. 97 (3, a.), ante, p. 238.

P.

Before the doctrine of equitable assignment of a fund was well understood, there were decisions on 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, which conflict with those cited above. Thus, where in order to prove the payment of money pursuant to order, the following letter was given in evidence:-" Mr. B., When the mahogany, per Regent, is sold, you will please pay over to P. 1,5007., in such bills as you receive from the said sale. S. Mann." inclosed this letter in another addressed by him to B.; and B. in reply, wrote promising to pay over the money. The letter from P. was stamped with an agreement stamp. It was held that the letter from Mann was an order for payment of money out of a fund which might or might not be available, and ought to have been stamped accordingly. Firbank v. Bell, ante, p. 238; Butts v. Swann, 2 B. & B. 78. So it seems that an order to pay half the not proceeds to R. & Co., "provided the same shall not exceed 5,0007.,” required a stamp. Hutchinson v. Heyworth, 9 Ad. & E. 375, 400.

In order however to come within 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, it was held that the instrument must be for the payment of a specified sum; and therefore where A., having consigned goods to B., sent him the following order,"Pay to C. the proceeds of a shipment of 12 bales of goods, value about 2,000l., consigned by me to you;" and B., by writing, consented to pay over the full amount of the net proceeds of the goods; it was held that neither of these instruments came within the above clause. Jones v. Simpson, 2 B. & C. 318; and see Roscoe, Dig. Bills of Exchange, p. 31.

The order in Hutchinson v. Heyworth, ante, p. 239, was held sufficiently to direct the payment of a specified sum to fall within the section.

It seems that an order for the payment of money sent or delivered to the person by whom it is to be paid, and not to the person to whom the payment is to be made, or any person on his behalf, is not liable to any stamp duty, unless payable after the date thereof, in which case it must bear a 1d. stamp. See Hutchinson v. Heyworth, ante, p. 239. A written authority by A. to defendant to pay certain sums to plaintiff out of debts from time to time accruing due from defendant to A., and a written promise by defendant to pay accordingly, were held to constitute together an agreement, and not to require a bill or note stamp. Hamilton v. Spottiswoode, 4 Exch. 200. See Thompson v. Condy, infra. See also Walker v. Rostron, 9 M. & W. 411, cited ante, p. 230. So, where the creditor sends an account to his debtor, requesting him, at the foot of it, to pay the amount to A. B., and hands the account to A. B. to collect it on his (the creditor's) behalf, this is not a bill of exchange within the Act. Norris v. Solomon, 2 M. & Rob. 266.

What are promissory notes within the Stamp Act, 1870.] The terms of the present Act are so much wider than those of 55 Geo. 3, c. 184 (vide ante, p. 236), that many of the cases decided thereon are now clearly inapplicable; it has been decided, however, that notwithstanding the wideness of the terms of sect. 49 (ante, p. 236), the section is "meant to include documents the contents of which consist substantially of a promise to pay a definite sum of money and of nothing else." Mortgage Insur. Corp. v. Inl. Rev. Coms., 21 Q. B. D. 352, 358, Č. A. If the promise to pay be coupled with stipulations other than those provided for by sect. 49 (2), it is not a promissory note. S. C. Thus, a policy of insurance guaranteeing the payment of 1007. in 1976, for a present payment of 97. 178. 4d., with a proviso that the assured might at any time claim the surrender value, fixed according to tables of the corporation for the time being in force, was held by reason of the proviso to require an agreement stamp only. S. C. See also Yeo v. Dawe, 53 L. T., N. S. 125, E. S. 1885, C. A.; and British India Steam Navigation Co. v. Inl. Rev. Coms., 7 Q. B. D. 165, cited post, p. 260.

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The following letter, signed by the defendant, and addressed by him to the plaintiff, G. T. M. Co.-I hereby undertake to pay you on the first allotment of shares in the above-named Co., the sum of 1057. out of commission I shall have to pay E. M. in accordance with his letter to you on the other side," was held by Pollock, B., after consulting with Kelly, C. B., not to require a note stamp under the Stamp Act, 1870, s. 49, ante, p. 236. Thompson v. Condy, Sittings in London, 27th June, 1874; Ex. rel. editoris. The ground of this decision appears to have been that sect. 49, (1) applies only where the promise is to pay absolutely and at all events; and that (2) is limited in its application to instruments purporting to be notes though not legally such because payable on a contingency, &c., and is not to be extended in its construction by reference to (1). See also Hamilton v. Spottiswoode, supra.

The following cases were all decided on 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, and some of them upon the special provisions of that Act with reference to agreements in the form of promissory notes, which were to be charged with agreement but not note duty, vide ante, p. 236. The Stamp Act, 1870, contains no similar provision, and the cases must therefore be read subject to sect. 49, (1), (ante, p. 236) of that Act.

