Wynhammer agt. The People. 8th. That it does not appear but that the liquor sold by the defendant was authorized to be sold by the statute as above referred to. The court overruled these objections, and the defendant excepted. The defendant's counsel then offered to prove that the liquor sold by him was imported into this state from foreign countries under the revenue laws of the United States, and that the legal duties had been paid thereon; that the defendant purchased said liquors from the importers in the imported packages; and that the same was drawn from such packages and sold to the persons and at the times proved by the witnesses for the people. The counsel for the people objected to this evidence as immaterial. The court sustained the objection, and the defendant excepted. The defendant's counsel then offered to prove that the liquor sold by him was owned by him on and before the third day of July, 1855. The counsel for the people objected to this evidence as immaterial, the court sustained the objection, and the defendant excepted. The evidence being closed, the counsel for the defendant requested the court to direct the jury to acquit the defendant on each and all of the grounds before stated by him. The court refused so to charge, and the defendant excepted. The jury, under the charge of the court, rendered a verdict of guilty; whereupon the court proceeded to render judgment pursuant to the statute, and the defendant sued out a writ of error to this court. F. J. FITHIAN, for plaintiff in error. By the court-GREENE, Justice. All the exceptions taken by the defendant to the rulings of the court below, on the motion to quash the indictment for irregularity, and on the trial Wynhammer agt. The People. of the issue joined on the challenge to the array, are improperly incorporated in the bill of exceptions. Bills of exceptions in criminal cases were unknown to the common law. The right to a bill of exceptions in such a case is given by statute. Its office is to bring up for review questions of law made and decided on the trial. But the statute, which gives the right, limits it to exceptions taken ́on the trial of the main issue. It is not extended to such as are taken on the trial of preliminary or collateral questions. (2 R. S. 736, § 21; The People agt. Freeman, 4 Denio, 21, per Beardsley, J.) It will, therefore, be unnecessary to examine the various questions raised by these exceptions, as our conclusion on them either way could not affect the result. The same answer must be given to many of the questions suggested by the exceptions taken on the trial of the main issue, and discussed on the argument. The facts proved on the trial do not raise the questions; and any opinion which we might express upon them would be the mere result of gratuitous specluation upon questions in which the defendant has no legal interest. The indictment was for selling brandy (not being liquor the sale of which was authorized by the laws of the United States) to persons not authorized to sell liquor by the act under which the indictment was found. The prosecution proved several sales, by the defendant, of brandy at his bar, in quantities less than one pint, which was drank on his premises. The defendant offered to prove that the brandy sold by him was imported from foreign countries under the revenue laws of the United States; that the duties had been paid thereon; that he purchased it from the importer in the packages in which it was imported, and that it was drawn from those packages, and sold by him, as proved on the trial. The evidence was rejected as immaterial, and the defendant excepted. He also offered to prove that the liquor in question was owned by him on and before the third day of July, 1855. This evidence was rejected on the same ground, and the defendant excepted. Two questions of law arise on these facts and exceptions: 1st. What is the extent of the prohibition upon the sale of [Wynhammer agt. The People. liquor, contained in the first section of the act, as it is qualified by the second and other sections? and, 2d. Is that prohibition a valid legislative act? That part of the first section that bears upon these questions is in these words: "Intoxicating liquors, except as hereinafter provided, shall not be sold by any person, for himself or any other person, in any place whatsoever." Then follow divers provisions prohibiting the giving away or keeping such liquor, except in certain specified places, which provisions, as they have no bearing upon the questions above stated, require no examination. The last clause of the section is in these words: "This section shall not apply to liquor the right to sell which is given by any law or treaty of the United States." The second section provides that certain persons, on complying with its provisions, "may keep for sale, and may sell, intoxicating liquor and alcohol, for mechanical, chemical, or medicinal purposes, or wine for sacramental use." The twenty-second section contains several provisions in relation to the construction of the act, and among others a provision that nothing in the act shall be