Woolsey agt. Judd and others. our judgment, the whole controversy turns. If, in the exercise of a power that courts of equity in similar cases have been accustomed to exercise, we may grant the injunction that is prayed for, we do not at all doubt that it will be our duty to grant it. We must, therefore, of necessity consider and determine the question, whether, upon the face of this complaint, and according to the established doctrine of equity, the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for. 1 The complaint does not aver that the letter of the plaintiff, to which it refers, has any value as a literary production, or that he will sustain any pecuniary damage, or any injury in his reputation or feelings from its threatened publication. It raises, therefore, the naked question, whether a court of equity is bound, or has power, to restrain, by injunction, the publication of private letters, in all cases in which it is alleged that the publication is about to be made without the consent, and contrary to the wishes, of the writer? The question is one of more than ordinary interest, and we have felt that it deserved to be examined with more than ordinary care. We believe that few, who reflect upon the mischievous consequences which would certainly result from the unrestrained and frequent publication of private and confidential letters, will dissent from the opinion that it is highly desirable, looking to the best interests of society, that courts of equity should possess and firmly exercise the jurisdiction which is questioned. Our own views and feelings, we do not hesitate to declare, correspond entirely with those which Mr. Justice STORY, in the most elaborate and useful of his works, has very forcibly expressed. We agree with him, that the unauthorized publication of such letters, "unless in cases where it is necessary to the vindication of the rights or conduct of the party against unjust claims or imputations, is, perhaps, one of the most odious breaches of private confidence, of social duty, and of honorable feelings which can well be imagined. It strikes at the root of that free interchange of advice, opinions and sentiments, which seems essential to the well-being of society, and may involve Woolsey agt. Judd and others. whole families in great distress from the public display of facts and circumstances which were reposed in the bosom of others. in the fullest and most affecting confidence that they should remain forever inviolable secrets." (2 Story's Equity Jur., § 946.) But, although, with Mr. Justice STORY, we cannot do otherwise than condemn a practice which springs from the motives, and leads to the consequences which he has depicted, and which, from the feelings of resentment it is calculated to proyoke, is dangerous to the peace as well as the morals of the community, we must not be understood to assert that these considerations are alone sufficient to justify the interposition of a court of equity. It is not necessary to deny, that upon these grounds alone the jurisdiction of the court cannot safely be placed. A court of equity is not the general guardian of the morals of society. It has not an unlimited authority to enforce the performance or prevent the violation of every moral duty. It would be extravagant to say that it may restrain, by an injunction, the perpetration of every act which it may judge to be corrupt in its motives, or demoralizing, or dangerous in its tendency. We advance no such doctrine, and we fully admit that an injunction can never be granted, unless it appears that the personal legal rights of the party who seeks the aid of the court, are in danger of violation; and as a general rule, that the injury to result to him from such violation, if not prevented, will be irreparable. It must be shown that a right is endangered which the law defines and is bound to protect, and that the mandate of the court is its only adequate protection; but when, by proof of these facts, the jurisdiction is established, we cannot doubt that considerations of public good and public policy, may furnish motives, and powerful motives, for its prompt and effectual exercise. They may invest the legal right with an importance and dignity that would not otherwise belong to it, and convert the protection of a single individual into an extensive public benefit. It being conceded that reasons of expediency and public Woolsey agt. Judd and others. policy can never be made the sole basis of civil jurisdiction, the question, whether upon any ground the plaintiff can be entitled to the relief which he claims, remains to be answered; and it appears to us that there is only one ground upon which his title to claim, and our jurisdiction to grant, the relief can be placed. We must be satisfied, that the publication of private letters, without the consent of the writer, is an invasion of an exclusive right of property which remains in the writer, even when the letters have been sent to, and are still in the possession of his correspondent. If this legal right can be shown to exist-it seems evident that it is only by an injunction that it can be protected from invasion. The rule laid down by Lord ELDON in Southey agt. Sherwood, we apprehend is universal, that an injunction will be granted whenever it is necessary to prevent the unauthorized use of that which is the exclusive property of another. (2 Merivale, 437.) We commence the inquiry into the existence of the legal right which we have stated is necessary to be proved, with observing, that there is probably no doctrine which, in general, is