"make the objection. Hence, for the practical guidance of "the magistrate, he is told he should state the fact of his being "interested, and inquire whether any objection be made by any "party to his taking part in the decision" (R. v. Cheltenham Commissioners, 1 Ad. & E. (N.S.) 467; 10 Law. J. Rep. (N.S.) M. C. 99; 1 Q. B. 467). By several acts justices of certain descriptions are prohibited from acting at all in some cases; for instance (h) : Under the Alehouse Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), where the justice is a brewer, distiller, malster, &c., or the owner of or agent for the Under the act 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, relative to the fraudulent removal of Under the act as to the cotton and other manufactures (6 & 7 Vict. On the hearing of appeals against rates (vide 16 Geo. 2, c. 18, s. 3, Under the statutes relating to the recovery of tithes and church rates from Quakers and others, where patron of the church or chapel Under the Annual Army or Marine Mutiny Acts, where the justice Under the Companies Clauses, the Lands Clauses, and the Railways Clauses Consolidation Acts (8 Vict. c. 16, s. 3; 8 Vict. c. 18, s. 3; and 8 Vict. c. 20, s. 3), where interested in the matter. When a sheriff of a county happens to be a justice of the peace for the same county, he cannot act as such during the continuance of his shrievalty; if he does, his acts are declared to be void (1 Mary, sess. 2, c. 8, s. 2). It seems also that a (h) These are shown under the respective titles throughout the work. C Ouster of juris. tions of property complained of. coroner cannot act as a justice of the peace within his county (2 Hawk. c. 8, s. 34; Dalt. c. 3). But attornies, solicitors and proctors, although they cannot be justices of the peace for counties, may be for boroughs (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 33; 5 Geo. 2, c. 18, ss. 2, 4). Where property or title is in question, the jurisdiction of diction on ques- justices of the peace to hear and determine in a summary manner is ousted, and their hands tied from interfering, though the facts be such as they have otherwise authority to take cognizance of (Paley, 3rd ed. p. 28). This principle is not founded upon any legislative provision, but is a qualification which the law itself raises in the execution of penal statutes, and is always implied in their construction (Id. 55). It is sometimes also the subject of special enactment, as under the Assault Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 29), when the title to any land or any interest therein, or as to any bankruptcy or insolvency, or any execution under process of any court of justice is in dispute; under the Malicious Injuries Act (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 24), "where the party trespassing acted under a fair and reasonable supposition "that he had a right to do the act complained of" (R. v. Thomas, MS. Q. B. H. 1841); and under the Poundbreach Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 30, s. 2), where any question of title shall arise as to any lands, &c., or as to the obligation of repairing any wall, &c. The jurisdiction is not to be ousted by a mere fictitious pretence of title (Paley, 3rd ed. p. 57; 5 J. P. 404; 11 J. P. 785; Harrington v. Moore, 12 J. P. 629; Rex v. Wrottesley, 1 B. & Ad. 648; R. v. Speed, 1 Ld. Raym. 583; R. v. Barnaby, 2 Ld. Raym, 900; 1 Salk. 181; Kinnersley v. Orpe, Doug. 499; R. v. Harpur, 1 D. & R. 222; 1 New Mag. Cas. 57; Hunt v. Andrews, 3 B. & Ald. 341; Rex v. Milnrow, 5 M. & S. 248); and in R. v. Dodson et al. (9 Ad. & Ell. 704; 5 J. P. 404), which was a rule for a criminal information against justices for acting corruptly in convicting a party who had set up a claim of right to do the act complained of as a defence, under the proviso of s. 24 of the Malicious Injuries Act (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30), it was held that it was not sufficient for the party to say that he had such a right, or to prove that others had asserted the same right as well as he, but he must give such evidence of his right as may satisfy the justices that the supposition of his having such a right was a fair and reasonable one; and in the same case it was held that it was no proof of a bonâ fide claim subsisting in the complainants, that several parties, Must not be a mere fictitious pretence of title. other than the individual charged, had committed similar trespasses, using the same colour of right as that which he professed to rely on, and that the complainants had obtained injunctions from the Court of Chancery against such parties. We have in the foregoing pages shown what are the principal General ingredients to give requisites or ingredients in general necessary to give justices justices jurisjurisdiction to exercise their authority, viz. :— Jurisdiction as to place where offence or matter arose, and the exceptions; Jurisdiction as to place of exercising their authority,-in adjoining counties, or place of exclusive jurisdiction, and detached parts of other counties; Jurisdiction ex officio in certain matters; Jurisdiction not to be exercised where justice a party, or interested; diction; When justices are disqualified from acting within their jurisdiction by When their jurisdiction (in all other respects complete) is ousted by a In addition to these there must be, Jurisdiction over the subject-matter within the strict meaning of the Jurisdiction in respect of the justices' description, where the authority Jurisdiction as to the time of offence or matter being prosecuted Jurisdiction as to the number required to hear and determine; and its nature, and costs, adjudged to be paid, neither for too (i) Sir John Jervis's Acts, 11 & 12 Vict. cc. 42, 43, give a series of forms for general use in summary convictions and orders, and indictable offences; but as they are merely outlines, and do not apply to particular cases, or under special provisions, or contain any mode of describing