said by Lord Redesdale in Hamilton v. Houghton, 2 Bligh, 184).

the decree.

For the mode of setting aside the decree, see 1 Setting aside W. 4, c. 36, ss. 6, 7. An order for taking the bill pro confesso may be discharged on motion. (Williams v. Thompson, 2 Bro. C. C. 280; S. C. 1 Cox, 413; Attorney-General v. Young, 3 Ves. 209). As to the terms on which it will be discharged, see Heyn v. Heyn, Jac. 50; Hearne v. Ogilvie, 11 Ves. 77; Knight V. Young, 2 Ves. & Bea. 184; or the defendant let in before the Master, Bolton v. Stopford, cited 2 Ves. & Bea. 186; Heyn v. Heyn, Jac. 49; Maynard v. Pomfret, 3 Atk. 468.

SECTION 6.

Taking Bill pro confesso against a Corporation. THE mode of taking a bill pro confesso against a corporation appears to be as follows:-The subpœna to appear should be served upon the corporation, and if no appearance be entered for the corporation, a distringas should then be issued, and on the return of nulla bona the plaintiff may then move that the clerk in court may attend with the record at the hearing of the cause, in order that the bill may be taken pro confesso against the corporation. (Brickwood v. Harvey, 8 Sim. 201).

SECTION 7.

Proceedings before the Master under Bill taken pro confesso.

UPON the proceedings under a decree taking the bill pro confesso for want of an answer in a foreclosure suit, the defendant, notwithstanding he is in contempt, ought to be served with warrants to attend the Master. An order, absolute in the first instance, to confirm the report made under a decree taken pro confesso for want of an answer, is irregular. (King v. Bryant, 3 My. & Cr. 191).

Reference for Scandal or Impertinence.

IF on the perusal of the bill or answer, or any other pleading or written matter in the cause, it appear to contain matter which is impertinent or scandalous, it may be excepted to in respect of such

impertinence or scandal. For scandal and impertinence exceptions may be taken at any stage of the suit; but for impertinence only the right to except is generally waived by taking a step in the cause; and therefore, for impertinence, an answer cannot be referred after it has been replied to, nor after the plaintiff has undertaken to speed, (Barnes v. Saxby, 3 Swanst. 282, n.), nor after a reference for insufficiency. (Pellew v.. 6 Ves. 457). A defendant, after having appeared to an amended bill, obtained an order for the delivery out of Court of his papers, to enable him to prepare his answer, and after the time for answering had expired, applied to the plaintiff for names of commissioners to join in taking his Held, that he could not afterwards refer the bill for impertinence. (Beaven v. Waterhouse, 1 Beav. 58). A plaintiff took out two contemporaneous warrants, one for the Master to consider whether the defendant's examination was impertinent, and the other whether it was insufficient. Held, that the former was not waived by the latter. (Rowley v. Adams, 8 Sim. 205).

answer.

If the answer be impertinent, and also insufficient, an order should first be obtained to refer it for impertinence. Till that reference is disposed of, no reference for insufficiency can be obtained. (Thomas 14 Ves. 537, n.; and Lacy v. Hornby, 2 Ves.

V.

& Bea.293).

All references of answers of defendants for insufficiency, or for scandal and impertinence, or for impertinence, made in the same cause, must be made to the same Master; and where answers have been re

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Master.

ferred for scandal and impertinence, or for impertinence, and the Court shall afterwards refer the same for insufficiency, the latter reference must be made to the same Master as the former reference. (Gen. Ord. 10 Mar. 1818, 1 Swanst. *128).

Where, in a proceeding before the Master, the defendant, by acquiescence or omission to object, permits the other party and the Master to proceed as if he did acquiesce, he comes too late if he does not come at the first opportunity to complain of the irregularity. Thus, on a reference to the Master of exceptions for impertinence, he enlarged the time for making his report three times, and on the 19th of February reported the answer insufficient; on the 4th of March the defendant gave notice of motion to take the certificate off the file, on the ground of irregularity, and of the Master's having power to enlarge the time only once: the Court held, that, even assuming the Master's power to have been so limited, the defendant came too late, he not having previously taken the objection. (Davis v. Franklin, 2 Beav. 369).

Notwithstanding dicta to the contrary, (Coffin v. Cooper, 6 Ves. 514), it is now settled that no application can be made by a stranger to the record to refer a bill for scandal. (Anon., 4 Madd. 252). "In ' order," says Sir J. Leach, in the case last cited, 'to decide upon the scandal, the Master must be ' attended with an office copy of the bill, but a stranger to the record has no right to take an office copy of the bill; and the order, if made, might be ineffectual. Besides, the party injured does not

require the aid of this Court to remedy the injury 'done to him, he has his action at law; for if a bill ' in this Court is made the vehicle of a libel, the party libelled by the record may proceed at common law, as on any other writing. I have conversed on this 'subject with the Lord Chancellor, and he concurs in the opinion which I have expressed." A reference for scandal may be had by one defendant against another; otherwise a plaintiff and one defendant might combine together to malign another defendant. (Coffin v. Cooper, 6 Ves. 514).

By the 11th of Lord Lyndhurst's General Orders, it is directed "That no order shall be made for referring any pleading or other matter depending before the Court for scandal or impertinence, 'unless exceptions are taken in writing and signed by counsel, describing the particular passages 'which are considered to be scandalous or imper'tinent, nor unless such order be obtained within ten days after the delivery of such exceptions."

Where, in the schedule to an answer, impertinent matter was so mixed up with pertinent matter, that the one could not be separated from the other, it was held, that a general exception for matter "impertinently set forth" was rightly taken, and that the whole schedule must be treated as impertinent: and it was also held that the 11th L. & B. has not altered the practice of the Court in this respect. (Byde v. Masterman, 5 Jur. 643). An exception for impertinence must be supported in toto, or will fail altogether. (Tench v. Cheese, 1 Beav. 571). Under the last-mentioned order it has been held, that, in de

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