Camp. 19. The above cases related to district courts having no statutable or other power, except over causes arising within the territorial limits. Where the court is limited only as to certain persons or causes, and not as to locality; or where the jurisdiction of the court, though established for a limited district, can lawfully exercise powers out of it; or where the practice of the inferior court requires, and is warranted by law in requiring, that the defect of jurisdiction should be pointed out by plea or otherwise, and the defendant has waived the objection;-in such cases it would seem that the inquiry will be, not simply where the cause of action arose, or where the parties reside, but whether the court had jurisdiction. See Moore v. Gamgee, 25 Q. B. D. 244. As to the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court, London, see Cox v. London, Mayor of, supra; L. Joint Stock Bank v. Id., 1 C. P. D. 1; 5 C. P. D. 494, C. A.; 6 Ap. Ca. 393, D. P.; and Cooke v. Gill, L. R., 8 C. P. 107.

It has been held that a judgment of the old County Court is examinable, and the existence of the facts necessary to the regularity of such judgment is a question for the jury, although a motion made in the County Court to set aside the proceedings for irregularity had been dismissed. Thompson v. Blackhurst, 1 N. & M. 266. But in such case there must be a proper defence to let in the inquiry. Williams v. Jones, 13 M. & W. 628. Where trespass was brought for executing a warrant to levy a poor-rate, the plaintiff was not permitted to impugn the appointment of the overseers on the ground of irregularity or miscalculation of votes at the meeting of justices at which the appointment was made; the jury having expressly negatived fraud. Penney v. Slade, 5 N. C. 319.

Where a cause was removed by habeas from an inferior court after a judgment by default, that judgment was not evidence against the defendant in the superior court. Bottings v. Firby, 9 B. & C. 762.

Effect of Convictions.

It is a general rule that the judgments of all courts of competent judicature are conclusive for the purpose of protecting their judicial officers acting within the scope of their authority. Thus, where the justices of the peace have an authority given to them by Act of Parliament, and they appear to have acted within the jurisdiction so given, and to have done all that they are required by the Act to do in order to originate their jurisdiction, a conviction drawn up in due form, and remaining in force, is a protection in any action brought against them for the act so done. Per Abbott, C. J., Basten v. Carew, 3 B. & C. 653. Therefore where, in trespass against two magistrates for giving the plaintiff's landlord possession of a farm as deserted, the defendants produced in evidence a record of their proceedings under the statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 16, which set forth all the circumstances necessary to give them jurisdiction, and by which it appeared that they had pursued the directions of the statute, it was held that this record was not traversable, and was a conclusive answer to the action. Ibid. So, in trespass against magistrates for taking and detaining a vessel, a conviction by them under the Bum-boat Act (2 Geo. 3, c. 28), was conclusive evidence that the vessel in question was a "boat" within the meaning of the Act. Brittain v. Kinnaird, 1 B. & B. 432. See further Kemp v. Neville, 10 C. B., N. S. 523; 31 L. J., C. P. 158, and cases cited post, Part III., sub tit., Actions against justices. The recital of an information on oath in a warrant of commitment in the nature of a conviction (as for refusal to give sureties of the peace) is evidence for the justice of such information; Haylock v. Sparke, 1 E. & B. 471; though it was held otherwise in the case of a warrant to appre

hend on a charge. Stevens v. Clark, 2 M. & Rob. 435. See R. v. Richards, 5 Q. B. 926. In like manner a conviction for a contempt by commissioners of a court of requests is conclusive for them in an action of trespass against them; and the plaintiff cannot controvert the fact of contempt, though unnecessarily alleged in the plea. Aldridge v. Haines, 2 B. & Ad. 395. But a want of jurisdiction in the commissioners may be shown. Andrews v. Marris, 1 Q. B. 3.

An affiliation order obtained by E. W. may be used to contradict E. W., who, when called to prove her marriage and the legitimacy of the plaintiff her son, denied, on cross-examination, that she had ever applied to the magistrates for an affiliation order. Watson v. Little, 5 H. & N. 472; 29 L. J., Ex. 267.

