S C., 1 Vent. 257. So the enrolment of the decree respecting London tithes under the 37 Hen. 8, c. 12, being lost, has been proved by user. S. C.; Macdougal v. Young, Ry. & M. 392.

On a question whether a decree in equity has been reversed by the House of Lords, a copy of the minutes of the judgment in the Journals is evidence; Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 17; and now see 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, s. 3, ante, p. 104. But as a judgment of the House on error or appeal from the Superior Courts of Common Law was entered of record, it would seem that in such case the minutes would not be sufficient. See also C. L. P. Act, 1852, ss. 155, 157. Under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 59), this distinction, however, is now abolished, and it seems that any judgment of the House given since 1875 (see J. Act, 1875, s. 2), may now be proved by a copy of the minutes in its Journals.

As to proof of judgments, &c., of Inferior Courts, vide post, p. 116.

Proof of Fines and Common Recoveries.

A common recovery is proved in the same manner as the record of a judgment in an adverse suit.

The chirograph or indenture of a fine, as formerly delivered by the chirographer, is the proper evidence of it. B. N. P. 229. But it has been held that the indorsement of proclamations on it is not evidence of them, because he has no official authority to deliver a copy of such indorsement. B.N.P. 230; Doe d. Hutch v. Bluck, 6 Taunt. 485. The original entry of the proclamations was usually filed with the note of the fine, and was in the custody of the chirographer, and this "note" is said to be the "principal erecordum," from which others are amendable. 3 Leon. 183. Besides these records, the proceedings on a fine were formerly enrolled in the Court of Common Pleas under statutes 5 Hen. 4, c. 14, and 23 Eliz. c. 3; and it should seem, on principle, that examined copies of these enrolments of record when found, or office copies stamped with the seal of the Record Office (1 & 2 Vict. c. 94, ante, p. 98), are legitimate evidence. The foot or pes finis, is a third counterpart of the indentures made by the chirographer, and originally engrossed on the same parchment. The entry of the proclamations on this is official, and the proper custody of it was, until lately, that of the Custos brevium. The result appears to be that there are several authentic records of fines, which show exactly the same facts, viz., the date, parties, property, concord, and proclamations. It must, however, be remembered that the practice and form of levying fines have undergone variations at different periods. See generally, on the mode of recording fines, 5 Rep. 39 a, and 2nd Report of Deputy Keeper of Records, Appendix 1.

By 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 82, other officers were substituted for the chirographer, whose copies were made as available as the old ones, and all the records of fine (with a few recent exceptions) are now in the custody of the Master of the Rolls, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 94. The 11 & 12 Vict. c. 70, enacted that all fines levied in the Common Pleas should be conclusively deemed to have been levied with proclamations, except where, at the passing of the Act (31st of August, 1848), the land was actually enjoyed under a title inconsistent with such fine. The Act was expressly designed to save the expense of other proof of proclamations. It is remarkable, however, that it proceeded on the false supposition that "all fines" had previously been levied with proclamations."

In the case of Welsh fines there is a special statute to facilitate the proof of them. See 4 Vict. c. 32, s. 2; and Doe d. Cadwalader v. Price, 16 M. & W. 603.

Proof of Verdicts.

When a verdict is offered as evidence of the truth of the facts found, the postea alone was not sufficient, but the judgment must also have been proved to show that it had not been arrested, nor a new trial granted; Pitton v. Walter, Stra. 162; B. N. P. 234; except in the case of an issue, when no judgment was entered up; B. N. P. 234. But semb. the verdict should in that case have been shown to have been satisfactory by proof of the decree, or other adoption by the court. Ibid. See Robinson v. Duleep Singh, 11 Ch. D. 798, C. A. As to proof of the judgment, see ante, pp. 107, 108. The Nisi Prius record with the postea indorsed, or with minute of the verdict indorsed by the officer of the court, was sufficient where the only object is to show that the cause came on to be tried. Pitton v. Walter, supra; R. v. Browne, M. & M. 315. But, without such minute, the Nisi Prius record alone was no evidence of the trial. Per Lord Tenterden, C. J., Ibid.

