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After error brought.

Terms of amendment.

Costs.

148; and see Ward v. M Kelvey, 7 Ir. Jur. N. 8. 409). In Connolly v.
Hayes, 2 Ir. L. T. 212, the Judge at the trial having offered to allow the
plaintiff to amend upon the terms of paying certain costs, which terms were
refused, the Court refused to grant a conditional order for a new trial. Not-
withstanding, however, the cases referred to, it would appear that the Court
may review the manner in which the Judge has exercised his discretion in
refusing to make the amendment (Brennan v. Howard, 1 H. & N. 138, 140;
Leo v. Kearns, 9 Ir. Jur. N. S. 318); and independent of directly reviewing
his refusal to amend, there would appear to be no objection to the Court, in
the exercise of its inherent control over its own proceedings, making any
amendment which the circumstances of the case render fit, and at the same
time directing a new trial, see Wilkin v. Reed, 15 C. B. 192, 200; Craw-
ford v. Cocks, 6 Ex. 287; Brennan v. Howard, ubi supra; Parsons v. Alex-
ander, 5 E. & B. 263. The Court will not, however, review an amendment
made by the Judge in the postea, or in a bill of exceptions (Daintry v.
Brocklehurst, 3 Ex. 691; Mersey Docks v. Penhallow, H. & N. 341).
As before mentioned the Court may, after the trial, amend the proceedings,
including the finding upon a special verdict. When error is brought, the
Court below may, notwithstanding, amend; and in Wilkinson v Sharland,
11 Ex. 33, the Court allowed the declaration to be amended after error was
brought, by inserting the words "money payable by the defendant to the
plaintiff." Previous to the Statute, after error brought, those things were
amendable which were amendable before error brought, so long as diminution
might be alleged, and a certiorari awarded (8 Co. Rep. 162 a. Usher v.
Dansey, 4 M. & S. 94); thus, a judgment against an executor de bonis pro-
priis, has been amended by changing it to one de bonis testatoris (Green v.
Rennett, 1 T. R. 783). When an amendment is allowed to be made, even
after error brought, the Court of Error will not review the propriety of the
amendment (Mellish v. Richardson, 7 B. & C. 819, 1 C. & F. 224; Scales
v. Cheese, 1 D. & L. 657). The application for leave to amend should in
such cases be made to the Court below, and not to the Court of Error Wil-
kinson v. Sharland, ubi supra).

As regards the terms of amendment, it is difficult to lay down any precise rule, the matter being one depending upon the circumstances of each particular case, and upon the discretion of the Court or Judge to whom the application is made. As a general rule, however, it may be laid down, that the Court will not allow any additional expense to be thrown upon the opposite party by reason of an amendment (Smith v. Brandram, 2 M. & G. 250, per Tindal, C. J.); and the costs therefore of all matters rendered unnecessary or useless, and all other costs properly incurred by reason of the error sought to be amended, will generally be ordered to be paid (Little v. The Midland Great Western Railway Co., 6 Ir. Jur. O. S. 291; Keatinge v. Johnson, 7 Ir. Jur. O. S. 148). In Mitchell v. Rodgers, 3 Ir. L. T. 136, leave having been applied for to add an additional defence after an abortive trial, the leave was granted upon the terms of the defendant paying the costs of the former trial. In a case of Gallagher v. Sweeny, referred to in that case (but not reported), the Court of Common Pleas, under similar circumstances, appear to have allowed the defendant to amend upon the terms of the costs of the former trial being a portion of the plaintiff's costs in the cause, but in no case the defendant to get any portion of the costs thereof. And see also, as to the costs of amendment after trial, Goucher v. Goucher, 1 Ir. C. L. R. 663, and Ellston v. Deacon, L. R. C. P. 22, in which

latter case the plaintiff was allowed after trial to add a count and enter judgment for the sum due and the costs of the action. So, also, if the opposite party would be prejudiced by the proposed amendment in other respects, the applicant will be put under terms, as, for instance, to accept short notice of trial and the like. As to the time within which a defendant must plead after the making of an amendment, see sect. 44, ante, p. 41.