Notwithstanding some authorities to the contrary (B. N. P. 245; Gilb. Ev. 30), it is now settled that a record of a conviction is inadmissible as evidence of the same fact coming into controversy in a civil suit. Gibson v. M'Carty, Cas. temp. Hardw. 311; March v. March, 28 L. J., P. & M. 30; Castrique v. Imrie, L. R., 4 H. L. 434, per Blackburn, J. In many of the earlier cases the conviction was held inadmissible by reason of the evidence on which it was procured. See Blakemore v. Glamorgan Canal Co., 2 C. M. & R. 139; Brook v. Carpenter, 3 Bing. 297; Smith v. Rummens, 1 Camp. 9, 151. But the conviction was also inadmissible, on the ground that it was res inter alios acta, and this objection is still in force. See Gibson v. M'Carty, supra; and Peake, Ev. 41 et seq. Yet, a plea of guilty on an indictment for assault is evidence by way of admission against the defendant in an action for that assault. Trial, per Pais, 1 Phill. Ev., 7th ed., 328; R. v. Fontaine Moreau, 11 Q. B. 1033. Though a verdict of guilty would not be evidence. R. v. Warden of the Fleet, 12 Mod, 337-9. But a conviction may sometimes be admissible as evidence of reputation. See Petrie v. Nuttall, 11 Exch. 569; 25 L. J., Ex. 200. When a conviction operated in rem it was evidence inter alios, though obtained by the testimony of the party who used it in evidence. Davis v. Nest, 6 C. & P. 167.

Effect of Sentences of Visitors, &c.

The sentence of expulsion of a member of a college by the master and fellows is conclusive, and cannot be impeached in a court of law. R. v. Grundon, Cowp. 315. A sentence of deprivation by a visitor of a college is in the same manner conclusive, and the grounds of it not examinable in any court. Philips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5; S. C., 2 T. R. 346; see Hargr. Law Tracts, 464, 465. So, in ejectment against a schoolmaster, who has been removed by sentence of the trustees of the school (such power being vested in them) for misbehaviour, it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove the grounds of the sentence, and the defendant cannot disprove them. Doe d. Davy v. Haddon, 3 Doug. 310.

Effect of Judgments of Foreign Courts.

The judgment of a foreign court (and for this purpose Irish, Scotch, and Colonial courts are foreign courts) of competent jurisdiction, directly deciding a question cognisable by the law of the country, is conclusive here, if the same question arise incidentally between the same parties, and the sentence be conclusive by the law of the foreign country. Garcias v. Ricardo, 12 Cl. & Fin. 368; Burrows v. Jemino, Stra. 733; Stafford v. Clark, 2 Bing. 377; Crispin v. Doglioni, 3 Sw. & Tr. 96; 32 L. J., P. M.

& A. 169; L. R., 1 H. L. 301; Dent v. Smith, L. R., 4 Q. B. 414; Messina v. Petrococchino, L. R., 4 P. C. 144; see cases collected in notes to Kingston's (Ds. of) case, 2 Smith's L. C. 9th ed. 868 et seq. Thus, in an action on a covenant to indemnify the plaintiff from all debts due from the late partnership of the plaintiff, defendant, and another, and from all suits, &c., proof of the proceedings in a foreign court in a suit there instituted against the late partners for the recovery of a partnership debt, in which suit a decree passed against them for want of answer, per quod the plaintiff was obliged to pay the debt, is conclusive against the defendant, who will not be permitted to show that the proceedings were erroneous. Tarleton v. Tarleton, 4 M. & S. 20.

In an action brought in this country upon the judgment of a foreign court having jurisdiction over the parties and subject-matter of the suit, such judgment must now be taken as conclusive and binding on both parties, so as to preclude their contesting the merits or propriety of the decision, although formerly on this question much difference of opinion prevailed. Ferguson v. Mahon, 11 Ad. & E. 179; Australasia, Bank of v. Nias, 16 Q. B. 717; 20 L. J., Q. B. 284; De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone, 6 H. & N. 301; 30 L. J., Ex. 238; Munroe v. Pilkington, 2 B. & S. 11; 31 L. J., Q. B. 81; Vanquelin v. Bonard, 15 C. B., N. S. 341; 33 L. J., C. P. 78; Ellis v. M'Henry, L. R., 6 C. P. 228; Godard v. Gray, L. R., 6 Q. B. 139. But if it appear on the face of the foreign proceedings or by extrinsic proof that the judgment is against natural justice, as that the defendant has never been summoned (in which case the court could have no jurisdiction), the courts here will not give effect to it. Ferguson v. Mahon, supra; Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East, 192; S. C., 1 Camp. 63; Cavan v. Stewart, 1 Stark. 525. So, where the judgment has been obtained by fraud; Ochsenbein v. Papelier, L. R., 8 Ch. 695; even although the foreign court tried the question of fraud and decided that it had not been committed. Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, 10 Q. B. D. 295, C. A.; Vadala v. Lawes, 25 Q. B. D. 310, C. A. So, where the judges in the foreign court were interested parties. Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279. But it is no objection that the proceedings have (according to the law of the foreign country) been served upon a public officer in the absence of the defendant. Becquet v. MacCarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951; and see Cowan v. Braidwood, 1 M. & Gr. 882; Australasia, Bank of v. Harding, post, p. 207; see also Valle v. Dumergue, 4 Exch. 290; Copin v. Strachan, and Copin v. Adamson, L. R., 9 Ex. 345; 1 Ex. D. 17, C. A.

