order that he might also affix his name to it, and without his signature the cooper had no authority to obey the order. But it was not the less. an order because the cooper had no authority to obey it. Again, assuming that the signatures of both the merchant and the clerk of the Company were necessary to make a perfect and efficient order, it would be an order by each as soon as his signature was affixed. If a promissory note were made payable to A. and B., not in partnership, or their order, so that the signature of both would be requisite to make an efficient endorsement, a party forging the endorsement of A., and uttering the instrument to B., for the purpose of procuring his signature, would be guilty of uttering a forged endorsement: (Winterbottom's case, 1 Den. C. C. R. 41, and ante, p. 37.) Upon the same principle, in this case we think that the prisoner was guilty of uttering a forged order. The next question is, whether it can be considered as an order for the delivery of goods. Now, [*876 although it is true that the quantity delivered for the purpose of tasting is very small, yet it is impossible to say that it is not an order for the delivery of some wine; and, as we cannot apply the principle of de minimis non curat lex to such a transaction, we feel bound to say that it was an order for the delivery of goods, and that the verdict of guilty was right. Conviction affirmed.

MAY SESSION, 1849.

BEFORE EDWARD BULLOCK, ESQ., COMMISSIONER.

REGINA v. ELIZA COOPER. May 12.

An indictment charged that A., intending to burthen the parish of B., did unlawfully convey a child of tender age into that parish, and in a highway there did unlawfully leave and desert the child, on the ground there, such child being of such tender age as to be unable to take care of herself:-Held bad, as not charging any criminal offence.

MISDEMEANOR. The second count of the indictment charged, that the defendant, "being an evil disposed person, and intending to injure and aggrieve the inhabitants of the parish of Barking, in the county of Essex, and unjustly to burthen the said parish with the charge and maintenance of a certain female child of very tender age, to wit, of the age of one month, whose name to the jurors aforesaid is unknown, which she the said Eliza Cooper had in her care and custody, afterwards, to wit, on, &c., with force and arms unlawfully and injuriously did take, carry, and convey the said female child which she so had in her care and custody, into the said parish of Barking, in the county of Essex, and within the jurisdiction of the said Court, and then and there in a certain open and public place and common queen's highway there, called Barley Lane, to wit, about the hour of eight in the evening of the same day, unlawfully did leave and desert the said child upon the ground of and in the said

lane, contrary to her *duty in that behalf, the said child being of *877] such tender age as aforesaid, and unable to take care of herself; against the peace," &c. The first count of the indictment alleged the child to be the prisoner's own child; but there was no evidence to show that, nor how the child came under the defendant's care and custody. Verdict-Guilty on the second count of the indictment, but not guilty on the first count.

The learned Commissioner doubted whether the second count of the indictment was sufficient in law, and reserved the case for the consideration of the Judges.

EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

BEFORE LORD DENMAN, C. J., PARKE, B., PATTESON, J., COLTMAN, J., AND VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, J. [June 2.]

This case was not argued.

Lord DENMAN, C. J.-The second count of this indictment charges no offence. It alleges that she left a child in a certain parish, she intending to burden that parish; but no ill usage of the child is charged. PARKE, B.-The indictment does not even allege that the child was settled elsewhere; and, with regard to the want of care of the child, it does not aver that the child received any damage, or was likely to do so.

PATTESON, J., COLTMAN, J., and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, J., concurred. Judgment arrested.

*878]

*AUGUST SESSION, 1849.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE ERLE.

REGINA v. HENRY SMYTHIES. Aug. 22.

A. was indicted at the Central Criminal Court for a forgery at common law. He had been on bail, and, immediately before the trial commenced, had surrendered in discharge of his bail. There was no evidence that A. had committed the forgery within the jurisdiction of that court; but, held, that he was triable there, as being "in custody" within the jurisdiction, under the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 24.

