the judges held that it was sufficient that these berries were poison, and that they were administered with intent to kill, to bring the case within the statute, and that therefore the conviction was right. R. v. Cluderoy, 2 Car. & K. 907. 19 Law J., 119 m. 2. That the prisoner did it, with intent to murder the prosecutor, or (where the offence is laid with intent to murder generally, without saying of whom, as mentioned in Ryan's case, supra,) with intent to murder some other person and that the poison was accidentally taken by the prosecutor. This is proved, first, by proving admissions or acts of the prisoner from which the jury may presume the intention (see ante, pp. 119, 120), and secondly, by proving the offence to have been committed under such circumstances, that if the prosecutor had died, the offence would have been murder. See ante, p. 208, &c. If it be doubtful whether the act charged against the prisoner were done wilfully, or by mistake or accident, it seems that other attempts by him upon the life of the prosecutor, may be given in evidence, to prove that it was done designedly. See R. v. Voke, R. & Ry. 531, and R. v. Dossett, 2 Car. § K. 306; ante, p. 120. to wit. 4. Attempting to administer Poison. Indictment. The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their oath present, that A. B., on the day of in the year of our Lord , feloniously did attempt to administer to one C. D., a certain poison [“ any poison or other destructive thing"] to wit, two drachms of a certain deadly poison called arsenic, with intent in so doing then and thereby feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, to kill and murder the said C. D.: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. [As to the addition of other counts, when necessary, see note to the last form, ante, p. 256. Where the prisoner was indicted for an attempt to poison, by mixing small pieces of sponge with milk, Alderson, J., held the indictment to be bad, because it did not allege that sponge was of a deleterious or poisonous nature. R. v. Powles, 4 Car. & P. 571. Felony, transportation for life, or not less than fifteen years,- —or imprisonment [with or without hard labour, s. 8] for not more than three years. 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 3. Accessories before the fact punishable in the same manner. Id. s. 7. Accessories after the fact, to be imprisoned [with or without hard labour, s. 8] for not more than two years. Id. s. 7. Evidence. To maintain this indictment, the prosecutor must prove 1. That the prisoner attempted to administer to the prosecutor the arsenic or other poison or destructive thing mentioned in the indictment; and that the attempt was unsuccessful. In Cadman's case, ante, p. 257, where the poisoning was holden not to be completed, because the poison was not actually taken into the stomach,-the offence it should seem would be punishable under this clause of the statute, as an attempt to poison. But where A. gave poison to B., with directions to administer it to C.; and B. instead of doing so, handed it over to C., telling him at the same time the instructions he had received from A.: this was holden not to be an attempt to administer the poison by A. R. v. Williams et al., 1 Car. & K.589. 2. The intent to murder, as in the last case, ante, p. 258. In R. v. Hanson (2 Car. & K. 912), where a man gave a woman a quantity of cantharides mixed in rum, which made her very ill and sick, but did not endanger her life, the counsel for the prosecution, seeing that the facts would not sustain an indictment for poisoning or attempting to poison, framed an indictment as for a misdemeanor at common law: but V. Williams, J., after conferring with Cresswell, J., held that it was no misdemeanor at common law; and the prisoner was accordingly acquitted. It is not necessary to prove that any bodily injury was effected by the attempt. See 1 Vict. c. 58, s. 3. 5. Stabbing, Cutting, or Wounding, with Intent to Murder. Indictment. The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their to wit. oath present, that A. B., on the day of in the year of our Lord with a certain [knife], which he the said A. B., in his right hand then had and held, feloniously did stab, cut, and wound ["stab, cut,or wound"] one C. D., with intent in so doing then and thereby feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, to kill and murder the said C. D.: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. [Add counts for stabbing, cutting, and wounding with intent to maim, &c., in the form, post, p. 262. Felony, death. 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2. fact, punishable in the same manner. Accessories before the after the fact, to be imprisoned [with or without hard labour, s. 8,] for not more than two years. Id. s. 7. Evidence. To maintain this indictment, the prosecutor must prove→ 1. The stabbing, cutting, or wounding, stated in the indictment. Where the indictment charged a cutting only, and the evidence was of a stabbing only, the judges held that the evidence did not support the indictment. R. v. M'Dermott, R. & Ry. 356. I have in the above form, used all the terms in the statute, "stab, and cut, and wound;" there is no objection to it in point of pleading, and in doubtful cases it may be usefully adopted; and if the prosecutor prove any one of them, he will sustain the indictment. Stabbing means a wounding with a pointed instrument; cutting, the making of an incised wound with a cutting instrument. But where the cut was made with an instrument, not originally intended for cutting, nor ordinarily used for such a purpose, and which was not in fact used by the prisoner with intent to cut the prosecutor, but rather with a design to break or lacerate his head, but which was capable of cutting, and did in fact cut his head : the prisoner being convicted, the judges held the conviction to be right. R. v. Hayward, R. & Ry. 78. So, where a man struck a woman in the face with the small claw of a hammer, and it cut her, this was holden by the judges to be a cutting, within the meaning of the statute. R. v. Atkinson, R. & Ry. 104. But a blow with a square iron bar, which inflicted a contused or lacerated wound merely, was holden not to be a cutting within the Act; R. v. Adams, 1 Russ. 728; it is