In order to render the judgment binding in this country, it must appear that it was final and conclusive in the foreign court in which it was given; Plummer v. Woodburn, 4 B. & C. 625, 637; Frayes v. Worms, 10 C. B., N. S. 149; Nouvion v. Freeman, 37 Ch. D. 244, C. A.; 15 Ap. Ca. 1; that the cause of action was exactly the same; Callandar v. Dittrich, 4 M. & Gr. 68 and that the parties were within or subject to its jurisdiction; Obicini v. Bligh, 8 Bing. 335; Novelli v. Rossi, 2 B. & Ad. 757, explained in Castrique v. Imrie, L. R., 4 H. L. 435, per Blackburn, J. As to when a court has jurisdiction, see Schibsby v. Westenholz, L. R., 6 Q. B. 155. The judgment to be conclusive must be on the merits. The Delta, 1 P. D. 393. Thus, a foreign judgment in favour of the defendant on the foreign Statute of Limitations is no bar to an action here, where the statute only bars the remedy and not the right. Harris v. Quine, L. R., 4 Q. B. 653. In these respects an Irish, Scotch, or Colonial judgment stands on the same footing as a foreign judgment. Harris v. Saunders, 4 B. & C. 411; Ferguson v. Mahon, and other cases cited supra. Mistake by the foreign court as to the English law applicable to the case affords no defence to an action on the judgment, it being a ques

tion of fact in that court. Godard v. Gray, L. R., 6 Q. B. 139; Trafford v. Blanc, 36 Ch. D. 600. But where the foreign court acts in defiance of the comity of nations by refusing to recognise a title properly acquired according to the laws of England, our courts will not give effect to its decision. Simpson v. Fogo, 1 J. & H. 18; 29 L. J., Ch. 657; S. C., 1 H. & M. 195; 32 L. J., Ch. 349. This case was recognised as good law in Castrique v. Imrie, L. R., 4 H. L. 436, per Blackburn, J.

Where there was a decree in Ireland against the validity of a will of lands in England and Ireland, such decree was held no bar to a suit between the same parties in the English Chancery respecting the land in England devised by the same will. Boyse v. Colclough, 1 K. & J. 124; 24 L. J., Ch. 7. In Australasia, Bank of v. Harding, 9 C. B. 661; 19 L. J., C. P. 345, it was held on demurrer to a plea of judgment recovered in a British colony against the defendant, pleaded to a count on a simple contract, that such a judgment was no merger in this country, though it might be so in the colony; and, generally, that a foreign judgment was only prima facie evidence of a debt here. The mere pendency of a suit in a foreign court is no bar to a suit in this country for the same cause. Ostell v. Lepage, 5 De G. & Sm. 95; 21 L. J., Ch. 501. A judgment against the defendant in the Consular Court in Constantinople, and payment to the plaintiff under the judgment, is a conclusive bar to another action in this country by the plaintiff against the defendant for the same cause of action. Barber v. Lamb, 8 C. B., N. S. 95; 29 L. J., C. P. 234.

A notarial attestation, purporting to contain the substance, but not the tenor, of a judgment of the Court of the Inquisition at Rome, stating the offences for which the defendant had been sentenced, and sealed with the seal of that court, is inadmissible as evidence of the offences alleged therein to have been committed. R. v. Newman, Dearsly, C. C. 85. The document was there admitted as proof that a judgment had been pronounced, but not of the grounds of it; and it seems questionable how far it was admissible even for this purpose; for it was a mere certificate of what the notary considered to be the result of a selected portion only of the original proceedings.

Effect of Court Rolls and Manor Books.