Under Rules, 1883, O. xxxvi. r. 30, two copies of the pleadings in the action are delivered to the officer when the action is entered for trial, one of which is for the use of the judge at the trial; this delivery corresponds with the former delivery of the N. P. record (see O. xxvi. r. 1); and by r. 41, "the associate or master shall enter all such findings of fact as the judge may direct to be entered, and the directions, if any, of the judge as to judgment," in a book to be kept for the purpose. Under r. 42, where the judge directs any judgment to be entered for any party absolutely, judgment may be entered on a certificate given by the associate in Form 17, App. B.; this certificate seems to correspond to the postea.

Proof of Writs.

A writ must be proved by a copy of the record of it after its return; and this is said to be necessary whenever it is the gist of the action (i.e. ut semble wherever it is treated as matter of record in the pleading); B. N. P. 234; otherwise the writ itself may be produced; or secondary evidence given, when its non-production is accounted for. A copy of the judgment-roll containing an award of an elegit and the return of the inquisition is evidence (and ut semb. the best evidence) of the elegit and inquisition. Ramsbottom v. Buckhurst, 2 M. & S. 565. To prove that the defendant issued a writ, it is not sufficient secondary evidence to produce the filacer's book unless it be shown that it has not been returned but is in the defendant's hands, who has had notice to produce it. Edmonstone v. Plaisted, 4 Esp. 160. Where a writ is pleaded in terms, and nul tiel record is replied, it must be proved by the production of the record, as in other cases of records; ante, pp. 107, 108. As to proof by office copy, see Rules, 1883, O. xxxvii. r. 4, and observations thereon, ante, p. 97.

A writ of summons may be proved by production of the original writ, or by the copy thereof left with and filed by the officer under Rules, 1883, O. v., rr. 12, 13. R. v. Scott, 2 Q. B. D. 415. If the defendant has to prove the writ, it should seem that the copy served on him by the plaintiff is primary evidence; vide ante, p. 3.

Proof of Inquisitions.

Where the return to an inquisition is given in evidence, it is in general necessary to show that the inquiry was made under proper authority. On this head some distinctions are observable. Inquests of office are either by commission under the Great Seal, as offices of entitling, &c.; or by

commission or writ under the seal of the exchequer; or they are taken ex-officio, as by coroners, escheators, &c. The returns made under any of the above special commissions, or writs, are generally inadmissible as evidence, unless the commission be proved, or the non-production of it accounted for. But inquisitions taken ex-officio by officers acting under a general commission or appointment, as escheators, &c., seem to be admissible on principle, without further evidence of authority than that they were acting as such officers. See generally as to the nature of inquests of office, 3 Bl. Com. 258; 16 Vin. Ab. 79, tit. Office.

In the case of an inquisition post mortem, and such private offices, the return cannot be read without also reading the commission under which it was taken; unless, as it seems, the inquisition be old. 12 Vin. Ab. Ev. (A. b. 42). In cases of more general concern, such as the return to the commission in Henry VIII.'s time to inquire of the value of livings, the commission is said to require no proof. B. N. P. 228. So an ancient extent of crown lands found in the proper office, purporting to have been taken by a steward of the king's lands, and following in its form the direction of the statute 4 Edw. 1, stat. 1, will be presumed to have been taken under competent authority, though the commission cannot be found. Rowe v. Brenton, 3 M. & Ry. 164; S. C., 8 B. & C. 747. And there are many cases to show that an old commission may be presumed: see references, S. C., 3 M. & Ry. 171, 349. The book called Domesday is an inquest of this kind. An inquisition is admissible though it has become illegible in material parts. Anderton v. Magawley, 3 Bro. P. C. 208. A lost inquisition post mortem may be proved by a recital of it in ancient proceedings, as on a petition of right in the Coram Rege roll, where it was incidentally certified verbatim to the Court of K. B. and set forth on the record. Rowe v. Brenton, 3 M. & Ry. 141, 142.

Proof of Rules or Orders of Court, and Judge's Orders.

