Beverley, in and for the said riding, on Tuesday the day of, in the year of the reign of our sovereign Lady Victoria, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom. of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, defender of the faith, before A. B. and C. D., esquires, and others their associates, justices of our said Lady the Queen, assigned to keep the peace in the said riding, and also to hear and determine divers felonies, trespasses, and other misdemeanors in the said riding committed,-by the oath of twelve good and lawful men of the riding aforesaid, sworn and charged to inquire for our said Lady the Queen, and for the body of the riding aforesaid, it is presented that [&c., setting out the indictment to the end.]

Although in the first of the above forms the names of the grand jurors are set out, according to the precedent from which it is taken, yet it has been holden, on error to the House of Lords, that this is not necessary. Aylett v. Rex, in error, 3 Bro. Parl. Ca. 529. I have accordingly omitted the names in the second of the above forms.

3. Body of the Indictment.

Defendant how named.] The person charged by the indictment must be described by his christian or first name, and his surname. Formerly also, his addition of place or late residence, and his addition of degree or mystery, must have been given; as-"late of the parish of, in the county of labourer," or the like; and if it were omitted, or a wrong addition given to him, he might plead the matter in abatement. But now, by stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 24, no indictment for any offence shall be holden insufficient "for want of, or imperfection in, the addition of any defendant;" and such addition may therefore be safely omitted altogether. And whether the names, or the addition (if any) given to the defendant in the indictment, be a correct description of him or not, is now immaterial; for by stat. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 19, no indictment or information shall be abated by any dilatory plea of misnomer or of want of addition or of wrong addition of the party offering such plea; but the court, if satisfied of the truth of the plea by affidavit or otherwise, shall forthwith cause the indictment or information to be amended, and shall call upon the party to plead thereto, and shall proceed as if no such dilatory plea had been pleaded. It may be necessary here to observe, that a name of dignity, as Baron, Baronet, Garter King at Arms, (2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 69,) or the like, is not an addition, but as much a part of the name of the defendant as his christian or surname. But if it be omitted, or erroneously stated, this is the subject of amendment, within the meaning of the section last mentioned.

When however it is necessary to describe the defendant in any particular way, to bring him within the purview of any statute on which the indictment is framed, such statute extending only to such persons as are named in it,—the indictment must so describe the party, as to bring him within the words and meaning of the statute, and the evidence must support the description. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 112.

In indictments against a parish or township for the nonrepair of a highway, 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 68, or the inhabitants of a county for not repairing a bridge, the indictment may be against the inhabitants of the parish, township, or county generally, without naming any individnal.

An indictment against a corporation, must charge them by their corporate names; see ante p. 8, 9; and if there be any mistake in doing so, it may be remedied by amendment as above-mentioned.

Prosecutor or party injured, how named.] The prosecutor or party injured, or any other person named in the indictment, if known, must be described with certainty; 2 Hawk. c. 25, 8. 71: if an individual, he must be described by his christian and surname; if a corporation, by their name of incorporation. But it is not necessary to give any addition of degree or mystery; 2 Hale, 182, and see R. v. Peace, 3 B. & Ald. 579; nor is it safe to do so; for where in bigamy, the second wife was described as Elizabeth Chant, widow, and it appeared in evidence that she was at the time, in fact and by reputation, a single woman, the judges held the misdescription to be fatal, although it was not necessary to have stated more than the name of the party. R. v. Deeley, R. & Ry. 303, 4 Car. & P. 579. But if the party be described by the name by which he is usually known, it will be sufficient; and therefore where the prosecutor was named in the indictment "John Hancox," his real name being John Walter Hancox, but he was usually called and known by the name of John Hancox, Parke, J. held it to be sufficient. R. v. Berriman, 5 Car. & P. 601. So, where the real name was Richard Jeremiah Pratt, but he was named in the indictment Richard Pratt, the name by which he was generally known, it was holden sufficient. Anon. 6 Car. & P. 408. So, where the prosecutrix was named in the indictment by a name which she had assumed, but by which alone she was known in the neighbourhood, the judges held it sufficient. R. v. Norton, R. & Ry. 510. So where the pro. secutor was named Charles Frederick Augustus William, duke of Brunswick, that being the name by which he was generally known, though his proper family name was D'Este: the court held that as the law in this case only required certainty to a common intent, the description was sufficient. R. v. Gregory, 10 Shaw's J. P. 262. So, if a bastard acquire a name by reputation, he may be described by it in the indictment. And

when a child was baptized by the name of Louis, and his mother's maiden name was Drake, the only name by which she was known, and the nurse to whom he was sent, spoke of him to several persons as Louis Drake,-this was holden to be evidence to go to the jury, to say whether he was not a bastard, and whether he had not acquired this name of Drake by reputation. R. v. Drake, 14 Shaw's J. P. 483. So, if the name in the indictment be spelt differently from the real and usual mode of spelling it, but be idem sonans with it, (and whether it be idem sonans seems to be a question to be left to the jury), it will be sufficient; otherwise not. R. v. Davis, 20 Law J. 207 m. But the indictment shall not be holden insufficient, because any person therein-mentioned is designated by a name of office, or other descriptive appellation, instead of his proper name. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 24.

