question having arisen as to the decree to be made against him under this Order, Wigram, V. C., said, "You will take a decree absolute in the first instance. I have been told by two of the Registrars that there has been a doubt upon the 44th of the New Orders, whether the decree upon default at the hearing is not to be taken as in the case of a bill taken pro confesso. The difference between a decree made on default and one on a bill taken pro confesso is, that in the one case the plaintiff must take such a decree as by the pleadings and evidence he may be entitled to; in the other case, the bill being taken as true, it would be very odd if he should take a wrong decree." (Browne v. Smith, 5 Jur. 1195). CHAPTER XLIX. DECREE BY CONSENT. THE ordering part of a decree by consent commences thus:-"The Court doth by consent order" &c. Sometimes the decree is stated to be by consent generally, sometimes by consent of counsel, sometimes by consent of parties, or their clerks in Court, certified by their signing the registrar's book. (Seton on Decr. 374). A decree by consent of counsel cannot be set aside, either by rehearing or appeal; (Ib.; Bradish v. Gee, Amb. 229, Mr. Blunt's ed., and cases there cited); nor, as it should seem, by a bill of review; (Webb v. Webb, 3 Swanst. 658). In the case cited, Lord Nottingham, after stating the circumstances, says: "After all this, the father brought a bill of review to reverse this decree, but I immediately dismissed the bill and would hear no more of it; for there can be no error in a decree by consent, consensus tollit errorem: there can be no injury in a decree by consent, volenti non fit injuria;" (and see Smith v. Turner, 1 Vern. 274; Anon. 1 Ves. jun. 93). Counsel must determine for themselves on their authority to consent. (Mole v. Smith, 1 Jac. & Walk. 673). A party is bound by the consent of counsel, though they had no instructions to consent, if they were at the time apprised of all those facts of which the knowledge was essential to the proper exercise of their discretion; but he will, upon terms, be relieved from an order made by such consent, if they gave that consent in ignorance of material circumstances. (Furnival v. Bogle, 4 Russ. 142). If the party did not in fact consent, his remedy is against the counsel; (Bradish v. Gee, Amb. 229); if the decree was obtained by fraud, the party may be relieved against it, not by rehearing or appeal, but by original bill. (Ib.). Where counsel for the same party was instructed by different solicitors, one instructing him to consent to, the other to oppose a petition, it was ordered to stand over, that the authority of the solicitors might be verified. (Butterworth v. Clapham, 1 Jac. & W. 673, n.). Where a person, not a party to the suit, is interested in a question, and appears by counsel, and submits to be bound by the decision, the Court will not hear him without the consent of the other parties. (Bozon v. Bolland, 1 Russ. & M. 69). In the case of infants, the Court does not usually make a decree by consent, without a previous inquiry whether it will be for their benefit; (Wall v. Bushby, 1 Bro. C. C. 488); but if made without inquiry, the infants are bound. (S. C., and see Anon. Freem. 127). Counsel for an infant heir may decline taking an issue. (Levy v. Levy, 3 Madd. 245). See further Butterfield v. Butterfield; (1 Ves. sen. 133; Belt's Supp. 83; Hibbert v. Hibbert, 3 Mer. 682; Wood v. Griffith, 19 Ves. 551; S. C. 1 Mer.38; Bernal v. The Marquis of Donegal, 3 Dow. 146; Buck v. Fawcett, 3 P. W. 242). CHAPTER L. DECREE ON CONSENT OF FEME COVERT. Form. THE form of the decree is as follows:- Whereupon and upon debate of the matter, and hearing the testator's will, &c., read, and what was alleged, &c., and the plaintiff Jane Heylin, being now present in Court, and examined, consenting that her share of the said New South Sea Annuities shall be transferred to Edward Heylin her husband, his Honor doth order and decree, that, &c. The wife is as much bound by the decree as a feme sole, and is not, like an infant, entitled to a day to shew cause against it. (Burke v. Crosbie, 1 Ball & Beat. 502; Mallock v. Galton, 3 P. W. 352). The word "desiring" is sometimes added. (Hand's Prac. 219; Willatts v. Clay, 2 Atk. 67, n.). The Court cannot refuse to take a married woman's consent, if she persist. (Wright v. Rutter, 2 Ves. jun. 677). Her consent will not be taken till the amount of the fund is ascertained (Jernegan v. Baxter, 6 Madd. 32; Godber v. Lawrie, 10 Price, 152); but will be dispensed with where the sum is under £200, or £10 a-year. (Elworthy v. Wickstead, 1 Jac. & Walk. 69). CHAPTER LI. THE MASTER. 1. Form of the Report, 373. 2. Master's Report, 379. 8. Taxation of Costs, 388. 4. Evidence before the Mas- 10. Effect of the 5. Prosecution of the Decree in Master ter, 383. becoming incapacitated, 389. By the 48th Order (C. & L.) it is ordered, “That ' in the reports made by the Masters of the Court, 'no part of any state of facts, charge, affidavit, de 'position, examination, or answer, brought in or ' used before them, shall be stated or recited. But such state of facts, charge, affidavit, deposition, 'examination, or answer, shall be identified, specified, and referred to, so as to inform the Court 'what state of facts, charge, affidavit, deposition, examination, or answer, were so brought in or 'used." This order,-it would be difficult to assign any good reason why, has been singularly misunderstood in some of the Masters' Offices. In a case before Wigram, V. C., (Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare, 91), it had been referred to the Master to inquire who was on the 23rd July, 1832, entitled to the bond which was the subject of the suit, and the money received thereon; and how such person became so entitled; and how it came into the possession of A. B. The Master by his report certified, that he had examined witnesses; and he stated their depositions, and found that the bond came into the possession of A.B. under the circumstances stated in the evidence and depositions thereinbefore referred to. Upon this report his Honor made the following observations: "I take this occasion to observe, that I have great difficulty in understanding how the misapprehension can have arisen which is said to exist in the Masters' Offices respecting the object and effect of the 48th Order. When the Court sends a case to the Master for inquiry as to the circumstances under which a transaction took place, the object of the Court is, that the Master may (as far as he can) find facts on the face of the report on which the Court may afterwards act, as it would do upon a |