defraud, although the receipt was not used in fact, and was probably not intended to be used in fact for the purpose of increasing B's liability.

(2.) 'A imitates a Bank of England note with intent to defraud any person to whom it may be passed, but without specially intending to defraud the Bank of England. This is an intent to defraud.

(3.) A makes a false acceptance to a bill of exchange, and puts it in circulation, intending to take it up, and actually taking it up before the bill is presented to the acceptor for payment. This is forgery with intent to defraud.

(4.) A being directed by his master to fill up a blank cheque with an amount to be ascertained, and to take up a bill with the proceeds, A fills it up for a larger amount and keeps the difference on a claim that it was due to him for salary. Here there is an intent to defraud.

(5.) A pays to his credit at a bank a false promissory note. The bank hold guarantees for a much larger amount. Notwithstanding this the inevitable conclusion is that he meant to defraud.

(6.) A signs B's name without his authority to two deeds of transfer of railway shares, by one of which the shares purport to be transferred by C to B, and by the other to be transferred from B to D. The circumstances are such that no one can be defrauded by these deeds. This rebuts the presumption of an intent to defraud raised by the writing of B's name.

(7.) A imitates a cheque in B's handwriting and name on a bank at which, to A's knowledge, B had long ceased to keep an account. The jury may infer from this an absence of intent to defraud.

(8.) A imitates a cheque in B's name on a bank from which B had, without A's knowledge, withdrawn his balance the day before. Here the fact that no one could be defrauded by the false cheque does not rebut the presumption of an intent to defraud.

(9.) A makes a false will. It does not appear whether there was or was

124 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 44, would now apply in terms to such a case. In R. v. Mazagora, R. & R. 291, the judges held that the jury ought in such a case to have found an intent to defraud the Bank of England.

2 R. v. Geach, 9 C. & P. 499; and in the case stated by Coleridge, J., in R. v. Todd, 1 Cox, C. C. 57.

3 R. v. Wilson, 1 Den. 284.

4 Compare R. v. James, 7 C. & P. 553, with R. v. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 582-5. I have taken the very words of Patterson, J. "Inevitable conclusion" is a little less strong and distinct than "conclusive presumption of law," an expression which the judge seems to have shrunk from.

5 This is a barely possible supposition, though Cresswell, J., held that it was so in R. v. Marcus, 2 C. & K. 356. Rolfe, B., held otherwise in R. v. Hontson, 2 C. & K. 777, see note.

R. v. Marcus, 2 C. & K. 356.

7 This and Illustration (6) are founded on the dictum of Maule, J., in R. v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 499.

8 Tuff's Case, 1 Den. C. C. 319. The Court were equally divided on a question which, I submit, was substantially the one stated.

not any person who could be defrauded by it. It is uncertain whether an intent to defraud is or is not to be presumed.

(10.) A forges a diploma of the College of Surgeons, intending to induce a belief that the document is genuine, and that he is a member of the College of Surgeons, and shews it to two persons with intent to induce that belief in them. This is not an intent to defraud within the meaning of this Article, though it is an intent to deceive.

ARTICLE 356.

MAKING A FALSE DOCUMENT DEFINED.

To make a false document is

(a.) 2 to make a document purporting to be what in fact it is not;

3

(b.) to alter a document without authority in such a manner that if the alteration had been authorized it would have altered the effect of the document;

(c.) to introduce into a document without authority, whilst it is being drawn up, matter which, if it had been authorized, would have altered the effect of the document; (d.) to sign a document

(i.) in the name of any person without his authority, whether such name is or is not the same as that of the person signing;

5 (ii.) in the name of any fictitious person alleged to exist, whether the fictitious person is or is not alleged to be of the same name as the person signing;

(iii.) in a name represented as being the name of a different person from that of the person signing it, and intended to be mistaken for the name of that person;

(iv.) in a name of a person personated by the person signing the document, provided that the effect of the instrument

1 R. v. Hodgson, D. & B. 3. It would, however, be an offence under the Medical Act, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, s. 40. This Act was passed in 1858, two years after the decision of R. v. Hodgson. The offence is "falsely pretending to be, &c., a surgeon, &c.," and the penalty is £20. The forgery of a diploma would seem to deserve more severe punishment.

2 Illustration (1).

3 Illustrations (2) and (3).

4 Illustrations (4) and (5).

5 Illustrations (6) and (7).

• Illustration (8).

7 Illustration (9).

depends upon the identity between the person signing the document and the person whom he professes to be.

But it is not making a false document,

1 to procure the execution of a document by fraud;

2 to omit from a document being drawn up matter which would have altered its effect if introduced, and which might have been introduced, 3 unless the matter omitted qualifies the matter inserted;

4 to sign a document in the name of a person personated by the person who signs it, or in a fictitious name, provided that the effect of the instrument does not depend upon the maker's identity with the person personated, or on the correctness of the name assumed by him.

5 It is not essential to the making of a false document that the false document should be so framed that if genuine it would have been valid or binding, provided that in cases in which the forgery of any particular instrument is made a specific offence by any statute, the false document must, in order that the offence may be completed, fall within the description given in the Act.

The fact that a document is made to resemble that which it purports to be and is not, is evidence for the consideration of the jury of an intent to defraud, but is not essential to the making of a false document.

"Provided that in cases in which the forgery of any particular instrument is made a specific offence by any statute, the false document must have such a resemblance to the document which it is intended to resemble as to be likely to deceive a common person.

Illustrations.

(1.) A conveys land to B in fee. Afterwards A and C draw up and

1 Illustrations (10), (11).

2 Illustration (12).

3 Illustration (13).
Illustration (14).

5 Illustrations (15)–(17).

6 Illustration (18).

Illustration (19).