On the other hand, when leave to amend is granted, the Court will not as a general rule compel the party applying to pay any other costs than those above mentioned. Thus, where a plaintiff or a defendant applies for leave to amend his pleading, and has previously tendered a proper consent offering all the terms which the Court considers should have been tendered, the opposite party will not get the costs of appearing upon the motion rendered necessary by his refusal to sign the consent, unless the applicant has been guilty of a default or act of negligence which the Court thinks it fit to punish by making him pay costs (Smith v. Delacherois, 10 Ir. Jur. N. S. 357; Tormey v. Tormey, 7 Ir. Jur. O. S. 138; Corcoran v. Wills, 5 Ir. Jur. O. S. 249; Watson v. Jones, ib. 117; Stow v. Archer, 2 Ir. Jur. N. S. 367); but see e contra, Harris v. Jevers, Ir. R. 2 C. L. 670. Where the opposite party cannot have been misled or prejudiced by the error or omission sought to be amended, leave to amend will be given without payment of costs (Bush v. Curran, 9 Ir. C. L. R. Ap. 28), and in such cases the defendant may, moreover, be put under terms of taking short notice of trial (Cunningham v. O'Gorman, 4 Ir. Jur. N. S. 221); and see Scriber v. M'Cann, 10 Ir. Jur. N. S. 114. In Tomlinson v. Bollard, 4 Q. B. 643, the defendant was allowed to amend after demurrer upon the payment of nominal costs.

When leave to amend is given upon payment of costs, the payment of them is a condition precedent to the making of the amendment (Levy v. Drew, 5 D. & L. 307). In such cases, however, the party applying need not act upon the order, and if he do not, the opposite party will not be entitled to the costs (Black v. Sangster, 1 C. M. & R. 521; Field v. Sawyer, 6 C. B. 71), unless the order provides that the applicant shall pay the costs, even though he do not avail himself of the order.

As to supplying an accidental omission to provide for the costs of the day in an order made by the Judge at the trial giving liberty to amend, see Skinner v. London and Brighton Railway Co., L. M. & P. 189.

With respect to the general regulation of business in the said superior Courts of Law:

232. The following, and none other, shall be observed and kept as holidays in the said superior Courts and the offices thereof, and the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and in the office of Registrar of Judgments; that is to say, every Sunday, Christmas Day, and the seven days following that day, Good Friday, Easter Eve, Monday and Tuesday in Easter week, Whit Monday and Whit Tuesday, any day appointed for a public fast or thanksgiving, and when they do not occur in Term Time the day appointed to be kept as the birthday and the day of the accession of Her Majesty the Queen or of any of her successors; and the said holidays shall not be reckoned

Regulation of

Business.

Holidays.

See R. G. H. 173-175.

T. 1853, rr.

When the holidays are not to be reckoned.

The long vacation.

Entering

rule for costs of the day.

or included in any notices or other proceedings, except notices of trial and notices of inquiry, in any of the said Courts (k); and Sunday shall not be reckoned or included in any notice or proceeding whatsoever; and where the last last day included in any such notice of trial or notice of inquiry shall happen to fall on any of the days hereby appointed to be observed and kept as holidays, in such case the following day, or, when there shall be consecutive holidays, the day following the last of such holidays, shall be considered as the last of such days; and the days from and including the first day of August to the twentieth day of October inclusive, in each year, shall not be reckoned days within which any summons and plaint, defence, or other pleading should be filed, nor shall any such pleading be filed or received upon such days except a plea of confession or consent for judgment (1).

(*) The holidays in question are not be reckoned in notices or other proceedings when time is to be computed by days, but when time is to be computed by months the holidays cannot be excluded. The 84th G. O. 1854, requires a party excepting to furnish a draft bill of exceptions ten days before the term succeeding the trial, and accordingly on the principle of excluding the holidays mentioned in the above section, it has been held that a bill of exceptions furnished on the 29th December is too late (White v. Tyrrell, 5 Ir. C. L. R. 278; Hassard v. Caulfield, 7 Ir. Jur. O. S. 141).

By the 6th G. O. 1854, it is provided that in the computation of time it shall in all cases be reckoned exclusive of the first, and inclusive of the last day, unless the last be a holiday under the present Act, when the following day shall be included. It should, however, be remembered that when the time for doing an act is prescribed by statute it cannot be extended or shortened by a general order (Flower v. Bright, 2 John & Hem. 590; Evans v. Jones, 2 B. & S. 45); and see further the note to the General Order referred to as to the manner of computing time.

As to notice of trial, see ante, p. 110.

(1) The days in question are notwithstanding to be included in the period of six months, after the expiration of which the plaintiff cannot proceed to enforce a defence unless he has filed the summons and plaint, and served notice of filing before they have expired (Mullen v. Bonjor, 5 Ir. C. L. R. 475). As to the filing of the summons and plaint and defence, see ante, sections 37, 38, 39, and 43.

When the action is brought under the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act (Ireland) 1861, the days for appearing and filing a defence run in vacation as well as term time without excepting the days above mentioned, 25 Vict. c. 23, post, in the Appendix.

