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R. & Ry. 264; Kent v. Lowen, 1 Camp. 177. But a post-mark may be contradicted by oral evidence of the real date of posting. Stocken v. Collin, 7 M. & W. 515. The post-mark is no proof of a publication of the contents of the letter at the place of posting. R. v. Watson, 1 Camp. 215. Where it was required to prove that A. effected an insurance by order of B., the production by B. of an order in a letter, with the post-mark, addressed to A., was received as evidence that a policy effected in A.'s name of the date of the letter was effected under that order. Arcangelo v. Thompson, 2 Camp. 620. In K. v. Plumer, supra, it was held that the double postage office-mark on a letter was not, per se, proof that it contained an inclosure. See further, ante, p. 122.

Books of history, &c.] A general history may be given in evidence to prove a matter relating to the kingdom in general. B. N. P. 248; Vin. Ab. Ev. (A. b. 40). Thus, chronicles are said to have been admitted to prove that at a certain period Charles V. of Spain had not surrendered the crown to Philip. Neale v. Fry, cited 1 Salk. 281. But see, however, S. C., sub nom. Mossam v. Joy, 10 How. St. Tr. 626, and Peake, Ev. 82, 83, and 2 Taylor, Evidence, § 1522, n. Historical evidence of this kind is only to be used in proof of a matter concerning the government, and was therefore rejected as proof that King Alfred was the founder of a college. Cockman v. Mather, 1 Barnardist. 14. See Brounker v. Atkyns, Skin. 15. Nor can it be admitted in proof of a local custom; thus Camden's "Britannia" was held to be no evidence on an issue whether, by the custom of Droitwich, salt-pits could be sunk in any part of the town. Stainer v. Droitwich, 1 Salk. 281. Nor is it evidence of the creation of a peerage. Vaux Peerage, 5 Cl. & F. 526. It seems indeed only to be used to refresh the memory of the jury on notorious facts, which require no evidence at all. Thus, it has been held that counsel may, in addressing a jury, refer generally to matters of history, whether ecclesiastical or political, and cite the language of writers or statesmen by way of illustration or explanation; but they are not at liberty to cite specific canons or foreign treaties, or the printed works in use among certain communities, and purporting to represent their doctrines, so as to fix a party to the suit with those doctrínes, and to persuade the jury to act upon such imputation, unless such documents be proved by regular evidence, and brought home to the party by proof of his personal adoption of them. Darby v. Ouseley, 1 H. & N. 1; 25 L. J., Ex. 227.

Effect of Corporation Books.

The public official acts of a municipal corporation, registered in their books, regularly kept and entered by the proper officer, may be [and ought to be] proved by the books themselves, which are evidence of them even as between strangers. Thetford, Case of, 12 Vin. Ab. 90; R. v. Mothersell, Stra. 93; Lauderdale Peerage, 10 Ap. Ca. 692, 700. Thus, an entry of the disfranchisement of a corporator is evidence to prove it; and it cannot be collaterally examined on the merits. Brown v. London, Corporation of, 11 Mod. 225. But the books of a corporation, whether public or private, are not admissible in their own favour as to matters of a private nature; as to establish a claim of toll; Brett v. Beales, M. & M. 419, cited ante, p. 54; Marriage v. Lawrence, 3 B. & A. 142; London v. Lynn, 1 H. Bl. 214, n.; or a right to appoint a curate as against the vicar; Att.-Gen. v. Warwick, 4 Russ. 222; or an exclusive right of trading. Davies v. Morgan, 1 C. & J. 590-3. Where plaintiff sued a corporation (of which he was an alderman) on a bond, and defendants

pleaded, 1. Fraud; 2. That the bond was irregularly executed contrary to a bye-law, Parke, B., admitted the books of the corporation to prove the bye-law, but rejected them as evidence for the defendants of a private transaction between the plaintiff and the corporation in proof of the fraud. Holdsworth v. Dartmouth, Mayor of, Exeter Sum. Ass. 1838, MS.

Effect of Parish Registers, &c.

