circumstances comprised in the definition of the offence, by the rule of the common law or statute on which the indictment is founded. And these must be stated with clearness and certainty, otherwise the indictment will be bad. The principal rule as to the certainty required in an indictment, may, I think, be correctly laid down thus: that where the definition of an offence, whether by a rule of the common law or by statute, includes generic terms, (as it necessarily must,) it is not sufficient that the indictment should charge the offence in the same generic terms as in the definition, but it must state the species, -it must descend to particulars. Wherefore an indictment for stealing "bona et catalla" of J. S., without further describing them, by stating what goods or chattels were intended, would be bad. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 74. R. v. Powell, 1 Str. 8. So, where a person was indicted for stealing "three eggs of the value of twopence," Tindal, C. J., held the indictment to be bad, for not stating what sort of eggs they were; for all that appeared in the indictment, they might be adder's eggs or other eggs, which could not be the subject of larceny. R. v. Cox, 1 Car. & K. 494. But where a man was indicted for stealing one ham of the value of 108., of the goods and chattels of Thomas Keighway," and it was objected that the description was not sufficient, as it might be the ham of some wild animal, which would not be the subject of larceny: the judges however held it to be sufficient, for even if it were the ham of a wild animal, it might be of value, and the subject of larceny, the rule as to animals feræ naturæ applying only to the live animal. R. v. Gallears, 2 Car. & K. 981. 19 Law J. 13, m. So, where a man was indicted for stealing "one sheep," and it appeared that the animal was between nine and twelve months old, and some of the witnesses called it a sheep, some a lamb, but the jury said that in common parlance it was called a lamb; the prisoner being convicted, the judges held the conviction to be right, as the word "sheep” being general, was applicable to one of that age, whatever it might in common parlance be called. R. v. Spicer, 1 Car. & K. 699. So, where the prisoner was indicted for receiving "twenty-eight pounds of tin," and it appeared that what he had received were two lumps of tin, called in the trade ingots; and it was then objected that they ought to have been so called in the indictment: but Coleridge, J., held that they were properly described as so many pounds weight of tin; if the ingots were some article which in ordinary parlance was called by a particular name of its own, it would be improper to call it by the name of the material of which it was composed; in speaking of a piece of cloth, you could not call it so many pounds of wool, in speaking of sovereigns you could not call them so many ounces of gold; but here this is the material itself, and is properly described as so many pounds weight of tin; so in larceny of

a bar of iron, it would be properly described as so many pounds weight of iron. R. v. Mansfield, Car. & M. 140. But where a man was indicted for stealing "ten pounds in money numbered," the judges held the conviction to be wrong, because the indictment did not specify the species of coin stolen. R. v. Fry, R. & Ry. 482, but see now stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 18, post, p. 91. So, it has been holden bad, to charge a man with "speaking divers false and scandalous words" of the mayor of a town, without setting out the words. 2 Hawk. e. 25, 8. 59. So, where an indictment, at the instance of a justice of the peace, charged a defendant that "per diversa scandalosa, minacia et contemptuosa verba abusus fuit, et ipsum in executione officii sui prædicti vi et armis illicitè retardavit," and it was demurred to as being too general; on the part of the prosecutor, it was admitted that the indictment was bad as to the words, but it was argued that it was sufficiently certain as to the obstruction: the court however held that it was bad as to that also; for it was not sufficient to say generally retardavit, but the act should have been specially set out. R. v. How, 2 Str. 699. So, where a defendant was convicted on an indictment, charging him with having obtained a certain promissory note by false tokens, the court upon motion arrested the judgment, because the false tokens were not specified in the indictment. R. v. Munoz, 2 Str. 1127. So, an indictment against a constable, charging that malè et negligenter se gessit in the execution of his office, was quashed by the court of King's Bench upon motion, as being too general. R. v. Winteringham, 1 Str. 2. See also R. v. Robe, 2 Str. 999. So, an indictment charging a man with being a common defamer, vexer, and oppressor; or a common disturber of the peace; or a common deceiver of the Queen's people,-or the like,would be bad. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 59. 2 Hale, 182. See R. v. Brian et al., 1 Ad. § El. 436 m.

The following exceptions to this rule as to the certainty required in indictments, have recently been made by stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100.

1. In an indictment for murder or manslaughter, it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was caused; but it shall be sufficient in every indictment for murder, to charge that the defendant did wilfully, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder the deceased; and it shall be sullicient in every indictment for manslaughter, to charge that the defendant did feloniously kill and slay the deceased. 14 § 15 Vict. c. 100, 8. 4.

2. In an indictment for forging, uttering, stealing, embezzling, destroying, or concealing, or for obtaining by false pretences, any instrument, it shall be sufficient to describe such instrument by any name or designation by which the same may

be usually known, or by the purport thereof, without setting out any copy or fac-simile thereof, or otherwise describing the same or the value thereof. 14 § 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 5.

3. In an indictment for engraving or making the whole or any part of any instrument, matter, or thing whatsoever,-or for using or having the unlawful possession of any plate or other material upon which the whole or any part of any instrument, matter, or thing whatsoever shall have been engraved or made, or for having the unlawful possession of any paper upon which the whole or any part of any instrument, matter, or thing whatsoever shall have been made or printed,-it shall be sufficient to describe such instrument, matter, or thing by any name or designation by which the same may be usually known, without setting out any copy or fac-simile of the whole or any part of such instrument, matter, or thing. 14 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 6.

4. In all other cases, wherever it shall be necessary to make any averment in any indictment as to any instrument, whether the same consist wholly or in part of writing, print, or figures, it shall be sufficient to describe such instrument by any name or designation by which the same may be usually known, or by the purport thereof, without setting out any copy or fac-simile of the whole or any part thereof. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 7.

