pass willingly, as ordered and difpofed by the moft excellent Mind and Counsel And fo we fhall never find fault with him, nor complain as if we were neglected by him. Whereas, if we imagine this to be ill done, and that to be a Mischief which befalls us, we fhall fall into murmuring against the Caufe of all thofe Things. For this is natural to all living Creatures, to fly from and avoid, with a great Averfation, both all thofe Things which they apprehend hurtful, and the Authors of them as on the other Side, to love and admire that which they apprehend profitable, and those who are the Caufe of it. Upon which Paffage another excellent Philofopher hath made

Simplicius

a notable Difcourfe, to this Sense: in cap. 38. Obferve, faith he, wherein the right

Notion of God confifts. First, That we judge him to be the firft Caufe of all Things and then that he advifes and confults for the Government of the World, and doth not let Things go at all adventure: and laftly that he difpofes of all Things, well and wifely. He therfore that either believes there is no God, the Creator of the World; or if there be, thinks that he regards nothing, and doth not exercife any Providence over his Creatures; or if he grant both thefe, yet is not fenfible that he governs all Things in the most excellent manner, agreeable to the highest Wifdom, Juftice and Goodnefs; he will never honour him nor worship him as he ought: nor will he fubfcribe to what he appoints, nor fub

mit himself to it, as proceeding from the best Judgment. No, nor will it be poffible for us to direct our Lives aright, fo that we never reproach or accufe that which is ordered by the best Mind; unless we think likewife, that thofe Things only are the Good and the Evil in which we are concerned, which are within our own Power. For if we feek our Good and Happiness in external Things, and there also imagine that our Evil and Mifery lyes; fince we cannot but be often fruftrated in our Defires to enjoy that Good, and to avoid that Evil; we fhall naturally fall into a fecret repining at the Author of thofe Things, who, when he could, would not give us the one, and keep from us the other. For all Things that have Sense in them naturally abhor that which they conceive hurtful, and einbrace, as you heard, that which they conceive moft delightful: and they are affected towards the Authors and Caufes of them, according to the Hurt or Good, which they take to be in the Things themselves. Is it not neceflary then that we rectify our Thoughts and Apprehenfions of Things? otherwife it cannot be avoided, but that he who thinks himself mifchieved and undone by any Thing, and believes God to have a Hand in all Events, should be apt to complain and have an evil Heart towards him. He will never delight in him, that is the Caufe of his Mifery, For every one is affected towards him that doth the Damage, like as he is towards the Damage it felf. Children themfelves, we fee, are an

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gry

gry at their Parents, when they with-hold that which they apprehend neceffary for them, or when they inflict that which they think unneceffary. Who doth not fee then, I fay again, an abfolute Neceffity of establishing firmly in his Mind the Notions forementioned? That is, after he is rooted in this Belief that God is the firft Cause of all Things, to perfwade himself that he ftill governs all Things; which thofe are most apt to doubt of, who have ill Succefs, even in good Enterprises. Notwithstanding that we see the Evil unpunifhed according to their Merits, and the Good unrewarded, and in want of these Things, which we think they fhould be encouraged withall; Let this Principle remain unfhaken in our Minds, that Things do not fall out by Chance, but are difpofed by Almighty Providence and a better Wisdom than our own. Efpecially the Affairs of Mankind, who are the only pious and religious Creatures in this lower World; and therefore are no fmall and contemptible Portion of God's Goods and Poffeffions (as one may call them,) which are valued by him, according to their Worth and Dignity. Do we not fee how the Mind of Man takes care of its own Works? nay, how it governs whole Nations and manages the Affairs of Kingdoms? why fhould we think then that the divine Mind is unconcerned in its Works, even in the principal of them, or that it is wearied in its Infpection over them? Let not any of the crofs Things that we meet withal, particulary the Troubles and Afflictions of the

good

good and the profperous, flourishing Condition of the Bad, be of any Force to fupplant our Belief of this Matter. And that we may always preferve it and hold it faft, let us always remember that it is impoffible. the divine Mind fhould not do Juftice, and manage Things with the greatest Prudence, and have the greatest Love to thofe that are his Worfhippers and cordially obey his Laws. We ought to think that thofe Things are not fo good, as we imagine, which pious Men want, nor thofe Things fo Evil, as we fancy, which they fuffer; rather than think that God is not good when he denys them the one, and when he lets them endure the other. And by the fame Reafon we fhould not be offended at the Profperity of the Wicked; nor think God to be of fo weak a Nature as to be bribed by a Multitude of Gifts and Sacrifices (which their Riches can furnish his Temples withal) to be more liberal to them in his Benefits, than to the poor pious Perfons. There is nothing more abfurd than this. We may be fure there are other Reafons in his moft excellent Mind for this Sort of Difpenfation. Which if we cannot comprehend. yet this we ought to be fure of, that he is fo juft and good, as to do good alwayes to thofe that are good, and to make them better even by their Calamities.

This Difcourfe fhows how needful it is to imprint the first Rule in our Minds, and to joyn it together with this. For if we had not fo high an Opinion of thofe Things which we

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defire

1

defire as our Good, nor fo bad an Opinion of thofe Things which we would by all means avoid as our Evil, if we thought the one could not do us any fuch great Good, nor the other fuch great Harm; and that to be the true Good and Evil, which we do our felves; we fhould not be tempted to have, in the leaft, worfe Thoughts of God for want of that Good which we long for, or because of that Evil which we fuffer. The better we practife the firft Rule, the better we shall follow this and this will eafe us of all our Troubles. If we think that God is good, notwithftanding what we want or what we endure; nay, that he can do us Good by either; and that he doth not, nor we ought to efteem that fo Good which may do us Hurt, and that fo Evil which may do us Good; we fhould be eafily fatisfied and acquiefce in that which he is pleafed to appoint or permit. The Courfe of the World cannot run amifs under his Guidance. Which foever the Current or Storm drives us, we way fhall ftill meet with our Haven. If our main Intereft be fecured, nay, promoted by what happens, there will be no Cause of making complaints, much lefs of bitter Lamentations. And truly it argues a great Defect in the Minds of Men, and that their Judgment is blind, as Philo the Jew ftill better explains this Matter, in that they admire thefe outward petty Things fo much, and regard not how Matters are within.

Men