The registers of baptisms, marriages, and burials, preserved in churches, are good evidence of the facts which it is the duty of the officiating minister to record in them. B. N. P. 247; Doe d. Warren v. Bray, 8 B. & C. 816. Where it appeared that the practice was to make entries in the general parish register, once in three months, out of a day-book in which the entries were made immediately after the baptism or on the same morning; and in the day-book after a particular entry, the letters B.B. (signifying base-born) were inserted, which were omitted in the register, it was held that evidence of the day-book could not be received, for there could not be two parish registers. May v. May, 2 Stra. 1073. An entry by the minister of a baptism which took place before he became minister, and of which he received information from the parish clerk, is not admissible; nor is the private memorandum of the fact made by the clerk, who was present at the baptism. Doe d. Warren v. Bray, 8 B. & C. 813. But see Doe d. France v. Andrews, 15 Q. B. 756, ante, p. 124. As to proof of the identity of the parties, vide ante, p. 124.

The books of Fleet, King's Bench, May Fair, and Mint marriages are not evidence to prove a marriage, for they were not made by public authority. They were, in fact, only private memoranda kept by ministers who officiated at clandestine marriages contrary to the canons of the church. See Burn on Fleet Registers, ch. 6, and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 92, ss. 6, 20. Such a register, however, may, if signed by a party, be equivalent to a declaration by such party, and, as such, admissible where hearsay is admissible. Lloyd v. Passingham, 16 Ves. 59. A register of ceremonies performed at a dissenters' meeting-house is not admissible in evidence, for it is not a public document; Newham v. Raithby, 1 Phill. Rep. 315; Ex parte Taylor, 1 J. & W. 483; and the stat. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, ante, p. 126, would appear not to have made any difference in this respect, for the register appointed by that Act is to be kept by the registrar and not at the meeting-house. Such of these registers, however, as have been deposited with the Registrar-General under 3 & 4 Vict. c. 92, and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 25, ante, p. 125, are admissible in evidence after notice. See 3 & 4 Vict. c. 92, ss. 19 et seq.

An attempt is sometimes made to use the register for the purpose of proving facts stated therein in addition to the main fact of baptism, marriage, or burial, as the case may be. There has been a good deal of discussion as to how far this can be done. In a criminal proceeding against a person for falsely swearing that he was twenty-one years of age, Ld. Tenterden refused to allow that part of a register of baptisms which stated the day upon which the defendant was born to be read; R. v. Clapham, 4 C. & P. 29; and in Wihen v. Law, 3 Stark. 63, and Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690, the entry in a register of baptisms of the day of the defendant's birth was rejected as a proof of a plea of infancy. But such an entry has been admitted where the enquiry is as to the legitimacy of the person to whom the entry relates. Glenister v. Harding, 29 Ch. D. 985, following Cope v. Cope, 1 M. & Rob. 269, in which case, upon an issue as to the legitimacy of a child, a baptismal

register which described it as the illegitimate son of E. C. was adınitted by Alderson, J., though with the observation that it was entitled to little weight. In R. v. North Petherton, 5 B. & C. 508, a copy of a register of baptism was put in to show that an infant was born in a certain parish, but Bayley, J., rejected the evidence, saying, however, that if it could be shown that the child was very young at the time of baptism, the register would afford presumptive evidence of its having been born in the parish where it was baptised. See R. v. S. Katharine, 5 B. & Ad. 970, n. register of marriage is evidence of the time of the marriage. Wollaston v. Barnes, Id. 386.

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Doe d.

As to the effect of the registers of births, marriages, and deaths under 6 & 7 Will. 4, cc. 85, 86, and 37 & 38 Vict. c. 88, see ante, p. 126. As to the effect of registers of births, marriages, and deaths in Scotland, Ireland, the colonies, at sea and abroad, vide ante, pp. 127, et seq.

Effect of Ship's Register.

A ship's register, describing her to be British built, was held to be no evidence of that fact as against third persons. Reusse v. Meyers, 3 Camp. 475. Nor was it admitted as evidence of ownership or interest, except as against the persons who made the affidavit or declaration. Fraser v. Hopkins, 2 Taunt. 5; Pirie v. Anderson, 4 Taunt. 652; Cooper v. South, Id. 803. But, since the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), s. 107, cited ante, p. 129, such register is prima facie evidence of all the matters contained in it or certified by the registrar in his certificate, as, for instance, that the ship is British; R. v. Bjornsen, Leigh & Cave, 545; 34 L. J., M. C. 180; or that the defendant is owner; Hibbs v. Ross, L. R., 1 Q. B. 534. See also the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act, 1855, s. 15, cited ante, p. 129.