5. In every indictment in which it shall be necessary to make any averment as to any money, or any note of the bank of England or any other bank, it shall be sufficient to describe such money or bank note simply as money, without specifying any particular coin or bank note; and such allegation, so far as regards the description of the property, shall be sustained by proof of any amount of coin, or of any bank note, although the particular species of coin of which such amount was composed, or the particular nature of the bank note shall not be proved, and, in cases of embezzlement,—and obtaining money or bank notes by false pretences,-by proof that the offender embezzled or obtained any piece of coin or any bank note, or any portion of the value thereof, although such piece of coin or bank note may have been delivered to him in order that some part of the value thereof should be returned to the party delivering the same, or to any person, and such part shall have been returned accordingly. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 18.

In the time laid to each material fact, also, uncertainty was formerly as fatal as in the statement of the facts themselves; and therefore an indictment, charging the owner of a ferry with extorting several sums of money from several persons, between such a day and such a day, was holden void. 2 Hawk. c. 25, 8.82. But this defect, as far as respects the time laid, would now, it should seem, be cured by stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 24, ante, p. 85.

Besides uncertainty, arising from too great generality of statement, an indictment may be uncertain in other respects, and therefore bad. As, for instance, where an indictment charged a miller, in the same count, with having received two several parcels of barley, of four bushels each, to be ground at his mill, and that he delivered three bushels of oat and barley meal, other and different from the produce of the said four bushels: the indictment was holden bad for uncertainty, as not showing as to which of the parcels of barley the offence was committed. R. v. Haynes, 4 M. & S. 214.

A charge also in the alternative, charging a defendant with having done so or so,-as that he murdered or caused to be murdered, is bad for uncertainty. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 58.

Statement must not be repugnant.] One material part of an indictment, must not be repugnant to another, otherwise the indictment will be bad. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 62. Therefore if an indictment charge a man with forging an instrument by which A. was bound to B., it is bad, for A. could not be bound by the instrument if it were forged. Id. So, if an indictment for forcible entry charge that A. disseised B., and it appear on the face of the indictment that B. was not seised in fee: it is bad. Id. So, an indictment for selling iron by false weights and measures, has been holden bad for repugnancy, for it was absurd to say that it could be sold both by weight and measure at the same time. Id. 2 Ro. Abr. 18. But where an indictment charged Francis Morris as a receiver, "he the said Thomas Morris, well knowing," &c., it was holden that the words, "the said Thomas Morris," might be rejected as surplusage, and so the indictment be good. R. v. Morris, 1 Leach, 103. So where an indictment charged the defendant that he on one Henry Bennett did make an assault, " and him the said William Bennett did beat," &c., this was holden good in arrest of judgment, for the same reason. R. v. Crispin, 12 Shaw's J. P. 323.

Technical words.] In some cases certain technical words are required, such as "treasonably and against his allegiance," in indictments for treason, 2 Hawk, c. 25, s. 55. 4 Bl. Com. 307,-" murder," and "of his malice aforethought," in an indictment for murder, 2 Hawk. c. 25, 8. 60. 4 Bl. Com. 307,-" ravish," in an indictment for rape, 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 56,-" burglariously," in an indictment for burglary,-"feloniously," in an indictment for felony, 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 55. 2 Hale, 184, and the like: in these cases, no other words, nor any periphrasis whatever, would be deemed equivalent to them, and an indictment omitting them would be bad. So, an indictment upon statutes, where the definition of the offence contained in them, includes such adverbs as "unlawfully," "wilfully," "maliciously," &c., the offence must be charged

to have been committed "unlawfully," "wilfully," or 66 maliciously" accordingly, otherwise the indictment will be bad. The word "unlawfully" is not essentially necessary in indictments at common law, 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 96, although very generally used. The words, "with force and arms," were formerly always used in all indictments for offences with force, and indeed for all felonies, for a felony was deemed to include a trespass; and the words " as appears by the record” were always used, where a matter of record was pleaded but now, by stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 24, no indictment for any offence shall be held insufficient for the omission of the words, as appears by the record," or of the words, "with force and arms."

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4. Conclusion of the Indictment.

Against the peace.] All indictments, whether for offences at common law or by statute, conclude "against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity." 2 Hawk. c. 25, 8. 92. The words "against the peace of our Lady the Queen," are in all cases deemed necessary; the words "her crown and dignity" not. Id. s. 94. If the offence be committed in the reign of one King, and the offender be indicted in the reign of his successor, the indictment should conclude, against the peace of the late King; R. v. Lookup, 3 Burr. 1901; or if commenced in the reign of one King, and continued into the reign of another, it seems that a conclusion, against the peace of both Kings, would be good. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 93. By stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 24, however, no indictment shall be held insufficient, for the omissions of the words "against the peace." And the like omission was before cured by verdict, or judgment by confession, &c., by stat. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 20; which Act was holden to apply to the case of an indictment, in the reign of William the fourth, for an offence committed in the reign of George the fourth, concluding against the peace of our lord the King, &c., instead of our late lord the King. R. v. Chalmers, Ry. § M. 352, and see R. v. Scott, R. & Ry. 415.

In misdemeanors to the person or property of an individual, it is very usual to conclude " To the great damage of the said J. S. to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace" &c.; but the above words in italics are unnecessary.

Against the form of the statute.] Indictments for offences against a statute or statutes, conclude "against the form of the statute [or statutes] in such case made and provided,” and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. This is material to be observed; for where the contra