Except where otherwise specially provided, the days above mentioned are to be reckoned in all proceedings, and therefore, the month within which a rule for the costs of the day for not proceeding to trial may be entered, pursuant to the 103rd section, ante, is to be reckoned, inclusive of them, and after its expiration the Court has no authority to allow it to be entered

(M'Kinney v. Reynolds, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 133). By section 192, ante, it is provided that rules or orders may be made, entered, or issued, on or as of any day except the days appointed to be kept as holidays, and the days limited for compliance with them shall run in term as well as in vacation, except the holidays and the days from 1st Aug. to 20th Oct.

rules may be

16 Vict. c. 76,

8.223.

233. It shall be lawful for the Judges of the said Courts, General or any seven or more of them, whereof two shall be chief made by the Judges, from time to time to make all such general rules and Judges. 15 & orders for the effectual execution of this Act, and for establishing a simple code of practice, pleading, and evidence in the said Courts, and in the Court of Error, in accordance with the intention and object of this Act, and for apportioning the costs of issues, and for fixing the costs to be allowed for and in respect of the matters herein contained, or prescribed by such General Orders, and the performance thereof, and for the purpose of enforcing uniformity of practice and pleading in the said Courts and the offices thereof, and of ensuring, as far as may be practicable, an equal division of the business amongst the said Courts, as in their judgment shall be necessary or proper, and for that purpose to meet from time to time as occasion may require; and all such rules and orders as they shall so make shall be valid and effectual, and shall be observed in each of the said Courts and the offices thereof, until varied or altered by the like authority, anything in this Act to the contrary notwithstanding; and any expenses which the Judges shall certify (as now required with reference to incidental expenses) to have been properly incurred in giving effect to the provisions of this Act shall be charged and paid in like manner and as part of the incidental expenses of the said Courts provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to restrain the authority or limit the jurisdiction of the said Courts, or the Judges thereof, to make rules or orders, or otherwise to regulate and dispose of the business therein.

234. The Nisi Prius Courts of the said superior Courts of Common Law sitting at Dublin shall continue to be consolidated, and there shall be but one common Court of Nisi Prius for the trial at Dublin of issues of fact arising in any of the Courts, except as herein-after provided, which Court of Nisi Prius shall consist of one Judge or Baron of either of the said superior Courts, to be chosen for that purpose by the said Judges and Barons according to such arrangements as they

Consolidated
Prius for the

Court of Nisi

trial of
issues arising

in any of the
Courts.

superior

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shall think proper, and in such order of rotation that each Court shall by one of its Judges or Barons take the duty in turn by terms, and all jurors, witnesses, and other persons shall be summoned or required to attend, and shall give their attendance at or for the trial of any cause depending in any such Court, before such Judge as shall be sitting for the trial thereof by virtue of this Act: provided always, that all causes intended to be tried at any sittings at Nisi Prius at Dublin shall be entered for trial with the Registrar of the chief Judge of that Court of which one of the Judges is to sit, and all other process and proceedings for or relating to the trials thereof, shall be made and issued as herein-before required, but nevertheless the trial of every cause which shall be tried by virtue of this Act shall be entered and made of record, as having been had and made before the Judge before whom such cause shall happen to have been actually tried (m).

(m) The Consolidated Nisi Prius Court was first created by 13 Vict. c. 18, s. 27. As to the class of cases which may be disposed of in the Consolidated Nisi Prius Court see s. 237, post. The docket and abstract of Nisi Prius must in every case be lodged with the Registrar of the Court, in the same manner as in the case of an ordinary trial at Nisi Prius.

Unlike the sittings after Term, each day of the Consolidated Nisi Prius sittings is to be considered as a distinct day (Johnson v. Budge, 3 Dowl. 207, ante, p. 187); but if notice of trial is served for a particular day and postponed, the trial is to be considered as taking place on the day for which the notice was served. If a case remains undisposed of at the end of the Consolidated Nisi Prius sittings, it will be transferred into the after sitting list, s. 235, post. Where a plaintiff served notice of trial for the Consolidated Court, and the defendant made no objection to the notice, but appeared at the trial, and objected that the Judge had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court (the last day for serving notice of trial having passed) allowed a notice of trial served on that day to stand for the sittings after Term (Waldron v. Parrott, 8 Ir. C. L. R. Ap. 50).

Where a plaintiff served notice of trial for the Consolidated Nisi Prins Court in a case not properly triable therein, it was held that a rule might notwithstanding be entered, under s. 105, ante, for the costs of the day for not proceeding to trial (Murphy v. M Cay, 6 Ir. Jur. O. S. 312)..

235. Such Consolidated Nisi Prius Court shall sit continuously, or by adjournment, as occasion may require, on the second day of each term, and thence continuously until the end thereof, or so much longer as may be necessary for the completion of any trial then in progress before the said Court; and notice of trial may be served for any day within the said period, subject, however, to such regulations as to the class

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