If, however, the name of the party be unknown, he should be described as a person to the jurors aforesaid unknown;" 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 71, and see R. v. Mary Smith, 6 Car. & P. 151; but if afterwards at the trial it appear that the party is known, the defendant must be acquitted. Where the prisoner was indicted for plundering a vessel which had been wrecked, and the property was laid, in the first count, to belong to persons therein-named, and in the second count to belong to persons unknown; at the trial, the witnesses did not know the christian names of the owners, so that the first count could not be proved; and the counsel for the prosecution then proposed to rely upon the second count: but Richards, C. B., held that the defendant must be acquitted; his lordship said, "The owners it appears are known, but the evidence is defective on this point; how can I say that the owners are unknown? I remember a case at Chester, where the property was laid as belonging to a person unknown, but upon the trial it was clear that the owner was known, and might easily have been ascertained by the prosecutor; and Lord Kenyon ac cordingly directed an acquittal." R. v. Robinson, Holt, 595. So, where an indictment against an accessory before the fact to a larceny, stated the larceny to have been committed by a person unknown, and the grand jury found the bill on the evidence of a person who acknowledged that he had committed the larceny: Le Blanc, J. ordered the defendant to be acquitted. R. v. Walker, 3 Camp. 264. Where a man named Daniel Campbell was indicted for the manslaughter of a woman, who, in the first count was called Catherine Macgonnis, in the second, Catherine Campbell, and in the third, a person to the jurors unknown; and it appeared in evidence that her christian name was not known, that there was no proof of her surname being Macgennis, and the only proof of her name being Campbell, was, that the prisoner at one time stated her to be his wife, though he afterwards denied it: Erskine, J. left it to the

jury to say whether she was the wife of the prisoner, for if so, she was entitled to the name of Campbell, though not to that of Catherine, but if she was not his wife, and the jury believed that her name could not with due diligence have been ascertained, then she was a person unknown within the meaning of the third count: the jury acquitted the prisoner. R. v. Campbell, 1 Car. & K. 82. In another case, where a woman named Stroud was indicted for the murder of her illegitimate child, which in the first count was called "Harriet Stroud," and in the second as "a female of tender age, whose name is to the jurors aforesaid unknown;" the evidence was, that the child was baptized by the name of Harriet, and not Harriet Stroud; the prisoner was found guilty; but the case being reserved for the opinion of the judges, they held that she ought not to have been convicted on either count: not on the first count, because the child's name was not proved to be Harriet Stroud; and not on the second, because the child had a name, "Harriet," by which it might have been described in the indictment. R. v. Sarah Stroud, 1 Car. & K. 187. But where a woman was indicted for murdering her illegitimate child immediately after its birth, and it was neither described by any name, nor as a child whose name to the jurors was unknown: the woman being acquitted of the murder, but convicted of concealing the birth, this seeming defect in the indictment was made the subject of a motion in arrest of judgment; but Coleridge, J., held the indictment to be correct; the child being illegitimate, could have no name but by reputation, and it could not have acquired that at the time of its death; and to state in the indictment that its name was to the jurors unknown, was assuming that it had a name. R. v. Willis, 1 Car. & K. 722. And this decision was afterwards confirmed by the judges. Id.

By stat. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 14, in any indictment or information wherein it shall be requisite to state the ownership of any property whatsoever, whether real or personal, which shall belong to or be in the possession of more than one person, whether such persons be partners in trade, joint tenants, parceners, or tenants in common, it shall be sufficient to name one of such persons, and to state such property to belong to the person so named, and another or others, as the case may be; and whenever, in any indictment or information for any felony or misdemeanor, it shall be necessary to mention, for any purpose whatsoever, any partners, joint tenants, parceners, or tenants in common, it shall be sufficient to describe them in the manner aforesaid; and this provision shall be construed to extend to all joint stock companies and trustees. See R. v. Boulton, 5 Car. & P. 537. R. v. Steel, Car. & M. 337.

And with respect to the property of counties, ridings, and divisions, it is enacted, that in any indictment or information

for any felony or misdemeanor committed in, upon, or with respect to any bridge, court, gaol, house of correction, infirmary, asylum, or other building, erected or maintained in whole or in part at the expense of any county, riding, or division, or on or with respect to any goods or chattels whatsoever, provided for or at the expense of any county, riding, or division, to be used for making, altering, or repairing any bridge, or any highway at the ends thereof, or any court or other such building as aforesaid, or to be used in or with any such court or other building,-it shall be sufficient to state any such property, real or personal, to belong to the inhabitants of such county, riding, or division, and it shall not be necessary to specify the names of any such inhabitants. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 15..

And with respect to the property of parishes, townships, and hamlets, it is enacted, that in any indictment or information for any felony or misdemeanor committed in, upon, or with respect to any workhouse or poor house, or on or with respect to any goods or chattels whatsoever, provided for the use of the poor of any parish or parishes, township or townships, hamlet or hamlets, place or places,-or to be used in any workhouse or poor house, in or belonging to the same,or by the master or mistress of such workhouse or poor house, -or by any workmen or servants employed therein,-it shall be sufficient to state any such property to belong to the overseers of the poor for the time being of such parish or parishes, township or townships, hamlet or hamlets, place or places, and it shall not be necessary to specify the names of all or any of such overseers. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 16. And where goods were laid to be the property of the overseers of the poor for the time being" of the parish of K., the judges held it to be sufficient, the words "for the time being" sufficiently importing that the goods were the property of those who were overseers at the time of the theft. R. v. Went, R. & Ry. 359.

the

The guardians of the poor of a union or parish, are by stat. 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 69, made a corporation, and are called " guardians of the poor of the union, (or of the parish of

-), in the county of ;" and as such they may accept, take, and hold, for the benefit of such union or parish, any buildings, lands, or hereditaments, goods, effects, or other property, and by that name may prefer indictments; and in every such indictment relating to any such property, it shall be sufficient to lay or state the property to be that of the guardians of the union, or of the parish of - ." 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 69, s. 7. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 57, s. 16.

And in any indictment or information for any felony or misdemeanor committed on or with respect to any materials, tools or implements for making, altering or repairing any highway within any parish, township, hamlet, or place, otherwise than