An order (in the common law courts formerly called a rule) of a superior court, is proved by an office copy thereof, for such a copy is the order itself. Per cur. Streeter v. Bartlett, 5 C. B. 564; Selby v. Harris, 1 Ld. Raym. 745; Ludlow v. Charlton, 9 C. & P. 242. Where a court (as that of Insolvent Debtors) prints and circulates copies of its general rules for the guidance of its officers, one of such copies is evidence of the rules, without showing it to have been examined with the original. Dance v. Robson, M. & M. 294. But the rules must be shown to have been sanctioned by the court in order to support an indictment for perjury on an affidavit required by them. R. v. Koops, 6 Ad. & E. 198.

A judge's order may be proved either by producing the order itself signed by the judge, and delivered out in the usual way, or by proof of the rule or order, if any, making it a rule or order of court. Still v. Halford, 4 Camp. 17. An order of court, however, is not matter of record in the strict sense of the word. R. v. Bingham, 3 Y. & J. 101. The statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, s. 2 (ante, p. 81), enacts that all courts are to take judicial notice of the signature of the superior judges of equity and common law attached to an official or judicial document; and by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 137 (ante, p. 82), this provision is extended to the signatures of judges and registrars of courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy.

As to proof of orders made in chambers in the Chancery Division, and drawn up by the chief clerk, see rules O. lv. rr. 74, 74a (Dec. 1885), and J. Act, 1875, s. 20, post, p. 152.

Proof of Decrees and Answers in Chancery.

A decree in Chancery may be proved by an exemplification; or by an examined copy; or by production of a decretal order in paper, together with proof of the bill and answer, where such proof may be necessary. Trowel v. Castle, 1 Keb. 21; B. N. P. 244. The bill and answer need not be proved if they are recited (as they formerly were) in the decree. Ibid.; Com. Dig. Testm. (C. 1); Accord. Wharton Peerage, 12 Cl. & Fin. 295. The rule laid down in a text-book of authority is, that where a party intends to avail himself of the contents of a decree, and not merely to prove an extrinsic collateral act (as that a decree was made by the court), he ought regularly to give in evidence the proceedings on which the decree was founded. 1 Phill. Ev. 373. And see Peake, Ev. 74; Hewitt v. Piggott, 5 C. & P. 75. Still, if the decree or order itself contain all the facts required, it has been held unnecessary to produce the bill and answer, though it is otherwise where it is material to show the particular issue raised. Thus, in an action against the sheriff for an escape under an attachment issued out of Chancery for non-payment of costs, the order for an attachment is prima facie proof of the pendency of a suit in Chancery without proof of bill and answer; and for this purpose a decree, even without a recital or other evidence of bill and answer, would be admissible. Blower v. Hollis, 1 Cr. & M. 396. This case was doubted at Nisi Prius by Ld. Abinger, C. B., in Attwood v. Taylor, 1 M. & Gr. 289, 290, where the vendor of an estate sued the vendee for interest due on the contract of sale, and the plaintiff, in order to account for laches in suing, offered in evidence an injunction in a suit of Equity by the defendant against him, restraining him from suing at law; his Lordship refused to admit the order until the bill and answer were produced. The case seems to be reconcilable with Blower v. Hollis, supra, and it is possible that Lord Abinger only dissented from the marginal note of the case in the above report of it. It might be that the injunction was obtained on grounds which did not relieve the plaintiff from his imputed laches. As to proof of the reversal of a decree, see ante, p. 109. As to proof of judgments of the High Court of Justice, vide ante, pp. 107, 108.

An answer in Chancery is proved by the production of the bill and answer, or by examined, or Record Office, copies of them; but on proof by the proper officer that the bill has been searched for in the proper office and not found the answer may be read without the bill. Gilb. Ev. 55. A distinction was sought to be drawn between proof of answers, filed in Chancery, and affidavits, but the distinction is untenable; vide post, pp. 113, 114. Some proof of the identity of the parties is requisite. Rees d. Howell v. Bowen, M'Cl. & Y. 383, 391, 392. This may be given by a witness, who has seen the handwriting of the defendant to the original answer, though it is not produced in court. Dartnall v. Howard, Ry. & M. 169. Identity may also be inferred from intrinsic evidence; as if the name, description, and character of the party to the action agree with the name and description of the party answering in equity, it is primâ facie evidence of identity. Hennell v. Lyon, 1 B. & A. 182. See also Garvin v. Carroll, 10 Ir. L. R. 330, and the recent case of Hubbard v. Lees, L. R., 1 Ex. 255, 257 (cited post, p. 124, decided on a family register), whence it seems that such evidence is sufficient for the jury, and where the jury are satisfied with the identity the court will not interfere. See, however, Rees d. Howell v. Bowen, supra; Burnand v. Nerot, 1 C. & P. 578; and Proof of Deeds, &c., post, p. 134.

