scribing any particular passage which is impertinent, it is sufficient to state it as extending from a specified word in a given folio to a specified word in another folio; but the exception will be overruled if it include any one passage which is not impertinent, for the object of this order might be completely avoided if a party were left to file sweeping general exceptions, and take the chance of succeeding on some small portion of a vast mass of matter. (Wagstaff v. Bryan, 1 R. & M. 30). And under the latter it has been held, that it is too late to except to an answer for impertinence when the time has expired, after which the answer is to be deemed sufficient. (Jeffrey v. M'Cave, 1 Russ. & M. 739).

SECTION 2.

Abandonment of the Order of Reference. By the 12th L. & B., it is ordered, "That 'when any order is made for referring an answer 'for insufficiency, or for referring an answer or ' other pleading or matter depending before the 'Court for scandal or impertinence, the order shall

(

be considered as abandoned, unless the party ob'taining the order shall procure the Master's report within a fortnight from the date of such order, or ' unless the Master shall within the fortnight certify that a further time, to be stated in his certificate, is necessary, in order to enable him to make a satisfactory report; in which case the order shall be considered as abandoned, if the report be not obtained within the further time so stated; and

'where such order relates to alleged insufficiency in 'an answer, such answer shall be deemed sufficient 'from the time when the order is to be considered 6 as abandoned."

SECTION 3.

Exceptions to the Master's Report.

If either party be dissatisfied with the Master's report, he may except to it, and the exceptions must be argued and decided upon before the defendant can be called upon for his answer. A party may take exceptions to the Master's report of impertinence at any time before the impertinent matter is actually expunged; and the practice in this respect is not altered by the 22nd B., inasmuch as it provides that impertinent matter shall not be expunged until the expiration of four days from the filing of the report," in order that the adverse party may have an opportunity of filing exceptions to such report.' (Evans v. Owen, 2 My. & Kee. 382). The Master having allowed all the exceptions taken to a bill for impertinence, the plaintiff took one general exception to the report, alleging that the Master ought not to have found the bill impertinent in all the points excepted to. The exception will be supported, if the Court thinks that the Master ought to have allowed one of the exceptions. (Woods v. Woods, 10 Sim. 197). Where a number of exceptions to an answer allowed by the Master are enumerated seriatim, and the defendant takes one general exception to the Master's report, alleging that all the before

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mentioned exceptions ought to have been disallowed; if the Court is of opinion that the Master was right in allowing any one of the exceptions, the general exception to the Master's report covers too much, and will be overruled. (Pearson v. Knapp, 1 My. & Kee. 312).

According to the old practice, where the report was against the bill, and not excepted to, the defendant, on the report being filed, was entitled, on a motion of course, to have a reference back to the Master, to expunge the matter reported to be impertinent or scandalous, and to tax the defendant's costs. In consequence of this order, the clerk in court who filed the record attended with it before the Master, who struck his pen through the scandalous or impertinent words, setting his initials against the part so expunged. Generally it is necessary that exceptions should be founded upon objections previously taken before the Master, but this was not so with exceptions to the Master's report of impertinence. Even after the order to expunge had been obtained, exceptions might be taken at any time before the matter alleged to be scandalous or impertinent had been actually expunged; but in that case it was necessary to make an application to the Court to suspend or discharge the order to expunge. (Mortimer v. West, 3 Swanst. 230; David v. Williams, 1 Sim. 17). But now, by the 22nd B., all orders to refer an answer or other pleading or matter depending before the Court for scandal or impertinence, shall contain a direction to the Master to expunge any such scan

dalous or impertinent matter as he shall certify to be contained therein, and which shall have been the subject of the reference, and the Master shall be at liberty, without further order, to tax the costs of such reference and consequent thereon, and to direct by whom the same shall be paid, and the same shall be recoverable by subpœna; but such scandalous or impertinent matter shall not be expunged, nor costs taxed, until the expiration of four days from the filing of the report of such scandal or impertinence, in order that the adverse party may have an opportunity to file exceptions to such report. (See Tyrrell v. Redifer, 1 Mer. 132, for the former practice as to the costs of the reference).

SECTION 4.

What constitutes Impertinence.

It is frequently difficult to say what is or is not impertinent. The following observations may lend some assistance to the practitioner. If in an answer to an amended bill the defendant put in a complete answer instead of referring to his former answer, it may be referred for impertinence. (Hildyard v. Cressy, 3 Atk. 305). Statements in an answer to a bill of revivor, which merely shew irregularity and misconduct in the former proceedings in the suit, are impertinent; (Wagstaff v. Bryant, 1 Russ. & M. 28); but it is not impertinent for defendants, who by their answer admit the right to revive, to state further, that, since answering the original bill, they

had become bankrupt and obtained their certificates. (Langley v. Fisher, 10 Sim. 345). A schedule to an answer containing a bill of costs at length, and observations with reference to a bill formerly delivered for the same business, was considered impertinent, though the bill called upon the defendant to set forth how he computed and made out his demand, with all the particulars relating thereto, with interrogatories pointed to the particular items, and to a minute comparison of the two bills. The defendant ought to have referred to the former bill of costs. (Alsager v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 217). Where by the bill a defendant is called upon to set forth in the ordinary form, and without any limitation being suggested by the plaintiff, a schedule of deeds in his possession, it is not impertinent to state the names of the parties to the deeds, in addition to the dates and description of the estate to which they relate. (Tench v. Cheese, 1 Beav. 571). In answer to an interrogatory, Whether any further sum of money was due from the house ' of A. to the house of B., and how they made out 'the same," &c., the defendant by his answer set forth a long schedule, containing an account of all monies and transactions. This was held to be impertinent; the defendant ought merely to have answered that such a sum of money was due, and that it was due upon the balance of an account. (French v. Jacko, 1 Mer. 357, n.) So, when the bill required the defendant to set forth an account of all and every the quantities of metals and minerals dug, &c., distinguishing from which of the mines the same were