more fully sustained, and, indeed, established by authority, than that the author of an unpublished manuscript has an exclusive right of property therein at common law a right which entitles him to determine for himself, whether the manuscript shall be published at all; and in all cases to forbid its publication by another; and it is equally certain, that whenever this exclusive right is in danger of being violated, a court of equity is bound, upon the application of the author, to prevent the wrong by a perpetual injunction; so far, there is no controversy. The language of text writers is uniform and positive; the decisions numerous and express. (Forrester agt. Waller, cited 2 Brown P. C., Tompkin's ed., p. 138, and by Lord MANSFIELD, 4 Burr, 2320; Webb agt. Rose, id; Donaldson agt. Beckett, 4 Burr, 2408; Duke of Queensbury agt. Shebbeare, 2 Eden Ch. R., 329; Southy agt. Sherwood, 2 Merivale, 434; Wheaton agt. Peters, 8 Peters' S. C. R., 591; Eden on Injunctions, 295, 296; 2 Story Eq. Jur., § 943; Curtis on Copyright, pp. 84, 150, 159.) Nor has this common law right Woolsey agt. Judd and others. been taken away or abridged by the statutes that have been. passed for the protection of copyright, in the ordinary sense of the term. Its existence is prior to these statutes, and independent of their provisions. In the great case of literary property, (Donaldson agt. Beckett, 2 B. P. C., 130; 4 Burr, ut sup.,) in which it was finally determined by the house of lords, that the perpetual right of authors in their published works, if it existed at all at common law, was taken away by the statute of Anne, and reduced to the period which the statute allows; it was affirmed by all the judges, with a single exception, not only that an author has, at common law, the sole right and dominion over his own manuscript; but that this established right was not changed or affected by the provisions of the statute. The right is still absolute and exclusive; and so long as the manuscript may exist unpublished, and its author or his representatives may choose, perpetual. What then is the foundation at common law of this exclusive right? Does it exist only when the manuscript is intended to be published? or does it depend upon its pecuniary value or intrinsic merits as a literary composition? To each question, we think, the reply may be confidently given, certainly not. In none of the cases is there any reference to these circumstances, or any of them, as necessary to be averred or proved, in order to establish the rights of the author or the jurisdiction of the court; and in some, the admitted facts repel the supposition that such proof could be required. In Webb agt. Rose, where the injunction was granted to restrain the publication of certain drafts of settlements and other conveyances, which had been stolen by a clerk from the office of a conveyancer, and sold to a bookseller-the drafts were used in the office as forms and precedents, and there is no reason to suppose that they were meant to be published, either by the conveyancer who prepared them, or his representative who brought the suit. Their sole value, probably, consisted in their exclusive possession and use. In Forrester agt. Waller, it does not appear that the notes of decisions to which the injunction related, were written with Woolsey agt. Judd and others. any view to their future publication. It would seem that they were taken by Mr. Forrester for his own private use; and it is doubtless for this reason that Lord EDON says, that the decision in this case certainly applies to private letters. Swanston, p. 426.) (2 We, therefore, agree entirely with the able author of the American treatise on the law of copyright; that the exclusive right of an author in a manuscript yet unpublished, rests upon the same foundation as that which sustains every other species or description of property. Its sole foundation is "the right which every man has to the exclusive possession and control of the products of his own labor." (Curtis on Copyright, p. 84.) We can perceive no reason for doubting that the exclusive property of an author rests exactly upon the same ground as that of a manufacturer or artist-a painting may be a wretched daub—a statute, a lamentable abortion; yet, should either be purloined by an enemy with the view to secure profits to himself, or to disgrace the artist by its public exhibition, a court of equity would renounce its principles should it refuse to protect the owner, the unfortunate artist, by a peremptory injunction. Such being the true foundation of the exclusive right of an author before publication; the next inquiry is, into the nature and extent of his right. And it is assuredly a great mistake to suppose that it is confined to the material on which his manuscript is written; and that it is only because he is owner of the paper that a court of equity interferes for his protection. This is so far from being true, that had he no other right of property than in the paper, we hold it to be certain that a court of equity would not interfere at all; and we affirm with confidence, that no case is to be found in which the court has interfered upon this ground. Merely as owner of the paper, an action at law, in which the measure of damages would be the value of the material, would afford him a full and adequate remedy, and to this remedy he would undoubtedly be left. The exclusive right, which alone a court of equity is bound to protect, and which, from its nature, can only be protected by an injunction, is his right of property in the words, thoughts |