offences or complaints, the neces sity for a publication containing a complete collection of forms and precedents for practical use in all matters in a separate volume, distinct from the practice, founded upon those outlines, was generally acknowleged by the magistracy and diction, &c. Written proshow every receedings should quisite to give jurisdiction. cially in those records of their judgments which are final, i. e. Convictions and Orders, as the bad part cannot be severed from the good (R. v. Patchett, 5 East's Rep. 344; 1 Smith's Rep. 547, S. C.; R. v. Catherall, 2 Stra. 900), there must appear on the face of them (for they cannot be gathered by inference or intendment) every essential ingredient, and every material fact, to give jurisdiction (sce Paley, 3rd edit. 69). The special authority given to justices must be exactly pursued, according to the letter of the act by which it is created, or their acts will not be good (Wilkins v. Wright, 2 C. & M. 101; Bracey's case, 1 Salk. 349; 2 Salk. 475, pl. 14; 5 Burr. 2686; see Paley, 16, 67; 2 T. R. 18; R. v. Corben, 4 Burr. 2218). (3.) The Protec tion of Justices from vexatious Actions. 3. THE PROTECTION OF JUSTICES FROM VEXATIOUS ACTIONS. The principal statute upon this subject now in force, in addition to the protective clauses usually inserted in acts extending to the summary jurisdiction of justices, is one of Sir John Jervis's Acts, the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, intituled "An Act to protect "Justices of the Peace from vexatious Actions for Acts done "by them in execution of their Office," which came into operation on the same day (2nd October, 1848) as the other two of Jervis's Acts (id. s. 16), and repeals all other statutes on the subject (j). It recites in its preamble, "that it is expedient to protect justices of the peace in the execution of their duty," and we now proceed to give an abstract of its provisions. General provi- The general provisions of this act applicable to all acts of a be of action, notice, justice, as to the form of action and notice thereof, &c., may sions as to form &c. classed as follows: : 1. No action is to be brought unless commenced within six calendar months next after the act complained of is committed (s. 8); their clerks, and urged upon the author of the present work,-upon consideration of which The Magisterial Formulist" was recently published, and which contains all the forms required by justices and their clerks, especially the mode of describing all summary as well as indictable offences, and may be used either as a companion to this work, or any other book of practice on the subjects, thereby securing that great desideratum in legal proceedings of this nature,-uniformity in forms, as well as in practice. (j) By sect. 17 the following statutes are repealed, viz.: 7 Jac. 1, c. 5; 21 Jac. 1, c. 12, s. 5; 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, ss. 1 and 2, and part of sect. 8; and the whole of 43 Geo. 3, c. 141; and all other act or acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act; save and except so much of the said several acts as repeal any other acts or parts of acts, and also except as to proceedings then pending, to which the same or any of them may be applicable. By sect. 18, the act is to apply to persons protected by the repealed statutes. and one calendar month's notice in writing of such action is to be given to the justice either personally or left at his abode (s. 9). 2. After notice of action given, and before it is brought, defendant (the justice) may tender amends; or, after action brought, and before issue joined, pay money into court. If no more damage proved, a verdict to pass for defendant, and the sum paid in to be paid out of court to the defendant; and if the amount exceeds the defendant's costs, the residue is to be paid to the plaintiff. If plaintiff elect to accept the sum paid in in satisfaction of damages, a judge to grant an order to that effect, and that defendant shall pay the plaintiff's taxed costs, and the action be determined (s. 11). 3. The onus of proof of due notice, of action brought within the time limited, of the cause of action stated in the notice, and that it arose in the county laid as venue, to lie on the plaintiff; in either case, if no proof, the plaintiff to be nonsuit, or a verdict for the defendant (s. 12). 4. The venue is to be laid in the county where the act complained of was committed, or, if in the county court, in the district; and the defendant may plead the general issue, and put any special matter in evidence under such plea; but no action is to be brought in any such county court if the justice object thereto, and if within six days after being served with a summons such justice, or his attorney or agent, shall give written notice (k) to the plaintiff that he objects to being sued in such court, all proceedings afterwards had in such court shall be null and void (s. 10). 5. No action to be brought for the manner in which a justice shall exercise a discretionary power given him (s. 4). (See Bassett v. Godschall, 3 Wils. 121.) 6. If a justice refuse to do an act, the Court of Queen's Bench may, by rule grounded on an affidavit of the facts, order him to do it, and no action shall be brought against him for doing it (s. 5). 7. If an action be brought where by this act it is prohibited, a judge may set aside the proceedings (s. 7). 8. For an act done by a justice in the execution of his duty as such justice, with respect to any matter within his jurisdiction, the action shall be on the case; and it shall be expressly alleged in the declaration that such act was done muliciously, and without reasonable and probable cause (s. 1). 9. For an act done by a justice without jurisdiction, or exceeding his jurisdiction (), any person injured thereby, or by any act done (k) Vide form of notice, Oke's "Magisterial Formulist," pp. 504, 505. (1) Vide ante, p. 19, for the general ingredients to give jurisdiction. In the |