An instrument in this form: "Received of A. B. 1007. which I promise to pay on demand," is a promissory note, and requires a stamp as such.

Green v. Davies, 4 B. & C. 235. "I O U 201., to be paid on the 22nd inst.," dated and signed, is an instrument requiring to be stamped either as a note or an agreement. Brooks v. Elkins, 2 M. & W. 74. But the words "value received" will not render an IO U liable to a stamp. Gould v. Coombs, 1 C. B. 543. "I O U 407., which I borrowed of M., and to pay 51. per cent. till paid,-R. T.," is neither an agreement nor a note. Melanotte v. Teasdale, 13 M. & W. 216. See also Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23. "I have received the sum of 201. borrowed of you, and am accountable for it with interest," was held to be an agreement and not a note. Horne v. Redfearn, 4 N. C. 433. So, "Borrowed of J. W. 2007. to account for at months' notice if required," &c. White v. North, 3 Exch. 689. So, an instrument in the form of a receipt for money which had been advanced long before, containing a promise to pay interest thereon, is not a promissory note. Taylor v. Steele, 16 M. & W. 665. But a note for money payable on demand to H., " and I have lodged with H. the counterpart leases signed, &c., as a collateral security for the sum," is a note, and not an agreement. Fancourt v. Thorne, 9 Q. B. 312.

The reservation of interest is not to be considered an addition to the sum advanced so as to require a larger stamp; thus a stamp, applicable to a note not exceeding 301., is applicable to a note for the payment of 301. at three months after date with interest from the date. Pruessing v. Ing, 4 B. & A. 204. Where a joint and several note for securing the repayment of a loan was signed first by one, and some days afterwards by the other party, it was held not to require an additional stamp if the last signature was put before the money was advanced; or if the party last signing had promised to sign the note before the advance, notwithstanding it may not have been signed till afterwards. Ex pte. White, 3 Deac. & Chit. 366.

A memorandum in the form of a promissory note, offered in evidence for the purpose of taking a case out of the Statute of Limitations is inadmissible, unless stamped; although 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 8, exempts memoranda made for that purpose from the stamp duty on agreements; Jones v. Ryder, 4 M. & W. 32. So it was held that a promissory note for 1,1107., with 4 per cent. interest, made on a receipt stamp, was not admissible to take a debt out of the Statute of Limitations. Parmiter v. Parmiter, 1 J. & H. 135; 30 L. J., Ch. 508. It is to be observed that the schedule of 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, ante, p. 236, exempting instruments in the form of notes from the note stamp, if deemed to be agreements, was not cited in either of the two cases last cited.

Stamp on re-issued bill.] A bill payable to the drawer's order, and taken up by him, may be re-issued without a fresh stamp, unless this would have the effect of rendering any of the indorsers liable to an action. Callow v. Lawrence, 3 M. & S. 97; Hubbard v. Jackson, 4 Bing. 390. Where the bill is an accommodation bill, it would seem that it can only be re-issued with the consent of the acceptor, and therefore would require a fresh stamp. Jewell v. Parr, 13 C. B. 909; 22 L. J., C. P. 253. But a bill payable to the order of a third person, indorsed by him and taken up by the drawer, cannot be re-issued by him, for it would wrongfully charge the payee. Beck v. Robley, 1 H. Bl. 89, n.

What alteration of a bill requires a new stamp.] If a bill or note is altered in a material part, though by the consent of all parties, after it has been once issued it requires a new stamp; Bayl. on Bills, 6th ed.

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118, (1); Bowman v. Nichol, 5 T. R. 537; Wilson v. Justice, Peake, Add. Ca. 96; for it is, in effect, substituting a new bill, and using a stamp already used for the old one.

An alteration in the date of a bill payable after date, Bowman v. Nichol; Wilson v. Justice, supra; Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Camp. 179; or in the consideration, Knill v. Williams, 10 East, 431; or by inserting words rendering a bill or note negotiable, which was not so originally; Id. 437, explaining Kershaw v. Cox, 3 Esp. 246;-are material alterations, and require restamping. So, where the drawer, without the consent of the accceptor, added the words "payable at Mr. B.'s, C. Street," to the acceptance, this alteration was held to be material. Cowie v. Halsall, 4 B. & A. 197. And a similar alteration has been held to be material since the statute 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78; for the right of an indorsee to sue his indorser would, according to the altered bill, be complete upon default made at the banker's and notice thereof; whereas, in truth, the acceptor, not having in reality undertaken to pay there, would have committed no default by such non-payment. Macintosh v. Haydon, Ry. & M. 362; see Marson v. Petit, 1 Camp. 82, n. The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 64 (2), enumerates some material alterations, but this, by reason of sect. 97 (3, a) infra, has no bearing on the present question.