FORGERY.-The defendant was charged in the first count of the indictment with forgery at common law, in having forged a consent of Richard Soden to act as next friend to infant parties in a Chancery suit, Miles v. Miles, with intent to defraud Richard Soden; and a second count charged him with having uttered the consent, knowing it to be forged, with the like intent.

It appeared that the defendant, the infants, and Mr. Soden, all lived in Buckinghamshire, and that the uttering of the consent was by the defendant producing it before Mr. Baines, the Taxing Master, at his office in Staple's Inn, London; but there was no evidence at all to show where the forged instrument, or any part of it, was written, but evidence was given that the defendant had said that he had written it.

66

The forged instrument was as follows:

"In Chancery.

"MILES against MILES.

"I hereby consent to be next friend to the infants, for the purposes of this suit. "RICHARD SODEN."

It was proved by Mr. Soden, that he never signed the paper, but had said to the defendant, that he was very willing to do all he could for the children, but would not make himself responsible for any costs. The defendant had been on bail, and surrendered in *discharge of his bail, immediately before the commencement of the present trial.

[*879

W. H. Cooke, for the defendant, submitted, that, as to the forgery there was no evidence that it was committed within the jurisdiction of this Court, or that the defendant was in custody within the jurisdiction of the Court, he not having surrendered till the moment of trial, which would, as he submitted, not satisfy the terms of the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 24, which made persons charged with forgery triable in the jurisdiction in which they were in custody; and, with respect to the uttering, it had been held, in the case of Regina v. Boult, ante, p. 604, that the uttering of a forged instrument, which was only the subject of forgery at common law, was no offence.

Byles, Serjt., for the prosecution, contended, that the surrender of the defendant to take his trial was a sufficient custody to give the Court jurisdiction.

ERLE, J.-I am of opinion that there is evidence to go to the jury, both as to the forgery and uttering; but I will reserve the question as to the jurisdiction, if it should become necessary.

The jury found, as to the first count, that the defendant "was guilty of forgery, but that there was no evidence of its having been done within the jurisdiction of the Court; and, as to the second count-Guilty."

ERLE, J., reserved the case for the opinion of the Judges, on the questions, "First, was the defendant indicted when he was in custody, within the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 24, he not being shown to be in custody till the time of the *trial? If not, Secondly, is the uttering a forged instrument with intent to defraud, where the forgery is a misdemeanor at common law, a misdemeanor?"

[*880

Byles, Serjt., Bodkin, and Huddleston, for the prosecution.
W. H. Cooke and Robinson, for the defendant.

[Attorneys, W. C. Humphreys, and Baines.]

EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

BEFORE POLLOCK, C. B., PARKE, B., WIGHTMAN, J., PLATT, B., AND TALFOURD, J. [Nov. 20.]

Keating, for the defendant.-The forgery is not shown to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court.

PARKE, B.-Why is the conviction not good on the first count? The defendant was in custody within the jurisdiction at the time of the trial. It is exactly like the case of Regina v. Whiley.

Keating. It appears by the report of that case, in Mr. Moody's Crown Cases, vol. 2, p. 186, that the conviction was there held to be wrong.

PARKE, B.-It is erroneously reported by Mr. Moody. The conviction was held right. It was a decision of Lord Chief Justice Tindal, myself, Baron Alderson, Mr. Justice Bosanquet, Mr. Justice Patteson, Baron Gurney, Mr. Justice Coleridge, Mr. Justice Coltman, and Mr. Justice Maule.-Lord Denman thought the conviction wrong.

POLLOCK, C. B.-Lord Abinger also seems to have agreed with the majority.

*881]

*Huddleston.-In Carrington and Kirwan, (a) the case is reported as your Lordship has stated it.

PARKE, B.-That is the correct report.

-

Keating. In the present case the jury find the defendant guilty of the forgery, but not within the jurisdiction of the Court. I submit that that is a special verdict.