Court Rolls, whether of a court baron or customary court, are evidence as well between the lord of the manor and his tenants or copyholders (B. N. P. 247), as against them; Att.-Gen. v. Hotham, 1 Turn. 217; and for many purposes, as against strangers. Copies of court rolls, purporting to be a surrender by a person shown to have been in possession of the land, and an admittance of the surrenderee accordingly, are evidence against the defendant both of the copyhold tenure and of the title of surrenderee, in an action by him for use and occupation. Standen v. Chrismas, 10 Q. B. 135.

They will be admitted as evidence of reputation within the manor; and even an ancient custumal, not properly a court roll, nor signed by any of the tenants, but found among the rolls, and delivered down from steward to steward, purporting to have been made assensu omnium tenentium, has been admitted as evidence to prove the course of descent within a manor. Denn d. Goodwin v. Spray, 1 T. R. 466; Johnstone v. Spencer, Earl, 30 Ch. D. 581. So, a presentment by the homage on the court rolls of a manor, stating the mode of descent of lands in the manor, is evidence of such mode, though no instance of any person having taken according to it be proved. Roe d. Beebee v. Parker, 5 T. R. 26. Entries of admissions

durante casta viduitate are evidence of a custom to hold on that condition, though there may be no instance of a forfeiture for incontinence. Doe d. Askew v. Askew, 10 East, 520. Proof of the admission of the youngest among the collaterals of a certain degree of consanguinity is not evidence per se of the custom of descent to the youngest of a more remote degree; thus the entry of an admission of the youngest son of an uncle is no evidence that the custom extends to youngest son of the youngest brother of a great-grandfather. Muggleton v. Barnett, 2 H. & N. 653; 26 L. J., Ex. 47; 27 L. J., Ex. 125, Ex. Ch. An entry of an admission reciting a previous surrender to the use of a will, is evidence of the surrender (the latter being lost) in proof of a settlement by estate. R. v. Thrushcross, 1 Ad. & E. 126. In an action by a copyholder against a freeholder of a manor, an ancient parchment writing, preserved among the muniments of a manor, purporting to be signed by certain copyholders of the manor, was held to be evidence, as against the plaintiff, of the reputation of the manor as to a customary right of common set up to him. Chapman v. Cowlan, 13 East, 10. The court rolls are evidence of proclamations before seizure of a forfeited copyhold, though tendered on behalf of a party claiming under the lord after seizure. Doe d. Tarrant v. Hellier, 3 T. R. 164. A presentment of a jury at a manor court, setting forth the bounds of the manor, is admissible evidence of the bounds, though mutilated in part, such part not being apparently connected with the subject of boundary. Evans v. Rees, 10 Ad. & E. 151. The existence of a customary compiled within the period of legal memory is conclusive evidence against the existence of a custom not mentioned therein. Portland, Dk. of v. Hill, L. R., 2 Eq. 765. See also Anglesey, Ms. of v. Hatherton, Ld., 10 M. & W. 218.

Entries of amercements on court rolls for acts of waste, offered in proof of the nature of a customary tenure, were said not to be admissible for that purpose without proof of payment. Rowe v. Brenton, 3 M. & Ry. 302. Yet it is not common to find in ancient court rolls anything to indicate such payments. Whether made voluntarily or upon process, the entry of payment is more likely to appear in the bailiff's accounts, or in the estreat rolls.

Presentments by the leet jury of unlawful fishing in a stream belonging to the lord of the manor are not evidence for the lord of his right to the stream; for they are made in the exercise of a criminal jurisdiction, and are res inter alios; per Erle, J., in Mildmay v. Newton, Winton Sum. Ass. 1846; dubitante Coleridge, J., in Waddington v. Newton, Winton Sum. Ass. 1850, who was disposed to admit them, on the same presentments being tendered at a subsequent trial on the same question between other parties. See ante, p. 205. In Calmady v. Rowe, 6 C. B. 861, 877, 878, presentments of purprestures were rejected by Patteson, J., because no fine appeared to have been imposed; and it should seem that a bare presentment, without more, is only evidence where reputation within the manor is admissible. Entries of fines assessed in the books of a deceased steward are not evidence of a custom to take such fines unless there be some proof of payment. Ely, Deane of v. Caldecott, 7 Bing. 433. Presentments are not evidence of matters not within the jurisdiction of the homage; as a presentment by the freeholders of a right of common enjoyed by the owner of a certain farm. Richards v. Bassett, 10 B. & C. 657.

Effect of Public Books and Public Documents.

Public books and documents of an official character are in many instances evidence, even as between strangers of the facts therein recorded.