Effect of Awards.

An award, regularly made by an arbitrator to whom matters in difference are referred, is conclusive in an action at law between the parties to the reference upon all matters inquired into within the submission. 1 Phill. Ev. 360; Campbell v. Twemlow, 1 Price, 81. Thus, where a covenantor and a covenantee submitted the amount of damages of a breach of covenant to arbitration, the award was held conclusive of the amount in an action on the covenant to which defendants pleaded non est factum. Whitehead v. Tattersall, 1 Ad. & E. 491. See also Cummings v. Heard, L. R., 4 Q. B. 669. So, where in an action of ejectment it appeared that the lessor of the plaintiff and the defendant had before referred their right to the land to an arbitrator, who had awarded in favour of the lessor, it was held that the award precluded the defendant from disputing the lessor's title. Doe d. Morris v. Rosser, 3 East, 11. But where, on a reference by landlord and tenant, the arbitrator awarded that a stack of hay, left upon the premises by the tenant, should be delivered up by him to the landlord upon the tenant being paid a certain sum, it was held that the property in the hay did not pass to the landlord on his tender of the money by mere force of the award. Hunter v. Rice, 15 East, 100. Where the commissioners under an inclosure Act were directed to make an award respecting the boundaries of a parish, and to advertise a description of the boundaries so fixed, and the boundaries so fixed were to be inserted in their award, and to be binding, final, and conclusive, but the boundaries mentioned in the award varied from those which had been advertised; it was

held that the commissioners, not having pursued their authority, their award was not binding as to the boundaries. R. v. Washbrook, 4 B. & C. 732; but see the remedial Acts, ante, p. 151.

It has been repeatedly decided that corruption or misconduct of the arbitrators, including the case of an award made ex parte, does not invalidate the award, in any case, at least, in which an application might have been successfully made to the court to set it aside; vide post, Action on award, Defence.

An award made on a reference of all matters in difference between the parties will not be a bar with regard to any demand which was not in difference between them at the time of the submission, nor referred by them to the arbitrators. Ravee v. Furmer, 4 T. R. 146; Smith v. Johnson, 15 East, 213. And awards under inclosure Acts are so far on the same footing as private submissions, that if the award go beyond the powers of the commissioners, it is void pro tanto; and if it omit to decide on anything within the scope of the submission, the interest of parties remains in statu quo. Per Best, C. J., Thorpe v. Cooper, 5 Bing. 129. But where an action by a person for his salary, and also for damages for dismissal from service, was referred, and the plaintiff gave evidence of dismissal, but claimed no damages for it before the arbitrator, who only awarded the amount of salary: held that the award was nevertheless a bar to a second action for damages for the dismissal. Dunn v. Murray, 9 B. & C. 780. See Hadley v. Green, 2 C. & J. 374. A. filed a bill against B. for the infringement of a patent, and the arbitrator found that the patent was not illegal and void: it was held that, in a subsequent action by A. against B. for infringement of the same patent, this award did not estop B. from setting up the defence that A. was not the first and true inventor. Newall v. Elliott, 1 H. & C. 797; 32 L. J., Ex. 120.

The judgment of an usurped jurisdiction between parties is not admissible as an award without proof of mutual submission. Rogers v. Wood, 2 B. & Ad. 245.

