and the present action was brought to recover their value. The defendant was not a sworn broker of the city.

WILDE, C. J.—I must direct the jury to find for the plaintiff in this case. There is no fact to go to the jury. The defendant is not a sworn broker, and, under 7 Geo. 2, c. 8, the contract he entered into with the plaintiff was illegal, as a gambling transaction: Child v. Maley, 8 T. R. 610. As the transaction was not legal, the defendant was not in a position to claim a lien on the shares deposited as a security. The jury, therefore, must find a verdict for the plaintiff, for the highest amount for which the shares could have been sold. Verdict accordingly.

*698]

*The learned Judge gave leave to move to enter a verdict for the defendant, or a nonsuit, if the Court above should be of opinion that the transaction was legal.

Cockburn, Gray, and Snow, for the plaintiff.
Byles, Serjt., and Jones, for the defendant.

[Attorneys-Hutson, and Brown.]

Sittings in Trinity Term.

LORD v. HALL. May 26.

Where an agent is authorized to endorse the name of his principal, he may do so by the instru mentality of a third party.

ASSUMPSIT on a bill of exchange, drawn by the defendant, and payable to one Shuttleworth, and endorsed by him to the plaintiff. Shuttleworth's wife was in the habit of arranging her husband's business, and was authorized to endorse bills, &c., in his name. She directed her daughter to endorse his name to the bill, which was the subject of this action; she did so in her mother's presence.

Humfrey, for the defendant, contended, that, on the principle "delegatus non delegare potest," Mrs. Shuttleworth could not delegate her own authority to her daughter. Hence, that the endorsement was invalid.

WILLIAMS, J., overruled the objection.-The daughter was to be considered merely as her mother's instrument, not her delegate. Had Mrs. Shuttleworth attached the signature by means of a machine, no objection could have been raised; and there was no difference between an inanimate machine and a living one. Verdict for plaintiff.

Whitehurst and Hunter, for the plaintiff.
Humfrey, for the defendant.

[Attorneys-Toulton, and Mayler.]

*Sittings at Westminster after Trinity Term, 1848.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE WILLIAMS.

(Who sat for the Lord Chief Justice.)

[*699

SMITH v. PRITCHARD and Others. June 19.

Under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95 (Small Debts Act), to take advantage of want of notice of action, it must be specially pleaded.

The High Bailiff of L., who has transferred a warrant to the High Bailiff of S., is not responsible for acts afterwards done under colour of such warrant.

CASE for trespass and false imprisonment. The action was brought against W. T. Pritchard, High Bailiff of the Lambeth County Court, W. Pritchard, High Bailiff of the Southwark County Court, and two sub-bailiffs. It appeared in evidence, that the Judge of the Lambeth County Court had ordered the son of the plaintiff to be imprisoned for twenty days, for neglecting to pay the costs of an action in that court, in which he had been unsuccessful; and a warrant for his apprehension had been put into the hands of the defendant, W. T. Pritchard. In consequence of the party not being found within his jurisdiction, and from information as to the place of his concealment, the warrant was transferred, pursuant to the 13th section of 8 & 9 Vict., to the other defendant, W. Pritchard, and by him given to the sub-bailiffs, to execute. Under colour of executing this process, the trespass and false imprisonment complained of were committed by them.

Humfrey, for the defendants, objected, first, that no notice of action had been given, as directed by the act; and, secondly, that, as to one of the defendants, W. T. Pritchard, no cause of action had been shown. He was responsible only for acts done under colour of his authority; and, when he had signed and handed over the warrant to W. Pritchard, as the act directs, his authority and responsibility ceased.

*Byles, Serjt., for the plaintiff, contended, as to the first point, that, unless the want of notice of action was pleaded, the defend- [*700 ants could not take advantage of it; and, as to the second point, that the 33d section of the act made the high bailiff responsible for all acts and defaults of himself and of all bailiffs employed under him.

WILLIAMS, J., overruled the objection as to want of notice; as to the second point, he was of opinion that the defendant, W. T. Pritchard, was not liable. What was done at Southwark, under authority of the transferred warrant, would not affect the High Bailiff of Lambeth. The duties of high bailiffs might be taken to be analogous to those of sheriffs.

The learned Judge gave Byles leave to move the Court above, as to

the second part.

As to W. T. Pritchard-Verdict for the defendant.
As to others-Verdict for the plaintiffs.

Byles, Serjt., and Bovill, for the plaintiff.

Humfrey and Harman, for the defendants.

[Attorneys-Lofts & Potter, and Dean.]

*701]

*HARGRAVE v. HARGRAVE. June 22.

Where the legitimacy of a party was the question in dispute, and a witness deposed to certain expressions of the mother, tending to bastardize the child:-Held, that the evidence was admissible.

THIS was an issue, sent down by the Master of the Rolls, to try the legitimacy of the plaintiff—whether or not he was the child of John Hargrave, by Mary his wife. The parties had been living separate for several years, but not altogether without possibility of access. In the course of the cause, a witness deposed, that when she first discovered the existence of the plaintiff, then a child, Mary Hargrave, his mother, begged her, on her knees, to conceal his existence from her husband.

Wilkins, Serjt., for the plaintiff, objected to this evidence being received, on the ground that it was contrary to the rule of law, that the statements of a parent tending to bastardize his issue cannot be given in evidence. The objection, however, was overruled by the Court.