however a wounding within it. "Wound" is a generic term, including not only incised wounds, but also contused wounds, where the skin is broken, no matter with what instrument or how inflicted. Where it appeared that the prisoner, upon the prosecutor's attempting to apprehend him for some offence, threw a heavy hammer at him, hit him over the eye and nose, breaking the skin on the side of the nose, to the extent of an inch and a half, from which he bled profusely; the blow was given with such force, as to cause the prosecutor to fall senseless from his horse: the judges held this to be a wound within the meaning of a former statute (9 G. 4, c. 31, s. 12,) upon this subject. R. v. Withers, Ry. & M. 294, 4 Car. & P. 446. So, where the wound was inflicted with a bludgeon which broke the skin and drew blood, Patteson, J., held it to be a wound within the meaning of the Act. R. v. Payne et al., 4 Car. & P. 558. So, where it appeared that the prisoner, in attempting to rob the prosecutor, threw him down, and kicked him in the face with great violence, cutting the skin of the face near the lip, and breaking it a little near the eye, this was holden to be a wounding. R. v. Shadbolt, 5 Car. & P. 504. So, where the prisoner struck the prosecutor twice with an air gun, at the side of a thick hat he had on his head, and inflicted a contused wound on his head, not directly with the gun, but with the hat: the prisoner being convicted, the judges held the conviction to be right. R. v. Sheard, 7 Car. § P. 846. And where the indictment stated that the prisoners, with a stick and with their feet, wounded the prosecutor, and it appeared that one of the prisoners knocked the prosecutor off his horse by a blow on the head with a hedge stake, and the others afterwards kicked him about the head and body with their feet; he was cut on the mouth, and had a severe contused wound on the head, the muscle being divided to the skull: it was contended that a wound given by a foot with a shoe on it, was not within the statute, or, even if it were, it was badly described in this indictment, which stated it to have been done with the feet only; but the judges held, that whether the wounds were inflicted with a stick or a kick from a shoe, in either case the indictment was supported; it was not necessary to state in the indictment the means or instrument by which the wound was inflicted, nor did the statement confine the prosecutor to the means stated, which might be rejected altogether as surplusage. R. v. Briggs, Ry. & M. 318. A wound however inflicted with the hands or teeth, as by beating with the fists or biting, is not within the Act. Per Patteson, J., in R. v. Harris, 7 Car. & P. 446. R. v Stevens, Ry. & M. 409. But to constitute a wounding, there must be a breaking of the skin; and not merely of the cutis or outer skin, but of the whole skin. R. v. M'Laughlin, 8 Car. & P. 635. It is immaterial however whether it be an outward or inward wound. R. v. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 173. R. v. Waltham, 13 Shaw's J. P. 183. It is immaterial also on what part of the body the wound is inflicted; per Parke, J., in R. v. Griffith, 1 Car. & P. 298; but if the nature of the wound be one of the circumstances from which the jury are to infer the intent with which the wound was inflicted, it will no doubt be most material to prove that it was inflicted near, or aimed at, a vital part. Where three men were indicted for cutting and wounding a police constable, it appeared that one of them first attacked him, and the second came and joined him in the attack, and after a while the first ran away; the constable, who had been knocked down, and was then on the ground, was endeavouring to retain his hold of the second man, when the third came up, and kicked him violently several times on various parts of the body: Tindal, C. J., held that as the third man did not come until the first had got away, he could not be found guilty upon a joint charge with the other two; he was accordingly acquitted and the other two found guilty. R. v. McPhane et al., Car. & M. 212. See ante, p. 249, as to the principals in the second degree in murder, which is equally applicable to this offence. 2. The intent to murder, as ante, p. 258. As to the verdict: By stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, which enables a prosecutor to indict as for a misdemeanor any person who shall unlawfully and maliciously cut, stab, or wound him, it is provided by sect. 5, that "If, upon the trial of any indictment for any felony, except murder or manslaughter, where the indictment shall allege that the defendant did cut, stab, or wound any person, the jury shall be satisfied that the defendant is guilty of the cutting, stabbing, or wounding charged in such indictment, but are not satisfied that the defendant is guilty of the felony charged in such indictment, then and in every such case the jury may acquit the defendant of such felony, and find him guilty of unlawfully cutting, stabbing, or wounding; and thereupon such defendant shall be liable to be punished in the same manner as if he had been convicted upon an indictment for the misdemeanor of cutting, stabbing, or wounding," [that is to say, by imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for not more than three years. Sect. 4.] As to costs, see ante, p. 186; and costs of apprehension, see ante, p. 189. 6. Stabbing, Cutting, or Wounding, with Intent to do grievous bodily Harm. Indictment. The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their oath to wit. present, that A. B., on the day of -, in the year of our Lord with a certain [knife] which he the said A. B. in his right hand then had and held, feloniously did stab, cut, and wound ["stab, cut, or wound"] one C. D., with intent in so doing then and thereby to maim the said C. D.: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. [Second count.] And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid do further present, that the said A. B., on the day and year aforesaid, with a certain other [knife] which he the said A. B. in his right hand then had and held, feloniously did stab, cut, and wound the said C. D., with intent in so doing then and thereby to disfigure the said C. D. against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her |