An award made on ejectment, brought by A. against a mortgagor after mortgage, is not evidence for A. on an ejectment brought by the mortgagee against him. Doe d. Smith v. Webber, 1 Ad. & E. 119. In a suit for injury to A.'s reversionary interest in a close whereof F. was tenant, in which the defendant set up the right of G., and denied that of A., it was held that the plaintiff could not put in, as evidence of such right, an award made in a former action between F. as plaintiff and G. as defendant, in which the same right was in question, and in which G. had pleaded not guilty only, and afterwards paid damages awarded against him; for as it was not shown that A. was substantially the plaintiff in the first action, or that F. brought it by A.'s authority, a verdict or award against F. could not have prejudiced A., and therefore could not be available as evidence for A. Wenham, Ly. v. Mackenzie, 5 E. & B. 447; 25 L. J., Q. B. 44. But where the right of a watercourse and a question of boundary were referred by a submission between A. and his tenant B. on the one side, and C., a neighbouring landowner, on the other, the award was held admissible evidence for C. on both points in a subsequent action by him against B.; although B. had, in the meantime, become tenant of the same land to another landlord, under whom he now justified, and who was not shown to be in privity with A. Breton v. Knight, Winton Sum. Ass. 1837, per Tindal, C. J., confirmed in Banc on motion for a new trial, MS. On an issue between plaintiff and an execution creditor of B., whether growing crops belonged to B., an award made between plaintiff and B. touching the crops, just before the execution, was held admissible as against the defendant. Thorpe v. Eyre, 1 Ad. & E. 926. In an action

on a policy Ld. Kenyon admitted evidence that the defendant had agreed to be bound by an award to which other persons were parties, and that the award was in favour of the plaintiff. Kingston v. Phelps, Peake, 228.

That an award is not evidence, as between strangers, even in a matter in which hearsay is admissible, see Evans v. Rees, 10 Ad. & E. 151, cited ante, p. 50; Wenham, Ly. v. Mackenzie, ante, p. 217. So an award against a principal debtor is not evidence in an action against his surety. Ex parte Young, 17 Ch. D. 668, C. A.

The award of arbitrators or an umpire upon a claim for compensation under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, has the same effect as the verdict of a jury in an inquisition before the sheriff under that Act (ante, p. 196), and is conclusive as to the amount, but not as to the right to compensation. In re Newbold & Metropolitan Ry. Co., 14 C. B., N. S. 405; Beckett v. Midland Ry. Co., L. R., 1 C. P. 241; R. v. Cambrian Ry. Co., L. R., 4 Q. B. 320. So in the case of an award under the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55); Pearsall v. Brierley Hill Local Board, 11 Q. B. D. 735; 9 App. Ca. 595, D. P.; or under the Artizans' and Labourers' Dwellings and Improvement Act, 1875 (Id. c. 36). Wilkins v. Mayor of Birmingham, 25 Ch. D. 78. Where the award is given for one entire sum, if any part of the sum be given contrary to law the whole is invalidated. Beckett v. Midland Ry. Co., supra.

Of the effect of awards under inclosure Acts, see further ante, p. 151. Where an award under seal directs the payment of money, the award does not create a specialty debt, although the submission was also under seal. Talbot v. Shrewsbury, El. of, L. R., 16 Eq. 26.

STAMPS.

The subject of stamps, though important and useful at Nisi Prius, is one that cannot be treated of at length in a work of this kind. The following summary only contains some of the principal heads, and a selection of the most useful decisions on the Acts. Nearly all the prior Stamp Acts were repealed by the Inland Revenue Repeal Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 99), and their provisions embodied, with some modifications, in a consolidated form, under the title of the Stamp Act, 1870 (Id. c. 97). The duties on Policies of Marine Insurance (vide post, p. 261), were an unfortunate exception from this consolidation.

The stamp duties cited in the following pages are all, unless otherwise stated, those specified in the schedule to the Stamp Act, 1870. These duties are, by sects. 1, 3, imposed on and after the 1st January, 1871, on the instruments specified in the schedule, in lieu of all other duties thereon, and are subject to the exemptions contained in the schedule, and in any other Acts for the time being in force, and by sect. 6, they are charged in accordance with the regulations of that Act. Sect. 5 provides that "except where express provision to the contrary is made by this or any other Act," the same duties are to be charged on instruments relating to the property of the Crown, or the private property of the sovereign, as on instruments relating to the property of subjects; such express provision is made in the stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 77, with reference to instruments entered into with H. M.'s Commissioners of Woods and Forests, under the provisions of that Act; and that Act is incorporated with subsequent Acts, e.g., 5 Vict. c. 1, s. 7.

The principal changes introduced by the Act are the abolition of pro

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