construed so as to prevent "the importer of foreign liquor from keeping or selling the same in the original packages, to any person authorized by this act to sell such liquor." These provisions embody all the prohibitions and exceptions material to the questions under consideration contained in this act. It will be observed, that the act contains no provisions excepting any liquor specifically from the operation of the prohibitory clause. The exception in the first section relates to "liquor, the right to sell which is given by any law or treaty of the United States." No law or treaty of the United States has been cited, and I am not aware that any exists, expressly giving the right to sell any specific liquor. But there are divers laws and treaties providing and stipulating for the admission of foreign liquors into the United States, upon certain terms pre Wynhammer agt. The People. scribed by such laws and treaties. These laws and treaties. were enacted and entered into in pursuance of the power conferred upon congress by the constitution of the United States, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. (Art. 1, § 8.) In the case of Brown agt. The State of Maryland, (12 Wheat.) it was held, by the supreme court of the United States, that an act of that state requiring importers to take out a license to sell imported merchandise, was repugnant to the provision of the constitution of the United States prohibiting the states from laying duties on imports. Chief Justice MARSHALL, in the same case, held, that an importer of foreign merchandise, who had imported the same under the revenue laws of the United States, acquired a right under such laws to sell the imported article in the state and condition in which it was imported; that the law of Maryland was a regulation of foreign commerce, and, as such, was in conflict with the revenue laws of the United States. Justice THOMPSON dissented from the position taken by the Chief Justice, and insisted upon the right of the state to levy the license tax, as a legitimate exercise both of its power of taxation and its power to regulate its own internal trade; holding that the importer acquired no right under the laws of the United States to sell the imported article independent of state regulation. In the cases of Pierce agt. The State of New-Hampshire, Thurlow agt. The State of Massachusetts, and Fletcher agt. The State of Rhode Island, commonly known as the "license cases," (5 How. S. C. R.,) the question as to the right of the states to regulate and prohibit the sale of liquors, the importation of which was authorized by the laws of the United States, was brought before the same court. The statute of Massachusetts, under which one of the cases originated, made it unlawful for any person to sell intoxicating liquor, without a license, in quantities less than twenty-eight gallons. The law also contained an express provision, that the select-men, in whom the Wynhammer agt. The People. power to grant licenses was vested, should not be compelled to grant any licenses. The statute of New-Hampshire prohibited the sale of liquor in that state in any quantity without a license. The law of Rhode Island contained provisions similar to those contained in the law of Massachusetts. The defendants were indicted and convicted in the state courts for violations of these laws; and the judgments, being affirmed by the supreme courts of the states respectively, were carried by writs of error to the supreme court of the United States. In that court it was contended, on the authority of Brown agt. Maryland, that the laws were void, on the ground that the laws of the United States authorized the importation of the liquor sold by the defendants in those cases,—(which liquor had been actually imported,)—and that the state laws were in conflict with those of the United States. The liquor sold by the defendant in the New-Hampshire case was imported from Massachusetts; and it was contended that the law of that state was repugnant to the provision of the constitution authorizing congress to regulate commerce among the states. But the court held that the laws of the states must be construed as applying exclusively to the domestic trade in liquor; that they had no application to imported liquor in the hands of the importer; that they did not interfere with his right to sell in the original packages, as laid down in Brown agt. Maryland, and were not, for that reason, in conflict with the laws of the United States, under which the liquor was imported. In the New-Hampshire case, it was held that the state law was a regulation of commerce "among the states," within the meaning of the constitution, and so within the power of congress; but the law was sustained on the ground that the powers of congress and the state legislature were concurrent; and that as congress had passed no law regulating commerce among the states, the state law was valid until congress passed some law conflicting with the provisions of the state law. Chief Justice TANEY, in these cases, reiterated the doctrine laid down by Chief Justice MARSHALL in Brown agt. Mary |