Verdict for the defendant. Butt, Wilkins, Serjt., Greenwood, and Pullen, for the plaintiff. Channell, Serjt., Byles, Serjt., Adolphus, and Wilkins, for the defendant.

[Attorneys-C. Fiddley, Smith, and Wiltham & Co.]

*702]

*Sittings at Guildhall after Trinity Term, 1848.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE WILLIAMS.

(Who sat for the Lord Chief Justice.)

GRAHAM and Another v. COX and Another. July 10.

1st. A written acknowledgment of a loan, accompanied by an undertaking to repay it, cannot be read in evidence, unless stamped as a promissory note.

2d. In an action by assignees, proof that a check for a certain sum in defendant's favour was drawn by the bankrupts upon their bankers, and that the amount thereof was placed by

their bankers to the defendants' credit, no evidence to go to the jury of a loan of money to the defendants by the bankrupts.

DEBT.-The plaintiffs in this action were the assignees of the Tring, Reading, and Basingstoke Railway Company, which was formed in the course of the year 1845, and became bankrupt in October, 1846. The defendants were members of the Stock Exchange. The action was brought to recover the sum of 6,300l., alleged to have been lent by the Company to the defendants, with interest. A document, which contained an acknowledgment of the loan by the defendants, and an undertaking to repay it with interest at the rate of 51. per cent. per annum, and which was stamped as an agreement, was tendered in evidence to prove the loan.

Channell, Serjt., for the defendants, objected to the instrument being read, on the ground that it ought to have been stamped as a promissory

note.

The learned Judge held, that the objection was good, and that the document could not be read.

Evidence was then given that the chairman of the Company, the Hon. Henry Berkley, and the directors, had drawn a check upon the bankers of the Company, in favour of the defendants, for the sum of 6,300l., the amount sued for in this action; and also, that the defendants' bankers had placed the amount of the check to their credit.

Channell, Serjt., contended, that there was no evidence to go to the jury of any loan to the defendants. The *point to be proved was, that [*703 the check, which had been drawn by the directors of the Company, described a loan to the defendants; of this there was no evidence what

ever.

Byles, Serjt., for the plaintiffs, submitted that, under the circumstances, and in default of any evidence that the check was given for any other purpose, the facts proved amounted to some evidence of a loan to the defendants by the Company. If so, the case must go to the jury. WILLIAMS, J., was of opinion that he ought to direct a verdict for the defendants.

There was no evidence of any loan.

Byles, Serjt., and Dowling, Serjt., for the plaintiffs.

Nonsuit.

Channell, Serjt., Willes, and C. L. Pollock, for the defendants.
[Attorneys-Joyce, and Dod.]

Sittings at Westminster after Michaelmas Term, 1848.

BEFORE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE WILDE.

FLOWER v. SHAW, Esq., and Others. Dec. 4.

In debt by payee against makers of a banker's check, in which the defendants pleaded that they did not make the check, the defendants' signatures were admitted, but it was opened for

the defendants, that the defendants, who were directors of a company, of which the plaintiff was secretary, kept blank checks, with their signatures to them, in a book, and that this check was one of those filled up by the plaintiff without authority. The judge intimated, that this would be a forgery, even though the whole sum the check was drawn for was due to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's counsel elected to be nonsuited, and the judge ordered the check to be impounded in the hands of the associate, but would not order the plaintiff to be taken into custody, as no evidence of any forgery had been given, and the whole matter rested on the statement of counsel only.

DEBT by the plaintiff, as payee, against the defendants, as makers of a check upon a banker for 7841. 108.: Second count for work and labour. Pleas, First, that the *defendants did not make the *704] check. Secondly, that it was obtained by fraud. Thirdly, that it was given by the defendants to the plaintiff by mistake; and, Fourthly, to the second count, never indebted.

The signatures of the defendants to the check were admitted, and the check was put in and read.

It was opened by Whitehurst, for the defendants, that the plaintiff had been secretary to the Cattle Insurance Association, of which the defendants were directors; and that the defendants as directors signed blank checks in a book, which checks were to be filled up afterwards; and the defendants had signed this check in blank in the book which contained eighty-two blank checks so signed; and that the plaintiff had filled it up in favour of himself, without the authority of the defendants: the body of the check being in his handwriting, and nothing being writ ten on the counterfoil.

WILDE, C. J.-If the plaintiff took the check from the book in blank, and filled it up without authority, that is a forgery; and the fact, that all the money was really due to him, makes no difference.

Byles, Serjt., for the plaintiff.-As I am not at all prepared to meet this statement, and it comes on me by surprise, I shall elect to be nonsuited. Nonsuit. Whitehurst asked the Lord Chief Justice to order that the check should be impounded in the hands of the Associate.

Byles, Serjt., objected to the check being impounded.

*705]

WILDE, C. J.-Impounding the check only amounts to *this: that it shall be sure to be forthcoming at a future time when it may be wanted.

Whitehurst asked the Lord Chief Justice to order the plaintiff to be taken into custody.

WILDE, C. J.-I shall not do that, as no evidence has been given before me of any forgery whatever: it all rests on Mr. Whitehurst's statement, made from his instructions.

The check was kept by Mr. Claude Wilde, the Associate.(a)

(a) As to the mode of proceeding where the jury, on a trial at Nisi Prius, find by their verdict that a felony has been committed, see the case of Prosser v. Rowe, 2 C. & P. 421, and the notes to that case.