An answer, offered in evidence as an admission of the party on oath, is sufficiently proved by an examined copy of it without proof of a decree, or

of the party's handwriting. Dartmouth, Ly. v. Roberts, 16 East, 334. See Fleet v. Perrins, L. R., 3 Q. B. 536, post, p. 114. So when it is used to contradict the party making it, or to cross-examine him on it, vide post, pp. 177, 178. A letter written by the plaintiff's agent, referred to by the plaintiff in his answer to a bill in Chancery filed by a third person, and deposited by consent of parties with a clerk in court, was evidence against the plaintiff in an action at law, without reading the answer in Chancery. Long v. Champion, 2 B. & Ad. 284. But quære, whether-where A. had obtained sight of a letter or document of B. by means of a bill of discovery, to which B. had put in an answer with the document annexed-A. could read it in evidence without also reading the whole answer? See S. C. The mere fact that the document was obtained by a bill of discovery is not enough to exclude it, or to oblige the party who uses it to put in the bill and answer. Sturge v. Buchanan, per Cur., 10 Ad. & E. 605.

Where an answer is read as a mere admission by the defendant, he has hitherto been entitled to require that as well the bill as the interrogatories shall be also read as part of the plaintiff's case. Pennell v. Meyer, 2 M. & Rob. 98. The principle is, that the questions as well as answers should be read, and that in equity a defendant was bound to answer not only the interrogatory part, but also the narrative part of the bill. Ibid. But defendants in equity were relieved by the Gen. Order, 26 Aug. 1841, and by the Act 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 12, from answering except to interrogatories. This might perhaps dispense with the reading of anything but the interrogatories; but as the answer was not necessarily confined to the interrogatories (see sect. 14), it is still a question how far the reading of the bill, if required by the defendant, may be necessary? See Fleet v. Perrins, L. R., 3 Q. B. 536; L. R., 4 Q. B. 500, Ex. Ch., and Admissions on compulsory process, ante, p. 63. Where a bill, answer, and decree are put in evidence to prove a fact which appears on the face of those documents to have been in issue, the party producing them is not bound also to put in the depositions as part of his own case. Laybourn v. Crisp, 4 M. & W. 320.

Proof of Depositions and Affidavits.

A deposition used by a party to a suit in Chancery, for the purpose of proving certain facts, is primary evidence of the same facts against the same party in an action by a stranger. Richards v. Morgan, 4 B. & S. 641 ; 33 L. J., Q. B. 114. But such depositions are not, in general, admissible without proof of the bill and answer; B. N. P. 240; Gilb. Ev. 62; unless no bill or answer can be found; Gilb. Ev. 64; Rowe v. Brenton, 8 B. & C. 765; Byam v. Booth, 2 Price, 234, n.; Bayley v. Wylie, 6 Esp. 85; or unless the depositions are offered in evidence as containing an admission merely, or for the purpose of contradicting a witness. 1 Phill. Ev. 375. The bill and answer are only required to satisfy the judge that the depositions are admissible by enabling him to see what was in issue; and the opposite counsel therefore has no right to have them read, or to comment upon them to the jury. Chappell v. Purday, 14 M. & W. 303.

In general, depositions taken in perpetuam rei memoriam were not evidence at law unless an answer had been put in and proved; but if the defendant in equity were in contempt, or had neglected to take advantage of an opportunity to cross-examine, the deposition might be read on proof of the bill, without the answer; B. N. P. 240; Lancaster v. Lancaster, 6 Sim. 439; so in case of a bill filed for a commission to examine witnesses de bene esse; Cazenove v. Vaughan, 1 M. & S. 4. Whether the deposition was taken on a bill to perpetuate testimony, or a bill to

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