POLLOCK, C. B.-It is a verdict of guilty, with a memorandum as to this. A special verdict would not be argued here.

Keating. I was misled by the report in Moody's Crown Cases.(b) (a) Ante, V. 1, p. 150.

(b) In the report of the case of Regina v. Whiley, 2 M. C. C. 186, 190, it is stated that eight of the Judges held the conviction wrong; but in a corrigendum inserted on a slip (Id. p. 1), Mr. Moody directs the words "conviction wrong," to be struck out, and instead the following words to be inserted, "indictment bad per se; but all the Judges, except Lord Denman, C. J., held the objection cured by the caption, plea, &c., and the conviction good on the whole record.”

The case of Regina v. Whiley was considered at two meetings of the Judges; the one in M. T., 1840, the other in H. T., 1841. Two questions were considered by their Lordships: first, whether the indictment alone sufficiently showed jurisdiction; and secondly, if it did not, whether, when the record was made up, the jurisdiction would not sufficiently appear. Parke, B.. Alderson, B., and Maule, J., were of opinion that the indictment alone sufficiently showed juris lietion: Lord Denman, C. J., Tindal, C. J., Littledale, J., Bosanquet, J., Patteson, J., Gurney, B., Odes ridge, J., and Coltman, J., being of a contrary opinion; but all their Lordships, with the excep tion of Lord Denman, C. J., and Littledale, J., were of opinion that when the record was made up, the jurisdiction would sufficiently appear, and they therefore held the conviction right. Lei Denman, C. J., wasf a contrary opinion on this point, and Littledale, J., entertained doubts on i

PARKE, B.-That is quite wrong, which is very seldom the case with

any report of Mr. Moody's.

Judgment for the Crown on the first count.

*SEPTEMBER SESSION, 1849.

BEFORE BARON PLATT AND MR. JUSTICE VAUGHAN WILLIAMS.

[*882

A letter, written to a banker, stating that it is intended by a cracksman to burn his books and cause his bank to stop, and that, if 250l. are put in a certain place, the writer of the letter will prevent the mischief; but if the money is not put there, it will happen, is a letter demanding money with menaces within the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 8.

On a case reserved for the opinion of the judges, counsel can only argue the question stated in the case, upon the facts stated in the case, and cannot go beyond that; but if, in the statement of any such case, any material fact has been omitted, the counsel should, before the time of the argument, apply to the judge who tried the case, to have such fact inserted.

THREATENING LETTER.-The prisoner was indicted, under the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 8, for having knowingly and feloniously sent to Sir Walter Rockcliff Farquhar, Bart., and others, a letter directed to them by the names and description of Messrs. Herries, Farquhar, & Co., St. James's street, demanding money of and from them, with menaces, and without any reasonable or probable cause; against the form of the statute. The letter was as follows:

"Gentlemen,-You say that B. O. N. will accede to the terms proposed, and send part of the means to any place which may be named. You would have had an answer yesterday, but was prevented. If you act honourably with me, and not by any means deceive me, or allow any spy to watch me, I will save you or perish in the attempt, though I hazard my life in so doing. I must have means sufficient at my disposal without delay, or all will be lost. I am fully assured that 20,000l. would not cover the horrid catastrophe, which would not only stop your bank for a time, but, perhaps, for ever, as the books would be all destroyed. The match, that most dreadful and last resource, has been contemplated by the cracksman or captain of this most horrid gang, which I fervently pray to be relieved from. I have never yet, so help me God, done a deed I am afraid or ashamed of; and the only way I can privately obtain means will be the following:-At the London end of Kensington Gardens, on the Knightsbridge *side, there is a [*883 dyke slope, which divides the Gardens from the Park and a carriage road, where the roads meet as you turn to ride or drive across the bridge. It is a short distance from the first lodge where the keeper remains within the gardens. On looking up the dyke, you will see large iron pipes which convey water into the pond. A large elm-tree stands VOL. II.-72 3 B 2