9 R. v. Ritsm, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 200, and in 1 Hawk. P. C. 264.

execute a deed purporting to be of earlier date than the conveyance to B, by which the same land purports to be let to C for a term of 999 years. The second deed is a false document, though executed by A and C.

for

(2.) A obtains a blank acceptance from B, with authority to fill it up any amount not exceeding £200. A fills it up for £500. This is a false document.

2

(3.) A persuades his servant, William Wilkinson, to write his name across a stamped paper, so as to appear to be the name of the acceptor of a bill of exchange. A then fills up the bill and addresses it to Mr. William Wilkinson, Halifax, so as to make the bill appear as if it had been drawn upon and accepted by a different William Wilkinson. This is a false document.

(4.) A gets B to sign a receipt, and afterwards makes additions to it, so as to make it appear that a larger sum was paid to B than had actually been paid. The altered receipt is a false document.

(5.) A, employed to draw up B's will, inserts in it legacies out of his own head. The will is a false document.

5

(6.) Sheppard signs a draft in the name of H. Turner, Junior, of Noah's Row, Hampton Court, there being no such place or person. The note is a false document.

(7.) Thomas Brown authorizes B to sign a promissory note in the name of Thomas Brown, in order that it might be used as the note of a different and entirely fictitious Thomas Brown. This is a false document, whether B knew or not of the use for which the note was intended.

7

(8.) B agrees to give A time for the payment of a debt, if A will get his mother-in-law, C. Watters (whose Christian name is unknown to B), to execute a promissory note. A gets his wife to sign the note in her maiden name, “A. Watters,” and produces the note to B as the note of his motherin-law. This is a false document.

(9.) 8 A, personating the Hon. A. A. Hope, the brother of the Earl of Hopetown, draws a bill of exchange in the name of A. A. Hope on a person to whom he was known by that name, and who would have paid it if A had really been A. A. Hope, the brother of the Earl of Hopetown. The bill is a false document, though the person on whom it was drawn knew and gave credit to the person who drew it.

1 R. v. Hart, R. & M. 486; 7 C. & P. 652. In this case the words "£200 were written in the corner of the blank acceptance, and erased. Littledale, J., however, told the jury that the filling up the acceptance for a greater amount than that which was authorized was forgery: R. v. Bateman, 2 Russ. Cr. 715; 1 Cox, C. C. 186, is to the same effect.

2 R. v. Blenkinsop, 1 Den. C. C. 276; 2 Russ. Cr. 724.

3 R. v. Griffiths, D. & B. 584. It is not easy to see why this case was reserved. 1 Hawk. P. C. 264.

Sheppard's Case, 1 Lea. 226.

R. v. Parkes, 2 Lea, 775.

1 R. v. Mahoney, 6 Cox, C. C. 487;

R. v. Hadfield, 2 Russ. Cr. 733.

2 Russ. Cr. 726-7.

ค

This is the well-known case of the man

who married the girl known as the Beauty of Buttermere.

U

(10.) A gets B to make his mark to a deed by representing it to be a requisition to a person to stand for a seat in Parliament. A does not make a false document.

(11.) 2 A reads B a document by which an action is agreed to be settled for £9. B agrees to sign it, and pays the £9. A, before B signs it, alters the 9 to 12. A does not make a false document.

3

(12.) In drawing up B's will, A omits a legacy to C. A does not make a false document.

(13.) In drawing up B's will, A omits a devise of an estate for life to C, whereby the will operates to give D an estate in possession, and not in remainder, on B's death. A makes a false document.

4

(14.) A, personating B, draws a cheque in his assumed name of B, on a bank with which in his assumed name he had opened a genuine account by the actual payment of money to his credit. A does not make a false document.

5

(15.) A, with intent to defraud, counterfeits the will of a living person. A is guilty of forgery.

(16.) 6 A, with intent to defraud, counterfeits a bill of exchange on unstamped paper, a stamp being necessary to the validity of such a bill. A commits forgery.

(17.) If a person is indicted for forging a bill of exchange, it must be shewn that the document forged is a bill of exchange.

1 R. v. Collins, 2 M. & R. 461. But see Mr. Greaves' remarks (2 Russ. Cr. 718, note.) Mr. Greaves suggests, I think rightly, that this was a case of forgery by an innocent agent, B.

2 R. v. Chadwick, 2 M. & R. 545.

1 Hawkins, P. C. 265. The distinction seems idle, as every omission of a legacy must increase the residue.

Such, I submit, would be the law, though I know of no case in which the precise question has been determined. If the law is otherwise, a person passing by a false name would go half way to forgery every time he signed it. If a man passing by a false name drew many bills and regularly provided for them, and at last drew one for which he could not and ought to have known that he could not provide, I do not think he would be guilty of forgery any more than if he had used his own name. The use of a false name is no doubt a fact from which an intent to defraud may often be inferred, but which is a different matter. See the observations of Sir E. H. East on Aickles' Case, 2 East, P. C. 969. Since this first edition of this work was published the case of R. v. Martin, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 34, has been decided, which, without going quite as far as Illustration (14), confirms the view suggested by it. In that case, Robert Martin, for some reason which did not appear, drew in payment for a pony a cheque in the name of William Martin on a bank where he had ceased to have an account. This was held not to be forgery, though it was obtaining the pony by a false pretence. See, too. R. v. Dunn, 1 Leach, C. C. 59.

5 Murphy's Case, 2 East, P. C. 949.

• Hawkeswood's Case, 2 East, P. C. 955.

See several cases collected in 2 Russ. Cr. 755-61, all of which turn on the question whether peculiarly worded instruments answer the statutory description given in the indictment.