If the alteration be merely the correction of a mistake in furtherance of the original intent of the parties, as inserting the words "or order” in a bill intended to be negotiable, it will not require a new stamp. Byrom v. Thompson, 11 Ad. & E. 31. So, a mistake in the date may be corrected. Brutt v. Picard, Ry. & M. 37. See Hutchins v. Scott, 2 M. & W. 809.

At common law, a stranger to a bill, by indorsing it, rendered himself liable to a subsequent indorsee, as a new drawer of the bill; but it remained the same instrument as before, and did not require a fresh stamp. Penny v. Innes, 1 C. M. & R. 439; Matthews v. Bloxsome, 33 L. J., Q. B. 209. This doctrine was inapplicable to promissory notes (Gwinnell v. Herbert, 5 Ad. & E. 436) by reason of the Stamp Act. M'Call v. Taylor, 34 L. J., C. P. 365, 366, per Willes, J. By the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 56, where a person signs a bill otherwise than as drawer or acceptor he thereby incurs the liabilities "of an indorser, to a holder in due course," i.e., to a bona fide holder for value without notice; see sect. 29. By sect. 89 (1), the provisions of the Act are in general to extend to promissory notes; the maker being deemed to correspond with the acceptor of a bill, and the first indorsee with the drawer of an accepted bill payable to the drawer's order. As, however, sect. 97 (3 a) ante, p. 238, provides that nothing in the Act is to affect the Stamp Acts, it would appear that sect. 56 does not apply to promissory notes, and that Gwinnell v. Herbert, supra, is still good law.

The subject of altering bills and notes is treated of under the head of Defences to actions on bills, post, pp. 385, 386, to which it more properly belongs: for the alteration of such an instrument, without consent, even by a stranger, affects its validity without reference to the Stamp Acts. Master v. Miller, 2 H. Bl. 141; 1 Smith's L. C. If made after issue or negotiation, even with consent, the bill is, as above stated, vitiated for want of a new stamp.

What is such an issuing as to render an alteration fatal.] A bill is primâ facie considered as issued as soon as it is passed away by the drawer or accepted by the drawee, and not before. Bayley on Bills, 6th ed. 122. An exchange of acceptances is an issuing; Cardwell v. Martin, 9 East, 190; but a bill is not issued so as to make an alteration fatal, until it is

in the hands of a person entitled to make a claim thereon. Downes v. Richardson, 5 B. & A. 674 ; Tarleton v. Shingler, 7 C. B. 812.

The onus of proving that the alteration was made before negotiation lies upon the party suing on it. Johnson v. Marlborough, Dk. of, 2 Stark. 313; Henman v. Dickinson, 5 Bing. 183. And, where the alteration is visible, it cannot be left to the jury to say, on the mere inspection without further evidence, whether it was made at or after the original making of the bill. Knight v. Clements, 8 Ad. & E. 215; and Bishop v. Chambre, M. & M. 116, there explained; Clifford v. Parker, 2 M. & Gr. 909. Where there was an alteration by consent in a bill drawn abroad to which no stamp was necessary, it was held to lie on the party who objected to the want of a stamp to show that it was altered in England. Hamelin v. Bruck, 9 Q. B. 306.

Bankrupt's Estates.-Instruments relating thereto.

By the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 144, every deed, conveyance, &c., relating solely to freehold, &c., property, or to any mortgage, &c., on, or any estate, right or interest in any real or personal property which is part of the estate of any bankrupt, and which after the execution of such deed, &c., "either at law or in equity, is or remains the estate of the bankrupt or of the trustee under the bankruptcy, and every power of attorney, proxy paper, writ, order, certificate affidavit, bond or other instrument or writing relating solely to the property of any bankrupt, or to any proceeding under any bankruptcy, shall be exempt from stamp duty, except in respect of fees under this Act."

Bill of Lading.

"Bill of lading of or for any goods, merchandise, or effects, to be exported or carried coastwise:-6d."

Sect. 56. (1.) "A bill of lading is not to be stamped after the execution thereof."

Bill of Sale.

Absolute. See Conveyance on sale, post, p. 246.

By way of security. See Mortgage, &c., post, p. 257.

Sect. 57. "A copy of a bill of sale is not to be filed in any court, unless the original, duly stamped, is produced to the proper officer."

This section, however, does not invalidate the registration, otherwise regular, of a bill of sale not duly stamped. Bellamy v. Saull, 4 B. & S. 265; 32 L. J., Q. B. 366.

Bond.

"Bond for securing the payment or repayment of money or the transfer or re-transfer of stock. See Mortgage, &c.," post, p. 257.

This title includes the bonds of foreign governments and of public companies.

"Bond in relation to any annuity upon the original creation and sale thereof. See Conveyance on sale," post, p. 246.

"Bond, covenant, or instrument of any kind whatsoever.

(1.) Being the only or principal or primary security for any annuity (except upon the original creation thereof by way of sale or security), or of